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Abstract
This thesis investigates the determinants of earnings in the former Soviet re­
public of Uzbekistan. It represents the first in-depth investigation of earnings 
in this country of 23 million people, made possible by the availability of a 
large scale independent household survey that was carried out in mid-1995. 
Previously, an inquiry of this nature would have been frustrated by a lack of 
information at the individual level and the weak quality of official sources of 
data.
The basic objective of the thesis is to understand the institutional, eco­
nomic and individual factors that have affected wage outcomes during the 
transition. The main focus is on the Uzbek case, while at the same time at­
tempting to place and interpret this experience in a wider regional context.
PART I is devoted to providing a better understanding of the economic 
and institutional framework of earnings in Uzbekistan than has previously 
been available. It draws together a range of published and unpublished data 
to provide the first comprehensive evaluation of the pre- and post-transition 
labour market in Uzbekistan. Data limitations mean that PART I is largely 
descriptive.
Microeconometric analysis is undertaken in PART II. One important area 
of focus is the return to human capital -  that is, the response of earnings to 
different levels of education and years of experience. The thesis establishes 
the stylised fact that, by comparison with economies further advanced in 
economic liberalisation and transition, returns to education in Uzbekistan in 
1995 were not unduly low, and were of the same order of magnitude as Russia 
and Poland, for example. An augmented model reveals that the significance 
of certain regional, ethnic and sectoral factors, and the importance of gender.
The thesis contributes to the growing literature on earnings in transition 
by testing and utilising recent developments in Western studies with respect 
to the measurement and specification of key variables. Questions which are
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directly addressed include the problem of measurement of female experience 
and the appropriate functional form of the human capital earnings model, 
and in particular, the specification of experience. In some respects, the re­
sults cast doubt on the usefulness of conventional techniques, at least in the 
circumstances of Uzbekistan. For example, non-parametric regression tech­
niques indicate that there are substantial cohort effects in Uzbekistan, which 
might otherwise be neglected in cross-sectional data.
Uzbekistan exhibits a number of characteristics that are peculiar to econ­
omies in transition -  in particular, the existence of wage arrears which affect 
almost two in five workers. Arrears could be one way for employers to shift 
net wages toward market-clearing levels in the face of institutional and other 
constraints. Decomposition indicates that arrears account for between half 
and two-thirds of the widening of the earnings distribution that has occurred 
since 1989, and in this sense may be contributing to a more efficient labour 
market. However there is only mixed support for the hypothesis that individ­
ual productivity (human capital) variables determine the pattern of arrears. 
The nature and extent of arrears suggests that political economic factors play 
a key role. Wage simulations are used to establish upper and lower bounds 
for the effect of arrears on real wage trends and levels. Because of the high 
price inflation, the implications are substantial, even if the delay in wage 
payments was limited to only one month.
The analysis raises a number of points that are relevant to the formulation 
of policy in Uzbekistan, and indeed to a number of countries in transition 
that share similar problems. These include the falls in enrolment rates at 
all levels of education, but most markedly at the universities; the relative 
earnings disadvantage being experienced by certain demographic groups, in 
particular those living outside the capital, and women. A general theme 
is the unreliability of official statistics, particularly with respect to labour 
market developments. There is a need to improve data for decision-making. 
This applies to both government departments concerned with labour mar­
ket developments and living standards, as well as the international financial 
agencies charged with the provision of advice to government.
Contents
A b stract i
1 In trod u ction  and O verview  1
1.1 Introduction...................................................................................  1
1.2 The Country ................................................................................  2
1.3 Motivation......................................................................................  5
1.4 Structure and M ethodology........................................................ 7
1.5 Summary of Main Findings ........................................................ 9
1 E m p irica l and  T h eoretica l B ackground  19
Sum m ary o f  P art I 21
2 Soviet U zb ek istan  27
2.1 Introduction...................................................................................  27
2.2 Determinants of W ages.................................................................  30
2.2.1 Introduction...........................................................................30
2.2.2 Structure of the E conom y ...................................................31
2.2.3 Demand for Labour...............................................................33
2.2.4 Human C a p ita l ..................................................................... 37
2.3 The Institutional Framework............................................................46
2.3.1 The Wage Tariff..................................................................... 48
2.3.2 Perceived Problem s...............................................................52
2.3.3 Wage Reforms........................................................................ 56
2.4 Wage Outcomes................................................................................. 58
2.4.1 Inter-sectoral Relativities......................................................59
2.4.2 Inter-republic R e la tiv itie s ...................................................60
iii
IV CONTENTS
2.4.3 Extent of Inequality .......................................................  62
2.4.4 Returns to Human C ap ita l..............................................  66
2.5 Conclusions..................................................................................  72
3 T ransition  and th e  Labour M arket 75
3.1 Introduction...................................................................................  75
3.2 Determinants of W ages................................................................. 76
3.2.1 Demand-side: Macroeconomic Trends............................ 76
3.2.2 Labour Supply C h a n g e s .................................................  80
3.3 Institutional and Structural R e fo rm s........................................  88
3.3.1 Legal Basis for Labour R e la tio n s ..................................  88
3.3.2 Agricultural R eform s.......................................................  91
3.3.3 Enterprise and Financial Policy and A rre a rs ................... 94
3.3.4 S u m m ary ..........................................................................  97
3.4 Labour Market O u tco m es........................................................... 99
3.4.1 Introduction.......................................................................  99
3.4.2 Employment......................................................................... 102
3.4.3 U nem ploym ent................................................................... 103
3.4.4 W ag e s .................................................................................. 109
3.5 Conclusions......................................................................................115
4 W ages in  T ransition  117
4.1 Introduction......................................................................................117
4.2 The Theory of Equalising Differences.......................................... 118
4.3 The Human Capital Earnings Function ....................................... 121
4.4 Criticisms of the Human Capital M odel....................................... 126
4.4.1 Linear Specification of Human Capital Variables . . . .  126
4.4.2 Measurement of Independent V ariables........................... 130
4.4.3 Omitted Variables .............................................................131
4.4.4 Experience and Productivity............................................. 133
4.4.5 Education: Productivity versus S ig n a llin g .....................135
4.5 A Review of the E v id en ce .............................................................137
4.5.1 Evidence from Elsewhere in the W o r ld ........................... 137
4.5.2 Evidence from Transition Countries................................. 140
4.6 Conclusions......................................................................................153
4. A Appendix. Calculating Rates of Return to E d u ca tio n .............. 155
CONTENTS v
II M icroecon om etr ic  A n a lysis  157
Sum m ary o f P art II 159
5 T h e D a ta  and  B asic  R esu lts  169
5.1 Introduction......................................................................................169
5.2 The Data S e t ...................................................................................170
5.3 The V ariables.................................................................................. 177
5.3.1 Earnings............................................................................. 177
5.3.2 Ethnicity .......................................................................... 184
5.3.3 R egion................................................................................ 186
5.4 The Basic M o d e l .......................................................................... 193
5.5 Conclusions...................................... .............................................199
5. A Appendix. Earnings by Raion: the Case of K K P ...................... 201
6 M easurem ent o f  Fem ale E xp erien ce 203
6.1 Introduction..................................................................................... 203
6.2 Female Participation and Em ploym ent..................................... 205
6.3 Imputing Experience for W omen....................................................212
6.3.1 Factors Affecting the Participation D ecis io n ..................212
6.3.2 The Model............................................................................ 217
6.3.3 L im ita tions......................................................................... 223
6.4 The Effect of Im putation................................................................226
6.4.1 Results.................................................................................. 226
6.4.2 Returns to E xperience.......................................................227
6.5 Conclusions..................................................................................... 231
6. A A p p e n d ix ........................................................................................ 234
7 Functional Form  and E xp erien ce 235
7.1 Introduction..................................................................................... 235
7.2 Polynomial Specifications................................................................ 237
7.2.1 Theory.................................................................................. 237
7.2.2 M e th o d ............................................................................... 240
7.2.3 Testing Polynomial Specifications.................................... 243
7.3 Non-Parametric Regression Analysis .......................................... 247
7.3.1 Theory.................................................................................. 248
7.3.2 Locally-Weighted Regression..............................................250
7.3.3 Results.................................................................................. 252
VI CONTENTS
7.3.4 Interpretation....................................................................... 255
7.4 Graphical Comparisons................................................................... 268
7.5 Conclusions......................................................................................272
7. A A p p e n d ix ..................................................................................... 275
8 E x ten sion s and  A pp lications 277
8.1 Introduction......................................................................................277
8.2 The Effect of Additional C on tro ls................................................ 278
8.2.1 M e n ......................................................................................279
8.2.2 Women ............................................................................... 285
8.3 Education and Sheepskin Effects................................................. 291
8.3.1 The Sheepskin Hypothesis: Evidence and Caveats . . . 293
8.3.2 Testing for Sheepskin Effects in Uzbekistan......................296
8.3.3 Interpretation...................................................................... 297
8.4 Arrears and Returns to Human C ap ita l....................................... 299
8.4.1 Possible Effects of A rre a rs ................................................ 301
8.4.2 Results.................................................................................. 303
8.5 Experience and Gender Wage Differences.................................... 306
8.5.1 Existing Evidence................................................................ 307
8.5.2 Models of Wage D iscrim ination....................................... 311
8.5.3 Decomposition Methodology............................................. 315
8.5.4 Decomposition R e su lts .......................................................320
8.6 Conclusions..................................................................................... 327
8. A A p p e n d ix ........................................................................................ 330
9 W h o  G ets  P a id  in T ransition? 337
9.1 Introduction......................................................................................337
9.2 Institutional and Economic C ontex t............................................. 340
9.2.1 A Conceptual Framework ................................................ 341
9.2.2 Existing Evidence and Institutional Factors ..................344
9.3 Who is A ffected?............................................................................ 348
9.4 Probit A nalysis................................................................................352
9.5 Distributive E ffects......................................................................... 358
9.6 How Much is Not Being P a id ? .......................................................363
9.7 Do Non-Wage Benefits M a t te r ? ....................................................371
9.8 Effects on the Real W age................................................................ 374
9.9 C onclusions......................................................................................377
List of Tables
1.1 Population by region, 1996 ........................................................... 4
2.1 Distribution of employment by branch, 1980-1990 ...................... 35
2.2 Distribution of employment by employer, 1985-1991 ................ 36
2.3 Educational attainment by age cohort, 1989 ............................  39
2.4 Tariff skill scale for mining industry, 1987 ..................................  48
2.5 Composition of labour remuneration, 1980-1991 ...................... 55
2.6 Relative wages by branch, 1980-1991 ........................................  59
2.7 Monthly wages by branch, Uzbekistan and Russia, 1987 . . . .  61
2.8 Measures of earnings inequality, selected countries.......................66
2.9 Measures of earnings inequality, 1981 and 1986 ......................... 66
2.10 Distribution of wages by job position, 1989 ...............................  68
o.l Macroeconomic indicators during transition, 1992-1997 . . . .  77
3.2 Enrolment per 10,000 population, 1990-1994 ............................  83
3.3 State orders, 1991-1996 (percentage of crop subject to pro­
curement) .......................................................................................... 92
3.4 Distribution of sown land (percent), 1990-1994 .........................  93
3.5 Changes in employment by ownership, 1990-1995 (per cent) . 95
3.6 Regional levels in the labour market: official d a t a ............... 100
3.7 Sectoral shares of employment, 1990-1995 (per cen t) ............ 103
3.8 Alternative labour force measures, 1995 (percentage of working-
age population)..........................................................................107
3.9 A comparison of profiles of the unemployed, 1995 ................... 108
3.10 Trends in relative wage by branch, 1992-1995 .............................. I l l
3.11 Trends in earnings inequality: selected transition countries,
1987-1993 ......................................................................................  114
4.1 Schooling coefficients, regional averages................................. 138
vii
LIST OF TABLESviii
4.2 Effect of an additional year of experience, selected countries . 140
4.3 Methodology of selected studies of wages in transition ........... 142
4.4 Human capital coefficients, selected transition countries . . . .  146
4.5 Education coefficients in nine transition c o u n trie s ..................151
5.1 Main variables used in estim ation ............................................. 172
5.2 Summary of variables, restricted sample .................................... 174
5.3 Summary of variables, unrestricted adult sam ple.....................175
5.4 Personal income tax rates, June 1995 ........................................  179
5.5 Regional employment by sector, 1993 ........................................  187
5.6 Relative wages by region, 1991-1995   187
5.7 Basic Mincer model with education dummies, pooled sample . 194
5.8 Basic Mincer model, pooled sa m p le .......................................... 195
5.9 Basic Mincer model with sex d u m m y ....................................... 197
5.10 Basic Mincer model, by sex .......................................................... 198
5A.1 Labour earnings by raion, K K P ................................................ 202
6.1 Female participation and employment rates, selected coun­
tries, 1970-1990 .............................................................................  209
6.2 Labour force participation rates for selected characteristics,
Uzbekistan, 1995 ..........................................................................  215
6.3 Logit model of female employment: marginal effects.............. 222
6.4 Fertility trends in Uzbekistan, 1958-1993 ..................................  225
6.5 Comparison of age and imputed experience for selected char­
acteristics .........................................................................................228
6.6 Alternative experience measures: summary OLS results . . . .  229
6.7 Increase in earnings associated with experience (percent) . . . 232
6A.1 Logit model of female participation d ec is io n .......................... 234
7.1 Comparison of t and F statistics using different polynomials,
by s e x ........................................................................................... 245
7.2 Explanatory power of alternative specifications (per cent) . . . 246
7.3 Ramsey RESET test r e s u l ts ..........................................................246
7A.1 Regression results with alternative specifications.................... 275
7A.2 Sample by education and gender................................................276
8.1 Extended model of wage determination: m en ...............................280
8.2 Extended model with interaction terms: m en ............................... 284
8.3 Extended model: w om en................................................................. 286
LIST OF TABLES IX
8.4 Extended model with interaction terms: w o m en ........................290
8.5 Sheepskin test resu lts...................................................................... 298
8.6 Comparing returns to human capital: males with and without
a rre a rs ...............................................................................................304
8.7 Comparing returns to human capital: females with and with­
out arrears........................................................................................ 305
8.8 Estimates of the crude gender wage g ap ....................................... 308
8.9 Decomposition results: Oaxaca-Blinder m e th o d ........................322
8.10 Decomposition results: Cotton m e th o d ....................................... 326
8A. 1 Extended male model, with quadratic experience........................330
8A.2 Extended female model, with quadratic experience.....................331
8A. 3 Quadratic model with interaction terms: w om en........................332
8A.4 Fully interacted model: m e n ..........................................................333
8A. 5 Fully interacted model: women ....................................................334
8A.6 Revised basic results, by s e x ..........................................................335
8A. 7 Decomposition with alternative experience measures..................336
9.1 Incidence and size of arrears: descriptive sta tis tics.....................349
9.2 Probit model of arrears...................................................................355
9.3 Measures of earnings inequality: contract versus net wage . . . 361
9.4 Decomposition of the rise in wage inequality, 1989-95 ............. 363
9.5 OLS model of size of arrears: employees with a r r e a r s .............. 366
9.6 Frequency of arrears and non-wage benefits................................. 372
9.7 Effect of arrears on real wage trends............................................. 376
List of Figures
1.1 Regions of U zbek istan .................................................................  3
2.1 Distribution of adult population, by education level, 1989 . . .  37
2.2 Relation between increases in wages and labour productivity,
USSR, 1966-1985 ..........................................................................  53
3.1 Falls in education enrolment (full-time), 1990-1996 ................... 84
3.2 Falls in adult education, 1990-1994 (1990=100)   87
3.3 Minimum relative to the average wage, Uzbekistan, 1992-1996 113
4.1 Effect of transition on explanatory power of earnings functions 145
5.1 Incidence of poverty, by region, 1995 ........................................  188
5.2 Trends in industrial output by region, 1994-1997 ...................... 190
6.1 Female participation rates by age, 1995 .....................................  217
6.2 Imputed versus potential experience............................................. 227
6.3 Alternative experience-earnings profiles....................................... 231
7.1 All females........................................................................................ 253
7.2 Secondary males ............................................................................ 253
7.3 University males ............................................................................ 254
7.4 Vocational m a le s ............................................................................ 254
7.5 College m a le s .................................................................................. 255
7.6 Possible effects of career breaks on female earnings profiles . . 264
7.7 Possible effect of transition on male earnings profiles .............. 266
7.8 Predicted earnings profiles: university m a le s ............................... 270
7.9 Predicted earnings profiles: vocational m a le s ............................... 270
7.10 Predicted earnings profiles: college m ales ......................................271
7.11 Predicted earnings profiles: all fem a le s .........................................271
LIST OF FIGURESxii
8.1 Possible effect of arrears on human capital re tu rn s ...................302
8.2 Gender wage decomposition: hypothetical c ase .........................318
8.3 Gender wage decomposition: Uzbekistan, 1995 .........................  324
9.1 Incidence of arrears by contract earnings group ......................359
Sources for Text Figures
1.1 Goskomprognost at
2.1 Goskomprognostat 1997
2.2 Kasimovskii 1989, Table 1
3.1 UNICEF TransMONEE database
3.2 UNICEF TransMONEE database
3.3 IM F 1997
4.1 A uthor
5.1 Coudouel 1998
5.2 Goskomprognostat 1998
6.1-6.3 Author estimates based on EESU
7.1-7.4 Author estimates based on EESU
7.5 Adapted from Goldin and Polachek 1987
7.6 Author
7.7-7.11 A uthor estimates based on EESU
8.1-8.3 A uthor
9.1 Author estimates based on EESU
Acronyms and Russian Terms
ADB Asian Development Bank
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CPI Consumer Price Index
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EESU European University In s titu te / University of Essex 
Survey of Uzbekistan
FSU Former Soviet Union
Goskomprognostat State Statistical Agency of Uzbekistan
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ILO International Labour Organisation
IM F International M onetary Fund
KKP Karakalpakstan
Kolkhoz Collective farm
Oblast region
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PIF Privatisation Investment Fund
PTU Professialno-teknicheskie uchilishcha, or vocational school
Soum national currency of Uzbekistan
GKI State Committee on Property Privatisation
Stazh work record
SSUZ Teknikum, or college
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Fund
USSR United Soviet Socialist Republics
W DR World Development Report
Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
1.1 Introduction
This thesis investigates the determinants of earnings in the former Soviet re­
public of Uzbekistan. Empirical micro-analysis is undertaken using a repre­
sentative data set that was collected three years after the onset of transition. 
It takes place in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union, and in the 
context of a period of unprecedented economic and social change for workers 
in the former Communist bloc.
Analysis of the structure and determinants of earnings casts light on key 
aspects of the transition process and outcomes. It was widely expected that 
the demise of central planning would reverse the economic stagnation which 
characterised the latter part of the communist period. It was hoped that lib­
eralisation would raise living standards generally by increasing efficiency and 
unleashing previously repressed individual productive capacity and initiative.
A primary avenue through which such changes were expected to take 
place was the labour market and, in particular, with respect to the level 
and structure of wages, especially given theapparently high levels of human 
capital that characterised the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For 
example, it was expected that university graduates would enjoy a wider range 
of choices as to where to live and where to work, including the possibility
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of entrepreneurship and capital accumulation, and receive higher rates of 
remuneration.
The basic objective of the thesis is to understand the institutional, eco­
nomic and individual factors that have affected wage outcomes during the 
transition. Throughout the thesis the main focus is on the former Soviet 
republic of Uzbekistan, but at the same time attempts to place and interpret 
this experience in a wider regional and international context.
The subject of earnings obviously has direct implications for the well­
being of individuals and households in Uzbekistan. The study also has wider 
policy implications for debates about alternative approaches to transition 
from a command economy.
This thesis represents the first in-depth investigation of earnings in Uzbek­
istan. Previously, an inquiry of this nature would have been frustrated by 
a lack of information at the individual level and the low quality of official 
sources of data. The analysis here has been made possible by the availabil­
ity of a large scale independent household survey that was carried out in 
mid-1995, the details of which are described below.
1.2 T he C ountry
Uzbekistan is large (about 45 million square hectares), and its geography 
ranges from remote desert and mountain ranges, to the densely populated 
Fergana basin. Regional differentiation is an important dimension of living 
standards in Uzbekistan (Coudouel, Marnie, Micklewright and Scherbakova 
1997). Uzbekistan is divided into 13 administrative regions, known as oblasts, 
a system of government that derives from the Soviet period. This is shown 
in Figure 1.1.
Table 1.1 lists the oblasts, their total populations, population density 
per square kilometre and the proportion living in rural areas as at Janu­
ary 1, 1996. It reveals the predominantly rural nature of every oblast ex-
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Figure 1.1: Regions of Uzbekistan
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cept the capital city, though the rural share varies from about 52 percent 
in Karakalpakstan, to  over 70 percent in three oblasts including Fergana. 
There is a huge range in term s of population density, even excluding the  
capital city, from only six and eight people per square kilometre in Navoi 
and Karakalpakstan, up to 338 in Fergana.
Table 1.1: Population by region, 1996
Total (000) population density % rural
Uzbekistan 22,912.1 49.6 61.8
Karakalpakstan 1,414.9 8.3 51.8
Andijan 2,034.3 464.6 70.1
Bukhara 1,335.4 32.7 67.7
Dzijak 886.1 41.6 68.2
Kashkadarya 1,971.9 65.8 74.0
Navoi 745.2 6.6 59.8
Namagan 1,780.4 215.1 62.2
Samarkand 2,479.9 145.0 71.6
Surhandarja 1,578.4 71.6 79.6
Sirdaya 629.9 121.0 69.3
Tashkent oblast 2,249.4 148.0 58.7
Fergana 2,487.6 337.7 70.8
Khorezm 1,223.5 185.6 75.4
Tashkent City 2,095.2 6,382.4 0.0
U zbekistan’s polity remains highly centralised, and th a t there is far less 
regional variation than  in Russia, for example.1 The political regime is based 
on Presidential authoritarianism . While some powers are formally subject to 
Oliy Majlis (parliam entary) confirmation, the President’s authority  is essen­
tially untram m eled.2
LThis is partly due to simple geographic size differences, but also to institutional fac­
tors. Stewart (1997) analyses the extensive decentralisation that has taken place in Russia; 
Commander and Yemtsov (1997) show the significant differences in labour market experi­
ences among the 89 oblasts of the Russian Federation.
2Indeed the country is unusual among transition countries in the conspicuous absence 
of political liberalisation. One index of democratic rights based on the extent of political
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1.3 M otivation
This topic is of interest for several reasons. First, and perhaps most impor­
tantly from the perspective of economists, the thesis provides a case study of 
the impact of dramatic macro-economic and structural changes on earnings 
outcomes. The pace and extent of change that has been experienced in the 
former republics of the Soviet Union during the 1990s is highly unusual. The 
transition from a centralised command system reveals the nature of individ­
ual responses in the face of massive economic and structural change, and this 
is of interest in itself. Not surprisingly, then, the transition process has been 
the subject of a number of studies from a labour market perspective,* 3 and 
there is growing literature on transition related to other spheres of economic 
interest.4
The second main reason for interest in the topic is that the paucity of the 
previously available information has limited understanding of the processes 
of transition in Uzbekistan. Despite the burgeoning literature on transition, 
the region of Central Asia has received comparatively little attention from 
academics and the international financial agencies, as the focus has been on 
the European parts of the former Soviet bloc.5 This represents a continuation
participation and the freedom of individuals to develop independent views and institutions
(Murrell 1996) suggests that while most transition countries enjoyed a dramatic expansion 
of political freedom since 1989, the people of Uzbekistan, along with their Tajik and 
Turkmen neighbours, had suffered a dramatic erosion of such rights, from the Soviet 
average of 25 at the end of perestroika era in 1989, down to zero in 1994. See also Human 
Rights Watch/Helsinki (1996).
3 An overview of studies of the labour market in transition is provided by Svenjar 
(forthcoming) in the Handbook of Labor Economics. See also Commander and Corricelli
(1995) , which contains a range of country studies, and Rutkowski (1995) for an overview.
4 The literature of the economics of transition is, by now, voluminous. Recent work 
which also provide overviews include Desai (1995); World Bank (1996a) and de Melo et al
(1996) .
5This can be illustrated by the number of country references in the ECONLIT data­
base: in October 1998, Uzbekistan had 49 references, compared to 104 for Estonia (with 
one-seventh the population), 181 for Ukraine and 1686 for the Russian Federation. There 
are of course several noteable contributions, including Pomfret (1995); Falkingham et al
(1997) and Kaiser (1997).
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of the bias that characterised the pre-transition period. Information about, 
and analysis of, the structure of earnings in the pre-transition period is scarce 
generally, but especially so for the Central Asian region. Within Central Asia, 
Uzbekistan is by far the most populous nation, accounting for over 40 percent 
of the population of the region.6 Indeed the country is the third largest 
among the fifteen former Soviet republics, after the Russian Federation and 
the Ukraine.
Measurement problems cast doubt on the accuracy of official data on 
prices, output and wages for Uzbekistan. The data which are available are 
often published in forms that are not amenable to Western-style economic 
analysis. This affects our understanding of key aspects of the labour market, 
including the structure of wages, labour force participation and unemploy­
ment. In such a context, the value of micro-analysis of representative data 
used in this thesis is obvious.
Third, within the genre of transition economies, Uzbekistan is an interest­
ing case because of the premium accorded by the government to institutional 
continuity and the minimisation of economic disruption. The experience of 
Uzbekistan can therefore be used to cast light on the “speed of transition” 
debate.' Some have drawn attention to the potentially positive welfare ef­
fects of slow transition (see, for example, Pomfret and Anderson 1997; Griffin 
(ed.) 1995; Klugman 1998). More commonly, however, the country has been 
viewed as a laggard in reform among the transition economies (see, for exam­
ple, World Bank (1996a); and De Melo et al... (1996)). Indeed relations with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been far 
from smooth -  adjustment lending was extended to Uzbekistan much later 
than Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, for example, and the 1995 IMF program
6 Central Asia is taken to comprise the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs­
tan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
' This debate has taken place between those who endorse rapid liberalisation of the 
economy and structural reforms (d la, for example, the “big bang” in Poland), and those 
who favour a more gradual approach to change. The former position tends to have been 
associated with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for example.
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subsequently broke down over major policy disagreements.
The relevance of the case of Uzbekistan would be heightened by the find­
ing that changes in the wage structure are nonetheless typical of those in 
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). The thesis thus examines whether the structure of earnings in 
Uzbekistan is similar to that in those countries that have adopted a faster 
pace of market reform with arguably larger social costs in terms of declines 
in output and rises in inequality. If this is the case, there are grounds to 
argue that efficiency in the labour market has not been inhibited by a delib­
erately gradual approach to reform. This debate has potentially important 
policy implications for the domestic government as well as the international 
agencies which advise on reform.
Fourth, what happens to the structure of earnings during transition is 
important not least because the labour market is the main source of income 
for individuals and households. In Russia, for example, changes in the level 
and distribution of earnings as opposed to, for example, the reduced value 
of state transfers, account for most of the decline in household welfare that 
has occurred during recent years (Klugman and Kolev, forthcoming). Hence 
there is interest in the distributive and social consequences of transition. 
This has several dimensions: not only is the overall distribution of earnings 
important, but the relative positions of women and men, and also of youth 
and older workers, matter. Each is investigated in detail in what follows.
1.4 S tructure and M eth od ology
The thesis comprises two parts, each of which is prefaced by a summary, 
which are structured as follows.
PA RT I is devoted to providing a better understanding of the economic 
and institutional framework than has previously been available, in order to 
facilitate interpretation of earnings in the mid-1990s. It draws together a
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range of published and unpublished data to provide the first comprehensive 
evaluation of the pre- and post-transition labour market in Uzbekistan.
PART I comprises three chapters. Chapter 2 considers the institutional 
and economic determinants of wages during the Soviet period, and available 
evidence on wage outcomes. Chapter 3 undertakes a similar task for the tran­
sition period, in the regional context of the former Soviet Union. Chapter 4 
sets out a theoretical framework that can be used to explain individual earn­
ings outcomes and reviews a selection of the findings of studies of earnings, 
focusing on the results for the transition economies.
The detailed econometric investigation undertaken in PART II of the the­
sis relies mainly on techniques that are fairly well-established in labour eco­
nomics. The estimation method employed is generally an Ordinary Least 
Squares regression model, with earnings as the dependent variable. The main 
novelty in this respect lies in construction and interpretation of the models of 
earnings for Uzbekistan in the broader economic, structural and institutional 
context of transition. In addition, recent developments in the measurement 
and specification of key variables, in particular, labour market experience, 
are utilised. In a number of areas, the results are used to cast doubt on 
the usefulness of conventional techniques, at least in the circumstances of 
Uzbekistan.
PART II comprises four chapters that present the results of micro-analysis 
of a representative data set that was collected in 1995. Chapter 5 describes 
the data set and variables, and presents results of estimation of a basic human 
capital earnings model. This highlights problems with the standard approach 
and, together with the literature review in the preceding chapter, indicates 
next steps.
Chapter 6 considers the problem of measurement of female experience 
associated with typical human capital estimations, and implements a correc­
tion mechanism based on information on female participation in the sample. 
Chapter 7 addresses the issue of the appropriate functional form of the hu-
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man capital earnings model, and in particular, the specification of experience. 
Chapter 8 develops several extensions to, and applications of, the basic hu­
man capital earnings model. First, an extended model of earnings which 
includes a range of regional, sectoral and other variables is estimated. Sec­
ond, some apparent peculiarities in the returns to education are investigated, 
in particular -  with respect to earnings premiums (or “sheepskin effects”) for 
graduates. Third, the appropriate choice of sample -  given widespread de­
lays in the payment of wages -  is formally tested. The fourth task is an 
application of an imputed experience variable, demonstrating its importance 
for the estimated extent of gender wage discrimination.
Chapter 9 undertakes micro-analysis of the data on delays in payment of 
wages (known as “arrears”). Systematic patterns in the distribution of ar­
rears are investigated using descriptive statistics and multivariate techniques 
that cast light on the incidence and size of arrears. The consequences of 
arrears for wage inflation and real wage levels are also examined.
1.5 Sum m ary o f M ain F indings
The thesis makes a number of contributions to understanding the labour 
market in Uzbekistan and, more generally, to the literature on labour markets 
in transition. These are as follows:8
The In s titu tio n a l F ram ew ork
•  Transition in Uzbekistan has been gradual, but nonetheless marked 
by a series of measures that have relaxed institutional constraints on 
individuals and firms and sharpened the importance of market signals. 
This includes the recognition of unemployment (which had been illegal 
during the Soviet period) and the withdrawal of budget subsidies to 
producers. Government intervention remains extensive however, and is
8See also the summaries for PARTS I and II.
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implemented through, for example, the system of state orders for major 
agricultural products and control of the financial system.
• In international terms, levels of achievement in education in Soviet 
Uzbekistan were high relative to the level of per capita income. How­
ever the system of education was apparently characterised by narrow 
specialisation and the limited development of problem-solving abilities.
• Although evidence concerning returns to education during the Soviet 
period is limited, at best, and no data existed for Uzbekistan that 
would allow micro-analysis, the general consensus for the USSR is that 
the effect of higher education on earnings was less than in established 
market economies. There is evidence, for example, of wages drift which 
increased the relative pay of manual workers, particularly the unskilled. 
It is however unclear whether this situation arose from the institutional 
framework or from technological factors related to low rates of capital 
investment during the late Soviet period.
E d u ca tio n  an d  E arn in gs
• The thesis establishes the stylised fact that, by comparison with other 
economies further advanced in economic liberalisation and transition, 
returns to education in Uzbekistan in 1995 were not unduly low. Rates 
of returns to education, as estimated by a basic human capital earnings 
model, are of the same order of magnitude in the transition economies 
of Russia and Poland, for example. The (gross) return to an additional 
year of schooling is around 7.7 percent for the pooled sample, which 
is also close to the regional average reported in the literature for the 
OECD and for Latin America.
• Returns to different levels of education are estimated using alternative 
specifications of the human capital earnings model. In the basic model, 
the wage increase associated with a university degree is 16.4 percent,
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which is among the highest reported for transition countries and well 
above the OECD regional average of 12.3 percent. The inclusion of 
controls for sectoral, regional and other factors in an extended model 
reduces the gross return somewhat, to 8.1 and 11.0 percent for men 
and women respectively. These returns still exceed those which have 
been reported for most Eastern European countries.
E xperien ce an d  E arn ings
• The returns to potential experience are low by international standards, 
particularly for women. The orders of magnitude are nonetheless simi­
lar to those reported for other transition countries, where age-earnings 
profiles have tended to flatten, which might suggest that pre-transition 
experience is now of lesser value in the workplace, but there are other 
possible interpretations. However the results raise the question as to 
whether experience is being appropriately measured by conventional 
proxies of potential years of work, w'hich will tend to bias the coeffi­
cients on experience downward. In fact it is shown that the return to 
potential experience for women is significantly below' that for men, and 
that the returns to an imputed (lower) measure of female experience 
are about three times higher.
W o m en ’s E xperien ce  and The G en d er  W age G ap
•  The intermittent pattern of female labour force attachment in Uzbek­
istan means that the amount of actual labour market experience is typ­
ically much less than the number of years since leaving school. Rates 
of labour force participation among working-age women are well below 
100 percent, and there is a high incidence of adult women on maternity 
leave (around 30 percent of the sample).
• The measurement of experience is important for analyses of gender dis­
crimination in the labour market. The use of potential experience (or
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age) in human capital earnings functions for women in Uzbekistan, and 
by implication, in the Russian Federation and elsewhere, will tend to 
overestimate the extent of unexplained gender wage differences. At the 
same time, however, the extreme sensitivity of the results to the as­
sumptions underlying the gender wage decomposition demonstrate the 
need for caution in drawing any firm conclusions about the magnitude 
of discrimination using these methods.
Specification of Experience and Implications
• A number of international studies have cast doubt on the appropriate­
ness of the quadratic model of experience, which has been the standard 
specification in human capital earnings functions. Conventional diag­
nostic tests suggest that this model performs badly in the case of Uzbek­
istan, though without indicating a clear preference among the alterna­
tive higher order polynomial specifications. Local or non-parametric 
regression techniques are valuable in indicating the preferred model 
w'hen the results of the conventional tests are ambiguous.
• A limitation that is inherent in cross-sectional analysis of earnings pro­
files is that the effects of individual experience and differences between 
age cohorts may be confounded. In the context of large-scale economic 
change, earnings profiles are particularly likely to be affected by both 
types of factors. The results suggest that cohort effects are indeed sub­
stantial in Uzbekistan. Even in depressed macroeconomic conditions, 
some individuals have done relatively well -  younger, better educated 
people seem to have higher wage opportunities that emerge as a result 
of liberalisation of the economy.
• Similar cohort effects might be expected to characterise other transition 
economies which have experienced similar types of structural change. 
Hence, the studies of earnings in transition based on a single cross-
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section of data and conventional quadratic specifications of experience 
could produce misleading results.
A d d itio n a l D e te rm in a n ts  o f  E arn ings
• For both men and women, region and ethnicity are found to be sig­
nificant determinants of earnings. There is a premium associated with 
living in the capital; somewhat less expected is the finding that Fergana 
has a larger negative wage effect than Karalkalpakstan, even though the 
latter is generally considered to be relatively poorer. The data suggest 
that the traditional advantages associated with Slavic ethnicity have 
persisted since independence from Moscow which, again, is somewhat 
surprising given the large-scale migration of Russians since the early 
1990s.
• Higher earnings are associated with all sectors of employment relative 
to the agricultural kolkhoz. There is also a premium associated with 
private sector employment.
Earm ings Inequality
• Earlier studies have suggested that the distribution of earnings has 
widened significantly in all transition economies. This has been the case 
in Uzbekistan, where the extent of inequality reflected in the .606 Gini 
coefficient for net earnings in 1995 is much larger than the Gini of .280 
reported for the Soviet period. At the same time, however, available 
data suggest that the trend toward higher earnings inequality has been 
less dramatic than in the Russian Federation during the transition.
• Given the institutional and political factors that would be expected 
to inhibit the adjustment of ex ante relativities, delays in payment of 
wages (arrears) appear to be an important avenue by which the ex­
pected widening in the wage distribution has occurred. Decomposition
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analysis suggests that arrears account for between 50 and 66 percent 
of the rise in wage inequality since 1989.
Arrears
• Uzbekistan exhibits a number of characteristics that are peculiar to 
economies in transition -  in particular, the delayed payment of wages af­
fects almost two in five workers. In an extended human capital model of 
earnings, an arrears dummy variable has large and significant negative 
effects, and interaction terms indicate that this effect is compounded 
for residents of Fergana and for non-Uzbeks.
• The possibility of statistically significant differences in the returns to 
human capital between those individuals who are affected by arrears, 
and those who are not, are investigated. Estimation of separate earn­
ings functions for the two groups (and by sex) with the net wage re­
ceived cis the dependent variable imply large differences in the returns 
to human capital, but formal F tests reveal that these differences are 
not statistically significant. These results confirm the appropriateness 
of the modelling approach adopted in this thesis, which pools individ­
uals regardless of whether or not they have been affected by arrears.
• The amount of arrears is calculated as the amount reported as owing 
to the individual from the past month from the main place of work. 
The amount of money that the individual had contracted to receive in 
the preceding month (May) can be derived by adding the net wage plus 
the amount of arrears owed. This is referred to as the “contract wage” , 
and is used in the analysis of the incidence and size of arrears.
• A conceptual framework is established, within which a series of hy­
potheses about the nature and extent of arrears are set up. In partic­
ular, it is possible that arrears are a route to greater efficiency in the 
labour market by reducing the real value of payments to workers whose
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contract wages are, for institutional or other reasons, too high; how­
ever it is also possible that arrears are simply a reflection of government 
intervention in the economy.
• Analysis of microdata on the pattern of wage arrears reveals distinct 
patterns. Adopting a two-step approach, the analysis shows who is af­
fected by arrears, and second, among those affected, by how much. In 
general the individual characteristics most frequently associated with 
the presence of arrears are also associated with larger amounts of ar­
rears. In particular those working on collective farms and people living 
outside the capital are found to be most affected. These regional and 
rural/urban disparities are compounded by the fact that the individ­
uals with low contract wages are more frequently and more adversely 
affected by arrears. Hence arrears have distributional implications.
• The extent and incidence of arrears provide some support for the “ef­
ficiency” hypothesis: that arrears are one way for employers to shift 
net wages toward market-clearing levels in the face of institutional and 
other constraints. However there is only mixed support for the hy­
pothesis that indicators of individual productivity reflected in human 
capital variables would be a significant factor in explaining the pattern 
of arrears. The analysis suggests that a political economic perspective 
is perhaps a more fruitful approach to thinking about wage arrears.
• In the presence of the high rates of inflation that have characterised 
much of the transition, delayed payment reduces the real value of earn­
ings and the measured rate of wage inflation. However this fact has 
not been taken into account in the construction of official statistics on 
wages by domestic and international agencies. Wage simulations are 
used to establish upper and lower bounds for the effect of arrears on 
real wage trends and levels. The implications are substantial, even if 
the delay in wage payments was limited to only one month.
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P o ss ib le  Im p lica tio n s  f o r  P o licy
• The analysis raises a number of points that are relevant to the formu­
lation of policy in Uzbekistan, and indeed to a number of countries 
in transition that share similar problems. The major points can be 
summarised as follows.
• The finding that returns to education in Uzbekistan are not unduly low 
should not be cause for complacency in educational policy. Transition 
has not been associated with significant structural or curricular reforms 
in education, and therefore the potential contribution of the sector to 
future growth has not been enhanced. There are several findings which 
might be of interest to policy makers.
First, enrolment rates have fallen at all levels of education, but most 
markedly at the universities. This has been a common trend in tran­
sition countries. There is evidence that educational access of children 
from worse-off households and poorer regions has been more adversely 
affected, thereby exacerbating the trend toward widening earnings and 
income inequality, and might require targeted responses if considered 
an issue by government.
Second, evidence of lower rates of university participation for women 
together with evidence that higher wage opportunities are available 
to tertiary graduates could be cause for concern if the government is 
concerned about equal opportunity.
Third, the sharp declines in adult participation in formal part-time 
training raise questions about the sustainability of the inherited system 
and the relevance of its approach in the post-transition era, and about 
the best way to reskill future and current workers. This trend, together 
with evidence indicating the existence of cohort effects, suggest that the 
earnings of older workers have been relatively adversely affected by the 
transition.
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• There axe substantial gender differences in earnings in Uzbekistan. This 
appears to have persisted despite the anti-discrimination type legisla­
tion. Reconsideration of the extensive leaves and benefits granted to 
pregnant women and mothers may be warranted insofar as there are 
reasons to believe that such concessions may increase the risk of gen­
der discrimination as employers become more profit-motivated in their 
orientation.
• A general theme throughout the thesis relates to the unreliability of 
official statistics, particularly with respect to labour market develop­
ments. The consideration of arrears, for example, suggests that official 
real wage series may be significantly misleading. To this extent, there 
is a clear need to improve data for decision-making. This applies to 
both domestic agencies, as well as the international financial agencies 
charged with the provision of advice to government. The recent ini­
tiatives to address issues of microdata data collection (household and 
labour force surveys), such as training in sampling techniques consis­
tent with OECD standards, are therefore timely.
P a r t I
E m pirical and  T h eo re tica l 
B ackground
Summary of Part I
The objective of PART I of the thesis is to understand the institutional and 
economic factors that are likely to affect wage outcomes during the transition 
in Uzbekistan. The relative lack of published information and analysis on 
this topic require that greater attention be given to this issue than would be 
needed for a country that had been more extensively studied.
PART I comprises three chapters, which are structured as follows.
Chapter 2 considers the economic determinants of wages during the Soviet 
period, within the institutional framework which then prevailed. Available 
evidence on wage outcomes is reviewed, drawing attention to the structure 
of relativities among sectors, and among the former Soviet republics, as well 
as what can be learnt about the effect of education on earnings.
Chapter 3 undertakes a similar task for the transition period, identifying 
the major economic and institutional changes that have been associated with 
the transition. Economic developments and outcomes in the labour market 
are reviewed in the regional context of the former Soviet Union.
Chapter 4 elaborates a framework that can be used to explain individ­
ual earnings outcomes based on the theory of equalising differences (Rosen, 
1986). The human capital theory of earnings is set out, followed by a review 
of the problems that arise in its empirical implementation that are relevant 
to the subsequent analysis. A survey of the literature on the determinants of 
earnings in transition is presented in the second part of the chapter, drawing 
attention to issues of methodology as well as the findings that have emerged 
to date.
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The main themes and findings of PART I can be summarised as follows:
E con om ic  C o n d itio n s
•  For seventy years, Uzbekistan was part of a larger planned economy, 
but was underdeveloped relative to the rest of the USSR in terms of 
the level of industrialisation. The republic was also characterised by 
problems associated with surplus labour. The Soviet state, through 
its ownership of the means of production and detailed central plans, 
strictly limited the role of product prices and the extent of enterprise 
autonomy. The planned economy was believed to be associated with 
pervasive inefficiencies, manifested in low factor productivity and stag­
nation of output growth.
• Economic transition was embarked upon after attaining formal inde­
pendence in December 1991. The subsequent period has been charac­
terised by periods of hyperinflation and large declines in output.
• There have also been some important structural changes, including a 
decline in the share of industrial output and an expansion of private 
sector activity. Government intervention remains extensive nonetheless 
and is mediated through, for example, the system of state orders for 
major agricultural products and control of the financial system.
E d u ca tio n
• In international terms, levels of achievement in education in Soviet 
Uzbekistan were high relative to the level of per capita income. How­
ever the system of education was seen to be characterised by substantial 
problems including early and narrow specialisation and limited devel­
opment of problem-solving abilities.
• The transition has not been associated with significant structural or 
curriculum reforms in education. Enrolment rates have fallen at all
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levels of education, but most markedly at the university level. The rea­
sons for this decline are discussed. Sharp declines are also documented 
for adult participation in formal, part-time training.
Labour Market Regulation
•  In general, during the Soviet period, individuals were free to choose 
their occupation, place of work, and educational paths.
• The formal determination of Soviet-period wages was the perogative 
of central planners. The available evidence nonetheless suggests that 
the theory of equalising differences, which refers to observed wage dif­
ferentials required to equalise the total monetary and non-monetary 
advantages or disadvantages among work activities and among workers 
themselves, influenced wage outcomes under central planning. However 
this does not mean that the system functioned efficiently.
Firm Regulation and Incentives
® There was a range of problems, related mainly to the incentives facing 
firms, that were arguably inherent in the Soviet economy. The result 
was high levels of labour hoarding and a tendency for wage levels to 
drift above the plan.
• Transition has been marked by a series of measures that have relaxed 
the institutional constraints on individuals and firms and sharpened the 
importance of market signals. This includes the legal recognition of un­
employment (which was formally illegal during the Soviet period) and 
the withdrawal of budget subsidies to producers (which were formerly 
extensive).
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Wage Outcomes
• Evidence about returns to education during the Soviet period is limited. 
No data exists for Uzbekistan that would allow microanalysis. However 
the relatively abundant supply of skilled labour in Uzbekistan relative 
to the level of economic development might be expected to depress 
returns to education.
• The general consensus is that the effect of higher education on earnings 
in the USSR was less than in established market economies. There is 
evidence, for example, of wages drift which increased the relative pay of 
manual workers, particularly the unskilled. It is unclear whether this 
situation arose from the institutional framework or from technological 
factors related to low rates of capital investment.
• Conventional indicators of inequality do not show an unusually com­
pressed distribution of earnings within the republics of the former 
Soviet Union relative to a number of Western European countries. 
Available evidence nonetheless suggests increases in measures of in­
equality have accompanied economic liberalisation in all the transition 
economies, with the sharpest rises being reported for the Russian Fed­
eration.
Earnings in Transition: Theory and Evidence
• There is a vast empirical literature that is based on the estimation of 
human capital wage functions which confirms the positive correlation 
between higher levels of education and experience on the one hand, and 
earnings on the other.
• However difficulties arise in interpreting the positive association be­
tween education and earnings which may be due to, for example, sig­
nalling effects or to the connections acquired through education, rather
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than due to increases in individual productivity.
• The recent availability of microdata has enabled a number of studies 
of formerly planned economies, which have generally found support for 
the hypothesis that rates of return to educational qualifications tend 
to rise during the transition.
• Empirical applications of earnings functions typically encounter prob­
lems related to omitted variables (like ability) and inaccurate measure­
ment of independent variables (like experience). Some of the existing 
studies of wages in transition are susceptible to criticism on a number 
of these methodological grounds, which are also encountered in West­
ern studies. Ways to deal with these issues are flagged, and tackled in 
PA R T II of the thesis.
Chapter 2
Soviet Uzbekistan
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides background on Uzbekistan during the Soviet period. 
The main objective is to facilitate interpretation of developments in the 
labour market during the transition. For seventy years, until 1992, the Re­
public of Uzbekistan was part of a regime that was highly centralised in 
both economic and political terms. This legacy would be expected to play 
a key part in shaping the immediate post-independence period. Yet our 
understanding of wages and the labour market during the Soviet era is un­
fortunately limited by a paucity of independent analysis and reliable data.
Soviet scholars worked within a totalitarian regime that imposed severe 
limits on the extent and nature of their inquiry. There were great quanti­
ties of data, as one might expect in a centrally planned system, yet there 
was a dearth of representative survey data. The regular household survey 
was subject to serious sampling bias (Fälkingham and Micklewright 1997), 
and/or the results were systematically suppressed and made available only 
in forms that limited its usefulness.1 The data on the labour market that
1 Even released information was often in forms that limited its usefulness. For example, 
all the available results from the Family Budget Survey on earnings were classified under 
two headings -  wage earners and collective farmers -  where the former category also 
included workers on state farms. Hence one cannot examine a rural-urban breakdown.
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was released by the statistical agency (Goskomstat, or Goskomprognostat, 
as it is now known in Uzbekistan) suffers from a range of drawbacks that 
are detailed below*. Even local researchers had problems accessing what data 
were available. Because of this combination of factors, there was no tradition 
of micro-analysis of wage and employment data of the type that had become 
well-established in Western (neo-classical) economics by the 1970s including, 
for example, the empirical analysis of earnings functions.
There are nonetheless a number of useful studies that can be drawn upon 
for an analysis of the Soviet period. This is particularly true since the era of 
glasnost, or opening up of discussion, in the 1980s . Western books relevant 
to the study of Soviet wages include Kirsch (1972), and run through to the 
end of the Soviet era with the publication of Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1992), Ofer and Vinokur (1992) and Marnie (1992). However the Western 
analyses are equally hampered by the lack of representative micro-data.* 2 
Moreover neither the Soviet nor Western studies tend to pay much explicit 
attention to the Central Asian region.3 In some senses this does not matter, 
since Uzbekistan was part of a centralised and planned system characterised 
by uniform rules. On the other hand, there were certain demographic and 
economic features that distinguished the republic from the rest of the Soviet 
Union, or at least from Russia, the republic which tended to receive the 
greatest attention.
This chapter is motivated by the need to understand the institutional,
See also Marnie and Micklewright (1994).
2 Ofer and Vinokur (1992) avoids the problems associated with the Soviet surveys by 
drawing upon sample surveys of emigre Jews, but this in turn raises further problems with 
respect to representativeness. In particular, it is noted that the individuals had come from 
urban and European (western) parts of the USSR, which limits the usefulness from the 
perspective of Uzbekistan. The same is true of Katz’s (1994) interesting study of gender 
differentials in Soviet -wages, based on a sample from Taganrog, a single industrial town 
in European Russia.
3There are some noteable exceptions: Marnie (1992) whose final chapter is entitled 
Regional Aspects of Employment and Unemployment in the USSR (With Particular Ref­
erence to Central Asia); Lubin (1984) Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia; and 
Rumer (1989) Soviet Central Asia: The Tragic Experiment.
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economic and demographic factors which influenced the determination of 
wages in Uzbekistan during and shortly after the Soviet period. The micro- 
analysis in PART II is based on a data set that was collected less than three 
years after the collapse of the USSR. The legacy of the system of central 
planning that had prevailed for seventy years would be expected to persist 
for several years, at least.
In this chapter, within the constraints imposed by the data, the follow­
ing broad questions are addressed with respect to the Soviet period. First, 
what was the demographic and economic context within which wages were 
determined? Second, what was the nature of the stock of human capital? 
Section 2.2 reviews the determinants of wages along several dimensions, viz. 
the structure of the economy and employment and the stock of human cap­
ital, as reflected in the levels of educational qualifications of the population 
and the system of education. Third, what were the institutional and behav­
ioral traits that affected the determination of individual wages in the Soviet 
era? Different aspects of the institutional framework that governed wage 
setting are reviewed in Section 2.3. And fourth, what were the outcomes in 
terms of the distribution of earnings and returns to skill? The final section 
presents evidence about earnings by branch (sector) ,4 measures of inequality 
and returns to skill. A key underlying question throughout the chapter is the 
extent of enterprise and individual autonomy within the overall constraints 
imposed by centralised wage fixation and the system of economic planning 
that determined output.
4The Soviet literature tends to refer to “branches of the economy” , which are equivalent 
to what western economists would call sectors of the economy. In this thesis, these two 
terms are used interchangeably.
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2.2 D eterm inants o f W ages
2 .2 .1  In trod u ction
Uzbekistan’s population of 23 million is the largest of the Central Asian 
countries of the former Soviet Union. About half reside in rural areas and 
43 percent of the population is under 16 years of age. Ethnically, according 
to the 1989 census, the population was mainly Uzbek (71 percent), alongside 
significant numbers of Russians (9 percent) and Tajiks and Kazaks (4 percent 
each). The regional ethnic picture is somewhat different in that the Russians 
mainly reside in urban areas, and the rural population is overwhelmingly 
Uzbek.
In several respects Uzbekistan has a socio-economic profile close to that of 
a developing country, although significantly distinguished from countries at 
similar levels of per capita income by virtually universal literacy and access 
to health services (Falkingham, Klugman, Marnie and Micklewright 1997). 
The level of economic development at independence in 1991 was low in terms 
of several commonly used indicators: low per capita income (US$ 860, second 
lowest in the USSR), rural predominance and high population growth. The 
mean income in Uzbekistan was only 55 percent of the mean income in the 
Russian Federation in 1989 (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992), and only 13 
percent of the United States.5
This section examines several broad dimensions of Soviet Uzbekistan that 
would be expected to affect wage outcomes. First the structure of economic 
activity in the republic is examined, drawing attention to the types of controls 
imposed on enterprises. Second, and relatedly, the structure of employment 
is reviewed. The third area of interest is the level and nature of human 
capital in the economy.
5Russia was about 30 percent of the US. These figures are based on Purchasing Power 
Parity Estimates of GDP per capita for 1987 (World Bank, 1996a, Annex Table 1).
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2 .2 .2  S tru ctu re o f th e  E conom y
Soviet Uzbekistan had a low level of economic development, that was com­
pounded by problems that characterized the rest of the USSR. Inefficient 
production and highly monopolistic market structures, stagnating output 
and repressed inflation were all evident in Soviet Uzbekistan (Pomfret 1995; 
see also Rumer (1989) on the problems of Soviet regional economic policy). 
Labour in both industry and agriculture was largely engaged in state-owned 
entities that were characterised by the significant overstaffing, obsolete pro­
duction methods and technology that typified the centrally planned regime.
As part of the Soviet Union, the economy of Uzbekistan was the subject of 
extensive centralised planning. Productive entities were largely state-owmed 
and the coordinating roles of markets and prices were almost completely 
suppressed. Detailed, centrally determined plans for the inputs and outputs 
of all branches (sectors) of the economy were developed on a strategic basis 
every five years, which in turn generated sets of targets, typically specified 
in terms of physical output. The targets were the task of branch ministries. 
Enterprises, collective farms and departments (e.g. railways) were owned by 
individual ministries at the all-Union or Republican level. Budget constraints 
on firms were soft in the sense that any losses were absorbed by either the 
state budget, the extension of credit or cross-subsidisation across the branch. 
Prices were administratively determined. Enterprise autonomy was, at least 
until 1987, strictly limited: for example enterprise deposits were earmarked 
for planned expenditures and could not be converted into cash except to 
make authorised payments, mainly wages (IMF et al. 1991).
The cornerstone of economic reforms in the late Soviet period was the 
1987 law On Enterprises which abolished traditional output targets, allowed 
enterprises to trade directly with their suppliers and customers, and enabled 
greater independence in decisions about investment and deployment of prof­
its. Enterprises were supposed to become self-financing. However state orders 
still accounted for the vast bulk of production and the degree of enterprise
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autonomy was less than might have been envisaged, in part because enter­
prises themselves wanted a guaranteed source of inputs to meet orders. Tax 
rates were unpredictable and profits were subject to arbitrary confiscation by 
the branch ministry to cross-subsidise loss making enterprises. While state 
orders declined from 1989, the lack of well-functioning markets proved to be 
highly disruptive to output levels (as will be shown in the next chapter).
At independence, agriculture accounted for about 36 percent of national 
income, followed by industry (33 percent of output and 14 percent of em­
ployment), and construction (14 percent of output). This reflected Soviet 
planning priorities, in particular the emphasis on cotton, and arguably re­
sulted in a lower level of diversification in production than might have been 
expected in a country with such varied natural resources.6 In 1990, cotton 
represented 38.2 percent of agricultural output, compared to 3.3 percent for 
grain and 9.6 percent for potatoes. Animal husbandry was almost as signif­
icant as cotton, accounting for 36.6 percent of agricultural output in 1990. 
The republic was heavily dependent on food, particularly grain, imports from 
Russia and Ukraine.
Agricultural production was organized into kolkhozy (collective farms) 
and sovkhozy (state farms) and a limited area devoted to private plots. The 
forms of ownership were mainly distinguished by the method of payment of 
workers: the sovkhozy paid fixed salaries to workers whereas the kolkhoz 
paid workers out of its own residual revenue. Official figures suggest that 
in 1990, a significant share of workers in agriculture (37 percent) fell into 
the category of “temporary workers and labour in private plots”. Since the 
scope of private plots w*as limited, it seems that a significant proportion of 
workers were regarded as “temporary” (see Marnie 1992). This suggests the 
existence of a large source of surplus labour, even during the Soviet era of 
“full employment”, that was formally employed only on a seasonal basis.
6 For example, the republic has a rich endowment of natural resources -  gold, natural 
gas and oil, and other minerals (OECD/ CCET, 1996).
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The industrial sector consisted largely of processing of agricultural raw 
materials and the production of machinery and chemicals linked to agricul­
ture. A possible advantage of “backwardness” was that industrial enterprises 
were, on average, smaller than, for example, in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
(employing on average 500-700 workers, versus 1,000 in the other three re­
publics). Uzbekistan still generally faced the problems of technical obsoles­
cence and low standards of quality of industrial output (Pomfret 1995, p. 
68).
As in other planned economies, Uzbekistan’s retail and trade services were 
relatively under-developed. The so-called non-material sphere accounted for 
about one-fourth of employment, the bulk of which comprised social services, 
in particular, education. Banking and finance represented only 0.3 percent 
of total employment. Trade and catering, which was actually classified under 
the material sector, accounted for 5.6 percent of employment in 1991.
2.2 .3  D em an d  for Labour
In the Soviet Union, managers tended to “bid for as many inputs as they 
can cajole out of the central planners, and ... the incentives to shed excess 
labour (were) weak to non-existent” (Rutland 1986, p. 199)'. Involuntary 
redundancies were virtually unknown through most of the Soviet period, in 
part due to legal constraints on firms, but more generally because of the 
output targets which encouraged firms to hoard labour. The phenomenon 
of labour hoarding can arise in market economies, because the fixed costs 
associated with recruitment and training may deter firms from immediately 
retrenching workers in response to downturns in demand, especially if the 
expected duration of the downturn is short.
It is difficult, however, to estimate the extent of labour hoarding since
7 Various administrative attempts to improve labour productivity -  such as the 
Shchekino method whereby workers and managers were allowed to share directly in any 
savings resulting from operating the plant with less than the initially targeted labour force 
- did not prove successful on a large scale. See Rutland (1986) for a review.
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this depends on identifying “potential” output per worker.* 8 Estimates of 
labour hoarding or “over-manning” in Soviet enterprises in the early 1980s 
were in the range of 10-15 percent (Marnie 1992, p.12), and up to 25 percent 
by the IMF et ai, (1991).
Despite labour hoarding, the combination of high population growth and 
a relatively lower level of industrialisation meant that Central Asia was known 
as a “labour surplus” area: the number of working age population exceeded 
the number of jobs in the official economy (Marnie 1992). This was in con­
trast to the western parts of the former Soviet Union which had been affected 
by “labour shortages”. Not all of Uzbekistan was characterised by labour sur­
plus, however. The sparsely populated rural oblasts such as Dzijak were seen 
to suffer “shortages”, whereas densely populated rural areas of Andijan and 
Fergana had surplus labour.
There were intermittent reports of unemployment in Uzbekistan since the 
1970s, although there are no reliable data upon which to judge these reports 
(Marnie 1992). In fact discussions of unemployment in the Soviet context ap­
pear to refer to those “not employed in the official economy” (nezanyantye), 
without any distinction between those actively seeking such employment, 
and those who preferred to work in the household sector. The share of the 
non-employed in the working-age population was almost 14 percent in 1989, 
when the comparable figure for Russia was 5.5 percent (Marnie 1992). The 
vast majority (nine out of ten) of the non-employed in Central Asia were 
women, and most lived in rural areas (Marnie and Motivans 1993).
Hence caution is needed in interpreting such Soviet concepts as “non- 
employed”, which might partly reflect the central planners’ imperative to 
provide jobs for all people of working age,9 and a refusal to recognize home
sBosworth and Westaway (1987) calculated estimates of labour hoarding for Australia,
for example.
9Hence, for example, there was no Soviet concept equivalent to the Western/ Interna­
tional Labor Organisation (ILO) measure of labour force participation: see Klugman and 
Scott (1997) for analysis of this point with respect to Kazakhstan.
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production as legitimate labor market activity.10 Non-employment may also 
have been over-stated by local officials bidding for additional resources from 
Moscow (0. Osipov, cited in Marnie 1992). According to calculations based 
on the 1989 census, the employment rate was about 90 percent for men aged 
between 25 and 54, and 80-86 percent for women aged between 25 and 49 
years* 11 (Isamiddinova 1997).
Table 2.1: Distribution of employment by branch, 1980-1990
Sector 1980 1985 1990
industry 19.4 19.7 19.5
agriculture 20.2 19.9 18.3
transport and communications 16.9 18.1 14.3
construction 10.4 10.1 10.8
trade and catering 9.0 8.7 8.3
housing and communal services 3.1 2.9 3.1
health and social security 7.1 7.6 8.8
education and culture 14.4 15.3 18.0
science 2.3 2.2 1.6
credit and insurance 0.5 0.4 0.5
state administration 2.5 2.4 1.6
Total 100 100 100
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat
The structure of employment reveals the importance of agriculture, in­
dustry and education, which accounted for roughly equal shares of total em­
ployment in 1990 (Table 2.1). Employment in the so-called “non-productive” 
sphere was dominated by public social services, while other service sector ac­
tivities, such as trade, absorbed a relatively small share of the workforce
10 The official labour statistics nonetheless include categories under the material sector, 
labelled “members of families of workers and employees working in private subsidiary 
agriculture” and “other”, which both rose over time and together accounted for 15 percent 
of the employed population in 1991.
11 The employment rate is defined as the ratio of the number of employed to the total 
number of population for the respective age-gender group.
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in Uzbekistan, as in other planned economies.12 Health, education and sci­
ence together accounted for about three-quarters of employment in the non­
productive sector.
There were significant changes over time in the relative share of employ­
ment accounted for by different enterprise types (Table 2.2). Official data 
for the period 1985-1991 show the increasing importance of the private sec­
tor, which virtually doubled its share to about 17 percent of employment 
by independence. The state sector nonetheless remained dominant: state 
enterprises and farms accounted for about two-thirds of employment, and 
collective farms for a further 15 percent.
Table 2.2: Distribution of employment by employer, 1985-1991
Sector 1985 1989 1991
state sector 71.8 67.0 64.6
collective farms 15.4 13.8 14.2
private sector 9.9 13.8 16.9
cooperative and other 2.9 5.4 4.2
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat
In sum, the socialist state guarantee of full employment was not fully 
implemented in Uzbekistan, which stands in sharp contrast to the western 
parts of the USSR. The republic was also distinguished by the relatively large 
role of agriculture, especially private agriculture, prior to the transition. This 
does not mean that labour hoarding was not an issue in Uzbekistan: indeed 
there is no reason to expect that it was less common than in the rest of the 
Soviet Union for which estimates range up to 25 percent.
12 Marxist economics separates “productive” from the “unproductive” sectors; the latter 
are concerned with the distribution, not the production of the social product, and received 
lower priority from planners (Rutland 1986, pp. 194-5).
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2 .2 .4  H u m a n  C a p ita l
Education indicators showed steady increases during the Soviet period. Lev­
els of literacy and higher education in Uzbekistan, in common with CEE, 
approached OECD levels, and were far above regional averages in the de­
veloping world. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the adult population 
in 1989 by level of education attainment. In 1990, the rate of illiteracy 
was about 2.3 percent, and the average number of years of schooling was 
10.9 years (Tibi 1995). This was an important achievement in Central Asia 
where, in contrast to much of Central Europe, there was no historic tradition 
of widespread access to education prior to central planning (UNICEF 1998, 
Chapter 2).
Figure 2.1: Distribution of adult population, by education level, 1989
higher primary
15% 11%
secondary
7 4 %
Broadly speaking, the system of Soviet education may be described as 
follows. Formal schooling began at seven years of age and extended for a 
compulsory minimum of ten/eleven years.13 Primary (of three/four years
13 In 1986 the duration of primary education was increased from three to four years,
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duration), middle (five years) and secondary schools (two years) formed the 
basic education. Even within the centralised Soviet system, there was a 
diversity of schools of varying quality; some, for example, had advanced 
teaching in particular subjects (Tibi 1995).
After the completion of middle school, there were two broad education 
paths open to the individual: the academic stream or vocational training. 
Those who completed two further years of secondary education, could pro­
ceed to higher education, provided by universities and institutes. Under­
graduate courses lasted five years. In 1989, about 30.2 percent of individuals 
aged between 15 and 19 years were enrolled in the former (grades 10-12), 
while 7.9 percent were enrolled in specialised secondary training and about 
11 percent in vocational training. About 260 different vocational specialties 
were taught in the so-called PTUs (vocational training schools) and SSUZs 
(special training schools).
Table 2.3 shows the relative significance of alternative education paths 
for different age cohorts in 1989. Overall, about 15 percent of the adult 
population had completed vocational training, compared to about 11 percent 
who attended higher education. Vocational training had been popular for 
about two decades, with 22 percent of individuals under 40 years of age 
having such training, compared to just 15 percent of 45-49 year age group. 
For higher education, there is evidence of reduced popularity over time; the 
share of 25-29 year olds with higher education was 14 percent, compared to 
22 percent for the 40-44 year age group. Of course these figures on levels 
of educational attainment could reflect supply-side constraints as well as 
changes in demand.
This introduction to the Soviet education system would not be complete
and hence the overall minimum from ten to eleven years. However recent enrolment data 
suggests that this reform was not fully implemented, and that primary education lasts 
three years for some pupils and four years for others (Tibi 1995, p. 98). Tibi (1995) also 
notes that primary education may still have been too late in starting and too short in 
duration, especially for those children who did not attend formal pre-schools. (Only about 
35 percent of the age cohort attended pre-schools in 1990: Klugman et al 1997.)
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Table 2.3: Educational attainment by age cohort, 1989
Age Cohort
Adult population 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Higher education 11.1 14.4 16.5 19.3 21.5 15.4
Vocational training 15.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 19.3 15.1
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat
without a review of the system of adult education that was undertaken by 
workers on a part-time or evening basis. This is a potentially important part 
of ‘on-the-job’ training. Adult education had a long history in the USSR, 
ever since Lenin’s 1919 decree On the Eradication of Illiteracy Among the 
Population which directed individuals under 50 years of age to become lit­
erate, a staggering task at that time when tens of millions of Soviet people 
were not. In the early twentieth century, only about 2 percent of the popu­
lation of Turkestan (as the region was then known) was literate (Ministry of 
Higher and Specialised Secondary Education of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
(MHSSE) 1996). In 1918, the Turkestan People’s University, the first state 
university in Central Asia, was opened in Tashkent to all those wishing to 
attend lectures, regardless of the educational level.14 Up until 1991, lifelong 
learning for working adults, improvement of qualifications and the provi­
sion of opportunities for re-learning were important elements of the Soviet 
regime (Zajda 1998, p. 1). This included so-called compensatory education 
for those who had been unable to complete their secondary education, and 
was offered in evening schools (vechemye shkoly) and correspondence schools 
(.zaochnye shkoly)}0 In the Uzbek republic, as elsewhere in the Union, there 
were colleges devoted to evening courses for workers. There were 190 such
14Specialised secondary education pre-dated communism, however: in 1895, an agricul­
tural school was opened in Samarkand, and by 1914 there were two agricultural schools 
and six technical and vocational schools.
15 During the 1960s and 1970s, adult education also took place in the voluntary sector 
(neformalnye struktury), which included people’s universities (Narodnye Universitety), 
public lectures and the Knowledge Society (Znanie): Zajda 1998, p. 2.
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schools providing general academic education in the late Soviet period, with 
enrolments numbering 64,800 (Tibi 1995, Annex 5A).
Structure
The Soviet educational system had some specific features which may well 
have affected the labour market. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to in­
vestigate such complex topics as curricula, pedagogical methods and teacher 
training. Here I simply set out the nature of the inheritance and highlight 
the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional approach to learning.16 The 
next chapter reviews the main reform tendencies in the education system 
that have emerged to date.
On the positive side, not only was access broad, as measured by enrolment 
figures, but the quality of basic education was good. One component of 
quality is the learning achievement of students -  this can be measured by 
standardised tests in well-defined subjects. Although results specifically for 
Uzbekistan are not available, pupils studying elsewhere in the region under 
a Soviet model of education have scored well in international assessments 
in science and mathematics.* 1' This was in part ensured through the use 
of national ‘norms’ which, while leading to a number of problems associated 
with over-centralisation (see Klugman, forthcoming), helped to establish and 
enforce minimum standards across the country.
As one might expect, Soviet education was highly centralised in terms of 
“the extent of control ... and the degree of uniformity enforced in principle 
and practice throughout the length and breadth of (the USSR)” (Grant 1964, 
p. 31). Education was to serve national political and economic needs as 
interpreted by the Supreme Soviet. The Council of Ministers in Moscow
16 This evaluation draws on work by the author that was published as Chapter 2 of 
UNICEF (1998) Regional Monitoring Report, ‘Education for All?’
1 7 Cross-country comparisons of learning achievement are of course fraught with diffi­
culty, although the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) does 
adjust for repetition rates and other factors that might be expected to affect the reliability 
of the results (see Vari 1997).
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acting on behalf of the Supreme Soviet passed directives down the line for 
implementation. In Moscow, the central planning agency Gosplan analysed 
the proposals submitted by each republic including Uzbekistan, then drafted 
a plan covering the number of students and schools at each level, number 
of staff, volume of investment and the necessary finances (Tomiak 1992, p. 
44). Republic-level submissions were based on industrial requirements for 
new specialists estimated on the basis of fixed coefficients per unit of output 
(normatives). In practice, the number of student places in institutes and 
their budget allocations “like everything else, were subject to bureaucratic 
bargaining” (Salehi-Esfahani and Thornton 1997, p. 6).
There were nonetheless local responsibilities in the Soviet system. There 
were twelve oblasts (corresponding to state or provincial level administrative 
units) in Uzbekistan (plus Tashkent city and the ‘autonomous republic’ of 
Karakalpakstan), and about 190 raions (corresponding to local councils or 
counties).18 Direct control over schools was exercised by the oblast and 
raion departments of education through the supervision of programmes and 
school directors. The vast bulk of spending on general (pre-school and basic) 
education came from local budgets: indeed it is doubtful whether the Union 
and Republican budgets together accounted for more than 10 percent of the 
total costs of general education of schools (Noah 1966, p. 58). Yet decisions 
over local expenditure decisions were very tightly controlled.
Norms played a pivotal role in central control over the education system, 
relegatingating local authorities to the task of transmitting funds to schools. 
There were different types of norms: for unit expenditure (per teacher, per 
class, per pupil), based on input ratios (e.g. pupils per class), and quan­
titative targets (e.g. enrolments). The allocation of funds among different 
types of school and articles of expenditure was centrally determined, and not 
responsive to local priorities.
One outcome of centralised control of education was relatively uniform
ISThis remains the basic administrative structure of the republic up through 1998.
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provision of services, at least in terms of pupil-teacher ratios and enrolment 
rates. In 1989, according to census figures, the share of the adult population 
who had higher education was 11.1 percent (see Table 2.3), not far behind 
much higher income republics including Ukraine (11.9 percent) and Russia 
(13 percent).19 Furthermore, efforts were made by the central planning au­
thorities in Moscow to extend access in rural areas, which would tend to have 
benefited the population of Uzbekistan.
It would nonetheless be wrong to conclude that the systems of educa­
tion developed under central planning attained uniform standards across the 
Soviet Union. Particularly in rural and remote areas, material standards 
were often poor (see UNICEF 1998, Chapter 2). The vast majority of rural 
schools lacked the basic amenities of water, heating and plumbing. Whereas 
four out of five urban schools did not have piped water, over three out of 
four rural schools did not. In Karakalpakstan, for example, only one in three 
secondary schools had piped water. The overall share of Karakalpak schools 
with sewerage was even lower (only 20 percent of secondary schools). Rural 
schools were prone to problems associated with their small size, including 
teacher shortages and subjects either not being offered or being taught by 
non-specialists. At the university level, there was an enormous gulf between 
the quality of education provided in universities and institutes in Moscow 
and St Petersburg (then Leningrad) and in the rest of the country (Salehi- 
Esfahani and Thornton 1997).
19Earlier studies have concluded that, relative to the significant variations in population 
density across the USSR, average school size and the share of the population enrolled in 
post-secondary education, the range of inter-republic expenditures per pupil were modest 
and far less than among the states of the USA (Noah 1966). At the extremes, average 
expenditure per pupil in Estonia was 28 percent above the Soviet mean in the early 1960s, 
while in Moldova and Kazakhstan, the figure was 12 percent below. Uzbekistan was close 
to the Soviet-wide average.
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Shortcomings
The Soviet model of education had further less positive traits. First, it 
is generally recognised that the pedagogical emphasis was upon fixed, as 
opposed to dynamic, skills, a tendency still found in more recent studies 
(Zablulionis 1997). In other words, the acquisition of factual material was 
stressed rather than its interpretation and the application of material to new 
contexts. As described by one former student
“At mid-level institutions in the republics, students merely re­
ceived some practical knowledge of institutions and tasks that 
might improve productivity in specific tasks but it afforded lit­
tle intellectual breadth. As a screening mechanism, a diploma 
from these institutions signalled that a student was willing to sit 
quietly for hours and memorise vast amounts of mind-numbing 
detail, abilities that would be tested in a future, mind-numbing 
job.” (Salehi-Esfahani and Thornton 1997, p. 10)
Second, the scope fox individualism was limited in various ways. The 
curriculum was rigid. Subject choice was very limited, even at the university 
level (see below). The nature of the planned economy together with political 
totalitarianism meant that methods of teaching focussed on instructing stu­
dents on what they needed to know to fill their positions within the various 
sectors of the economy. The number of courses offered in a programme was 
typically equal to the number of courses required for graduation -  that is, 
there was virtually no choice within the area of study.
The number of hours of instruction was very high. These features are 
consistent with the planners’ preoccupation with target output levels due to 
problems involved in monitoring quality, a tendency which has been noted by 
Stiglitz (1994) and others. In Uzbekistan, university students attend classes 
for 39 hours a week for an average 28 weeks annually, excluding examination
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and ‘practice’ time (Salehi-Esfahani 1997).20 By law, all university students 
were required to live in farming communities and participate in the cotton 
harvest for four to six weeks each autumn.
Third, the structure of the post-basic educational system encouraged, 
indeed generally required, narrow specialisations that limited individual op­
tions for occupational change. The system was highly fragmented resulting 
in a much larger number of specialties than one might expect of an economy 
with the level of sophistication of Soviet Uzbekistan. There were a num­
ber of highly specialised institutions, including, for example, the Tashkent 
Automobile and Road Construction Institute. This might be predicted to 
have limited worker mobility among occupations. Students who were not 
continuing with general secondary education (about one-fifth of the cohort: 
Table 2.3) were streamlined into narrow vocational training from the age of 
14 years. Vocational training itself was organised separately on a sectoral 
ministry basis, for agriculture, heavy industry, railroads and so on.
Vocational and technical education were important elements in the post 
-compulsory education system of the Soviet Union. Managers, however, were 
apt to criticise the quality of such training and the extent to which it met 
the skill demands of their enterprises (Heynemann 1997a). Doubts surround­
ing the efficacy of vocational type training are not of course confined to the 
USSR; vocational training has been seen to have poorer returns than more 
general academic education in many market economies (see Psacharapoulos 
1985; McMahon 1988).21 Given the apparent poor general quality, reputa­
tion and obsolescence of much vocational training in the formerly socialist 
economies, one would not anticipate such qualifications to be highly valued 
in the transition to a market economy. This is an empirical question: trends 
in the popularity of vocational courses are investigated in the next chapter,
20 The excessive number of hours of instruction has also been attributed to the lack of 
textbooks, which led teachers to dictate their lectures.
21 In addition, the higher unit cost of provision of vocational training generally lowers 
the social rate of return (see Psacharapoulos 1994).
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and the private returns to  such training are estim ated in PART II.
Fourth, teachers were often poorly qualified, especially at the elementary 
level. Though evidence for Uzbekistan is scarce, even in Russia, for example, 
more than half of primary school teachers have no higher education (OECD 
1997) and some pedagogical institutes admitted students with only grade 
nine school education. In the 1980s, sociological surveys suggested that well 
over 80 percent of Soviet teachers were dissatisfied with the quality of their 
training (Tomiak 1992, p. 42). This situation was associated with the earlier 
expansion of the Soviet education system which stretched the qualified labour 
supply to its limits, but also with wage rewards that were generally below 
average that made teaching relatively unattractive (see Table 2.6 below). One 
would expect that the situation in Uzbekistan was worse, not least because 
the school system had had to expand rapidly to cater for high population 
growth.
Finally, it is noted that the higher education sector suffered the foregoing 
problems to at least the same extent as primary and secondary levels of 
schooling.22 Higher education was characterised by a large number of small 
specialised institutions, some of which belonged to specialised ministries, a 
situation that is seen to be inefficient both pedagogically and economically 
(Thompson 1996).
In general, it was up to the individual to decide how much education to 
undertake and where to seek employment (subject to residence restrictions). 
The main exception was that graduates from PTUs and universities could 
be directed by the authorities to their first jobs, where they were officially 
obliged to stay for three years. In practice, however, “many youths dis­
obeyed) the directives or leave before their tour of duty is over” (Chapman 
1977, p. 250).
22The number of institutes of higher learning, as they are known, increased rapidly in 
Uzbekistan, from one in 1920, to 30 in 1940, and to 43 by 1990.
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It is notable that entrance to university was a highly competitive affair 
among secondary graduates. Salehi-Esfahani (1997) explains the apparent 
paradox of high demand for such a low quality service in terms of the licence 
and/or personal connections that university provided for individual advance­
ment in a planned economy (see Chapter 4). As a licence, a university degree 
was “a credential providing access to executive positions. That plus Party 
membership put a young professional on the bottom rung of an escalator into 
the nomenklatura with the prospect of...access to increasing authority and 
perquisites ” (Salehi-Esfahani and Thornton 1997, p. 6).
Personal connections were also extremely important in the bureaucratic 
command economy -  it has been argued that planning became a largely 
personalised bargaining process, with connection (“blat”) an important ele­
ment (World Bank 1996a, p. 1). The structure of learning at the university 
level was based on study collectives, which were close-knit groups, and of­
ten study groups became relationship networks later in the administrative 
system. Hence completion of university signalled “an individual’s ability 
to function as a cooperative member of a strong team, since this provided 
evidence of an individual’s ability to acquire relationship capital...” (Salehi- 
Esfahani and Thornton 1997, p. 10). The same factors may operate in a 
market economy as well, of course, as noted in Chapter 4.
After independence, Uzbekistan, like many other countries in the region, 
adopted national legislation that set out wide-ranging, often ambitious, goals 
and principles for education. For example, “planned enrollments” were abol­
ished at independence. Trends in enrolment, the extent of educational reform 
and its impact on the quality of education are reviewed in next chapter.
2.3 T he In stitu tiona l Framework
This section reviews the institutional framework within which individual 
wages were determined. According to Marnie (1992)
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Workers on the whole chose their place of work free of any central 
administrative body, and were free to change jobs at will, while 
administrative regulations aimed at limiting worker mobility are 
reported to have functioned imperfectly. Wage differentials were 
used to attract workers to priority branches and regions. Despite 
the amount of detail devoted to employment planning in theory, 
in practice it played a very minor role, and enterprises had a large 
degree of flexibility in hiring their workers within the limits of a 
centrally allocated wage fund (p. 56).
In contrast the World Bank (1996a) reports that:
Although people were both hired and paid wages under central 
planning, labour markets did not work anything like in market 
economies... Wages bore little relation to individual performance:
“Work was somewhere we went, not something we did” (p. 72).
There are contrasting views about the determination of individual earn­
ings in the planned Soviet economy. On the one hand, some have concluded 
that the labour market was the least regulated aspect of the planned econ­
omy (for example, Marnie 1992; Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). On the 
other hand, a common view held by the World Bank among others, is that 
individual incentives were generally repressed, and “required in their place 
an intrusive set of controls” (World Bank 1996a, p. 73).
Given the freedom of individuals in their choices of jobs, the setting of 
differentials was used at least partly to provide incentives as in a market 
economy (Phelps-Brown 1977).23 This section examines the system govern­
ing labour compensation as it existed from the mid 1950s through the mid 
1980s, the problems that were perceived by Soviet analysts and the objectives
23 The situation was thus quite different to which prevailed in pre-transition China, where 
Knight and Song (1990) observed “the initial assignment to a job is very important: the 
first job is often the last” (p. 9).
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and nature of the later reforms, in particular the 1987 law On Enterprises. 
The objective is to ascertain how individual earnings were supposed to be 
determined under the planned system, since this institutional context would 
be expected to influence the determinants of wages subject to micro-analysis 
in P a rt  II of the thesis.
2.3.1 The W age Tariff
After the mid-1950s a Union-wide system of tariff’s (tarifnaya sistema) was 
the basic administrative instrument of wage determination. The system was 
not static, in that changes were made at various times to respond to perceived 
problems. The system of tariff wages comprised, by the mid 1980s: (a) basic 
wage rates (stavki), which specified the base (minimum) wage in each branch 
of the economy; (b) a set of coefficients (tarifnayasetka), typically six, for 
each branch, which set the wage rates relative to the least skilled (minimum). 
Individual jobs were assigned to a particular point on this scale; and (c) 
additional coefficients for arduous work and for employment in remote parts 
of the country. Thus job categories were classified hierarchically according 
to skill levels and degree of responsibility; these wage grades determined the 
relevant tariff wage rates. Table 2.4 provides an example, for the mining 
industry.
Table 2.4: Tariff skill scale for mining industry, 1987
I II III IV V VI
Tariff Coefficient 1.0 1.11 1.22 1.38 1.58 1.86
Relative Step 11 11 13 15 18
SOURCE: Oxenstriena 1990, Table 5.1
There was a similar, though separate, tariff structure for the productive 
and non-productive spheres. Uniform criteria were supposed to apply across 
branches -  that is a grade III job was supposed to involve the same intrinsic 
levels of skill, irrespective of branch.
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Collective farm workers were outside the tariff wage system; while they 
were guaranteed minimum wages, their wages were formally a dividend from 
the net revenue of the kolhoz. According to Oxenstriena (1990, p. 126), 
the kolkhoz was able to receive “loans” from the budget when it had insuf­
ficient revenue to pay its members at rates comparable to the tariff wages 
in agriculture. However studies of living standards based on official data 
have suggested much lower levels of income among collective farm house­
holds (Marnie and Micklewright 1994). These households depended to a 
significant extent on their private plot activities to provide adequate food 
and cash (Nove 1988).
There is an important caveat in interpreting the institutional framework 
that governed wage setting and the official data on wages. The wage share 
declined over the decade to 1985, and represented, on average, about two- 
thirds of labour remuneration in 1990 (Scherbakov 1987, p. 76). This com­
pared to about 75 percent in the early 1960s24 (Kirsch 1972, p. 12). In fact 
the other cash elements of earnings -  bonuses, additional wage payments and 
supplements -  became regarded by a number of analysts in the late 1980s 
as automatic additions to the wage rate that served to equalise the earnings 
distribution (see e.g. Scherbakov 1987).
This is somewhat surprising if one expected that firms would use these 
discretionary payments to widen the structure of wages imposed by the cen­
tral tariff. The automatic nature of the payments also contrasted with earlier 
periods when bonuses had been viewed as a way for enterprises to overcome 
the lack of branch-wide wage differentials, even if most discretionary pay­
ments were not used to establish on-the-job incentives (Kirsch 1972). It is in 
any case clear that the larger the relative significance of enterprise-allocated 
non-wage payments, the weaker the extent of central control over the deter­
mination of earnings.
24These figures relate to the Soviet Union as a whole; the situation in Uzbekistan was 
similar, although given the lesser relative importance of industry in the republic, extra­
wage compensation may have been less significant in size.
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How were labour payments actually determined at the enterprise and 
individual level? As already noted, the tariff wage scales, the quantity and 
prices of material inputs and outputs were all set centrally. The wage fund 
was one of these inputs. The funds were assigned to ministries, enterprises 
and organisations in absolute amounts based on norms, once the volume of 
net output was determined (Lane 1987, p. 119). Norms represented the 
estimated amount of time necessary for the fulfillment of a particular work 
activity given the qualifications of the workers and the level of technology. 
Wage tariffs and associated rules and regulations were derived and set for 
jobs, not for people. As in a Western economy, the position of the individual 
worker within the overall scale depended on the decision of the employer.20
That said, a series of “pure wage differentials” were used by Soviet plan­
ners. In theory, the (multiplicative) components of the average wage at a 
given enterprise could be disaggregated as follows (Kirsch 1972, p. 161)
IT = B * S * C * I * P * R * D
where W  is the monthly wage, B is the basic wage rate under normal working 
conditions, S  is the skills coefficient, C is a coefficient to adjust for abnormal 
working conditions, /  is an incentive coefficient corresponding to earnings 
above base rates due to over-fulfillment of norms, P  is an inter-branch dif­
ferential based on the (planners’) priority of the branch, R  is a regional 
coefficient depending on location of the enterprise,26 and D is the number 
of workdays in a given month. It is unclear, however, as to whether an in­
dividual’s earnings could be decomposed along these lines. The formula sat 
alongside the frequently heard Soviet claim that payments to labour were 
based on the quality and quantity of work, where the former refers to the
2oA number of Western economists have pointed this out, including Malle (1986), Marnie 
(1992) and Commander and Staer (1991).
2 6 For example, workers in distant regions of Central Asia received a coefficient of between 
1.15 and 1.3. The same coefficient was applied to pensions. The rationale was that 
compensation was needed to account for higher prices and harsher conditions (though for 
workers this obviously overlaps with the coefficient for abnormal working conditions, C.
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skills required and the latter to working conditions that determined work 
“intensity”.
In the Soviet Union, each of these coefficients was set centrally. Yet it 
is arguable that these rules simply reflected market pressures. The formula 
bears obvious resemblance to the factors determining wage outcomes in a 
market economy. The skills coefficient can be interpreted as returns to hu­
man capital, C could be taken to represent “compensating differentials” for 
working conditions,2, I  suggests the notion of efficiency wages28, P  and R  
are adjustments for regional conditions (again, compensating differentials), 
and D is the amount of time spent working.
The familiarity of this formula to Western economists thus provides some 
insight into Soviet wage determination. It implies that a potential considera­
tion behind the differentiation of the wage structure was to provide incentives 
to workers to improve their qualifications (Kirsch 1972, p. 101). This objec­
tive was apparently fulfilled insofar as the average educational level of the 
Soviet workforce increased over time: between 1962 and 1979, the share of 
industrial workers classified in the lowest skill group fell 2.3 times, whereas 
the share classified in the highest skill group rose 1.9 times (Kunel’skii 1981, 
p. 151).29 However it is also possible that, because skill scales and basic 
rates were altered infrequently, enterprises inflated skill group classifications 
as a way to pay higher wages and thereby attract and retain workers (see 
below).
Economic reforms initiated in 1956 meant that central control over the 
wage structure was increased. The changes included a reduction in the num-
2 7 This theory is reviewed in Chapter 4.
28 The efficiency wage hypothesis suggests that worker productivity is affected by the 
wage paid: higher wages may lead to improved productivity through, for example, im­
provements in worker nutrition and health (an effect likely to be important in poor coun­
tries) and/or through the positive psychological effects associated with a higher wage (see 
Sapsford and Tzannatos, 1993, pp. 151-2).
29 Of course increasing average educational qualifications of the workforce also charac­
terised market economies over this period: see Shavit and Blossfeld (1993).
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ber of skill groups, increased minimum wages, and the introduction of single 
wage-skill rates for similar occupations across branches. Differentials for 
conditions of work and for geographic location were made more explicit and 
more uniform (Chapman 1977, p. 252). Trends in the extent of inequality 
over time are reviewed below. It is sufficient to note here that Western ana­
lysts observed a trend toward greater uniformity in wage determination and 
outcomes up through the 1970s.30
Even during the period of centralised control, however, Soviet enterprises 
tended to increase wages, especially for lower paid workers. This can be 
explained, at least in Western parts of the USSR, by the problems related 
to labour shortages in industry and high labour turnover (Rutland 1986). 
Enterprises did not, at least until the late 1980s, face hard budget constraints, 
and firm incentives, based on output targets, continued to favour overstaffing. 
For managers, a larger workforce meant that the enterprise had a larger wage 
fund as well as larger incentive funds (BukhvaFd and Pogrebinskaia 1987, p. 
41).
In the 1980s, planners sought to limit wage rises to only 0.35 percent for 
every one percent rise in productivity. This compared to outcomes in industry 
which had risen from 0.23 percent per one percent rise in productivity in the 
early 1950s, up to 0.9 percent in the period 1976-1983. However the limitation 
proved unsuccessful: apparently because production plans were often revised 
downward without reducing the size of the wage fund (Lane 1987, p. 119). 
Figure 2.2 shows the relation between changes in labour productivity and 
wages for selected branches of the Soviet economy between 1966 and 1985, 
suggesting that the largest gaps arose in agriculture.
2 .3 .2  P erce iv ed  P rob lem s
The Soviet system of wage determination developed a number of features 
that came under increasing domestic criticism in the 1980s. However data
30See, for example, Chapman (1977); Malle (1986).
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Figure 2.2: Relation between increases in wages and labour productivity, 
USSR, 1966-1985
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constraints make it difficult to establish the extent to which the percep­
tions reflected the underlying reality. The issues which attracted the most 
attention (and which also overlapped to a significant extent), included in­
flexibility and the related problem of inappropriate norms; the failure of 
bonuses to stimulate work effort; overpayments; inappropriate incentives at 
the enterprise level that tended to lead to, inter alia, overstaffing; and a 
perception that the earnings distribution was overly compressed, resulting 
in inadequate returns to skill and work effort. One important outcome was 
wages drift, whereby earnings outcomes differed significantly from the central 
plan. Each of the perceived problems is elaborated briefly below.
Inflex ib ility
The centralised differentials established in the wage tariff structure have been 
described as “ponderously inflexible and insensitive to labour market condi-
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tions” (Kirsch 1972, p. 169). Tariff revisions were infrequent partly because 
the handbooks which specified in detail the features that a job must have in 
order to be classified in a certain skill group would then have to be revised 
also (Oxenstriena 1990, p. 133). If centrally set wages were inappropriate 
(from the enterprise’s point of view), there were ways to circumvent the tariff.
Norms were widely used as instruments of planning in the command econ­
omy.31 Norms were also utilised (or manipulated) by enterprises to overcome 
perceived inadequacies in the established tariff structure. The determina­
tion of norm levels was largely decentralised since labour input requirements 
depended on the technological conditions at the plant level. Enterprise man­
agers tended to set their plant norms at “unduly low levels” (Bunich 1981), 
in order to facilitate fulfillment. Moreover since output norms were often 
not revised for many years, they became increasingly easy to surpass, re­
sulting in substantially higher wages relative to productivity (Bukhal’d and 
Pogrebinskaia 1987).
Hence official statistics suggested that output norms were overfulfilled 
by as much as 135 percent and occasionally 2-3 times, leading analysts to 
conclude that “a significant number of norms are without technical, organisa­
tional or economic foundation” (Scherbakov 1987, p. 76). It was apparently 
even possible for enterprises to simultaneously fail to meet their established 
output plans and overfulfil their labour norms. A frequently voiced criticism 
in Soviet academic journals by the late 1980s was that unduly low norms 
did not reflect existing levels of productivity, and enabled the payment of 
“excessive” wages.32 From the employers’ perspective, the behaviour was en­
tirely rational -  they wanted to maximise output (Oxenstriena 1990: Hanson 
1987), and low norms and high earnings facilitated recruitment and retention 
of workers to help meet this goal.
01 Including, for example, the organisation and financing of the education sector, dis­
cussed above.
32See, for example, Bukhal’d and Pogrebinskaia (1987).
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Bonuses
The role of bonuses in total labour remuneration increased steadily in com­
plexity and relative size over time. Table 2.5 shows that money wages only 
represented, on average, about two-thirds of labour remuneration. The bal­
ance came under the heading of bonuses and in-kind compensation, which 
are not accounted for in the official wage statistics.
Table 2.5: Composition of labour remuneration, 1980-1991
1980 1985 1991
money wage 70 67 66
bonuses etc 30 33 34
Total 100 100 100
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat
In industry alone, by the mid 1980s there were 56 bonus systems in op­
eration. There were various financing sources for bonus-type payments at 
the enterprise level, including the wage fund, the Material Incentives Fund 
(MIF) and the Social Consumption Fund (SCF). The MIF, which was orig­
inally based on a portion of retained profits, became less directly related, to 
enterprise performance and by the early 1980s at least, shortfalls in the MIF 
at the enterprise level were typically met by cross-subsidies across the branch. 
In the 1960s there were widespread concerns that managers were receiving a 
disproportionately high share of such payments, leading to the introduction 
of more centralised controls.
The SCF was used to finance various non-wage benefits including pre­
schools, health and recreational facilities. For every rouble of wages there 
were 46 kopeks in the SCF in 1965, and this rose to 58 kopeks in 1980 and 
further to 69 kopeks in 1984. According to Scherbakov (1987), bonuses and 
similar elements in the system of labour remuneration became an “automatic 
addition to the wage rate that is intended to preserve the economically nec­
essary level of wages”, used as a way to reduce unplanned labour turnover.
56 CHAPTER 2. SOVIET UZBEKISTAN
“  Overpayments ”
By the late Soviet period, there was widespread discussion in the economics 
literature about a phenomenon known as “overpayment” of workers. There 
were various routes by which this could occur. “VyvodilovkcE was a fre­
quently used term that included the practice of increasing wages through 
higher job classifications. This may have been a rational response by em­
ployers to centrally set wage rates in order to attract and retain workers in 
demand. It also extended to falsification of records by the enterprise. Exam­
ples include falsification of the volume of work done, and bonuses for fictitious 
fulfillment of the plan (Bukhval’d and Pogrebinskaia 1987). Such practices 
were apparently prevalent in the transport and construction branches, where 
output was often overstated by as much as 15-20 percent (ibid.).33 This was 
also referred to as “unearned income”, which extended somewhat further to 
include any illegal activity including the production of defective products and 
pilfering of material inputs such as fuel. In fact these practices occurred on a 
national scale in Uzbekistan during the stewardship of Party Secretary Sharif 
Rashidov in the 1960s, with the falsification of reports of cotton output (see 
Rumer 1989, Chapter 4).34
2.3.3 Wage Reforms
The various problems associated with the system of wage determination led to 
a number of reform attempts being undertaken by Soviet authorities. There 
were two major wage reforms in the post-war period under the presidencies 
of Kruschev (1956-1962) and Gorbachev (1987-1990). The main provisions 
of these reforms were “strikingly similar” (Filtzer 1994, p. 59), and included:
(i) Increased output quotas and basic wage rates, to reduce the frequency
Osipenko (1987) reported that falsifications were found at half the enterprises checked 
that belonged to the Ministry of Construction Materials.
34Interestingly, Rashidov is now regarded as something of a national hero for what has 
been interpreted as his anti-Soviet stance.
2.3. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 57
of payments for ‘overfulfillment’ of norms;
(ii) More extensive use of quality and performance bonuses;
(iii) A substantial regrading of jobs, both downwards and upwards in the 
tariff wage scale; and
(iv) Wider wage differentials between highly and less skilled workers.
Thus in 1987 the Party Congress resolved in favour of the “elimination of
(wage) levelling” and decrees were issued On Improving the Organisation of 
Wages and On Introducing New Wage Rates and Salaries for Personnel in 
the Productive Branches of the National Economy. The Gorbachev reform 
differed from earlier attempts because it was part of a package that aimed 
to introduce a hybrid market socialism with increased economic autonomy 
for enterprises and individuals, albeit still within the framework of predom­
inantly state ownership (IMF et al. 1991, p. 25). The 1987 law On State 
Enterprises, that introduced the principle of self-financing, has already been 
noted. Various rules governing bonuses and premia were relaxed. By January 
1990, 86 percent of the non-agricultural productive workforce in the USSR 
was under the new system (Filtzer 1994, p. 61).
In the agricultural sector, various experiments had taken place in the 
post-war period in an effort to increase productivity. For example, collective 
contracts whereby groups of workers were recognised as a legal entity within 
the jurisdiction of the farm and pledged certain levels of output to the state 
at set prices, designed to increase worker incentives (Laird and Laird 1988). 
However the contracts did not allow the farmers to decide which crop to 
grow, and they remained vulnerable to shortages of key inputs.
Gorbachev’s reforms were associated with an upsurge in the general level 
of wages in the late 1980s. Various measures to restrain wages growth, such as 
limiting wage rises to increases in productivity in 1989, failed. Subsequently 
a tax on excess wages was introduced, though with a series of exemptions 
that were progressively widened. The Gorbachev wage reform was eventually 
abandoned at the end of 1990.
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The conclusions of this review can be summarised as follows. In some 
senses the operation of the Soviet labour market was not very different to 
what is observed in established market economies. In fact a number of the 
rules, relating to the recognition of educational qualifications and the con­
ditions of work, for example, were in fact designed to reflect market forces. 
This was of course necessary, since individuals were largely free to choose 
their education and career paths. Moreover, even within the constraints of 
the central plan, the employer had substantial discretion in terms of set­
ting output norms and assigning individual employees to their skill and job 
grades.
This similarity does not however mean that the wage outcomes mirrored 
those found in market economies. There remained fundamental differences 
in the nature of the respective economic systems. Most importantly, the 
objective of Soviet firms was not profit maximisation, but rather the max­
imisation of output and employment. This had significant implications for 
wage outcomes, as shown in the next section.
2.4 Wage Outcomes
The picture portrayed of the Soviet wage structure typically is one of rigidity 
and pervasive and intrinsic inefficiencies. To quote the World Bank’s 1996 
World Development Report, “wage structures were rigid and varied little 
from top to bottom” (p. 72). In fact, however, official data on the structure 
of relative wages suggest some significant changes over the decade prior to 
transition. Moreover, levels of earnings inequality were of similar orders of 
magnitude to countries of Western Europe. This is not surprising in that the 
wage setting formulae explicitly sought to reward skill and effort, and com­
pensate for differences in working conditions, and were thus not dissimilar to 
the factors that are thought to affect wage outcomes in market economies.30
35 As reviewed in Chapter 4.
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This section examines evidence about wage outcomes in the demographic 
and economic context of the republic, and the institutional framework that 
governed wage setting. Evidence is available along three dimensions: the 
structure of wages by sector, the inter-republic structure of wages, and the 
extent of wage inequality.
2.4 .1  In ter-sectora l R e la tiv itie s
Trends in the structure of wages by sector (branch) in the late Soviet period 
show a relative improvement in the wage position of agricultural workers 
over the decade prior to transition (Table 2.6). By 1991, agricultural wages 
averaged 10 percent above the economy-wide mean. Over the same period, 
workers in industry appeared to lose their relatively privileged position. Fur­
ther down the distribution, however, among workers in the social sectors 
(health, social security, education and culture), there was greater stability in 
the ranking. Likewise, at the top end of the distribution, wages in construc­
tion, transport and communications remained well above average.
Table 2.6: Relative wages by branch, 1980-1991
1980 1985 1991
industry 107 109 100
agriculture 97 94 109
transport and communications 108 110 125
construction 132 134 122
trade and catering 83 83 82
housing and communal services 75 75 73
health and social security 77 75 73
education and culture 84 89 77
science 104 110 112
credit and insurance 93 94 178
state administration 93 90 108
Total 100 100 100
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat
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An important caveat needs to be recalled with respect to the foregoing 
pattern of wage differentials, which is limited to money wages as determined 
by the centralised wage tariff. This was shown in Table 2.5. The distribu­
tion of bonuses and other compensation was used by enterprise managers to 
attract and retain labour and skills in demand.
2.4.2 Inter-republic R elativities
The Soviet wage tariff was set centrally, so that sectoral wage relativities 
under the tariff system in Uzbekistan were similar to those, for example, in 
Russia. Table 2.7 shows republic level branch averages for Uzbekistan and 
Russia relative to a Soviet average (100). At least until the late 1980s, con­
struction and industrial workers were relatively better paid, whereas those 
working in agriculture received below-average wages. Average wages in the 
service sector (education, health, housing, culture) and administration, were 
even less than in agriculture. At the same time the overall level of nominal 
wages in Uzbekistan was below the Union wide level: in 1987 the average 
monthly rouble wage in Uzbekistan was 169.7, compared to 216.1 in Rus­
sia. Available evidence on official prices of consumer goods suggest that the 
differentials were even greater in real terms (Klugman 1996).
The significant differences in average branch wages among the Soviet 
republics are surprising to the extent that wages were determined by Union­
wide tariffs that should in principle have applied equally in Russia and Uzbek­
istan. At the branch level, individuals might have been expected to have the 
same average wages, wherever they happened to live in the USSR. On the 
other hand, of course, average wages in the two republics would be affected by 
compositional factors, and in particular the relative importance of different 
sectors and the skills of employees therein. Moreover, as Lane (1987), Malle 
(1985) and others have pointed out, the Soviet labour market was differen­
tiated on the demand side. This reflected the priority accorded to certain 
sectors and the status of specific working groups (in particular, women).
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Table 2.7: Monthly wages by branch, Uzbekistan and Russia, 1987
Sector Russia Uzbekistan
industry 114 90
agriculture 108 78
transport and communications 110 85
construction 134 110
trade and catering 82 66
housing and communal services 80 62
health and social security 75 67
education 84 82
science 111 97
credit and insurance 105 83
state administration 99 81
Republican Average 107 84
SOURCE: IMF et al. 1991
The outcomes would also be expected to reflect differences on the supply 
side of the labour market. Regional wage differentials may have reflected 
local market conditions, in particular, the relative abundance of labour re­
sources in Uzbekistan described in Section 2. The situation in Uzbekistan 
differed from that in the European parts of the USSR where labour short­
ages induced management to increase wages to maintain a stable and well- 
motivated workforce. Moreover since the size of wage funds was the product 
of negotiations between enterprises and higher administrative bodies, it is 
also quite plausible that enterprises located in Uzbekistan had lower prestige 
and political muscle and hence relatively weak bargaining power compared 
to firms located closer to Moscow.
Overall, despite the complex and extensive institutional framework that 
was established to govern payments to labour, the processes and outcomes 
may not have been dissimilar to those observed in market economies.36 As
36 An analogy can be drawn here to comparisons of wage outcomes in Australia and the 
United Kingdom. The two countries reflect a similar structure and extent of unionisation, 
though one might expect that the different institutional settings, in particular the system
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Lane (1987, p. 177) noted, “The differentiation in the (Soviet) labour market 
is the consequence of complex interchanges between administrative decision, 
traditional values and market shortage”. Although directed at sectoral dif­
ferentials, this observation has relevance for the inter-republic differences. It 
would also hold equally well as a description of wage outcomes in a developed 
market economy like Australia.
This does not mean that wage outcomes would necessarily mirror those 
found in market economies. A key difference lies in the objectives of firms: 
Soviet firms aimed to fulfill centrally set targets, and there was no general 
motivation to minimise costs or maximise profits.
2 .4 .3  E x ten t o f  In eq uality
As noted above, the Soviet distribution of earnings is typically believed to 
have been more compressed than in market economies, consistent with the 
egalitarian objectives of the planners of a socialist society. By the late Soviet 
period at least, a number of Soviet economists expressed the views that 
(i) the distribution of wages was “too narrow”; and (ii) this had adverse 
repercussions for efficiency in the labour market and the economy generally. 
There is some evidence for the proposition that skill differentials were narrow* 
relative to differentials in market economies, as shown in the next section. 
In this section the focus is on the overall distribution of wages.
The evidence for the Soviet Union and Uzbekistan does not suggest an 
unusually compressed interpersonal distribution of earnings however. This 
conclusion is supported by an evaluation of the available evidence, based on 
micro-data, about the extent of wage inequality, in the context of findings 
for Eastern and Western Europe. Before proceeding, a brief elaboration of 
the alternative inequality indicators is given.
of wage awards and arbitration tribunals in Australia, to have had a significant impact. In 
fact, the resulting sets of wage relativities have been similar, although the overall earnings 
distribution has tended to be more equal in Australia (Norris 1996, p. 211).
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Measures of Inequality
Several indicators of inequality are presented in this section, drawing upon 
earlier studies of distribution during the Soviet period. The Gini coefficient is 
a measure summarising evidence for the whole distribution under considera­
tion. A simple mathematical interpretation is that twice the Gini coefficient 
is equal to the expected difference in incomes, relative to their mean, between 
any two people drawn at random from the population (Atkinson and Mick- 
lewright 1992, p.25). For example, a Gini of 0.3 means that the expected 
difference between the wages of two randomly chosen individuals is 60 per­
cent of the average wage. The Gini has a range between zero and one, and 
the higher the Gini, the less equal is the distribution (see Deaton 1997, p. 
138-140).
The Gini is often defined from the Lorenz curve: in geometric terms, the 
Gini measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the (45 degree) line 
of equal incomes. The Lorenz curve is constructed by ranking individuals 
in ascending order of their earnings, and then calculating their cumulative 
share of total earnings. That is, the Gini coefficient is
where the y* are the individual incomes (wages), which are arranged in as­
Other inequality indicators are more sensitive to changes at the extremes 
of the distribution. One commonly used and simple measure is the 90/10 
or decile ratio. The decile ratio equals the earnings of an individual at the 
ninetieth percentile over that of an individual at the tenth percentile. An­
other indicator is the so-called “P10” denotes the average earnings of indi­
viduals in the bottom decile relative to the earnings of the median individual, 
expressed as a percentage.
A recent review by Wolfson (1997) draws attention to drawbacks associ­
ated with commonly used measures. A number of measures are evaluated in
cending order, V is the mean, and the population is size N.
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terms of a basic axiom of inequality measurement -  the Pigou-Dalton con­
dition of transfers, that a transfer from a better off individual to a worse off 
individual should reduce the extent of inequality, which is formally equivalent 
to a Lorenz criterion. A simple numerical example shows the problem with 
the P10 measure, for example.
Say there are three individuals with incomes (1, 5, 9). If the middle indi­
vidual gives one unit of income to the individual at the bottom, the resulting 
distribution (2, 4, 9) is clearly more equal according to the Lorenz curve cri­
terion. However the P10 measure increases, indicating an opposite direction 
of change. Wolfson (1997) concludes, quite strongly, that the decile ratio and 
the P10 have “no redeeming features” for the measurement of formal concepts 
of inequality, but concedes that their continued popularity is understandable, 
given their understandability and wide availability. The solution suggested 
by Wolfson (1997) is to use a carefully chosen set of measures, rather than 
rely on one or two in isolation.
The picture of inequality presented in this thesis is based on the Gini 
coefficient, the decile ratio and P10 measures. The justification is two-fold. 
First, the review is based on the measures used in already published sources. 
Common measures are attractive in part because their popularity facilitates 
cross-country comparisons, which are an important aspect of the present 
analysis.
Second, the decile ratio and P10 do not require information on the full 
distribution of earnings. Notably, they ignore information on the shape of 
the distribution within the first and last deciles, which may be particularly 
badly measured for a whole host of reasons that are especially important in 
the formerly planned economies.3. Hence the problems arising from mismea- 
surement at the top and bottom of the distribution are alleviated somewhat.38
3'I am grateful to John Micklewright for communications on this point.
3S0f course, the problems arise in part because we are interested in what is happening 
at the top and bottom of the distribution -  thus while 75/25 ratio might be expected to 
be more robust (as shown in Chapter 9, for example), useful information would thereby
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Evidence about Earnings Inequality
There have been a number of studies of earnings inequality during the period 
of central planning. Comparative evidence about levels of inequality reveals 
contrasts among the various command economies, as well as trends in the 
extent of inequality over time.
The extent of inequality in the distribution of earnings has varied over 
time, reflecting changes in institutional rules and in economic conditions. 
Following the increase in centralised control over the wage structure in 1956 
that was described in the previous section, the wage decile ratio fell from 
8:1 to 4:1 over the next two decades (Chapman 1977, p. 252). It is however 
difficult to directly attribute such trends to institutional changes, since falling 
rates of capital investment and capital productivity may have also played a 
role, as explained below.
There were significant differences among the planned economies of East­
ern Europe and even within the different republics of the USSR. Atkinson 
and Micklewright’s (1992) extensive study suggests that the magnitude of 
earnings inequality for the whole USSR was greater than for some Eastern 
European comparators, including then-Czechoslovakia and Poland, and even 
higher than Great Britain in 1986 (Table 2.8). The Gini coefficient was lowest 
in Czechoslovakia, where there was almost total socialisation of agriculture 
and severe restrictions on private business activity (Milanovic 1998, p. 13). 
In Poland, where private agriculture was permitted, the Gini coefficient was 
somewhat closer to Soviet levels. The fact that the Soviet distribution of 
earnings was comparatively unequal is of course not surprising in that the 
USSR is a much larger and more diverse country than any of the comparators 
listed, with over 250 million people in a range of economic and demographic 
circumstances.
A different picture might be expected to emerge if the distribution by 
republic is examined; specifically, one would expect within-republic distrib-
be “discarded” .
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Table 2.8: Measures of earnings inequality, selected countries
Gini Coefficient P 10 Decile Ratio
USSR .276 55.7 3.28
Czechoslovakia (1987) .197 63.2 2.45
Poland .242 55.7 2.77
Great Britain .267 55.7 3.23
SOURCE: Atkinson and Micklewright 1992, Table 4.1 
NOTE: See text for definition of the measures used.
ution of earnings to have been narrower. Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) 
concluded that this was indeed the case, as shown in Table 2.9. They found 
that Uzbekistan ranked fourth out of the 15 republics in the decile ratio for 
full-time workers.39
Table 2.9: Measures of earnings inequality, 1981 and 1986
Gini-coefficient Decile Ratio P10 (percent)
1981 2.90 60.3
1986 2.98 61.5
USSR (1986) .276 3.28 55.7
SOURCE: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), Tables 4.1 and 4.3.
2.4.4 Returns to Human Capital
It was widely perceived by Soviet economists that low returns to education 
and skills and on-the-job training were a critical problem with the system 
of earnings. To quote one leading Soviet analyst, “Wages now offer less 
motivation to master complex, highly skilled and highly productive (jobs)” 
(Scherbakov 1987, p.73).40 The general view of Western commentators has 
also been that the returns to human capital investment, and especially to
39The most equal of all the republics was Moldova -  population 4.3 million -  with a decile 
ratio of 2.8, while the highest decile ratios were observed for Russia, 3.3 and Armenia, 3.4.
40Scherbakov was writing as the head of the Department of Labour at the All-Union 
level in Moscow.
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higher education, were low in the centrally planned regimes (see, for example, 
Rutkowski 1995; Ozarem and Vodopevic 1997; Newell and Reilly 1996).41 
Ideally, for the purposes of providing a benchmark for the micro-analysis in 
PART II, some measures of distribution by education or skill level would be 
presented. The direct evidence for Soviet Uzbekistan is however scarce, and 
there is no possibility of multi-variate analysis to fully control for the effect of 
human capital variables on earnings outcomes. There are nonetheless some 
features that can be gleaned from the evidence that is available, as well as 
cause for caution in interpretation, as shown below.
Table 2.10 compares money wages by broad job position, and by branch, 
relative to an economy-wide mean. Several categories are presented: first, 
a Soviet concept which translates as “engineering and technical personnel” 
(ITRs); second, employees (both white and blue collar); third, managers; 
and fourth, specialists, who have vocational or secondary specialist edu­
cation. It shows some remarkably similar patterns across branches of the 
economy. Managers were generally receiving wages about 20 percent above 
the branch average. On the other hand, so-called specialists received below 
branch average wages (typically about one-fourth less than the mean). In the 
heavy resource extraction industries such as mining and metallurgy, employ­
ees’ wages averaged about double those of specialists, and generally exceeded 
those of the managers’.
In the mid 1980s, the range in wage rates between the highest and lowest 
skill grades in light industry was only 50-60 percent. The growth rate of 
wages of specialists and managers lagged behind that of workers; in a number 
of branches, including machine building, construction materials and mining, 
the wage of workers was higher than that of engineering technical personnel 
(Kostin 1988, p.63; Scherbakov 1987, p. 74). This situation was seen to 
contravene the socialist principle of payment according to one’s labour.42
41 These studies are among those reviewed in Chapter 4.
42 At least by the 1980s, the writings of Soviet academicians and leadership (eg Gor­
bachev) portrayed the principle that individuals ought to be remunerated according to
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Table 2.10: Distribution of wages by job position, 1989
ITR employees managers specialists Average
(percentage of average) (roubles)
industry 102 131 125 73 386
mining 107 126 124 75 556
energy 104 141 120 75 569
machine building 125 120 123 76 398
light industry, including 100 135 118 77 324
textile 102 127 119 76 359
food 101 117 128 74 298
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat
And among the results that flowed, domestic commentators observed that an 
“unjustifiably large number of persons with higher education have become 
blue collar workers” (Scherbakov 1987). The share of persons with higher 
education engaged in primarily physical work rose from 1.5 percent in 1959 
to 3.1 percent in 1970 to 7.7 percent in 1979 (Porket 1989, Table 8.3).
The importance of higher education in the socialist system may have ex­
tended beyond the monetary returns. For several reasons -  including the 
limits on asset and wealth accumulation, the number of essential and elite 
services (from housing to childcare to holiday resorts) that were tied to the 
individual’s job, and the fact that connections rather than roubles governed 
access to those goods and services in greatest scarcity (Atkinson and Mick- 
lewright 1992) — one might expect that the value of higher education would 
have been enhanced to the extent that access to networks and positions as­
sociated wdth these perquisites was thereby facilitated.
As noted already, the absence of micro-economic empirical evidence calls 
for caution; in particular, many of the Soviet studies failed to control for other 
factors like experience and location that would be expected to affect wage 
outcomes. There is also need for caution in attributing causes of the observed
their contribution to output as consistent with socialist principles of distribution. Of 
course this comes to close to saying that people ought to be paid their marginal product.
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outcomes. With these caveats in mind, the evidence available suggests the 
following tentative conclusions about the returns to education during the 
Soviet period.
First, specialists tended to be worse, or at least not much better, paid 
than workers, despite their further formal education at PTUs or universi­
ties. Oxenstriena (1990) found that when the intra-branch extent of tariff 
wage differentials was wider than the actual extent of the differentials, this 
was often because low skilled workers were receiving high wages. This was 
attributed to relatively high demand for low skilled labour and the back­
wardness of Soviet industry (p. 149). The fact that individuals still chose 
to pursue higher education and careers as specialists can be attributed to 
the non-pecuniary aspects of work and the gender division of labour. Work 
in a specialist position may have enabled the individual greater flexibility in 
terms of working hours as well as more pleasant working conditions. This 
may have also contributed to gender segregation in the labour market on the 
supply side (see below). It is nonetheless worth noting evidence (for Russia) 
that the attractiveness of higher education had declined over time.43
Second, as already noted, significant numbers of university graduates and 
people with specialised education were engaged as workers. In 1987, an esti­
mated 10 percent of university graduates and 36 percent of specialists were 
engaged as “workers” in the USSR (Filtzer 1994, p. 237). This figure had 
rapidly increased, by 9 percentage points in 1987 over 1985, and by a further 
6 percentage points to 1989, despite initiatives from the late 1970s that pro­
vided for earnings increments to individuals of high vocational skills of up to 
50 percent of the wage, in recognition of the fact that salaries “do not always 
reflect higher skill levels” (Bunich 1981, p. 37). The increasing likelihood 
that an individual with higher education would end up being employed as a
43 According to surveys of secondary school students in the 1960s, 80-90 percent desired 
to gain admission to a higher educational institution; by the mid 1970s, this figure had 
dropped to 50 percent (Porket, 1989, p. 146). The declining cohort enrolment rates have 
already been noted: Table 2.3.
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worker can be attributed to both supply and demand-side factors. On the 
supply-side, the monetary rewards of workers’ jobs often made such posi­
tions more attractive, while on the demand side, there was relatively higher 
demand for workers. In addition, the mismatch implies that the system of 
“planned enrolments” (whereby the demand for graduates in different fields 
ought to equal their supply from education institutions) was not functioning 
well.
Third, there is survey evidence that was compiled in order to investi­
gate the significant crude gender wage gap suggesting that “there was little 
connection between earnings and education in the USSR”, particularly for 
women (McAuley 1981, p. 146). In one sample, drawn from the Russian 
industrial city of Taganrog in 1967-70, 40 percent of the women were classed 
(and paid) as unskilled though they had at least a secondary specialist edu­
cation. About half of both men and women with at least secondary specialist 
education were classed as “semi-skilled”. Another sample, drawn at the same 
time, revealed that office staff who had on average 9.5 years of schooling 
earned only 97 rubles per month on average, compared to the 152.5 rubles 
earned by w'orkers with an average of 9.1 years of schooling. These figures 
provide some insights, but are based on cross-tabulations rather than multi­
variate analysis with a set of controls like level of experience, region and 
other factors that would be expected to affect wage outcomes. Hence the 
differences likely reflect gender discrimination against office staff (of whom 
women comprised the majority), as well as low returns to education.
Fourth, and related to the foregoing, is the importance of segmentation 
in the Soviet labour market. While employers were largely free to recruit, 
workers’ geographical mobility was significantly constrained by administra­
tive restrictions (the residence permit or propiska) ,44 This was compounded 
by pervasive housing shortages, especially in urban areas. In such a context
44At least up through the late 1970s, discriminatory legislation made it harder for work­
ers on collective farms (kolhozniki) to obtain internal passports and leave the land (Katz, 
1994, p. 81).
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one would expect that individuals would face difficulties in finding work that 
best utilised their skills. Hence the impact of education on earnings might 
thereby be diminished.
A final, more general point about the interpretation of evidence about 
skill differentials is needed. One has to be cautious in attributing a causal 
relationship between narrow skill differentials on the one hand, and the ex­
isting rules and institutions on the other. There are other reasons that could 
account for the former. Most obvious, perhaps, is the fact of low capital pro­
ductivity and low rates of technical progress. It has been shown in the US 
that the productivity of highly educated workers is greater the higher the rate 
of technological change (Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987). Empirical estimates 
of labour demand using cross-section time series over the period 1960-1980 
found that “the relative demand for educated workers declines as the capital 
stock (and presumably the technology embedded therein) ages” (Bartel and 
Lichtenberg 1987, p. 11). For Australia, Chapman and Tan (1992) found 
that the returns to on-the-job training are higher for individuals employed 
in industries experiencing rapid rates of technological change, as proxied by 
estimated rates of growth of multi-factor productivity.
Rates of total factor productivity growth in Uzbekistan had been at best 
stagnant in the couple of decades prior to independence. According to the 
estimates presented by Easterly and Fischer (1995), total factor productivity 
growth in Uzbekistan was amongst the worst of the Soviet republics, averag­
ing -0.4 percent over the period 1970-1990, and was as low as -3.7 percent in 
agriculture. A number of observers noted that much of the republic’s capital 
stock was obsolete at independence (e.g. Pomfret 1995).
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of the wage tariff and associated 
rules, from the effects of low rates of investment and productivity growth on 
returns to human capital and wage outcomes. This problem is implicit in 
the comments of some domestic observers. For example, Kostin (1987) stated 
that the compressed wage structure reduced the motivation of managers and
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specialists to “accelerate scientific-technological progress, to improve prod­
uct quality and increase labour productivity”, suggesting that the various 
dimensions compounded each other.
2.5 C onclusions
This chapter has evaluated the factors that influenced the determination of 
wages in pre-transition Uzbekistan. The passage of time since the collapse of 
the Soviet regime is only short -  the microeconometric analysis in PART II 
is based on data collected three years after independence. One would expect 
that the institutional factors and behavioural norms associated with seventy 
years of communism would wield a strong influence on outcomes in 1995. 
Although direct empirical investigation of earnings determination in Soviet 
Uzbekistan is constrained by the absence of representative microdata, the 
conclusions are important for the analysis in the chapters that follow.
The demographic and economic structure of the republic tended to be 
associated, even prior to the transition, with significant labour surplus. Agri­
culture has traditionally played an important role in providing income earn­
ing opportunities. While the workforce is well-educated by international 
standards, the rigid and narrow nature of the Soviet education system cre­
ates a suspicion that the skills transmitted would be less useful in market 
conditions.
Within the centralised economic system that existed in the USSR, the 
institutional framework for wages applied to jobs, not to individuals. As in 
Western economies, employers had autonomy both in assigning individuals to 
jobs, their associated skill grades and, to a significant extent, in the allocation 
of non-wage remuneration. Since 1956, Soviet workers had been free to choose 
their type and place of work, and to change jobs as they wished.
This review suggested that the earnings outcomes in Soviet Uzbekistan, 
as elsewhere in the USSR, often tended to frustrate the goals of the planners.
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Soviet policy makers were engaged in a continuing “struggle” to raise labour 
productivity, and the tariff system was designed to reward the “scientifically 
measurable” contribution of each worker in accordance with the principle 
of “equal pay for equal work” (Rutland 1986, p. 195). Individual wage 
differentiation within the planned system had several aspects, including a 
managerially assigned adjustment (razryad, or coefficient of personal labour 
contribution) for each job, as well as significant variance in the amount of 
bonuses across branches.
In practice the goals of the planners were not met, for several reasons, 
including increasing resort by employers to non-wage payments and to such 
expedients as setting low output norms, and this was reflected in the con­
tinued wages drift from the plan. Yet the determinants of wages and the 
associated outcomes still seemed to depart significantly from what would be 
expected in a market economy. This can be traced, at least in part, to the fact 
that management itself did not have incentives to increase efficiency in the 
firm: their dominant motivation was to attract and secure reliable workers.
The Soviet economics literature of the 1980s often discussed the issues of 
labour incentives and an “overly compressed” distribution of earnings which 
accorded inadequate returns to investments in education and training. How­
ever while skill differentials were narrow, the level of earnings inequality was 
not dissimilar to what is observed in Western economies -  in other words, the 
fact that education and skills were not well-rewarded cannot be attributed 
to an overly compressed distribution of earnings overall. To quote Rutland 
(1986, p. 196)
“... the Soviet problem with incentives is not, as is frequently 
assumed in the West, a result of a distaste for differentials per se.
The difficulties stem from an inability to so organise the incentive 
schemes so as to reward efficient work”.
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That these problems persisted despite major wage reforms in the late 
1960s and 1980s is perhaps largely explicable in terms of the extensive cen­
tralised controls over prices and output, and the peculiar incentives facing 
Soviet employers to meet output plans alongside pervasive shortages of other 
material inputs and soft budget constraints. These latter problems have been 
tackled as part of the economic reforms undertaken since independence, the 
subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Transition and the Labour 
Market
3.1 Introduction
Over the past five years, liberalisation of the economy in Uzbekistan has been 
associated with a series of policies and features that would be expected to 
affect the operations and outcomes of the labour market. The range of in­
struments of state control has been gradually curtailed through reduced state 
orders, privatisation, and the relaxation of restrictions on private sector ac­
tivity. At the macroeconomic level, the transition from a command economy 
in Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in the region, was associated with significant 
declines in output (IMF 1997).
Several changes in the labour market might be expected to be associated 
with the macroeconomic and structural changes in the economy. These in­
clude reduced demand for labour in the short term (increased unemployment 
and/or real wage cuts), and changes in relative wages. A widening in the dis­
tribution of earnings and higher returns to human capital investment would 
be expected to follow liberalisation of the wage tariff and in accordance with 
changes in product demand.
This chapter addresses some key questions about the impact of recent
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macroeconomic and structural changes on wages in Uzbekistan. Its structure 
mirrors that of the previous chapter. The next section considers dramatic 
trends in the macroeconomy and in the supply and quality of labour. Sec­
tion 3 reviews institutional and structural reforms that would be expected 
to influence wage outcomes. These include reforms to the legal framework 
governing labour relations, and in the agricultural, enterprise and financial 
sectors. Labour market outcomes -  employment, unemployment and wages 
- are examined in a regional context in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the 
chapter.
For the most part, the focus is on the period 1992-1996, since the em­
pirical investigation in PART II is based on data collected in mid-1995. The 
quantitative evidence in this chapter is limited mainly to official data, the 
nature of which has changed little since the Soviet era.1 The regional context 
encompasses the 28 countries in transition in Europe and Central Asia; al­
though the focus is on former Soviet comparators and neighbouring countries, 
for obvious reasons.
3.2 Determinants of Wages
3 .2 .1  D em and -sid e: M acroecon om ic Trends
On the demand side of the labour market, one would expect wage outcomes 
to have been affected by dramatic deterioration of macroeconomic indicators 
during the transition period. This is true even if macroeconomic outcomes 
have not been as unfavorable in Uzbekistan as in other countries in the 
region. This is shown in Table 3.1. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
and thesis, to fully explain these outcomes, which have been explored by 
Pomfret (1995; 1997), and Klugman (1996; 1998). Here the main trends are 
simply summarised, in a regional context, as set out in Table 3.1.
LSee Chapter 2 for a review of the Soviet sources and the associated problems.
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Table 3.1: Macroeconomic indicators during transition, 1992-1997
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Real GDP (percentage change)
Uzbekistan -11.2 -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 1.6 2.4
Kazakhstan -2.9 -10.4 -17.8 -8.9 1.1 2.0
Russian Federation -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.0 -5.0 1.0
Annual Inflation Rate (CPI Percentage Change)
Uzbekistan 645 534 1568 305 54 65
Kazakhstan 1,381 1,662 1,892 176 39 18
Russian Federation 1,526 875 307 198 48 17
Government Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Uzbekistan 43.4 38.8 38.4 38.7 41.5 33.9
Kazakhstan 31.8 25.2 25.9 20.7 18.5 -
Russian Federation 65.8 43.3 45.0 37.7 38.7 -
SOURCE: TransMONEE 3.0 (UNICEF/ICDC 1998)
• Large Declines in O utput. There have been massive declines in output 
in all the countries of the region.2 Despite signs of bottom ing out, 
in 1997 only Poland had recovered to 1989 levels of output (UNICEF 
1998). Uzbekistan has done relatively well, by former Soviet standards. 
This is shown in the Table, relative to  Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation. The cumulative decline in production am ounted to  about 
14.5 percent through to  the end of 1997, compared to, for example, 59 
percent in fast reforming Kyrgyzstan.3
The relatively better aggregate growth outcome in Uzbekistan has been 
attribu ted  to  a number of factors, including more favourable initial
2 Real measures of output change are difficult to compute in a period of rapidly changing 
relative prices. This problem is considered in detail below in the context of real wages. 
However there is broad agreement among national statistical agencies and international 
organisations such as the EBRD, IMF and World Bank about the country rankings in 
terms of the relative magnitudes of decline.
3Still, however, CIS Goskomstat has estimated that the level of GDP in Uzbekistan in 
1995 was no higher than that of twenty years prior (1974) (for Kazakhstan, 1995 output 
was equal to that of 1972): CIS STAT (1996).
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conditions insofar as its main exports (cotton and gold) could be trans­
ported and sold for hard currency (Pomffet and Anderson 1998, p. 2).4 
It should be noted that there are sectoral differences in economic per­
formance: industry, transport and communications and construction 
had negative growth in each year between 1992 and 1995; whereas the 
category of “other services” had expanded each year, as had agriculture 
(with the exception of 1994) (IMF 1997, Table 1).
• Slowdown in Inflation. Uzbekistan experienced very high inflation dur­
ing the years 1992-1994, peaking in the last year at over 1,500 percent. 
This has been traced to a combination of monetary factors, including 
monetary financing of the fiscal deficit and the import of roubles while 
the republic remained in the rouble zone (IMF 1997).5 One could also 
point to expectations-related factors after 1992, and the disruptions 
to input supply and trading arrangements that created output supply 
constraints. From late 1994 the annual rate of inflation was sharply 
reduced, to 117 percent by the end of 1995. The authorities moved to­
wards stabilizing the economy since that time, through a combination 
of tight financial policies and a significant reduction in the fiscal deficit, 
albeit with some lapses (e.g. in the fourth quarter of 1996). At over 
60 percent in 1997, the annual rate of inflation was still very high by 
international standards, and even relative to neighbouring Kazakhstan 
and Russia.
• Absence of Fiscal Crisis. That government revenue should decline dur­
ing this period is not surprising, given that a reduction in the role of the
4On the other hand, the World Bank has argued that continuing government regulation 
and support tends to postpone, rather than avoid, output decline (World Bank, 1996a). 
The debate on this point is beyond the scope of this thesis.
5 Between 1992 and 1994 large volumes of roubles flowed into Uzbekistan from other 
republics that had already introduced their own national currency (Shibarshova and 
Nabikhodjaev, 1997). Uzbekistan introduced the soum-coupon in November 1993 and 
the soum in July 1994.
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state, with privatisation and growing informal sector activity, is inher­
ent in the notion of transition. In many countries, however, there has 
been a virtual collapse in government tax collections that, in turn, has 
made the fulfillment of even minimal state functions difficult (UNICEF 
1998, Chapter 1). The strong revenue effort and the limited extent of 
tax arrears in Uzbekistan stand in sharp contrast to many countries in 
transition. Total revenue as a share of national income has declined, 
but far less so than the mean for countries in transition reported by the 
EBRD (1995, Table 6.5).6 Between 1994 and 1997, the budget deficit 
has been kept to around 4-7 percent of GDP without substantial re­
ductions of the share of public spending in national income. However 
there have been arrears on the expenditure side - loans from the state 
budget were extended to the agricultural sector and the Pension Fund 
in late 1996 to help clear the accumulated arrears (IMF 1997).
In sum, the drop in output has been much less severe than experienced in 
neighbouring countries while, as recently noted by the World Bank (1998a), 
the Government is apparently committed to macroeconomic stability. In 
contrast to the macroeconomic performance of Uzbekistan, the record witYi 
respect to structural reform is generally regarded as less favourable. The 
World Bank's 1996 World Development Report, From Plan to Market, put 
the country in the bottom-ranked group on various indicators of reform. Re­
views conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) have accorded a similarly poor ranking. Pomfret and Anderson 
(1997, Table 1) put Uzbekistan at the bottom of the list of Central Asian 
republics in terms of the speed and extent of liberalisation. The key elements 
of institutional and structural reforms affecting labour market outcomes are 
detailed in the next section. Before proceeding, however, changes on the sup­
ply side of the labour market and the implications for wages are considered.
6 Still, tax arrears (ie. non-payment of tax obligations) were estimated by the IMF and 
government authorities to amount to 2.5 percent of GDP in Uzbekistan in 1994 and 1995.
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3 .2 .2  L abour Sup p ly  C hanges
Key changes on the supply-side of the labour market relate to changes in the 
aggregate numbers of working age people and their rates of participation in 
the labour force, and changes in the stock of human capital. In this section 
evidence is reviewed on each of these aspects; the focus is on education and 
the human capital dimensions, which have most relevance to the empirical 
analysis of earnings in PART II.
Official demographic data show that the working-age population has con­
tinued to increase at a high rate. Between 1990 and 1996, the amount of 
labour resources' increased by over 13 percent nationally, and faster in rural 
areas (Goskomprognostat 1997). The pace of population growth varies quite 
markedly by region (Klugman and Marnie 1998, Table 1.6). In particular, 
since 1990 the working age population of Tashkent city has fallen, while 
growth rates in excess of 20 percent have been experienced in such oblasts 
as Syrkhandarya and Kashkadarya.8 This has been partially offset at the 
national level by the out-migration of many Slavs (Klugman and Schieber 
1997, Table 7), who tended to dominate skilled occupations in the country 
(Lubin 1984). Between 1989 and 1995 about 721.000 individuals (3.6 percent 
of the population) migrated out of the country, but this was more than offset
^The Soviet concept of labour resources is the closest we have to the Western/ ILO 
notion of labour force participation (Klugman and Scott, 1997). It comprises the popu­
lation aged between 16 and 60 years of age minus invalids and those on special pensions, 
plus people outside the age range who are working, and youth who are studying but avail­
able for work. An unknown proportion of individuals classed as part of labour resources 
would not actually be seeking work. Estimates of labour force participation based on 
representative survey data are presented in Section 4.
sThe stagnation of the capital’s population is somewhat surprising given the experience 
of many developing countries where metropolitan areas have expanded rapidly as people 
move to the city in search of work. The different situation in Uzbekistan can be attributed 
to (a) the outmigration of Slavs, who tended to live in the capital (see Klugman and 
Schieber, 1997, Table 1.2); (b) the legacy of residential control permits, known as propiski, 
which mean that individuals without a permit face harassment by the authorities; and 
(c) the strong cultural emphasis on the family which contributes to the low mobility of 
the rural population (Lubin, 1984). Rapid population growth in rural areas can also be 
attributed to lesser access to family planning services (Klugman and Schieber, 1997).
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by natural population increase of 19.2 percent over the period.
On the supply side of the labour market, education is seen to have a 
key influence on wage outcomes. There are a plethora of empirical studies 
for established market economies which show that education has a positive 
impact on the level of earnings (see Psacharopoulos 1994, and the studies 
cited therein). The economic model underlying this empirical regularity, the 
human capital theory of earnings, is set out in the next chapter. Education 
also tends to enhance income earning opportunities by reducing the risk of 
unemployment, as will be shown for Uzbekistan later in this chapter, and 
might increase the ability of individuals to cope with change (see Chapters 
4 and 7). Hence trends in enrolments are of clear relevance to the empirical 
analysis of wage outcomes in PART II.
R efo rm s in  E du ca tion
To what extent has the inherited Soviet system of education been subject 
to reform since 1992? The structure of education in Uzbekistan, as well as 
its curricula, instruction methods and teaching training, are still strongly 
influenced by the socialist legacy (Tibi 1995, p. 93). These aspects were 
reviewed in the previous chapter, along with the associated shortcomings, 
and need not be revisited.
There have been substantial real declines in state financing of education in 
Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (Klugman, forthcoming). 
Clearly, this would have placed significant pressures on the sector at all levels 
of education, and have made qualitative improvements difficult to design and 
implement.9
Since 1994, higher education institutions have been allowed to recruit 
up to 50 percent more students than their allocated quota, and to charge
9 One academic visitor to Samarkand University paints a depressing picture of student 
apathy and lack of interest, which is attributed to (i) the pressure on living standards, 
which forces many students to take up outside work; (ii) lack of confidence in the relevance 
of the courses; and (iii) very low probability of failure (Esfahani and Thornton, 1997).
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them fees. This approach is similar to that taken in Russia and the Ukraine 
(Thompson 1996, p. 6). In 1997, the proportion of fee-paying students was 
24 percent for the republic as a whole. The fees charged are very high relative 
to the average wage: in 1997, the annual fee was 80,000 soum and the average 
wage was 5,000 soum. The higher education institutes are the only part of 
the education system (apart from some kindergartens) where cost recovery 
has been introduced formally on a widespread basis. Even for secondary 
education, however, there is evidence from sociological surveys that the costs 
tend to exclude for average families. A recent study of Ak Altyn raion in 
Syrdarya oblast (see Figure 1.1) reported that average annual expenditures 
per child in secondary school in 1997 were roughly 10,000 soum, compared 
to an average annual wage of 14,000 soum (Lubin and Zholdasov 1998, p. 5). 
The same study reported average annual household expenditures to cover a 
family member in higher education of around 26,000 soum.10
There have been changes in education, beginning with the 1992 law On 
Education. The concept of orders for graduates from the various ministries 
has given way to assessments of needs by the relevant ministries, although the 
basis for the current practice is not clear (Thompson 1996, p. 3). University 
entrance arrangements have been altered, so that there is one single exam 
for all institutions of higher education, sat concurrently by all candidates.* 11 
An important change on the curriculum side has been the introduction of 
a general subject component for the first two undergraduate years of all 
courses, to give greater breadth to the courses.
10 These estimates are based on a random sample of 600 respondents from among the 
rural population in Syrdarya oblast.
11 However each student can apply to only one institiution -  if they don’t secure sufficient 
marks for entry for that institution, they have to wait until the following year to apply 
there again, or anywhere else.
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Declines in Enrolment
Since 1990, enrolment rates have fallen at all levels of education in Uzbek­
istan. This is shown in Table 3.2. The declines in university enrolment have 
been especially sharp. The rest of this section examines these overall trends 
in greater detail.
Table 3.2: Enrolment per 10,000 population, 1990-1994
1990 1994 % change
Secondary 2291 2220 -3.1
SSUZ 126 93 -26.2
PTU 11 10 -8.8
University 165 102 -38.2
Education is obligatory for all children between the ages of 7 - 16 years. 
According to official sources, 100 percent of the corresponding age cohort 
completes primary education, and 96-98 percent attends until reaching at 
least incomplete secondary (grade 9). UNICEF estimates show a somewhat 
lower and declining trend in the gross enrolment rate for basic education as 
a share of the 7 -15 year old age group, falling from 92.2 percent in 1989 to 
88.6 percent in 1994 (UNICEF Transmonee 1998, Table 7.2). This pattern 
is similar to that observed for neighbouring republics, including Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, where the basic enrolment rates fell from about 94 and 85 
percent respectively to 90 and 76 percent between 1989 and 1996 (ibid.). In 
Uzbekistan, the decline in enrolment reportedly has been greater among boys, 
and repetition and drop-out, which were not traditionally serious problems, 
have been reported especially in rural and poor areas (UNDP 1995)
At 16 years of age, children face a choice between continuing in the general 
academic stream of secondary education, moving to vocational training, or 
joining the workforce (see Chapter 2). Figure 3.1 depicts the shares of the 
relevant age cohorts enrolled in different types of education. The share of 
the age cohort completing secondary education has fallen, partly as a result
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of the introduction of examinations for entry into 10th class in 1992. The 
gross enrolment rate as a share of the 15-18 year old age group dropped 
from 37.5 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 1996.12 Similar declines have 
been experienced in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where enrolments over the 
same period fell from 30 to 25 percent, and from about 37 to 27 percent, 
respectively.
Figure 3.1: Falls in education enrolment (full-time), 1990-1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
— Complete secondary 
-■ -S S U Z  
PTU
-x  University
Given the declining rates of secondary completion, it is not surprising 
that there has also been a significant decrease in higher education enrolments 
(Figure 3.1). The share of the age cohort (18-22 years) enrolled in full-time 
tertiary education fell from about 9 percent to 5 percent between 1989 and 
1996, or in absolute terms, by about 65,550.
12For those who do continue in the general academic stream, the transition has been 
associated with increased diversity of schooling choice. Klugman (forthcoming) examines 
the equity implications of the development of elite streams of education, often supported 
by state subsidies, in the former Soviet Union,
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Hence the supply of new labour market entrants with higher education has 
fallen during the transition. This may be a rational, or even forced, response 
of individuals to the introduction of fees, current income constraints and 
significant levels of household poverty (Coudouel 1998), and lack of access 
to credit to finance investment in human capital. However this would be 
expected to damage their earnings prospects.13 Another question is whether 
declines in the supply of university graduates have lead to wage premiums. 
These questions axe investigated in depth in PART II, in particular, Chapter 
7.
What has happened to enrolments in vocational training? There are two 
broad categories of vocational training that enrol similar numbers of pupils.14 
The tightening of requirements for entry to both complete secondary school 
and to higher education, together with the introduction of tertiary fees, might 
have been expected to bolster enrolments at PTUs and SSUZs in recent years, 
since full-time vocational training is free of charge and carries a student 
stipend. On the other hand, the relevance of Soviet-style vocational training 
under the new economic conditions is open to doubt, as suggested in Chapter 
2.
UNICEF estimates show that as a share of the 15-19 year old age cohort, 
enrolments in SSUZ have fallen by over one-fifth, from about 7.9 percent in 
1989 to 6.2 percent in 1996. By way of contrast, enrolment data for PTUs 
(available only through to 1993), show a lesser decline, from 11.0 to 10.3 
percent since 1990.15
L3 Grants for university students in 1997 were 1,400 soum per month, or about one-third 
of the average wage. There are other in-kind subsidies -  like student accomodation, for 
which only a token fee is charged.
14In 1993 (latest year available for enrolment figures for PTU), there were 226,000 
individuals enrolled in PTUs and 240,130 enrolled in specialised secondary education.
13 The enrolment figures for the various types of educational institutions distinguish 
between daytime (full-time) attendance, and evening and correspondence courses. In 
calculating the enrolment rates as a share of the age cohort, we count only the full-time 
students. The exception is for PTUs, where authorities only publish the total number of 
students.
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The wage effect of the relative decline in the number of labour mar­
ket entrants with vocational qualifications would depend on changes on the 
demand-side of the labour market. Does the market valuation of PTU and 
SSUZ qualifications differ from that which was determined by the planned 
economy? This question is investigated in Chapters 7 and 8.
An important dimension of human capital accumulation is on-the-job 
training, which in turn is expected to have a critical influence upon the 
shape of the experience-earnings profile (see Chapter 7). While it is difficult 
to establish a complete picture in the absence of firm or individual specific 
data, trends in enrolment in adult and part-time education are nonetheless 
informative with respect to formal training. In 1990, enrolments in these 
courses amounted to about 235,000; by 1994 the figure had dropped to about 
180,000. Figure 3.2 summarises the trends in adult enrolments relative to a 
1990 base of 100, and reveals declines across-the-board.16 This is despite the 
right to paid leave for education and training in the 1992 law On Education.
The sharpest falls can be observed for part-time enrolments in university. 
The annual number of university students admitted to evening courses plum­
meted by about 81 percent between 1990 and 1994. The trends in tertiary 
enrolment by correspondence show a fall of about 23 percent over the same 
period. At SSUZs, the drop in evening enrolments has been of the order of 
20 percent between 1990 and 1994, the decline in the number of graduates 
has been even sharper.
This pattern of declining enrolment in adult education may be due to 
several factors. Reduced employer preparedness and capacity to finance such 
training might well be expected during the recent period of output decline. 
Individuals may themselves feel that the training provided is not useful in 
the new economic conditions, and face uncertainty about future employment
16 Another way of looking at these trends is through the relative share of total enrolments 
that are part-time. The relative share of part-time enrolment at SSUs has dropped, for 
example, since 1989, from about 37 to 26 percent. Similarly, at tertiary institutions, the 
share has dropped from about 47 percent in 1989 to 34 percent in 1995.
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Figure 3.2: Falls in adult education, 1990-1994 (1990=100)
Enrolments In evening 
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—tr— Graduates from evening 
SSU
—h— Graduates from SSU - by 
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—* — Enrolments in higher 
education - evening time
— Enrolments in higher 
education - by 
correspondence 
—i— Graduates from higher 
education - evening time
opportunities. There are also greater demands on the time of adults (es­
pecially parents), who may be seeking secondary employment to help make 
ends meet, and/or having to deal with the consequences of reduced access 
to child care (Klugman, Marnie, Micklewright and OKeefe 1997).1/ On the 
education supply side, there is evidence of reduced state provision for evening 
courses: for example the number of teachers in evening secondary schools fell 
by some 10 percent between 1990 and 1996, even though the total number 
of teachers in the education system has increased (Klugman, forthcoming).
What would be the effects of reduced formal on-the-job training on wage 
outcomes? If it is true that such training was not relevant to the needs 
of market economic conditions, then the demise of this type of on-the-job 
training would not be expected to matter. However to the extent that such 
training augments individual productivity, one might expect the returns to
1 / Kindergarten enrolment rates (of childen aged between one and seven years) fell from 
about 34 percent in 1989 to 24 percent in 1996.
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experience to be lower than previously. The studies reviewed in Chapter 
4 (e.g. Flanagan 1998), suggest that there is some evidence that this has 
been the case in other transition economies. While it is impossible to make 
definitive statements about Uzbekistan on this point using a single data cross- 
section, Chapter 7 is devoted to exploring the experience-earnings profiles of 
different demographic groups in Uzbekistan.
3.3 In stitu tion a l and Structured R eform s
The pace of structural reform in Uzbekistan has been at best gradual, though 
cumulatively significant in a number of areas.18 Progress has not always been 
linear. With respect to prices, for example, the IMF noted that the process 
of liberalisation was essentially completed by early 1995 (IMF 1996, p ll) , 
but later reported that price controls (cum rationing) had been introduced 
for key consumer goods in mid 1997. Reversal of earlier policy decisions also 
appeared with respect to the removal of state orders and foreign currency 
regulations. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully investigate the 
scale and nature of structural reform in Uzbekistan. Here the new legal basis 
for labour relations, reforms in the agricultural sector, and enterprise and 
financial policy, are considered with a view to the expected effects on the 
labour market and wage determination. The period under consideration is 
1992-1996.
3 .3 .1  L egal B a sis  for Labour R ela tion s
Chapter 2 painted a picture of labour relations under the Soviet regime 
characterised by significant formal constraints on enterprise decision-making. 
Legislation since independence has relaxed some of these controls, although 
the role of the employer still differs in key respects from what would be
18 Parts of this section have been published by the author in “Uzbekistan: Institutional 
Continuity Helps Performance” , MOCT/MOST, Volume 8: 63-82, 1998.
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expected in a market context, as shown below.
A series of laws was enacted that was designed to provide the legal ba­
sis for market relations in the republic, including the national constitution 
and laws On Employment, On Enterprises, and On Entrepreneurship ( see 
Saidova et al. 1996a, Appendix 1). The latter establishes the right of entre­
preneurs to independently hire and release workers (in conformity with na­
tional legislation).19 The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted 
on 8 December 1992, provides the right of every individual to free choice of 
work and to fair labour conditions, and for support for the unemployed ac­
cording to the law.
The law On Employment (13.01.92) formulates general principles of state 
policy in the sphere of employment and state guarantees for labour in a 
market economy, in particular, the functions, duties and rights of the state 
employment service.20 The concept of unemployment was legally recognised 
for the first time in Uzbekistan, and the law provides for registration of the 
unemployed and guarantees of material support in the event of retrenchment.
Even under the new conditions, the autonomy of a firm is still potentially 
limited by social obligations to its employees and the authority of government 
agencies to intervene in its operation. Thus, for example, Article 1 of the 
law On Enterprises, entitled “Main Tasks” states that the realisation of the 
firm’s objectives must “ensure the social and economic interests of working 
collective members, as well as management interests”. At the same time, 
Article 19 states that the “Labour incomes of every worker... shall be deter­
mined by his personal labour contribution with due account of final results of 
the enterprise’s operation., and not regulated by maximum amounts” , and 
that “forms, systems and the amount of labour payments as well as other
19 The individual or private economic activity that was permitted in the Soviet period 
did not extend to allow hiring of employees.
20 This is the basic law on employment enacted after independence. There had of course 
been legislation governing employment during the Soviet period (see Marnie (1992) for a 
summary of the rules relating to recruitment and dismissal, for example).
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incomes of the workers shall be fixed by the enterprise independently.”21
Similarly the Labour Code establishes that wages are agreed upon be­
tween employer and employee, subject to the legal minimum wage, and that 
the form and system of pay will be set in collective agreements. While these 
provisions suggest that enterprises would determine wages along the same 
lines as used in market economies, in practice, as will be shown below, gov­
ernment mandated indexation decrees have been a regular feature of the 
transition period in Uzbekistan.
Enterprises have a range of social obligations that have carried over since 
the Soviet era. For example, the state can oblige all firms employing more 
than 100 employees to reserve a quota of 7 percent of all jobs for “disad­
vantaged” workers, which are defined to include invalids, and women with 
many children (Klugman and Marnie 1998). The law On Enterprises in­
cludes a section on social guarantees with obligations to, for example, “con­
stantly improve the conditions of labour and life of women, provide work 
for women with young children with reduced working hours and transfer 
pregnant women to easy work.”
In sum, the scope of employer autonomy with respect to wages and redun­
dancy has been significantly enhanced since 1991. However the government 
still appears to attribute social obligation to the employer (whether in the 
state or private sector). This would imply some benevolence on the employ­
er’s part, and accord importance to non productivity related factors in wage 
and employment decisions. The extent to which this is borne out is examined 
in PART II. For example, Chapter 6 investigates female earnings profiles in 
depth and Chapter 9 examines the priority of wage payments in the event of 
shortfalls in the size of the wage fund.
21 The law also establishes a legal basis for the working collective of the enterprise, 
which signs collective agreements on behalf of the workers. The scope of the collective 
agreements is to “regulate production and labour relationships at the enterprise, issues of 
labour protection and social development of the collective and its members” (Article 30). 
Hence it seems that unions are restricted to issues related to work conditions and social 
benefits, and would not normally be involved in negotiations over wages.
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3 .3 .2  A gricu ltu ra l R eform s
Agriculture is of primary interest, not least because the sector accounted 
for 30-40 percent of formal employment in the mid-1990s. Changes in the 
economic and institutional framework surrounding agriculture have included 
a sharp decline in the prices paid for major outputs, the abolition of the 
sovkhozy and the expansion of individual farming.
Agricultural output has fallen, though by much less than in industrial 
production. The decline has also been less than in other former Soviet re­
publics where agricultural production has dropped by 20-40 percent (World 
Bank 1995a, p. 3).22 Employment in agriculture has actually risen, though 
this might be due more to its role as a residual sector in absorbing excess 
labour supply and recent technical changes in the sector, as discussed below. 
Between 1990 and 1995, the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 33 to 29 
percent, but over the same period the agricultural share in employment rose 
from 25 to 30 percent (Goskomprognostat 1997; see Table 3.7 below).
After independence there was an adverse price shock generally against 
agricultural goods, and in particular against cotton. This can be traced 
to the withdrawal of many subsidies formerly provided to cotton, and the 
continuation of state orders for the bulk of cotton and grain at prices set by 
the state (Table 3.3).23 Although estimates are very sensitive to the choice
22The World Bank identified two factors to explain the good performance of agricul­
ture in Uzbekistan relative to other former Soviet republics (World Bank 1995a). First, 
domestic production of essential agricultural inputs (fertiliser, pesticide and some farm 
equipment) meant that the trade collapse was less disruptive to farm production than 
tended to be the case elsewhere. Second, alternative cotton export markets have been 
found. To this, a third factor might be added: the inheritance and subsequent expansion 
of private sector activity in agriculture. The share of agricultural output produced in 
household plots and private farms increased from 28 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 1996 
(CIS STAT 1997).
23 Herman (1998) writes that the terms of trade have moved strongly against agriculture 
as a result of low output prices, monopolistic prices for inputs and reduced subsidies. He 
estimates that the sector has lost 65 percent of its “purchasing power” since 1990. For 
example, in nominal terms the price of fertilizer has risen 60 times while the price of cotton 
increased only 6 times. In 1996, the Government announced an increase in procurement
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of price index and the exchange rate, the state procurement price of cotton 
in 1994 was clearly only a small fraction of its 1990 level (Khan 1995, p. 80), 
and well below world market prices (World Bank 1995; Herman 1998).
Table 3.3: State orders, 1991-1996 (percentage of crop subject to procure­
ment)
Cotton Grain
1991 95 100
1992 85 85
1993 80 80
1995 60 50
1996 40 25
SOURCE: Khan (1995)
An associated issue is that government authorities tend to delay payment 
for procured output. Together, these factors imply heavy net taxation of 
agriculture, that has likely constrained Uzbekistan’s agricultural producers, 
especially in the formal sector, and led to a weak financial condition. It has 
meant, inter alia, that farms are often unable to pay wages, an issue which 
is investigated in depth in PART 11.24
The disadvantages imposed on farmers by government regulations do not 
appear to be offset by potential advantages in terms of extension services 
and access to credit. Agricultural producers’ access to credit is constrained 
(World Bank 1996c), which could be expected to exacerbated cash flow prob­
lems and hence arrears in the agricultural sector. From a peak of 10-12 
percent of GDP prior to independence, budget subsidies to agriculture have 
dropped to about 3-4 percent of GDP (Herman 1998, p. 8). The largest 
subsidy comes in the form of free irrigation.
prices for cotton to 70 percent of world prices, and to 75 percent for grain; while state 
orders were reduced to 40 and 25 percent respectively (see Klugman, 1998).
24On January 1, 1997, farm enterprises owed a total of 53 billion soum to their suppliers, 
workers and revenue authorities, of which about 9 billion soum was owed to workers (IMF, 
1997, p. 64).
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After 1992, the sovkhozy were transformed into kolkhozy, a change that 
has been attributed to fiscal pressures as well as efficiency reasons (see Khan 
1995). Thus nearly all state farms were removed from direct state control and 
the assets formally transferred to the workers. This is shown in Table 3.4. 
There has been an ongoing tendency of the kolkhozy to enter into individual 
contracts with their members, whereby the parent kolkhoz provides some 
services and inputs, subject to the individuals providing their share of the 
output quota (World Bank 1995a).
Table 3.4: Distribution of sown land (percent), 1990-1994
Kolkhoz Sovkhoz Private O ther
1990 34.9 58.7 0.1 6.3
1991 34.0 57.7 0.1 8.1
1992 36.4 51.8 0.4 11.5
1993 47.5 39.0 0.6 12.9
1994 75.3 1.0 2.1 21.6
While the agricultural sector remains dominated by large production units 
— out of the 4.5 million hectares of cultivable land, 3.6 million hectares is 
occupied by collective farms and farm co-operatives -  individual farming has 
been allowed to expand. By 1996, an estimated 25 percent of total cultivated 
land was under private control, and official reports stated that over half of 
all agricultural output and 80 percent of all meat and dairy products came 
from the non-government sector. There are two main types of direct private 
control of land:
(i) small household plots have existed since Soviet times and were an 
historically important source of marketed output, especially for perishable 
products. The plots average 0.2 hectares in size and accounted for about 9 
percent of total land area in 1994. There has been a significant increase in 
the number of personal plots, and relaxation of size limits thereon. By 1995 
they were estimated to number 2.9 million (Pomfret 1998, p.3).
(ii) the right to use land allocated from collectives and state farms, which
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by the end of 1995 had been given to about 14,250 farmers.
However as Pomfret (1998) points out, the kolkhozes dominate agriculture 
not just by their size, but because they have authority for the distribution of 
water, and thus retain crucial leverage over leasehold farms. Moreover, since 
farm workers lose their plots if they cease working in the kolkhoz, this link 
may help explain why farm workers apparently tolerate payment of wages 
often months late (Herman 1998, p. 5). Chapter 9 investigates patterns of 
non-payment of wages in some detail.
The labour absorption capacity of agriculture has already been noted. 
Beyond the expansion of individual agricultural activity and small-holdings, 
this has taken place through the demechanisation of cotton harvesting. In 
the late 1980s over half the harvest was mechanised, but this had fallen to 
less than 5 percent by 1997 (Pomfret 1998, p. 6). This may be an appropriate 
development given the abundance of labour resources in Uzbekistan and the 
perceived higher quality of handpicked cotton.20 At the same time, one might 
expect these technological changes to have reduced labour productivity in 
agriculture and have a negative impact on wages in the sector.
3.3.3 Enterprise and Financial Policy and Arrears
The leadership of Uzbekistan has consistently emphasised the social orien­
tation of its approach to economic reform and the desire to avoid, as far as 
possible, the social costs of transition experienced by its neighbours (Karimov 
1998).26 One might expect this to be reflected in the government’s enterprise 
and financial policies. Such policies raise a number of key questions from a 
labour market perspective, including: to what extent has employment shifted
2 0 Demechanisation may have produced overall efficiency gains in the economy through 
savings in fuel and maintenance, and in resources used to produce new machines; but the 
old cotton-picking machinery has no alternative uses and was apparently simply abandoned 
(Craumer 1995, p. 20-1).
26On the social costs of transition elsewhere in Central Asia see, for example, Pom­
fret and Anderson (1998) on the experience of Kyrgyzstan, and World Bank (1998b) on 
Kazakhstan.
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out of the state  sector; how much enterprise restructuring has taken place; 
and how might wage outcomes in the state  and private sectors be expected 
to differ. These issues are considered in this section, by way of background 
to  the detailed empirical analysis in PART II.
The structure of employment by enterprise ownership shifted significantly 
away from the state between 1990 and 1995, as shown in Table 3.5.27 The 
share of state enterprises and government has declined from almost two-thirds 
to less than 40 percent as the non-governmental sector has expanded. The 
share of joint stock companies, in particular, increased as corporatisation 
of state firms proceeded. In fact most medium and large scale enterprises 
have been incorporated as joint stock companies (IMF 1997, p. 24). The 
new private sector (as opposed to formerly state, privatised firms) accounts 
for only a small share (2.7 percent) of total employment. The vast bulk of 
private agriculture comprises individuals working their own plots; in 1995 
only about 1.4 percent were employed on private farms.
Table 3.5: Changes in employment by ownership, 1990-1995 (per cent)
1990 1993 1995
state 64.7 54.7 39.6
kolkhoz 14.4 20.7 22.4
joint stock 0.2 1.3 11.2
leased, co-op, etc 5.3 2.9 2.0
self employed 0.2 1.4 3.6
private agriculture 15.4 18.7 19.9
total 100 100 100
SOURCE: World Bank (1996b), Table 1.1
2 The following definitions are used: state sector refers to state-owned enterprises, ad­
ministration and public institutions run by government; kolkhozes are collectively owned 
farms; jo in t stock companies include former state enterprises which have been corporatised; 
leased enterprises are state enterprises that have been leased, usually to their employees; 
self employed refers to individual labour activities, legalised in 1986; and private agricul­
ture includes small private plots, which have been less restricted in recent years, as well 
as small independent farms which were always allowed to exist, though only in neglible 
numbers until recently.
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In a pattern familiar to many transition economies (see World Bank 
1996c), the approach to privatisation involved several phases. Phase I fo­
cussed on small scale enterprises and housing, and resulted in privatisation 
of over 90 percent of the stock. By the end of 1995, about 95 percent of the 
10,400 small enterprises -  retail shops, trade and service establishments -  had 
been privatised, as had about 96 percent of the housing stock. Privatisation 
in this phase typically meant transfer of ownership to existing staff.
Phase II includes corporatisation and partial privatisation of medium and 
large-scale enterprises. In 1995, 1,600 medium and large scale enterprises had 
been targeted for privatisation, of which about 1,000 had already been “par­
tially privatised” through sale of shares to managers and employees.28 The 
privatisation programme to date has tended to transfer assets to insiders, 
managers and employees, a pattern that was also observed in Russia (Com­
mander and Yemtsov 1997). Thus the extent to which the level and structure 
of wages would differ between state and newly privatised firms is unclear. It 
is possible that private ownership would not make much difference to wage 
outcomes, a hypothesis that is directly tested in Chapter 8.
Implementation of the stabilization program in early 1995 significantly 
tightened financial discipline on enterprises (IMF 1997). Budget subsidies 
and directed credit through the Central Bank to enterprises were eliminated. 
Since April 1995, Central Bank credit was only available at the refinance rate, 
which in mid-1996 stood at 80 percent per annum compared to projected 
annual inflation of 30-35 percent.
The financial system remains dominated by banks owned by the state 
that are heir to the largest sectoral banks of the Soviet era: Promstroibank 
(industrial bank); Phatbank (cotton bank); and the National Bank, the for­
mer foreign trade bank. In late 1995 there were 29 banks, many of which 
have a specific sectoral focus according to Government priorities (World Bank
28For the remaining 600 enterprises, the Government has decided to pursue a privatisa­
tion Investment Fund (PIF) scheme that will promote public participation through issuing 
a low priced category of shares, although implementation was delayed.
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1996c, p.12).29
Arrears in inter-enterprise payments for inputs have become prevalent, a 
pattern which has also characterised some other former transition countries.30 
Arrears refers to delays in payment for obligations to individuals, firms or 
to the state. Wages are often paid late (wage arrears), firms fail to pay 
other firms in a timely fashion for inputs (inter-enterprise arrears), and firms 
may fail to pay their tax obligations when these fall due (tax arrears). The 
real effect of arrears is magnified by the high rates of inflation that have 
prevailed in these economies (see Table 3.1). This is shown in Chapter 9, 
which considers the implications of arrears for real wage levels.
While arrears on taxation and bank loan payments have been limited, 
there was significant growth in inter-enterprise arrears during 1995. Arrears 
rose as a share of GDP from 2 to 7 percent in the year to January 1996, 
and as a share of payables from 8 to 27 percent. This phenomenon suggests 
that several factors could be at work: enterprises attempting to maintain 
production levels despite slack demand for their product, difficulties in access 
to credit, and/or expectations of future government support.
In response to arrears, the authorities imposed penalties on banks that 
accumulated arrears on refinancing and interbank borrowing. Similarly, Pres­
idential Decrees in May 1995 and January 1996 penalized enterprise managers 
who allowed their enterprise accounts to fall into arrear. In fact preliminary 
data suggests a significant fall in the real value of inter-enterprise arrears in 
the first half of 1996 (IMF 1997).
3 .3 .4  Sum m ary
Recent changes in the institutional and structural framework in Uzbekistan 
have eliminated a range of distortions, even if substantial controls remain on 
economic activity. Most prices in the economy have been allowed to adjust
29New legislation has been drafted that would, among other things, take away the special 
advantages enjoyed by the National Bank.
30See, e.g., Corricelli (1996).
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to market conditions, so that one would expect radical shifts in the relative 
prices of inputs, including labour, as well as in the relative prices of different 
goods and services. Of course the scope for redeployment of labour partly 
depends on the technical nature and flexibility of the capital stock (Flemming 
and Micklewright forthcoming p.31), as well as the institutional constraints 
that limit the extent of adjustment in wages.
The main messages for the determinants of wages that emerged from the 
consideration of structural and institutional change can be highlighted as 
follows:
• Institutional constraints and norms continue to place formal social 
obligations on employers, that could be expected to influence their 
employment and wage decisions in favour of “disadvantaged” groups, 
including women with children.
• Agriculture is an important source of employment in the economy, given 
recent technological changes and the associated scope for private pro­
ductive activity. However kolkhozes remain subject to substantial com­
petitive disadvantages which would in turn affect the level of wages in 
agriculture and their ability to pay wages on time.
• There has been a substantial expansion in private sector employment 
in the economy, although the nature of the privatisation process and 
capital constraints has hampered restructuring and investment in the 
private sector. This would be expected to limit both employment and 
wage adjustments in the private sector.
• Arrears have become an important dimension of enterprise and govern­
ment behaviour, that can be attributed in part to the operation of the 
financial sector and to delays in government payments. However little 
is known about arrears in wage payment.
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These points are the subject of detailed empirical examination in PART 
II. In the next section official data are used to cast light on the process of 
adjustment in the labour market.
3.4  Labour M arket O utcom es
3.4 .1  In trod u ction
Levels of employment and wages have fallen substantially everywhere in the 
early phase of the transition.31 There has been a divergence, however, be­
tween the outcomes generally experienced in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). For the CEE the decline in ag­
gregate employment has at least matched the fall in output, whereas massive 
output reductions have occurred in most of the FSU but adjustments to 
employment have been limited.
This section investigates trends in Uzbekistan, primarily on the basis of 
official national statistics. These are the main sources of information used 
by government decision makers as well as international agencies, including 
the EBRD, World Bank and IMF. The official wage and employment figures 
for Uzbekistan (and most of the other countries in the region) are based 
on enterprise surveys that are limited to established state or formerly state 
firms, and generally under-represent small business and private sector activity 
(Saidova et al. 1996b).
Official sources suffer various biases, the net effect of which is unclear 
(Klugman and Scott 1997). For example, employment figures include people 
who are formally on the books but not working (i.e. overstate employment) 
but also tend to exclude private activities (and hence underestimate em­
ployment). Also the wage data would generally ignore delays in payment of 
wages (arrears), so that their real value is overstated; an issue investigated in
3'^Recent studies of labour markets in the transition economies include Barr (1994); 
Commander and Corricelli (1995); Esrtin and Svenjar (1996); Allison and Ringold (1996) 
and Rutkowski (1995) and Rutkowski (1996b).
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Chapter 9. The need for an examination of the Uzbek labour market using 
a more reliable and representative data source is a recurring theme in this 
chapter. Indeed this is an important motivation for the analyses undertaken 
in P a rt  II.
The existing aggregate data, despite its shortcomings, nonetheless enable 
a comparative picture of trends during the transition period to be established. 
It suggests that recent trends in employment in Uzbekistan are, in regional 
terms, quite unusual. The same is true of wages. This is presented in Table 
3.6, and summarised below.
Table 3.6: Regional levels in the labour market: official data
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Average Real Wage Index
Belarus 100.0 96.0 76.0 70.5 45.3 42.1
Kazakhstan 100.0 87.2 56.4 50.9 33.3 29.9
Latvia 100.0 73.9 49.6 54.7 55.0 55.0
Russia 100.0 96.6 67.6 70.9 65.2 45.9
Uzbekistan 100.0 78.3 77.3 144.9 88.2 73.5
Registered Unemployment (%)
Belarus 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.4 2.1 2.7
Kazakhstan 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.7
Latvia 0.0 0.1 3.0 5.3 6.4 6.4
Russia 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 2.3 3.2
Uzbekistan 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Change in Total Employment since 1990 (cumulative %)
Kazakhstan -1.3 -2.6 -9.2 -11.8
Russia -2.0 -4.4 -5.8 -7.0
Uzbekistan 3.9 4.1 2.6 2.7 4.0
SOURCE: Rutkowski (1995), except Uzbekistan, 
author calculations based on World Bank (1996b)
• Rise in Employment. Between 1990 and 1995, total employment in 
Uzbekistan increased by about 2.6 percent, compared to declines of
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about 7 percent in Russia and of more than 15 percent in Kazakhstan. 
Between 1994 and 1997, 340,000 new jobs were created in Uzbekistan, 
implying an annual employment growth rate of 1.3 percent (Uzbek 
Economic Trends 1998). However official levels in employment are mis­
leading to the extent that hidden unemployment is ignored, as will be 
shown below.
• Low Registered Unemployment. Levels of registered unemployment are 
low in many of the former Soviet republics, despite the large falls in 
output and employment.32 The associated measurement problems are 
investigated in the next section.
• Real Wage Reductions. Throughout the FSU, very high price inflation 
and large declines in output resulted in significant cuts in the real wage 
(e.g. Rutkowski 1995). The official indices show that in many countries 
the real wage continued to decline at least until 1995. In Uzbekistan, 
the official data suggest more limited reduction over the whole period.
Measurement of trends in the real wage, as with output, is fraught with 
problems in a context where high inflation has prevailed. Price indices, which 
are weighted averages of individual prices of bundles of goods, are used to 
deflate movements in nominal prices and wages over time. Since the prices of 
individual items change at differing speeds, the choice of the basket of goods 
and of the index used to compute aggregate price levels has a substantial 
effect.33 Therefore when relative prices are undergoing massive and repeated
32 The estimated ratio of registered to open unemployment in 1995 ranged from 31 
percent in Bulgaria and 34 percent in Romania, up to 53 percent in Poland and 77 percent 
in Russia (Commander and Tolstopiatenko 1997, Box 1).
33Koen (1997, p. 27) concludes that “not only do extremely large discrepancies emerge 
(between the consumer price index and the retail price index), but even the direction of 
bias is not uniform, with one index rising much more in some (Central Asian) countries, 
and much less in others”. He shows that for Kazakhstan, the “average real wage seems to 
increase from 1992 to 1993 based on the retail price index, whereas it seems to fall based 
on the consumer price index...the average 1993 level of the real wage is more than twice 
as high using the (former) index”.
102 CHAPTER 3. TRANSITION AND THE LABOUR M ARKET
shifts, as has been the case in Uzbekistan (and the rest of the former Soviet 
Union), caution is needed in interpreting real wage series. A final point to 
note here is the relevance of the base period: in particular, whether the base 
period precedes the initial general liberalisation of prices in January 1992 
affects the apparent path of the average wage. The sharpest rises in prices 
(and hence declines in the real wage) occurred in the immediate wake of price 
liberalisation.
In the sections that follow, trends in employment, unemployment, and 
the level and structure of wages in Uzbekistan are considered and compared 
to neighbouring republics.
3.4.2 Employment
The buoyancy of employment levels in Uzbekistan is quite unusual in the 
former Soviet context (Table 3.6). Table 3.7 shows changes in sectoral shares 
of employment, which include a significant rise in the share of agriculture, and 
a fall in that of industry. Institutional reforms (expansion of private holdings) 
and technical changes (demechanisation) in agriculture that were considered 
above help explain this trend. The employment shares of the retail and 
trade sectors also rose relatively strongly, by about 24 percent, albeit from a 
low base. The shares accounted for by traditional public and social services -  
health, education and public utilities -  remained fairly stable. There may well 
have been further changes within the large category of “other” employment, 
but its overall share was stable.
Recall from Table 3.5 that there has been a large decline in the employ­
ment share of the state sector, to less than 40 percent of total employment. 
This partly reflects the rise in the share of kolkhozes and expansion of pri­
vate subsidiary agriculture (private plots). Individual labour activity has 
increased, albeit from a very low base.34 The vast bulk of working individ-
34 CIS Goskomstat figures show that 20.4 percent of the employed population in Uzbek­
istan in 1995 was self-employed compared to, say, 10.2 percent in Russia but higher levels
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Table 3.7: Sectoral shares of employment, 1990-1995 (per cent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Agriculture 25.3 27.2 28.3 29.6 28.8 30.0
Industry 15.5 1.6 13.7 14.3 12.7 12.1
Retail 3.7 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.6
Transport 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6
Public utilities 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5
Health 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9
Education 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.3 8.6 8.3
Administration 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
Other 24.9 24.5 24.7 23.8 25.3 25.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: World Bank (1996b)
uais are still employees, although the boundaries between employment and 
unemployment may be unclear, as shown in the next section.
3 .4 .3  U n e m p lo y m e n t
According to official statistics, Uzbekistan has not experienced a substantial 
increase in unemployment. This is in contradistinction to outsiders’ predic­
tions (e.g. World Bank 1993), and despite a sizeable drop in national income. 
Before proceeding to consider this pattern, a review of the concepts of unem­
ployment that are used in transition economies, and the associated caveats 
and problems, is in order.
D efin itio n s
Analyses of unemployment in transition economies typically rely on at least 
three concepts of unemployment: registered, hidden and open. The issue of 
labour force participation also warrants review. The concepts differ not only 
in terms of definition, but also imply different data sources, as shown below.
in Kazakhstan (24 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (51.1 percent) (CIS STAT 1996).
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Registered unemployment is a concept that is familiar to Western ob­
servers and comprises those individuals who are out of work and actively 
seeking work and are registered with the authorities as such. This cate­
gory of the labour force has only been legally permitted since 1992. As in 
Western countries like Australia (Norris 1996), rates of registered unemploy­
ment tend to be lower than the figures obtained from labour source surveys. 
In Uzbekistan, this can be explained by incentive-related and other factors, 
specifically: (a) restrictive eligibility for unemployment benefits -  fewer than 
half (48 percent) of the registered unemployed in Uzbekistan received un­
employment benefits, compared to 80.5 percent at the end of 1992 (Interfax 
1997); (b) that the unemployment benefit is low and limited in duration;35 
and (c) that hidden unemployment is widespread.
Hidden unemployment refers to workers who are formally attached to the 
enterprise although they are not in fact working (that is, their current mar­
ginal product is close to zero). This phenomenon reflects a continuation of 
the Soviet phenomenon of labour hoarding that reflected the then prevail­
ing firm incentives and constraints on redundancy dismissals (see Chapter 2). 
During the transition, such workers have often been unpaid and/or on unpaid 
leave (Klugman and Marnie 1998). Employees may prefer to stay registered 
with their employer, even if they are not being fully paid, for several reasons:
(i) pension regulations still grant privileges (supplements) to those who 
have an uninterrupted work record (stazh) with one employer;
(ii) in some cases the Soviet inheritance of firm-based provision of social 
benefits may also be an incentive for individuals to retain an attachment to 
their employer, though the scope of such benefits (e.g. kindergartens) has 
tended to decline during the transition (Klugman et al. 1997); and
(iii) formal sector jobs facilitate individual activities in the second unoffi-
35The receipt of unemployment benefit is limited to a maximum of six months, and the 
amount is linked to previous earnings. The benefit amount has averaged only 15 percent 
of the average wage. In Russia unemployment benefits have fallen below 10 percent of the 
average wage (Klugman and Braithwaite, 1998).
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cial economy. Due to the compressed wage levels and widespread arrears in 
payment, many citizens are obliged to pursue some other forms of income­
earning activity. Being registered officially with a firm reduces the risk of 
attracting the attention of officialdom to such activities, and can also pro­
vide a useful base and network from which to take on secondary employment 
(access to materials, connections, etc.).36
The preference of employers for hidden unemployment can be attributed 
to the following (Klugman and Marnie 1998). After decades of Soviet ide­
ology, and a tradition of the “paternal” firm, employers are still uncertain 
about firing workers, and in some cases (e.g. following privatisation) are 
expressly prohibited from doing so. They typically have no resources to in­
vest in restructuring and updating technology and equipment, so still rely 
on large numbers of unskilled workers to keep production going. The high 
payroll tax (for social insurance; 36 percent of the total wage bill) should act 
as an incentive to limit the number of employees, but until now firms have 
reacted by keeping official wages low (or incurring wage arrears) rather than 
reducing their workforce.
Open unemployment is unemployment in the sense used generally in west­
ern countries and by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (see Huss- 
mans 1994). It refers to individuals of working age who are not currently 
working but are actively seeking work and able to accept a job offer -  they 
need not be officially registered as such. Estimates of open unemployment are 
generally obtained through representative labour force or household surveys.
Hence one would expect open unemployment to be higher than registered 
unemployment, and hidden unemployment to be still higher. It is clear that 
the analysis of representative survey data would enhance our understanding 
of the extent and profile of unemployment and labour force participation in 
Uzbekistan. The available official data and survey evidence, including the
36 There are no official figures on this practice, although it is consistent with the au­
thor’s observations from field trips to Tashkent city, Tashkent oblast, Khorezm and 
Karakalpakalstan.
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results of the household survey that is described more fully in Chapter 5, are 
analysed below.
Trends
Table 3.6 showed that, relative to the scale of output decline, the rate of 
registered unemployment has been extraordinarily low in many of the former 
Soviet countries, including Uzbekistan. In 1995, the number of registered 
unemployed was only 29 400, or about 0.3 percent of the labour force. By 
1997, the rate had not risen beyond 0.7 percent (Goskomprognostat 1998). 
The average CIS rate in 1996 was 2.9 percent, with Russia, for example, 
having an official unemployment rate of 3.2 percent.
It is widely recognised that registered unemployment significantly un­
derstates the true magnitude of joblessness in transition economies (see, e.g., 
World Bank 1996a). However alternative estimates for Uzbekistan have been 
scarce. One estimate of the unemployment rate in 1994 was 4.5 percent of 
the workforce (UNDP 1996), though the source of this figure is unclear. It is, 
by its nature, also difficult to estimate the extent of hidden unemployment. 
The European University Institute/ University of Essex Survey of Uzbekistan 
(EESU) 1995, provides a handle on the extent of hidden unemployment, with 
direct questions about the non-payment of wages (arrears) and involuntary 
leave.
Table 3.8 compares several labour force measures for mid 1995. Interna­
tionally comparable measures of unemployment and labour force participa­
tion were estimated using the data set described in Chapter 5. Calculations 
of a measure of “hidden’1 unemployment are presented based on the extent 
of non-payment of wages and involuntary leave.
The measure of open unemployment is much higher than the registered 
rate. The share of the working-age sample who described themselves as “not 
working but actively seeking work” amounted to 9.5 percent, about 20 times 
larger than the rate of registration. The reasons underlying this difference
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Table 3.8: Alternative labour force measures, 1995 (percentage of working-
age population)
Registered unemployment 0.4
Unemployment (ILO definition) 9.5
“Hidden” unemployment, of which: 24.7
Unpaid 23.9
On forced leave 0.8 
Labour force participation rate (ILO) 62.3
Official participation rate 72.0
SOURCE: Author estimates based on EESU; see Chapter 5.
were set out in the previous section.
An even larger share of the sample, almost one in four individuals of 
working age, fell into the category of “hidden unemployed”. Virtually all of 
these individuals comprised those who had not been paid any wages in the 
previous month (i.e. the amount reported as owing was equal to their con­
tract wage). Hidden unemployment, in the form of workers who are formally 
attached but not paid their wages on time, is an important phenomenon in 
a number of former Soviet republics, and is the subject of detailed analysis 
in Chapter 9. The extent of involuntary leave, on the other hand, was quite 
limited, at less than one percent.3' This figure, which was estimated from 
the EESU, is less than that presented by the IMF (1997, Table 17) of about 
2 percent of employment.38
The estimates of labour force participation based on the EESU household 
survey are far below estimates of employment rates based on official sources 
(see Chapter 2). However, it is unclear whether these surprisingly low rates 
are a result of transition since, as noted above, it is difficult to establish 
trends over time. The labour force participation rate for women, which is
3'In contrast, estimates for Russia for mid 1994 are around 8.6 percent of the employed 
(Commander and Yemtsov, 1997, Table 6.3).
38 The source of the IMF figure is “Goskomprognostat, Ministry of Labour and staff 
estimates”.
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even lower, is the subject of detailed investigation in Chapter 6.
Given the very different magnitudes of registered and open unemploy­
ment, differences in the incidence of unemployment by demographic group 
might also be expected. Discussions about policies for the unemployed are 
generally based on official data, but this profile may be misleading, as Table 
3.9 reveals. Table 3.9 compares two profiles -  that is, a profile of the regis­
tered unemployed, and a profile of the individuals who were not working and 
actively seeking work in the EESU survey.
Table 3.9: A comparison of profiles of the unemployed, 1995
Officially Registered Survey-based
male 0.32 10.9
female 0.28 5.3
Age (in years)
16-18 0.55 24.3
19-30 0.72 13.0
31-50 0.25 14.3
50+ 0.01 4.0
Education level
Higher education 0.25 2.6
Special secondary 0.41 10.4
Complete secondary 0.45 11.7
Incomplete secondary 0.55 7.4
Average 0.4 9.5
SOURCE: Official estimates from Ministry of Labour. 
Author survey estimates based on EESU; see Chapter 5
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The profile of the officially registered unemployed shows that women and 
men are almost equally affected, and that first time jobseekers as well as 
individuals under 30 years of age have experienced above average rates of 
registered unemployment. There is also an inverse relation between unem­
ployment incidence and the education level of the group, with the highest 
rates among those with only incomplete secondary schooling.
The picture drawn from the representative household survey is somewhat 
different. The rate of unemployment among women is only about half that 
for men.39 New labour force entrants are experiencing high rates of unem­
ployment, but the rate drops to much closer to average for the 19-30 year old 
group. Interestingly, while university education is still associated with un­
employment rates significantly below the average, the education groups with 
the highest rates are vocational training and complete secondary. Incomplete 
secondary has a rate close to the average -  the fact that their employment 
prospects are not disadvantaged by incomplete education may be partly ex­
plained in terms of job opportunities having motivated those individuals to 
leave school in the first place.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the official unemployment data is 
problematic. Not only is the magnitude of the problem significantly under­
stated, but a misleading impression is given about the composition of the 
unemployed, and the demographic groups worst affected. The next section 
examines trends in the real wage based on official data.
3.4.4 Wages
There have been significant shifts on the price side of the labour market in 
Uzbekistan during the transition. This section reviews available evidence 
about trends in the level, and extent of differentiation, of earnings.
39 Although it should be noted that women may be more likely to become “discouraged” 
and cease actively searching for work.
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Trends
The need for caution in the interpretation of real wage series in light of prob­
lems inherent in the price indices has already been stressed. The currency 
reform that took place in 1994 (see Section 3.2 above) together with high 
rates of monthly inflation over much of the period, makes the construction 
of a real time series quite difficult. The available evidence nonetheless shows 
that there has been significant downward adjustment in the real wage in 
Uzbekistan, with some fluctuations over the period of transition (Table 3.6). 
Official data suggests that the real wage rose significantly in 1993. In 1994 
the Government apparently ceased any attempt to maintain real wage levels, 
and introduced regulations that restricted increases in the wage bill at state 
enterprises to 70 percent of the growth in nominal output. Subsequently, 
according to IMF estimates, the minimum and average wages fell, in real 
terms, by about 70 and 40 percent respectively during 1994-5 (IMF 1997, p. 
19).40
In te r -s  ectoral D iffe ren tia tio n
Wage differentiation among sectors has increased during the transition (Table 
3.10). Yet the inter-branch ranking of wages has been fairly stable over time, 
with only limited changes in relativities.41 The most important change has 
been the relative fall in agricultural wages, from above average levels just 
prior to independence (109 percent of the pre-transition average in 1991), 
down to only 68 percent of the average in mid 1995. Somewhat unexpectedly, 
given output trends, industrial workers have been able to protect their above 
average position.42 This may have been due to a compositional effect: if the 
structure of industrial employment has shifted in favour of relatively better
40 Valued at the official exchange rate, the average monthly wage was around US$40 in 
1995.
41 The same is true of Russia, for example (Mikhaelev and Bjorksten 1995).
42 The industrial sector has contracted in each year between 1991 and 1995 and the share 
of industry in GDP fell from 27 to 19 percent over the period.
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paid sub-sectors. Unfortunately available data is fairly aggregated, though 
it does show that the share of construction has fallen (World Bank 1996b, 
Table 1.2) suggesting that compositional effects have not driven the rise in 
the average industrial wage.
Table 3.10: Trends in relative wage by branch, 1992-1995
1992 1993 1994 1995
industry 124.6 134.5 148.7 146.8
agriculture 101.4 71.5 80.9 68.0
retail, trade 59.8 58.4 65.9 64.1
health 72.9 65.0 53.0 67.0
education 84.9 90.5 63.0 67.0
finance 166.8 170.4 175.1 143.2
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat 1997 
NOTE: National average equals 100
The evidence reviewed in Section 3 suggested that the pace of enterprise 
restructuring has been slow, and the extent of change limited. Employment 
levels have not generally been adjusted and industrial sector wages remain 
above average, despite significant declines in industrial output, particularly 
in manufacturing. Several factors help explain the pattern of aggregate wages 
in the enterprise sector, including:
(i) Privatisation to “insiders” (existing management and employees), which 
tends to have been associated with a slow pace of enterprise restructuring in 
transition economies (World Bank 1996a).
(ii) Extensive directed credits to enterprises at subsidized rates through 
the financial system and extra-budgetary funds, that continued until late 
1994 at least.
(iii) The numerous restrictions on the profile and activities of enterprises. 
For example, a substantial portion of asset sale proceeds go to the GKI 
(government privatisation agency), reducing the incentives for firms to re­
structure.
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Employees in the financial sector continue to be relatively well paid on 
average. As elsewhere in the FSU, workers in the so-called budget sphere, in­
cluding health and education, tend to have done relatively badly and dropped 
further behind. Wages in the sector labelled “trade, catering, material supply 
and procurement” remain significantly below average, and by mid-1995 had 
actually slipped to the bottom ranking, behind the traditionally low-paid 
social sector occupations.
Government wage policy is still largely based on the inherited wage tariff 
whereby centralised scales are used to set rewards for different jobs according 
to skill, working conditions and so on (see Chapter 2). Up until late 1994, 
this was accompanied by periodic decrees of the President mandating that 
all wages shall rise by, say, 30 percent, requiring a proportionate across-the- 
board increase in wages.43
In the budgetary (state) sector, levels of remuneration are linked to the 
minimum wage, which is periodically increased to compensate for price infla­
tion.44 In 1995 the differential between the lowest and highest wage categories 
was 5.3, and there were 28 budgetary wage categories.
Trends in the level of the minimum wage relative to the average for the 
economy are suggestive of changes in the wage distribution. In a number 
of transition economies the minimum wage has been allowed, through non­
indexation, to erode to very low real levels; Russia, where the minimum 
wage dropped from 25 to only 8 percent of the average between 1991 and 
1994 being a case in point (Klugman and Braithwaite 1998).
In Uzbekistan, by way of contrast, the minimum wage was about one- 
third of the average during 1993 and 1994. The relative position of the 
minimum wage went on to deteriorate in 1995 and 1996, possibly as a result 
of the stabilisation effort and lagged indexation, so that in March 1996 the
43In Russia, by way of contrast, centralised wage setting is limited to the budgetary sec­
tor. Infrequent indexation caused substantial erosion in the relative position of budgetary 
workers (Mikhaelev and Bjorksten, 1995).
44In 1995, for example, the minimum wage was raised four times in nominal terms.
3.4. LABOUR M ARKET OUTCOMES 113
Figure 3.3: Minimum relative to the average wage, Uzbekistan, 1992-1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
minimum wage was only about one-sixth of the average. This is shown 
in Figure 3.3. Trends in the level of the minimum wage raise the issue of 
inequality.
E arn in gs In equ a lity
The general expectation has been that the level of earnings inequality would 
increase during the transition, and this has indeed been the case, although 
to varying extents in different countries. The trend can be shown for sev­
eral Eastern European countries, where the transition to a market economy 
typically began earlier and has advanced further than in Uzbekistan (Table 
3.11). Note however that these estimates are based on official data compiled 
at the enterprise rather than at the household level, and therefore exclude 
informal economic activity. Also, agricultural workers are excluded as are, 
typically, smaller firms (less than 50 employees). The private sector is ex­
cluded altogether in Bulgaria and Slovakia. The expected net effect of these
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omissions would be to understate the degree of inequality. It is nonetheless 
apparent that levels of earnings inequality have increased in all countries in 
the sample since the late 1980s.
Table 3.11: Trends in earnings inequality: selected transition countries, 1987- 
1993
1987 1993
Decile ratio Gini coefficient Decile ratio Gini coefficient
Bulgaria (1990) 2.57 .213 3.13 .251
Czech Republic 2.60 .198 3.20 .257
Hungary (1988) 3.14 .268 3.67 .315
Poland 2.76 .230 3.03 .257
Romania (1989) 1.95 .156 2.76 .229
Slovakia 2.45 .194 2.54 .197
SOURCE: Rutkowski 1996b, Table 4
Flemming and Micklewright (forthcoming) present evidence for a number 
of European countries and the Russian Federation revealing that the changes 
in earnings inequality in the former are dwarfed by what they find for Russia 
using representative survey data. In Russia, the decile ratio leapt to over 8 
in 1992, the first year of the price liberalisation, then doubled again to 15 in 
1993, before falling back to 9.5 in 1994 and 10 in 1995. They conclude that 
the surge in inequality in Russia has been driven by changes at both ends of 
the earnings distribution. Similarly, Milanovic (1998, Table 4.2) reports that 
increases in the Gini coefficient for the distribution of earnings amounted to 
between .04 to .08 Gini point increases in Eastern Europe (ranging from .034 
points in Poland between 1987 and 1995, up to .078 in Bulgaria between 
1989 and 1995), compared to an increase of .178 in the Gini coefficient for 
earnings in Russia between 1989 and 1994.
In Uzbekistan, estimates based on official data suggest that increases in 
earnings inequality has been less dramatic than in the Russian Federation, 
although the analysis to date has been rather limited. Saidova et al. (1996) 
look at changes in the earnings distribution over the course of 1995, relative to
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 115
a base of January 1994, as indicated by the standard deviation and the share 
of workers with below average wages. Based on official data, they estimate 
that the standard deviation almost doubled in real terms over the course of 
the year (rising from 2292 to 4541) and that the share of workers with below 
average wages fluctuated between 56 and 65 percent. Consistent with the 
picture presented above, Saidova et al. (1996) suggest that employees in the 
social sectors tend to have wages much lower than the average, while there is a 
group with wages much higher than the national mean that includes workers 
in industry, construction and the financial sector. The extent of earnings 
inequality in Uzbekistan is revisited in PART II, including an evaluation of 
the role which arrears have played in widening the wage distribution.
3.5 C onclusions
This chapter has reviewed a range of recent economic and institutional changes 
that have occurred in Uzbekistan. Many of these mirror trends that can be 
observed for transition countries of the region, including a period of very 
high inflation, substantial output decline and falls in the real wage. It was 
showm that the pace of structural reform in Uzbekistan has been deliberately 
gradual, and extensive state intervention in the economy continued at least 
until 1997.
Aggregate trends in the levels of employment and unemployment, the 
real wage and the extent of earnings inequality have been relatively less ad­
verse in Uzbekistan than elsewhere in Central Asia and the FSU. There are 
a number of features that distinguish the Uzbek experience in the labour 
market, not least the apparent robustness of total employment levels and 
the more limited extent of real wage declines. Employment and to a lesser 
extent output has been maintained in agriculture, for example. The increase 
in measured inequality does not seem to have matched the trends seen else­
where in the economies in transition, although given data constraints any
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conclusions about Uzbekistan at this point must be tentative.
At the same time, national data suggest significant structural shifts in the 
composition of employment, in terms of sector as well as type of ownership, 
even if the pattern of relative wages by branch has been fairly stable. There 
have also been marked shifts on the supply-side of the labour market, in 
particular, substantial declines in higher and vocational education for youth, 
and also among adults undertaking part-time study.
The chapter has pointed to a series of key questions about the deter­
minants of wages and wage outcomes. For example, do the rates of return 
in Uzbekistan approximate those in other transition countries, despite the 
slower pace of economic reform? How have the declines in the shares of 
labour market entrants with higher education and vocational training af­
fected their relative earnings? Are there significant differences in wage out­
comes between the private and state sectors? Can the impact of protective 
employment legislation on designated “disadvantaged” groups, like women 
with small children, be discerned? These are among the questions subject to 
investigation in PART II.
Our understanding of these processes has previously been significantly 
constrained by the nature of official data sources. There is need for circum­
spection and caution in the interpretation of trends in the labour market as 
reported in official statistics. This is an important part of the motivation 
for the micro-analysis in PART II, which investigates the labour market in 
Uzbekistan in depth using representative survey data collected in 1995. Be­
fore proceeding, the next chapter examines theory and evidence about the 
determinants of earnings in transition.
Chapter 4
W ages in Transition: Theory  
and Evidence
4.1 In troduction
Chapter 2 suggested that the Soviet labour market was one of the least 
regulated aspects of the planned regime, and that it possessed several features 
resembling those in western economies, including the freedom of workers to 
choose the extent of schooling and among types of jobs. On the other hand, 
wage setting took place within the context of the Soviet planned economy 
and had its own idiosyncratic features. Since at least 1991, however, many 
of the planning controls have been liberalised or eliminated, as shown in 
Chapter 3. There have also been substantial changes in the macroeconomy 
that would have affected the demand for labour, as well as a series of changes 
affecting the supply-side of the labour market.
This chapter sets out the basic model that is applied in the detailed em­
pirical analysis of earnings that comprises the rest of the thesis. The general 
framework is the theory of equalising differences, which refers to observed 
wage differentials required to equalise the total monetary and nonmonetary 
advantages or disadvantages among work activities and among workers them­
selves (Rosen 1986). Human capital theory has developed within this frame-
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work, focussing on the idea that occupations requiring greater expenditure 
of time and money on education and training pay higher wages to compen­
sate both for the direct expense and for the foregone earnings. Observed 
earnings differentials between different levels of schooling provide a basis for 
imputing rates of return to education. Human capital theory has been used 
with widespread success to explain individual earnings outcomes in a range 
of Western economies.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the general 
theoretical framework of equalising differences. Section 4.3 sets out human 
capital theory and the functional relationship between earnings and human 
capital developed by Mincer (1974). The subsequent sub-sections critically 
examine some of the underlying assumptions of human capital theory that 
pose potential problems in empirical analysis. Section 4.4 reviews recent 
empirical evidence on earnings functions, with particular reference to the 
economies in transition in Europe and Asia, drawing attention to issues of 
methodology as well as the actual results.
4.2 The Theory of Equalising Differences
The theory of equalising or compensating differences has been described as 
“the fundamental (long-run) market equilibrium construct in labour eco­
nomics" (Rosen 1986, p. 640). Its empirical importance lies in its implica­
tions for the determinants of wages in the economy (ibid.). It is a framework 
which can be used to analyse the supply of workers to jobs that are differenti­
ated by various attributes -  skills, location, working environments, and other 
job requirements. This section reviews the theory of equalising differences,1 
before the next section goes on to consider its most popular form in empirical 
labour economics, the application of human capital theory.
In a standard market model, with identical economic agents, the identi-
lrThe discussion of the theory of equalising differences draws heavily on Rosen (1986).
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ties of the traders is immaterial to the final outcomes. By way of contrast, 
efficient allocation of labour entails matching and sorting among specific 
workers and firms. A basic difference between the theory of equalising differ­
ences and most market models is that the identity and characteristics of the 
traders is a key aspect. The labour market transaction is viewed as a “tied” 
sale in which the worker simultaneously sells (rents) her labour services and 
“buys” the attributes of the job. Job attributes vary from job to job, so that 
the worker can choose her preferred type of job and employer. Similarly, 
worker characteristics (skill, experience etc.) differ among workers. The ac­
tual wage paid can therefore be seen as the sum of two conceptually distinct 
transactions: one for labour services and worker characteristics, and another 
for job attributes. This set of transactions requires sorting and matching of 
individuals and jobs.
Given perfect information on both sides of the market, the set of wages 
and the measurable attributes and characteristics associated with all such 
assignments are the equalising differences observed in the market. “Such 
associations underlie virtually all empirical estimates of wage functions es­
timated in actual data and have become a focal point in labor economics” 
(Rosen 1986, p. 643). At the same time, the existence of job search and 
information costs mean that this theory cannot explain all wage variation 
in a specific data set, even in the absence of measurement error. In prac­
tice, imperfect information as well as omitted factors sustain wage variability 
among measurably “identical” individuals and jobs. In other words, the ex­
planatory value (coefficient of variation or R2; see Appendix 2) in the typical 
wage regression is not large.
A simple binary-choice model of equalising differences and its empirical 
consequences can be illustrated by a case where different types of jobs offer 
two different levels of some disamenity. It is assumed that this disamenity 
(e.g. dirtiness) of the job can be objectively measured. The compensating 
variation in the wage is the additional money needed to make the worker
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indifferent between the two types of job. Rosen (1986, pp. 645-650) sets out 
a formal presentation of preferences, opportunities and worker choices, which 
need not be reproduced here. A straightforward generalisation extends the 
binary choice model to the more realistic case of multinomial choice where 
job attributes exhibit more variation.
A simple presentation is as follows. In equilibrium, there is an equalisation 
of individual utilities across the economy. An individual’s net utility, £7, is 
a function of her gross wage or monetary compensation (w), net of any 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary costs (C). Examples of pecuniary costs include 
educational expenses and the cost of travelling to work; examples of non- 
pecuniary costs include health related risks or unpleasantness associated with 
the job. That is,
U = U(w — C )
Clearly the assumption of equalisation of individual utilities is a strong one. 
It relies on individuals having the same opportunity sets, in particular the 
same potential wage rates (e.g. ability). Indeed this assumption implies that 
there is no inequality of earnings, once the differing attributes of jobs are 
accounted for.
In the context of the equalising differences model, there is a range of 
factors that would be expected to affect earnings outcomes. A number of 
these have already been reviewed in Chapter 2 in considering the factors 
that influenced Soviet planners. In international studies, the measurable 
job attributes on which compensating wage differentials have been shown 
to arise empirically include onerous or dangerous working conditions, inter­
regional differences associated with variations in climate, urban crowding, 
and the skills necessary to perform different types of work (see Rosen 1986 
and references cited therein).
The assumption of perfect information that underlies the theory of equal­
ising differences has already been noted. It is also assumed individuals are 
mobile. Labour markets are imperfect if, for example, individuals are unable
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to move in response to job opportunities due to administrative regulations or 
housing shortages, in which case differences in earnings need not be equalised.
Of course the underlying assumptions about market perfection do not gen­
erally apply, at least in their strict form, to established market economies. 
This has not prevented the successful empirical application of earnings func­
tions around the world. The question is whether these assumptions are so re­
mote from the economic conditions that prevail in the transition economies, 
and in particular Uzbekistan, as to render the theory of equalising differ­
ences irrelevant. The review of the Soviet period indicated that the theory 
was relevant to explanations of central planners’s decisions about wage dif­
ferentiation. For the transition period, this is an empirical question that is 
addressed in the chapters that follow.
The next section focuses on individual worker skills and the human capital 
theory of earnings determination.
4.3  T he H um an C apital Earnings F unction
“As a statistical model, the human capital earnings function de­
veloped by Mincer has provided the basis for a vast body of empir­
ical research...(which) reveals some striking regularities concern­
ing the structure of wage differentials which hold over periods of 
time and across societies which differ dramatically in technology, 
patterns of demand, and forms of economic and social organisa­
tion”
R.J. Willis (1986), p. 540
The most important application of earnings functions has been to study 
the effects of the investments in education and post-school training on the 
level, pattern and distribution of earnings (Willis 1986, p. 235). This has 
followed the pioneering work of Becker (1964), Becker and Chiswick (1966) 
and Mincer (1974), although the major outline of human capital theory is
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found in the Wealth of Nations where Adam Smith notes that occupations 
requiring greater time and expenditure on training must pay larger wages to 
compensate for that (see Rosen 1986, p. 676). This section considers the 
conceptual underpinnings of human capital theory, and examines the major 
criticisms that are relevant to studies of economies in transition.
Human capital theory explains why earnings in occupations requiring 
large entry costs (more education/ skill) are higher than in those where entry 
is easier. Earnings differences must compensate for educational cost and 
training differences among occupations.
The most widely assumed relationship between earnings and human cap­
ital is quite simple. The logarithm of earnings is a linear function of years 
of schooling and a quadratic function of work experience. This method in­
volves using ordinary least squares (OLS) procedures to fit individual level 
cross-sectional survey data to a semi-logarithmic function of the following 
form:
Wi =  ct bSi 4 - cTi +  dT? 4-  Ui ( 4 - 1)
where Wi represents the natural logarithm of labour earnings for individual 
z, S{ represents years of schooling for individual z, Tz represents years of work 
experience for individual z, and Ui is an error term which satisfies the full set of 
assumptions necessary for the use of OLS. The conventional functional form 
assumes a quadratic relationship between the natural logarithm of earnings 
and labour force experience.2 When schooling is expressed as a continuous 
cardinal variable, the coefficient on the years of schooling variable can be 
interpreted as the percentage increase in annual labour earnings from an 
extra year of education.3
Labour market experience is sometimes directly observed in the sample 
data. This was the case, for example, -with Ofer and Vinokur’s (1992) study 
of Russian emigres. More often, however, the length of work experience has
2The validity of this assumption is investigated fully in Chapter 7 below.
3 Note that direct or indirect monetary costs of education are neglected.
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to be assumed. The convention, following Mincer (1974), has been to assume 
that experience equals potential experience, which is defined as the age of 
individual minus the years of schooling minus school entry age. In the case 
of Uzbekistan, this would imply that
T  = age — s — 7 (4.2)
where age is the age of the individual in years and the normal school entry age 
is seven. This measure of potential experience is often known as Mincerian 
experience.
The semi-logarithmic form of the earnings function arises due to the de­
finition of the present value of schooling, and can be derived as follows, by 
drawing on Freeman (1986). The basic idea is that education represents an 
investment of current time (and money) for future payoffs. In a simplified 
context, an individual, z, faces the option of either working full-time or going 
to school full-time and investing in her human capital. Her earnings at time 
t are proportional to the amount of human capital already accumulated:
Wi(t) = w.Si(t) (4.3)
where Wi(t) is earnings,w is the rental price of human capital and Si(t) is 
the amount of human capital. If, starting at time t, the individual spends 
(te) years in full-time education, the amount of human capital will increase 
according to an education production function:
S(t +  te) = f ( t e) + (1 — cr)teS(t) (4-4)
where /  is the production function translating time in school (te) into addi­
tional units of human capital and a is the depreciation rate. In this frame­
work, it is clear that the cost of schooling is wS{, that is, the forgone earn­
ings plus any direct costs associated with education. The return to schooling 
depends on w, which may change over time (say due to labour market con­
ditions), f  (te) &nd (J- Demand for education would be higher the longer
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the future working life, the more productive is time spent in education and 
the smaller the discount rate. The effect of depreciation of human capital 
has an ambiguous effect on demand for education (Freeman 1986, p. 368). 
The underlying intuition is that depreciation on the one hand necessitates 
retraining, but on the other hand, makes education less attractive because 
individuals would know that they need to undergo retraining or need to be 
“replaced” in the future.
As an example of how the semi-log earnings function can be derived in this 
framework, consider the example of an individual with a university degree. 
The rate of return to investment in an university degree can be calculated as 
that number r that satisfies the following equation:
r n  r s  r n s
/  Wte~rtd t=  /  (Wet ~ D)e-rtdt +  /  Wste~rtdt (4.5)
J o  J o  J s
where Wt is the wage of individuals, at date t, without a university degree;
n is the retirement age of those without university education minus year of
\
leaving school (i.e. number of years that such individuals work); Wst is the 
wage, at date £, of individuals with a degree; and ns the number of years that 
they devote to both work and education; Wet represents wages for individuals 
during the period of university; D is the direct (how) cost of university and 
s the duration (in years) of the university degree.
The term on the left hand side of equation 4.5 is the present value of 
earnings for those who do not go on to university, discounted at the rate r. 
The first term on the right hand side measures earnings during university 
net of direct costs. The second term on the right hand side is the value of 
earnings for individuals with education after they graduate, discounted back 
to time t = 0 (i.e., the beginning of the degree). The left and right hand 
sides of the equation are set equal to obtain the rate of return because the 
internal rate of return (r) is that which makes the net benefits of university 
education equal to zero.
It is then assumed (i) that annual earnings do not change with age/ 
experience; (ii) that university education is full-time (so that Wet = 0) and
4.3. THE HUMAN CAPITAL EARNINGS FUNCTION 125
net earnings at university are zero (i.e. the first term on RHS of equation 
(4.5) equals zero); and (iii) that workers with degrees retire s years later than 
those without degrees. With these assumptions, equation (4.5) becomes:
rn r n + s
/  We~rt = /  Wse~rt 
JO J  s
or
W s e ~rn  _  2
7 7 7  = ----t——t--------- assuming D = 0I Y  g - r ( n + s )  _  g - r s  °
Taking logs, we obtain:
logu^ = a  logic 4- rs + other terms (4-6)
This last equation is the widely used log earnings function that was set out 
as equation (4.1).
In practice, earnings functions are usually estimated in a more gener­
alised form to control for the factors that the theory of equalising differences 
would suggest to be significant determinants of earnings. The basic func­
tional form -  with only human capital variables on the right hand side - can 
be augmented with a range of independent variables expected to impact upon 
individual earnings. These are the “other terms” included in equation (4.6). 
The variables included might extend to, for example, region of residence, 
occupation and industry.
Equalising differences for locational amenities, for example, has long been 
an area of empirical inquiry in labour economics (Rosen 1986, p. 673). A 
number of studies have sought to explain the persistent differences in wages 
across the United State among workers with the same measured productivity 
(education, experience and so on) -  in particular, the lower level of earnings in 
the South.4 It is clear intuitively that differences in locational amenities must
4 For example, some have argued that the observed wage premium associated with larger 
cities is compensation for the impersonality and difficulties associated with metropolitan 
living (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972).
126 CHAPTER 4. WAGES IN TRANSITION
be associated with differences in prices to attract people to less attractive 
areas -  otherwise mobile individuals would simply move.5
As noted at the outset, this empirical specification of human capital the­
ory has enjoyed very widespread popularity in the study of determinants of 
individual wages. Indeed Griliches (1977) described the earnings functions 
thus specified as “the most stable econometric relationship in the area of 
applied economics”. Of course that does not mean that the model is entirely 
uncontroversial.
4 .4  C riticism s o f th e H um an C apital M odel
There are a number of debates that surround human capital earnings func­
tions, a full review of which is beyond the scope of this study (see, for exam­
ple, Behrman (forthcoming) and Dougherty and Jimenez 1991). The debates 
which are directly relevant to the application of the model to Uzbekistan ob­
viously do warrant some attention, however. These include questions of func­
tional form and the use of potential experience measure to proxy for actual 
labour market experience of women. In some cases, the literature suggests 
that a new consensus is emerging whereas other issues remain subject to de­
bate. The rest of this section introduces some of the major methodological 
and theoretical questions that are subject to fuller empirical investigation in 
the chapters that follow.
4 .4 .1  L inear S pecification  o f  H um an  C ap ita l V ariab les
In equation (4.1) the relation between education and earnings in the conven­
tional basic model is highly constrained in the sense that an additional year 
of education, whether it be the pentultimate year of secondary school (Year 
11, to take an Australian example), or the successful completion of a PhD,
5This could be true even in the absence of free mobility - for example, its relevance 
can be seen the system of regional coefficients that were used to raise wages in otherwise 
unattractive parts of the USSR (see Chapter 2).
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has the same marginal effect on an individual’s earnings. This is unlikely 
and unduly restricts the regression (Greene 1994, p. 234). In other words, in 
the conventional form of the earnings function presented in equation (4.1), 
the coefficients necessarily yield an average wage increase associated with an 
additional year of education. There is also evidence that the conventional 
relationship between experience and earnings in the basic human capital 
model of earnings may not be sufficiently flexible, even with the inclusion of 
a quadratic term to allow for declining marginal increments to wages.
Fortunately there are ways to alleviate these constraints that are well- 
established in the literature, including the use of dummy variables for the 
completion and non-completion of different levels of education and the inclu­
sion of interaction terms. Another approach of growing importance is the use 
of non-parametric specifications of experience terms. Each of these modifica­
tions are introduced in this section, and explored more fully in the chapters 
that follow.
The present data set, with information on complete and incomplete edu­
cation at each level, allows the basic earnings function model to be extended 
to estimate private gross returns to different educational levels. The con­
tinuous years of schooling variable {S i ) in equation (4.1) can be replaced 
by a set of mutually exclusive discrete educational variables. In Uzbekistan, 
individuals in the sample reported one of nine educational categories as their 
highest educational attainment.6 These categories consist of the following:
1. individuals with a primary education or less;
2. incomplete secondary education;
3. complete secondary;
4. incomplete vocational (PTU) education;
5. complete vocational;
6 The small number reporting “other” education were deemed to be missing.
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6. incomplete teknikum (SSUZ) or college;
7. complete teknikum (SSUZ) or college;
8. with incomplete higher and, finally,
9. those with a university qualification.
In the regression analysis, the education categories are used to construct 
a set of discrete dummy (or binary) variables that adopt a value of one if the 
individual is in a given category and zero otherwise. These nine categories 
can be denoted
Zj , j  — U --9
We can then rewrite equation (4.1) as
9
= ex +  ^   ^ßjZj +  'ipTi + STf + Ui (4-7)
j = 2
where Ui is an error term which satisfies the full set of assumptions for the use 
of OLS. The lowest education category, that of primary or less, is omitted 
from the specification. Note that the estimated coefficients on the set of 
binary educational variables do not represent the estimated returns to the 
qualification in question. Appendix 1 to this chapter shows how private gross 
rates of return to the different qualifications can be derived from information 
about the coefficients and years of schooling.
Even when different levels of education are allowed for rather than a 
linear years of schooling variable, as in equation (4.1), once workers enter 
employment the age-earnings profiles for each educational attainment group 
are parallel to one another. This is a highly restrictive form to impose on the 
data, even if it has tended to be standard in the literature. It means that the 
regression results stand counter to the stylised facts that the age-earnings 
profiles of those with the lowest levels of schooling tend to rise relatively 
slowly after the first few years of work experience, whereas individuals with
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higher levels of education tend to enjoy increasing earnings throughout their 
working lives (Psacharopoulos and Layard 1979; Dourgherty and Jimenez 
1991). The latter has been attributed to the greater learning opportunities 
and occupational mobility afforded by higher levels of education.7
A more flexible specification of the earnings function is enabled through 
the inclusion of interaction terms. Whereas the model specification without 
interaction terms is constrained to measure an average effect of experience 
across individuals with different levels of education, the inclusion of inter­
action terms means that this effect may vary with education. We can thus 
return to the simplest education definition (i.e. years of schooling) to illus­
trate,
Wi  =  cz +  ßSi +  'ipT'i +  6Tf -f- eStTi -f- 4>SiTf +  Ui  (4.8)
where eSiTi and <f>SiTf admit an interaction between the number of years 
of schooling (5) and experience (T). When dummy variables are used, each 
level of schooling can be interacted with other independent variables thought 
to be relevant.8
It has been argued that the conventional quadratic term in labour force 
experience is also highly restrictive, and possibly misleading (Murphy and 
Welch 1990; Borland and Suen 1994; Will 1998). It suggests too slow an 
increase in the early part of an individual’s career and too rapid a slowdown 
in the latter part. In Chapter 7 alternative specifications of experience are 
tested, leading to a different preferred functional form.
In sum, the conventional form of the basic earnings function is highly 
restrictive in a number of respects, although methods have been developed 
to overcome some of the drawbacks. The refinements in method are tested 
and utilised in P a r t  II of the thesis.
See Alba-Ramirez and Segundo (1995) for the case of Spain, for example.
s When experience-education effects are introduced into the regression model, the earn­
ings functions cease to be isomorphic and it is no longer possible to interpret the coefficient 
on the schooling variable as the rate of return (Dourgherty and Jimenez, 1991).
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4 .4 .2  M easu rem en t o f In d ep en d en t V ariables
Accurate measurement of the variables of interest is always a potential prob­
lem in econometric analysis. Deaton (1997, p. 99) refers to measurement 
error in survey data as a “fact of life”. In the present context, the mea­
surement of the experience term raises special concerns. The conventional 
specification of experience explicitly assumes an uninterrupted working life 
on the part of the individual. This has been the subject of critical debate.9 
Criticism was prompted in part by the increasing frequency and prevalence 
of unemployment in Western industrial countries that has rendered this as­
sumption less tenable since the mid-1970s (Main and Elias 1987).
Involuntary unemployment is probably less of an issue for the measure­
ment of work experience in Uzbekistan, at least in 1995 (although there is 
evidence of surplus labour during the Soviet period and the transition, as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). More problematic, however, is that the use 
of potential experience for women is compromised by high fertility rates and 
the likelihood of career interruptions due to child-bearing and family respon­
sibilities.10 If this is the case, the use of potential experience will lead to 
inconsistent regression estimates, that are biased downward since potential 
experience is greater than actual experience.
Direct evidence on the extent of measurement error is of course rare. But 
in cases where comparison of Mincerian estimates and actual experience has 
been possible, like the analysis carried out on Australian data by Kidd and 
Shannon (1997), the differences have been demonstrated to be substantial. 
This problem is investigated for the case of Uzbekistan in Chapter 6, and 
methods are adopted to counter its effects.
Another potential measurement problem relates to labour compensation 
and the role of non-pecuniary benefits. In Uzbekistan, as in other parts of
9 See, for example, Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979); and Rummery (1992) for an 
application to Australia
l0For example, the likelihood of extended career breaks is high in the former Soviet 
Union given the right to three years maternity leave.
4.4. CRITICISMS OF THE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL 131
the former Soviet Union, employers provided a range of services that were 
part of total remuneration. These included access to free or highly subsidised 
child care, for example (see Klugman et al. 1997). The amount of mone­
tary earnings therefore would fail to reflect the total benefits that attach 
to a given job. The inclusion of “fringe benefits” is, of course, an issue in 
Western countries also (see Fleming and Micklewright forthcoming, p. 29). 
The present data set includes a number of direct questions on non-monetary 
benefits, and asks the respondents to value such services. However the total 
net earnings figure may be subject to under-reporting (see Chapter 5, Section 
3).
Finally with respect to the dependent variable it is noted that data lim­
itations mean that the monthly wage specifications cannot be corrected for 
potential endogeneity of hours. Nonetheless, the problem may be minimal 
insofar as the focus is on employees in their main job, and official adminis­
trative data suggest that only 2 percent of the employed workforce worked 
less than full-time (see also Chapter 6). The presence of random measure­
ment error in the dependent variable does not bias the regression coefficients, 
because it simply adds to the variance of the equation as a whole (Deaton 
1997, p. 99). However such errors do reduce the precision with which the 
parameters are estimated.
4.4.3 Omitted Variables
A common problem in the specification of regression models is the omis­
sion of relevant variables. The use of OLS assumes that the systematic or 
deterministic part of the equation can be accurately specified. If, however, 
systematic components of the relationship are contained in the error terms, 
the estimated coefficients are subject to bias. Not even the direction of the 
bias caused by omission can be deduced if there are multiple regression co­
efficients (Greene 1994, p. 246).
The problem of omitted variables frequently affects empirical analysis of
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earnings because information is lacking on certain variables that one would 
expect to influence earnings outcomes. This could affect our interpretation 
of the coefficients on the education and experience variables.
For example, most of the existing studies of the impact of schooling on 
wages/ productivity do not control well, if at all, for the behavioural decisions 
that determine who goes to what type of school, for how long, and with 
what degree of success (Behrman, forthcoming). Freeman (1986) refers to 
the role of the family in education as “perhaps the most important element 
missing from the model” (p. 367). One might expect that individuals with 
higher investments in schooling would be relatively more likely to have higher 
levels of ability and motivation and come from better-off family backgrounds. 
This pattern seems to have been true in the formerly planned economies 
in spite of the ostensibly egalitarian objectives of the socialist regimes (see 
Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Coudouel and Fajth forthcoming). There is also 
a growing literature on the endogeneity of schooling choice and the role of 
ability in determining earnings and schooling (see, for example, Blackburn 
and Neumark 1993; Card 1995).
The extent to which the omission of such controls as family background, 
ability and school quality affects the estimated effect on schooling attainment 
is not however clear (Behrman forthcoming, p. 39).11 The present data set 
does not allow these issues to be investigated here, except to the extent that 
regional controls reflect variations in school quality.
The interpretation of returns to experience is also affected by omitted 
variables. Experience is generally taken to be a proxy for time spent in 
on-the-job training. But even if experience is correctly measured as time 
in the labour force, empirical tests of human capital theory do not usually
11 Behrman (1990) claimed that the studies of developing countries that do incorporate 
controls for such factors as unobserved family background suggest that the “standard 
estimates” (without controls) may overstate the impact of schooling attainment by as 
much as 40 to 100 percent. However as Behrman (forthcoming) notes, more recent work 
in the US suggests that the standard studies may not have overestimated the effects to 
this extent.
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distinguish between general and specific training. General training is, by 
definition, completely transferable among firms whereas firm-specific training 
is not. Theory suggests that the individual worker will bear the costs of the 
former (in terms of lower current wages), while the costs of specific training 
will tend to be shared between the worker and employer.12 The inclusion 
of tenure allows a segregation of estimates of returns to general and specific 
human capital (Chapman and Tan 1980). Unfortunately such information is 
not available in the present case, so that experience, as measured, would tend 
to confound firm-specific training and general experience.13 Further caveats 
with respect to the interpretation of coefficients on the experience variable 
are addressed in the next section.
4 .4 .4  E xp er ien ce  and P ro d u c tiv ity
It has been widely observed that earnings tend to increase with experience 
in the labour market. Human capital theory posits that this occurs because 
a worker’s productivity is augmented by on-the-job training. However it is 
very difficult to empirically test this proposition in the absence of accurate 
measures of each individual worker’s productivity.14 One suggestion is that 
upward earnings profiles, which reward individual tenure (experience) with 
the firm, raise worker productivity because workers are motivated to work 
hard in order to remain with the firm until retirement and thereby obtain 
the benefits associated with longer tenure (Lazear 1979).
There are other potential explanations of the relationship between ex­
perience and earnings, such as seniority provisions, that are independent of 
productivity growth. Some of the reasons to be cautious in interpreting the
12See Blau and Ferber (1992), pp. 164-166.
13In any case, the effect of tenure on earnings remains a controversial point, with some 
studies supporting the human capital explanation and others refuting it. Studies sup­
porting the human capital/ training hypothesis include Topel (1991) and Brown (1989). 
Negative studies include Medoff and Abraham (1980).
14 Studies which support the training-human capital hypothesis include Topel (1991) and 
Brown (1989).
134 CHAPTER 4. WAGES IN TRANSITION
observed correlation between experience and earnings in terms of increases 
in individual worker productivity can be highlighted as follows.
First, there is some direct evidence, using individual performance ratings 
as a proxy for individual productivity, that human capital derived from on- 
the-job training cannot explain a substantial part of the observed return to 
labour market experience (Medoff and Abraham 1980).15
Second, technical change would be expected to affect the rate of growth of 
individual worker productivity, and would vary by sector and also over time. 
There is evidence for Australia that formal training (general and specific) has 
a much larger effect on wages in industries experiencing rapid rates of tech­
nological change (Chapman and Tan 1992). On the other hand it is possible 
that during periods of rapid technological change, the skills that workers had 
acquired at “school” (prior to labour force entry) may become obsolete, a 
tendency which would be more likely with longer time in the labour force 
and in more technical fields, like engineering (Medoff and Abraham 1980, p. 
731).
Third, societal norms about “just” relative compensation may require 
a positive association between experience and earnings, regardless of the 
individual’s level of productivity. Such norms would tend to be economy- 
specific. However it should be noted that, in theory at least, the Soviet system 
of wage determination did not take seniority into account: see Chapter 2.3.
The foregoing calls for caution in interpretation of the returns to the 
experience variable in earnings regressions. These alternative possibilities are 
borne in mind in the interpretation of the estimated returns to experience in 
P a r t  II.
lo Specifically, using the personnel records of two major U.S. corporations, Medoff and 
Abraham (1980) find that greater experience moves white male employees toward the 
upper part of the relevant (grade) earnings distribution, but it does not move them toward 
the upper tail of the relevant performance distribution.
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4 .4 .5  E ducation: P ro d u ctiv ity  versus S ignallin g
The conventional view of the positive correlation between education and 
earnings, based on human capital theory, is that the latter augments earnings 
through increasing the individual's productivity. But one can think of other 
explanations to account for the positive correlation. As noted in Chapter 
2, higher education may be associated with higher earnings because of the 
signal imparted to the employer about the capacity of the individual and/or 
because personal connections are acquired at university that lead to better 
jobs.
Economic theories have been developed to support the signalling inter­
pretation: that is, that schooling serves to identify those individuals w*ho are 
more productive, without the education process itself necessarily adding to 
their productivity (Wolpin 1977). Spence (1973) developed the theoretical 
basis of the signalling model, on the assumptions that there is imperfect infor­
mation about the individual’s actual productivity and that it is prohibitively 
costly to identify each individual’s productivity within a workplace. Readily 
observed information, such as a university degree, is used as a signal by em­
ployers to label individuals as more productive, who are then able to obtain a 
higher wage. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that in the Soviet system, a uni­
versity degree could be seen to signal an individual’s capacity to (i) memorise 
vast amounts of detailed information in a disciplined fashion; and (ii) work 
in close-knit groups (the study collective). Both were valued in the Soviet 
economy, the latter because the administrative command system depended 
very much on the acquisition and development of personal relationships.
The empirical predictions of the human capital and screening hypotheses 
both involve a positive relation between education and earnings, and for 
this reason it is difficult to disentangle the operation of the hypotheses in 
practice. That is, if one observes that individuals with university education 
receive higher wages, that finding per se is consistent with both the human
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capital and signalling theories of wage determination.16 Various tests have 
been proposed for distinguishing between the impacts of the human capital 
and screening impacts of education (see, e.g. Miller and Volker 1984; Wolpin 
1977), but the results of these tests have been inconclusive.1'
One way to disentangle the data on education and earnings is to test for 
the existence of so-called “sheepskin effects”. If education was valued by 
employers for its effect in enhancing productivity, one would not expect that 
the award of a degree or diploma after, say, three years of tertiary education 
to have a dramatic effect on earnings relative to the effect of two years of 
university. If the receipt of a degree does have such an effect, this is known as 
a sheepskin effect.18 Sheepskin effects have been fairly widely documented in 
a range of country circumstances, from Pakistan (Shabbir 1991) to the USA 
(Hungerford and Solon 1987). The econometric techniques which have been 
developed to investigate whether or not sheepskin effects exist are employed 
in Chapter 8.
Signalling and human capital theories share the common framework of 
a competitive labour market where employers must reward workers accord­
ing to their productivity, even if information constraints are an explicit el-
16An indirect test of the signalling hypothesis is to compare the earnings of employees 
and the self employed, who in general have similar levels of education (Wolpin 1977). 
However accurate measurement of net earnings of the self-employed is difficult -  e.g. dis­
tinguishing between returns to capital and returns to labour. In addition, the sample 
investigated by Wolpin is arguably a rather special one: World War II veterans. See also 
Riley (1979), who partitions the dataset into sub-sets with high and low mean education, 
and high and low earnings, and concludes that the screening hypothesis is a more complete 
explanation of observed behaviour than human capital theory.
17For example, Katz and Ziderman (1990), using Israeli data found strong screening 
effects, whereas de Oliveria et al (1987) for the US did not, and Boissiere et al (1985) 
found support for human capital theory in Kenya. Recent papers have explored the causal 
link between education and earnings using natural experiments: e.g. Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1992).
18 Where a continuous education variables (e.g. years of schooling) is used in an earnings 
model, sheepskin effects are taken to exist where there are statistically significant discon­
tinuities in the returns to education in the year of completion. It is thus called because 
employers are paying for a mere “sheepskin” -  that is, literally for the material used for 
medieval diplomas.
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ement in the former model. By way of contrast, if licences and personal 
connections determine wage outcomes, education is not important either as 
a productivity-enhancing process nor as a signal of individual capacity. The 
value of education is solely as a route to developing personal contacts to be 
relied upon in later working life. Knowing people would matter if markets 
are not competitive, so that employers can make decisions about employment 
and wages that are not related to individual productivity. Again, however, it 
is difficult to disentangle this explanation of the correlation between educa­
tion and earnings empirically. It would imply a segmented labour market - 
with one part engaging individuals with higher education and higher earnings 
- and little mobility between the segments.
4.5 A  R eview  o f th e  E vidence
Earnings functions based on human capital theory have been applied in many 
industrial and developing countries (for surveys, see Willis 1986; Behrman 
1990; Behrman forthcoming). Empirical studies of earnings determination 
in the context of the formerly planned economies are, however, relatively 
scarce. The basic constraint has been lack of access to representative micro 
data, although this is being steadily overcome as governments in the region 
undertake the reform of household and labour force surveys (see Falkingham 
and Micklewright 1997; Milanovic 1998). In this section recent findings for 
industrial and developing countries about returns to human capital are high­
lighted before turning to review in greater detail the evidence available for 
transition countries. Attention is drawn to the methodologies that have been 
employed, as well as to the results that have emerged.
4.5 .1  E v id en ce from  E lsew h ere in  th e  W orld
By way of introduction, a table from a widely cited survey of returns to ed­
ucation is reproduced (Psacharapoulos 1994, Table 1). Although this survey
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does not include a category for the transition economies, the general picture 
provides useful background. The regional averages for coefficients for years 
of schoolomh range from about 13 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 12 
percent in Latin America, down to about 7 percent in the OECD (Table 
4.1).
Table 4.1: Schooling coefficients, regional averages
Region Schooling coefficient
(years) (percent)
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.9 13.4
Asia 8.4 9.6
Middle E ast/ North Africa 8.5 8.2
Latin America 7.9 12.4
OECD 10.9 6.8
World 8.4 10.1
SOURCE: Psacharapoulos 1994, Table 1
The associated “stylised facts” include: (i) rates of return to schooling in 
developing countries are high, and do not decline very rapidly with the level 
of development; and (ii) rates of return are highest for primary schooling. 
The apparent inverse relationship between rates of return and the level of 
economic development is explained by the generally more limited access to 
education and therefore lower supply of skilled individuals in poorer countries 
(Psacharapoulos 1985).
Rates of return to education need not be stable over time, even in eco­
nomic conditions that are far more stable than has been experienced by 
transition countries in recent years. An important stylised fact for the US, 
for example, is that over the 1980s there were sharp increases in the return 
to schooling estimated with conventional wage regressions. A number of ex­
planations have been put forward, including changes in the relative demand 
for workers at different educational levels resulting from shifts in trade pat­
terns and/or changes in the structure of the economy, as well as changes in
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the relationship between ability and schooling outcomes (see Blackburn and 
Neumark 1993; Katz 1998).
The most recent estimates for market economies in the World Bank’s 
lower-middle income per capita range, the category into which most socialist 
economies including Uzbekistan would fall, recorded education coefficients of 
over 11 percent (Psacharapoulos 1994). But given the widespread access to 
education and relatively larger supply of skilled individuals in the republic 
(Chapter 2; Falkingham et al 1997) the rates of return to education would be 
expected to approximate the lower levels that tend to be found in the higher 
income industrial economies. The fact that Uzbekistan’s economy is less 
developed than established market countries with similar levels of education 
suggests the risk of a relative over-supply of skilled labour, which would also 
tend to lower the rate of return to schooling.
Evidence is also available with respect to returns to experience, derived 
from many different data sets but using comparable methodological ap­
proaches. Typically direct evidence about actual time in employment is 
missing, and a Mincerian proxy is used. Estimates of the returns to experi­
ence need to be presented at specific numbers of years of experience, because 
of the effect of the quadratic term which means that earnings rise with ex­
perience at a diminishing rate.
Table 4.2 presents estimates of the rate at which wages rise with addi­
tional years of labour market experience, expressed as an annual percentage 
increase. This suggests a range of effects of experience on wages even among 
the OECD countries, with Australia and the United Kingdom at the bottom 
end, and Japan at the top. The relatively flat experience-earnings profiles in 
Australia have been linked to (i) narrowly defined job positions which tend to 
discourage both multi-skilling and worker identification with employer train­
ing needs; and (ii) binding minimum wages which bias short term labour 
utilisation in favour of production rather than training (Borland, Chapman 
and Rimmer 1992, p. 112). Empirical evidence from the US and Japan is
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Table 4.2: Effect of an additional year of experience, selected countries
Country Number of years of experience 
10 20
Australia 2.27 1.36
West Germany 2.72 1.77
US 3.39 2.37
UK 2.11 1.08
Israel 2.50 1.33
Japan 3.77 2.74
SOURCE: Borland et cd. (1992).
also suggestive of a direct link between technological change and training, 
which would show up in returns to experience (Lillard and Tan 1986).
The level and nature of economic development in Uzbekistan that was 
described in Chapters 2 and 3, in particular the relatively low per capita 
income, rural predominance and young population structure, suggests that 
findings from developing countries are most relevant. At the same time, 
however, rates of literacy and general levels of schooling are significantly 
higher in the FSU than in developing countries of comparable per capita 
income (UNICEF 1998; Cusan and Motivans forthcoming). The institutional 
framework and the nature of the education system implies that occupations 
would tend to be defined narrowly, which might be expected to flatten the 
experience-earnings profile.
4 .5 .2  E v id en ce  from  T ransition  C ountries
Changes in the structure of earnings over the course of transition from a com­
mand economy is a subject that has generated considerable recent interest. 
Studies are available for several Eastern European countries, including the 
Czech and Slovak Republics (Flanagan 1994 1998; Vecernik 1995 and Chase 
1997), East Germany (Bird et cd. 1994; Krueger and Pichke 1992), Poland 
(Rutkowski 1996a) and Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec 1995 1997) and a
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number of countries covered in Commander and Corricelli (1995). The only 
detailed country study of returns to human capital in the former Soviet Union 
is limited to Russia (Newell and Reilly (1996) which focussed on the gender 
wage gap). A recent paper by Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) computes 
rates of return for nine transition countries (including Uzbekistan).
A general motivation of many of the studies has been to test whether 
rates of return to educational qualifications have risen during the transition 
(Svenjar forthcoming). The expectation was that economic liberalisation and 
structural change would increase returns to higher education from formerly 
repressed levels: according to the World Bank (1996a), “Wages are starting to 
assist reform by creating incentives to work hard and acquire skills” (p. 73). 
The story that emerges from the Eastern European studies is not uniform 
across countries, however, so it is worth comparing the findings and providing 
some detail on the methodology and data sources that were used in each case. 
Unfortunately the functional form adopted in many of the studies has been 
quite restrictive, which might leave the results open to question.
Methodology
The methodological aspects of the existing studies of wages in transition 
warrant review, since the findings are at least potentially sensitive to the 
details of those studies. The nature of the data sets also vary, some are based 
on household data, while others use administrative sources (e.g. collected by 
social insurance agencies), or firm-based surveys.
Table 4.3 summarises some key aspects of model specification and sam­
pling issues for the existing studies. It shows that the studies to date share a 
number of common features in terms of measurement of variables and model 
specification, viz. (i) the use of age or Mincerian potential experience; and 
(ii) a quadratic term on experience. The studies based on official sources like 
administrative records typically exclude private sector employees.
The use of Mincerian potential experience is likely to lead to overesti-
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Table 4.3: Methodology of selected studies of wages in transition
Study (author) Year Specification 
Education Experience
Source
Poland 1987 & 1993 linear Mincerian + individual
(Rutkowski 1996a) quadratic
Czech Republic Mincerian -1-
(Flanagan 1994) 1992 dummies quadratic grouped
(Flanagan 1998) 1988 & 1996 dummies Mincerian -I- individual
quadratic
Czech and Slovakia 1984-1993 linear Mincerian + individual
(Chase 1997) quadratic
Slovenia 1987 & 1991 dummies Mincerian 4- admin.
(Orazem Sz Vodopevic 1997) quadratic
Russia 1992 dummies age 4- individual
(Newell and Reilly 1996) quadratic
NOTES: Further details on each study are provided in the text.
mates of the number of years of experience, especially for women, and corre­
spondingly low estimates of the returns to experience (Rummery 1992). This 
problem has not been directly addressed by any of the studies of wages in 
transition economies to date. Rather, the studies tend to assume that close 
to full employment during the period of central planning makes this issue 
less of a concern for the economies of the region.
While the use of potential experience (and associated assumption of con­
tinuous work) may be valid for men, this is untenable for women in Uzbek­
istan. First, while labour force participation rates for women rose earlier in 
the region than in a number of western countries, the levels never came close 
to being universal, especially in Soviet Central Asia (see McAuley 1981). Sec­
ond, women were entitled to leaves and concessions in the event of childbirth 
that were generous by Western standards (see McAuley 1981; Katz 1994).19
19The motivation for these concessions can be traced to three factors: first, in the 
European parts of the region in particular, low birth rates were a source of concern to 
government, so that these policies were explicitly pro-natalist; second, the benefits for
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Indeed, formal rates of participation were high partly because of the exten­
sive concessions granted to women with children which allowed them to take 
up to three years off work after birth. While she was officially considered to 
be working for the purpose of pension and other entitlements,20 one might 
well expect that she would not be gaining what employers would consider 
to be productivity-enhancing experience. An examination of the results of 
the transition studies (Table 4.4), shows that the coefficient on experience 
for women is generally significantly lower than that for men, adding weight 
to the suspicion that experience has been mismeasured. This problem is 
addressed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8, Section 4.
A number of recent studies in the international literature on earnings 
functions have emphasised the importance of functional form with respect to 
experience. As noted above, there is a growing number of studies that suggest 
that the simple quadratic relationship does not fit the data well (Murphy and 
Welch 1990; Borland and Suen 1994; Pagan and Ullah forthcoming). The 
specification of experience may significantly affect the measured coefficients 
on experience, the measured contribution of experience to earnings, and so 
on. This topic is investigated in depth in Chapter 7.
Sample exclusion of private sector workers has often characterised enterprise- 
based and labour force surveys, which are generally based on a pre-transition 
sample frame of state-owned enterprises. This would tend to detract from 
the value of the findings, insofar as the interest is in change during the transi­
tion, and the private sector -  both privatised, and new private, firms -  could 
be expected to be primary sources of change in the structure of earnings.
Finally it is noted that some studies have utilised a linear variable for 
education. As noted above, this specification is likely to unduly constrain
mothers and children tended to redistribute income toward the poorer republics of Central 
Asia, offsetting the distributive effect of old age pensions which benefited the Western parts 
of the Union; and third, given the perception of labour shortages in the Soviet Union, 
measures such as these, together with the provision of childcare etc. were taken in order 
to facilitate women’s participation in the labour market.
20 That is, she would have an uninterrupted official work record (stazh).
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estimates of the return to education. It also heightens the risk of mis- 
measurement or misinterpretation, since it has to be assumed that the various 
levels of education are completed in exactly the standard number of years.21
Results
A general finding of a number of studies, particularly those in the fast re­
forming Eastern European countries, has been that returns to education are 
now in the range observed for established market economies. Those studies 
which have a series of cross-sections or panel data have tended to find that 
returns to education have risen over time (e.g. Rutkowski 1996a, for Poland). 
Some have found that the returns to experience acquired during the socialist 
period have declined (e.g. Flanagan (1998) and Chase (1997) for the Czech 
Republic).
At the same time, however, the explanatory power of the basic human 
capital model, as revealed by the coefficient of determination (R2) has tended 
to decline in those studies which trace changes over the period of transition 
(eg. Orazem and Vodopevic 1995; 1997, for Slovenia). Moreover it seems 
that the conventional human capital earnings function does a better job of 
explaining earnings in the state sector than in the new private sector. Neither 
of these results are unexpected, however, for similar reasons.
In a centralised economy, planners’ seek to constrain individual manage­
rial discretion. Earnings are determined by reference to central guidelines 
(the wage tariff) that are based on such “objective” standards as education 
and experience. Hence earnings outcomes are closely associated with the 
observed characteristics of workers. One would expect transition to be asso­
ciated with greater variation in earnings outcomes as the controls on wage 
setting are relaxed. Returns to other important, albeit unobserved, factors
JL There is evidence that school repetition rates have risen during the transition 
(UNICEF 1998). In the US, up to 15 percent of the sample may complete their edu­
cational qualifications in more or less time than the standard assumed duration (Jaeger 
and Page 1996). See Chapter 8.2 for further discussion in the context of sheepskin effects.
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axe expected to rise. At the same time the returns to the observed charac­
teristics is expected to rise.
Figure 4.1: Effect of transition on explanatory power of earnings functions
Transition
Pre-transition
Observed productivity 
characteristics
This is depicted hypothetically in Figure 4.1. During the period of central 
planning, wage outcomes are concentrated around the (flatter) curve that 
depicts the earnings profile. In transition, the curve steepens (due to, for 
example, higher returns to university education), but there is also greater 
variation, thereby reducing the co-efficient of variation. Alternatively the 
curves may be thought of as the public and private sectors respectively, with
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the latter exhibiting higher returns but also larger variance.
Table 4.4 provides an overview of the estimates of education and ex­
perience coefficients from a range of studies of transition economies. The 
methodological approach and results of each of these studies warrant a brief 
review. This is organised by country and individual study, rather than on 
a thematic basis, given the differences among the papers in the depth of 
treatment of various topics. Note, however, that the variation in the nature 
and coverage of the studies -  for example, some are based on single cross- 
sections whereas others exploit more than one round of data (Table 4.3) -  
is inevitably reflected in the somewhat uneven nature of this review. The 
concluding section of this chapter attempts to highlight the main themes of 
the earnings function literature for transition economies.
Table 4.4: Human capital coefficients, selected transition countries
C o u n try  an d  Year E ducation  
M en W om en
E xperience 
M en W om en
Czech R epublic  1996 (F lanagan  1998) 0.045 0.070 .022 .018
P o land  1993 (R utkoski 1996a) 0.074 0.021
Slovenia* 1991 (O razem  an d  V odapevic 1997) 0.094 0.094 0.018 0.011
R ussia  1992 (Newell and  Reilly 1996) 0.089 0.060 0.045 0.028
NOTE: * return to a university degree
In Slovenia over the period 1987-1991, Orazem and Vodopevic (1995;1997) 
found that returns to human capital rose dramatically. Average returns to 
each completed level of education rose, although by relatively less for vo­
cational education. The data source, the earnings records of the national 
social insurance fund, provided several cross-sections for analysis, allowing 
changes in the coefficients over time to be identified. A drawback is that 
workers in private enterprises were excluded. The authors found rising re­
turns to education and experience over the period, as well as rising wage 
inequality. At the same time, however, the variance of wages among workers 
with “identical skills” (defined as the same level of completed education) in-
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creased and the explanatory power of the regression (reflected in the R 2) fell 
significantly between 1987 and 1991. While Slovenia is atypical among the 
transition countries, being relatively rich and more Western oriented prior to 
the reforms, the country shares the inherited characteristics of social own­
ership of enterprises and full employment, coupled with substantial hidden 
unemployment and an egalitarian wage structure (ibid. p.3).
The Czech Republic, which shares with Slovenia the characteristics of 
relative affluence, success in transformation, and renewed growth (at least 
until 1997), has been the subject of three studies. Flanagan (1994), using 
grouped data, found that the returns to education generally rose during the 
transition, while returns to potential experience fell. At the same time, 
however, the rate of return to vocational qualifications fell.
Investigations of microdata collected before and during the transition 
have been undertaken by Chase (1997) for the period 1984-1993, and Flana­
gan (1998) for a more recent period (1986-1996). Chase (1997) found that 
the coefficients on education were quite low during the Communist era, in 
the range of 2.5 percent, and then increased markedly, to around 5 percent 
by 1993. In general, education coefficients were higher for women, although 
men had enjoyed the largest relative gains during the transition. Significant 
relative gains were also observed for workers with general secondary educa­
tion, which was attributed to their greater capacity to adapt compared to 
workers with specific vocational training. Returns to experience tended to 
fall. Each of these trends was found to have been more pronounced in the 
faster reforming Czech Republic, than in Slovakia.
A study using more recent Czech data reported that schooling coefficients 
had risen to almost 8 percent (Flanagan 1998). The rise tended to be most 
significant at the university level, especially for women. This study also 
confirmed the observed declines in returns to potential experience: in 1996, 
ten years of (potential) experience brought about half the wage effect it would 
have produced in 1986 (p. 307). An investigation of differences by sector
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found that employees in the private sector receive a wage premium of about 
15 percent over the state sector. Interestingly, the gender wage differential 
also appears to be larger in the private, relative to the state, sector, suggesting 
that the former administrative system of pay determination had limited the 
size of such differences.
In Poland there was a significant jump in the education coefficient and 
a dramatic rise in the premium for white collar skills between 1987 and 
1993 (Rutkowski 1996). In the early 1990s an additional year of education 
yielded a return of around 7.5 percent, as against 5 percent in 1987. More 
specifically, whereas an individual with university degree earned on average 
19 percent more than someone with basic vocational training and 37 percent 
percent more than a person with only primary education in 1987, by 1993 
these differentials had risen to 46 and 52 percent, respectively.
At the same time the returns to secondary and primary education both 
rose relative to vocational training in Poland. There were increased returns to 
white collar skills, especially in the private sector. Over the same period, the 
age-earnings profile became flatter, which suggests that experience gained 
under the centrally planned system lost much of its value. The standard 
human capital factors explained less of the total variation in earnings in the 
1990s than they had prior to the onset of reforms in 1987 (i.e. the R 2 fell 
over the period). The earnings functions for Poland were estimated using 
a household data set whose sampling frame virtually excluded the informal 
sector and small private firms.
In the former Soviet Union, a representative household survey -  the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) -  allows analysis of earn­
ings functions in Russia. Newell and Reilly (1996) present estimates for 
males and females for a basic Mincerian and augmented earnings functions 
for 1992. The augmented equation included education, age, marital status, 
location (region), ethnicity, health status, position and occupation. They 
describe the estimated rates of return to education, at 0.033 for men and
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0.030 for women in the augmented wage equation as “striking(ly)” low. The 
explanatory value (R2) of the basic Mincerian wage equation is low -  only 
0.049 -  rising to 0.261 (men) and 0.149 for women in the augmented model.
Recent findings are also available for China. China obviously differs sig­
nificantly from the countries reported above, not least because of the much 
higher levels of illiteracy (reported by the World Bank to be 27 percent for 
women and 10 percent for men in 1995) and the different nature of labour 
market regulation. Until the adoption of economic reforms, individuals in 
China were directed to specific employers -  who had discretion over the price 
paid, but not over the quantity of labour employed. Even in the 1980s, job 
assignments were normally made without regard to the wishes of either the 
employer or employee (Knight and Li 1990 p. 9). At the same time China is 
a useful case for comparison with Uzbekistan for several reasons, including 
the common labour surplus problem, significance of the rural sector in the 
economy, and the lingering state control over firm decision making.
Meng (1992) analysed returns to schooling in the town and village enter­
prise (TVP) sector in rural China, based on L985 household data. She found 
that the coefficient for years of schooling was not statistically significant: in­
deed the sign was negative in two of the four models estimated (p. 92). This 
was consistent with earlier investigations of the same data set (Gelb 1990) as 
well as the subjective belief expressed by a strikingly high share (98 percent) 
of employees in the sample that education was not an important variable in 
wage determination. Experimentation with the specification of education, 
and the use of a series of dummy variables rather than a continuous years of 
schooling variable, did not yield a significant education effect.
Knight and Song (1995) report results separately for rural and urban 
China. In a model specified with gender, level of education, type of own­
ership, position and age cohort as independent variables, they find that 
among urban workers surveyed in 1988, the premium on education increased 
monotonically with completion of each level. Separating employees by type
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of firm ownership, the evidence suggested that education was better rewarded 
where employers had greater autonomy from the government. However the 
effect of education on earnings -  with coefficients ranging from 0.038 for pri­
mary school completion through 0.181 for a college graduate relative to less 
than three years education -  was described as “remarkably slight compared 
to other countries” (p. 103). The regression for the rural sector had a poorer 
overall fit (explaining only 19 percent of the variance in income, compared 
to 46 percent in the urban sector). Consistent with Meng (1992), the coef­
ficients on the education terms for rural employees are in a similar range to 
those in the urban sector, but most are not statistically significant.
Finally the approach and results of Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) are 
examined. This paper aimed to provide an analysis of rates of returns to ed­
ucation in a way that allows cross-country comparability. The main novelty 
is that it provides estimates on returns to educational qualifications across 
a variety of transitional economies and through time. Nine countries are in­
cluded, with a geographic range covering Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
Russia, a number of countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The basic drawback is that the desire for a 
common framework across these countries means that the specifications are 
at least partly driven by the lowest common denominator in terms of data 
availability.
The basic specification Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) includes four lev­
els of educational qualification plus age, age squared and, on the full sample, 
a gender indicator. The extended specification adds controls for occupation, 
industry and public/private sector. Their focus is limited to education, ig­
noring the other determinant of human capital, experience. Indeed only the 
estimates for higher education are presented for all countries; for a subset, 
estimates of returns to vocational training are given. Moreover the interpre­
tation and analysis of national results is, perhaps inevitably, limited given 
the ambitious number of countries covered.
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The results presented by Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) are summarised 
in Table 4.5, which shows estimated coefficients relative to the omitted cate­
gory of primary education or less. The estimated coefficients associated with 
a university qualification are highest in Yugoslavia and the Central Asian 
republics but lowest in the Czech and Slovak republics. The countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and Russia generally register estimates that are 
in the range of the estimated returns to higher education reported for high- 
income market economies (see Table 4.1 above and Psacharopoulos 1994).
Table 4.5: Education coefficients in nine transition countries
Country Year R Secondary Technical Higher
Kazakhstan 1994 0.135 n.a. 6.5 7.3
1996 0.077 n.a. 6.7 14.3
Azerbaijan 1995 0.114 n.a 8.6 13.8
Uzbekistan 1995 0.155 n.a 8.2 12.3
Russia 1992 0.144 n.a 3.8 5.4
1994 0.115 n.a 10.3 13.2
1995 0.095 n.a 5.9 9.7
1996 0.073 n.a 4.6 8.7
Hungary 1992 0.312 n.a n.a 6.4
Poland 1992 0.339 n.a n.a 7.2
1993 0.333 n.a n.a 9.7
1994 0.345 n.a n.a 9.9
1995 0.353 n.a n.a 10.4
1996 0.356 n.a n.a 10.1
FRYugoslavia 1995 0.514 11.0 n.a 15.2
1996 0.554 10.5 n.a 18.0
Czech Republic 1984 0.419 n.a n.a 1.3
1992 0.263 n.a n.a 5.5
Slovakia 1984 0.399 n.a n.a 2.8
1992 0.245 n.a n.a 5.0
SOURCE: Newell and Reilly (forthcoming), Table 4.1 
NOTE: The omitted category is primary (8 years) or less.
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These results suggest that vocational qualifications in the FSU still appear 
to command reasonable premia. This is surprising given the concern that the 
Soviet style vocational training would be made redundant by the changing 
structure of the economy and the movement away from heavy industry (see, 
e.g. World Bank 1996a; Rutkowski 1997b; Heynemann 1997a). Indeed in 
most transitional economies vocational enrollments have exhibited steady 
declines (Cusan and Motivans forthcoming). There has been a decline in 
supply of vocational skills has occurred alongside (or possibly as a result of) 
a decline in demand for such skills. The net effect is nonetheless a continuing 
premium for vocational skills, a finding which stands in contrast to other 
studies, including Flanagan (1998) who finds a deterioration in the wage 
and employment prospects for Czech males with vocational qualifications, 
especially in the private sector.
Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) examine trends in the returns to higher 
educational qualifications over time for the subset of countries where the data 
permits. Increased returns are observed for the Czech and Slovak republics 
(from a very low base in 1984), Russia, and Yugoslavia, which are statisti­
cally significant at conventional levels. For Poland, the estimated returns to 
higher education rose from 7.2 to 10.1 per cent between 1992 and 1996. How­
ever the authors find that once additional controls are entered, the apparent 
inter-temporal differences in returns become insignificant in all the countries 
studied.
Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) also investigate age and gender dimen­
sions of the wage structure. One question they address is whether younger 
workers are more advantaged in transition than their older counterparts who 
are less able to adjust to changing conditions. For male employees in the 
CEE economies, Uzbekistan and Russia, the age/wage relationship is as ex­
pected and younger workers seem to do relatively well. For Russia in 1996, 
the estimated age effect suggests that ceteris paribus young male workers 
receive a mark-up of over 17 percent compared to their older counterparts.
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In Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the 
age effects are poorly determined.
Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) find little evidence of a systematic gender 
differential in returns to higher educational qualifications. While the evidence 
on vocational returns provides a more mixed picture, they conclude that 
women have not suffered reduced returns relative to men in the transition to 
a market economy.22
4.6 C onclusions
This chapter has set out the theoretical framework that will be subject to 
empirical testing in PART II. The focus was on the human capital theory of 
individual earnings differentials. This theory has enjoyed widespread popu­
larity in labour economics, and has been empirically tested for virtually all 
the countries for which data is available. Earnings functions have now been 
estimated for a number of formerly planned economies, to test the hypothesis 
that the returns to education would increase from formerly repressed levels.
A review of the literature provided some important insights. While the 
transition country studies differ in terms of the focus of the analysis, the 
major themes that have emerged can be highlighted as follows.
First, the evidence generally bears out the expectation that returns to 
years of schooling tend to rise as a result of economic liberalisation. This 
tendency has been most marked for university graduates.
Second, the returns to formal vocational qualifications have generally not 
held up well during the transition, and in several cases have actually fallen 
over time. Not all studies support this proposition however, and one recent 
cross-country study concluded that vocational qualifications are still associ-
22There is still a gender wage gap (see, for the FSU, McAuley 1981; Ofer and Vinokur 
1992; Katz 1994; Newell and Reilly 1996) - but their analysis suggests that this has not 
worsened during the transition. It is noted that this finding stands in contrast to other 
studies, including Flanagan (1998), as reported above.
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ated with wage premia.
Third, a number of studies have found that experience-earnings profiles 
are fairly flat. The studies which have exploited more than one cross-section 
of data have tended to find that the returns to pre-transition experience has 
fallen over time.
Fourth, and relatedly, some of the studies have pointed to cohort effects 
and the possibility that more recent entrants to the labour market have 
benefitted from transition.
Fifth, the studies which included information on private sector employees 
have tended to indicate a wage premium in the private sector.
Finally, all the studies which address gender effects indicate a male wage 
advantage. At the same time, however, there is no direct evidence of a widen­
ing in the gender wage gap and in several cases, women have experienced 
larger relative gains in education returns than men.
This review has also highlighted that human capital theory, as convention­
ally formulated and applied in empirical analyses, raises certain difficulties. 
Interpretation of coefficients on key variables -  in particular education and 
experience - requires caution. Attention should be given to alternative ex­
planations of observed correlations with earnings outcomes. For example, 
measurement error can arise with respect to experience when direct informa­
tion is unavailable, especially for women. The debates that are most relevant 
to a study of wages in Uzbekistan were considered, as were the methods 
available to address shortcomings of the human capital approach. This the­
sis will address questions of measurement and functional form, so that a 
better understanding of the determinants of earnings in transition might be 
developed. Following a summary, Chapter 5 opens PART II by describing 
the data set, the variables and presenting basic results of the human capital 
model for Uzbekistan.
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4 .A  C alculating R ates o f R eturn  to  Educa-
If schooling is expressed in years, as in equation (4.1), the estimated coeffi­
cient on the schooling variable is an estimate of the ceteris paribus effect of 
an additional year of schooling on earnings. If foregone earnings represents 
the only cost of an extra year of schooling (i.e. where there is no direct cost 
recovery for schooling, as has been the case in the former Soviet Union), b 
provides an estimate of the average private rate of return to an additional 
year of education. As noted above, the basic model is constrained such that 
this would be the estimated rate of return regardless of the level of educa­
tion to which the additional year refers. This is unrealistic, however, and a 
preferred approach is to use dummy variables to represent different levels of 
education.
When the model is specified using dummy variables for education rather 
than a continuous years of schooling variable, the interpretation of the coeffi­
cients is less straightforward. The estimated coefficients on the set of binary 
educational variables do not represent the estimated returns to the qualifi­
cation in question. The private rates of return to the different qualifications 
are derived from the following expression where Nx denotes the number of 
extra years required to complete the xth. level of education, x = 1,2,3...9, 
in addition to those required for the comparison or base case (e.g. primary 
level).
For example, the private returns for the group with completed secondary 
education can be calculated as
where Ssec = 10 and Sprim = 6. Similarly for the group with vocational 
certificates (which is essentially a stream parallel to completed secondary)
tion
(4.9)
'voc (4.10)
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See Johnes (1993) p. 30.
As noted in the next chapter, for Uzbekistan the following values for years 
of schooling are imputed for each level:
SP,ta =  6,
Ssec = 11 (the number of years completed at the end of secondary school), 
S'voc— 12 (the number of years completed at the end of vocational train­
ing), and
Suni= 16 (the number of years completed at the end of university).
P a r t  II
M icroeconom etric  A nalysis
Summary of Part II
The objective of PART II is to understand the determinants of wages in 
Uzbekistan in transition. The formal analysis of the role of education is 
complemented by a focus on transition-specific issues -  like the effect of 
transition on the returns to experience and the issue of wage arrears -  as well 
as linkages to the broader economic, structural and institutional context.
The initial results suggest that there are a number of reasons to be cau­
tious about the usefulness of the conventional approach to modelling earn­
ings, applied in its simplest form, even though this has been widely used in 
studies of transition economies. A building-block type approach is employed, 
whereby the results of successive chapters are utilised in constructing a useful 
model of earnings.
PART II comprises four chapters, which are structured as follows.
Chapter 5 introduces the data set upon which the econometric analysis in 
the thesis is founded. The European University Institute/ University of Essex 
Survey of Uzbekistan (hereinafter referred to as the EESU) is a large survey of 
1,500 households carried out in three regions of the country in June 1995. The 
dependent and independent variables are elaborated. Initial results about the 
returns to education and experience in Uzbekistan are presented.
Chapter 6 addresses the problems raised by intermittent work attachment 
for the measurement of experience. An imputation method based on the 
sample characteristics is implemented for the female sample. Attention is 
drawn to caveats to be borne in mind in interpretation of the results.
Chapter 7 investigates alternative specifications of the earnings model
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with respect to experience. The analysis leads to several conclusions about 
methodology and the value of non-parametric analysis, the preferred func­
tional form and, more generally, about the cohort effects associated with 
structural change and economic transition.
Chapter 8 develops extensions to, and applications of, the basic human 
capital earnings model in four areas. First, an extended model of earnings 
is estimated, using an augmented set of controls like region and sector that, 
based on earlier analysis, would be expected to affect earnings. Second, tests 
are applied to ascertain whether or not completion of study programs is being 
relied upon as a signal by employers, which would lead to earnings premiums 
(or “sheepskin effects”) for graduates. Third, the significance of apparent 
differences in the returns to human capital between individuals who are af­
fected by arrears and those who are not are formally tested. The fourth task 
is an application of an imputed experience variable. The estimated extent of 
unexplained gender wage differences varies depending on whether a conven­
tional measure of potential experience or the imputed experience variable is 
used. The results also demonstrate the sensitivity of the conclusions about 
the extent of “discrimination” to alternative approaches to decomposition of 
the gender wage gap.
Chapter 9 considers wage arrears in detail. A conceptual framework is 
established, within which a series of hypotheses are set up. Systematic pat­
terns in the distribution of arrears are then investigated using descriptive 
statistics and multivariate techniques that cast light on the incidence and 
size of arrears. The consequences of arrears are also examined at the indi­
vidual level, by considering the frequency of non-monetary payments, and 
at the macro-economic level, through estimating the impact of alternative 
repayment scenarios on the level of real wage.
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The main themes and findings of PART II can be summarised as follows:
Education and Earnings
• Education coefficients in wage estimates are of the same order of mag­
nitude as in the other transition economies of Russia and Poland, for 
example. The (gross) return to an additional year of schooling is around 
7.7 percent for the pooled sample, which is also close to the regional 
average reported in the literature for Latin America.
• Coefficients for different levels of education are estimated using alter­
native specifications of the human capital earnings model. In the basic 
model the coefficient associated with a university degree is 16.4 per­
cent, which is among the highest reported for transition countries and 
well above the OECD regional average of 12.3 percent. The inclusion 
of controls for sectoral, regional and other factors in an extended model 
reduces the coefficient from 8.8 and 11.4, to 8.1 and 11.0 percent for 
men and women respectively. These coefficients are still well above 
those which have been reported for most Eastern European countries. 
Higher returns to university education for women are not uncommon 
in international studies, and reasons for this, related to relative supply 
and signalling, are suggested.
• Earnings premiums associated with completion of different levels of 
education, known as “sheepskin effects”, have been found to exist in 
a range of industrial and developing countries, although there are no 
published studies for transition economies. The initial results suggest 
that sheepskin effects might exist in Uzbekistan, although formal test­
ing is used to show that the apparent differences in earnings associ­
ated with completion and non-completion are statistically insignificant. 
This analysis suggests that pooling of individuals with complete and 
incomplete education at each of the respective levels of education is the 
appropriate approach.
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Experience and Earnings
• The returns to potential experience are low by international standards, 
particularly for women. The orders of magnitude are nonetheless simi­
lar to those reported for other transition countries, where age-earnings 
profiles in multiple cross-sections have tended to become more flat. 
This has been interpreted as indicating that pre-transition experience 
is now of lesser value in the workplace. However the results raise the 
question as to whether experience is being appropriately measured by 
the conventional proxy of potential years of work, which will always 
tend to bias the coefficients on experience downward. This is espe­
cially true for women, since the coefficients on potential experience for 
women are significantly below that for men.
Measurement of Female Experience and The Gender Wage Gap
• The intermittent pattern of female labour force attachment in Uzbek­
istan means that the amount of experience is typically much less than 
the number of years since leaving school. Rates of labour force partic­
ipation among working-age women are much lower than 100 percent, 
and there is an unusually high incidence of adult women on maternity 
leave (around 30 percent of the sample).
• An imputation method based on the characteristics of female partici­
pants in the sample is used to correct for this problem. The returns to 
an imputed (lower) measure of female experience is about three times 
higher than potential experience. In the absence of time series effects 
(i.e. changes over time in the factors affecting the participation de­
cision), the imputation procedure would, on average, provide a true 
measure of experience. But it does not follow that the resulting im­
putation will be correct for every individual. This calls for caution in 
interpretation.
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• The measurement of experience is important for analyses of unex­
plained gender differences in wages. The use of potential experience 
(or age) in decomposition of the sources of gender wage differences in 
Uzbekistan, and by implication, in the Russian Federation and else­
where, will tend to overestimate the extent of measured gender wage 
“discrimination”. At the same time, however, the extreme sensitivity 
of the results to the method of gender wage decomposition demon­
strates the need for caution in drawing any firm conclusions about the 
magnitude of discrimination using these methods.
• Overall differences in productivity-related characteristics between men 
and women, rather than wage “discrimination” appear to be the pri­
mary source of earnings differences. In particular the tendency toward 
large families result in lower levels of experience for women as well as 
possibly deterring the pursuit of higher education. It is likely that feed­
back effects influence female “choices”, which could be conditioned by 
societal norms as well as individual earnings expectations.
Specification of Experience and Implications
• A number of international studies have cast doubt on the appropriate­
ness of the quadratic model of experience, which has been the stan­
dard specification in human capital earnings functions. Conventional 
diagnostic tests suggest that the quadratic model of experience per­
forms badly in Uzbekistan, though they do not indicate a clear prefer­
ence among alternative polynomial specifications of experience. Local 
or non-parametric regression techniques are valuable in indicating the 
preferred model when the results of the conventional tests are not un­
ambiguous.
• The use of non-parametric methods provide major insights. First, the 
non-parametric analysis suggests that the quadratic model can be mis- 
specified because it is too simple to pick up the unusual patterns of
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experience and earnings observed in transition for recent cohorts. In 
Uzbekistan, this is especially true of university and college educated 
males. The higher order polynomial specifications of experience, in 
particular the cubic, appear to provide a more adequate description of 
the experience-earnings profile for different education groups. Second, 
the analysis illustrates a limitation that is inherent in cross-sectional 
analysis of earnings profiles, that is, that the effects of individual ex­
perience and time may be confounded. The risks of so-called cohort 
effects are even larger in the context of large-scale economic change. 
Third, the results show the need for caution in the interpretation of 
cross-sectional analysis, which might be the case for other transition 
economies. Hence, the studies of earnings in transition economies (re­
viewed in Chapter 4) that have proceeded on the basis of a quadratic 
on experience, could suffer from model mis-specification, especially in 
the absence of multiple cross-sections of data.
• It is unclear a priori whether recent cohorts would be adversely af­
fected, or relatively advantaged, by the economic transition. The re­
sults suggest that, even in depressed macroeconomic conditions, some 
individuals have done relatively well -  younger, better educated people 
appear to be best placed to gain from new openings and high wage 
opportunities that emerge as a result of liberalisation of the economy.
Additional Effects on Earnings
• For both men and women, fixed effects for region and ethnicity are 
found to be significant determinants of earnings. There is a premium 
associated with living in the capital; somewhat less expected is the 
finding that Fergana has a larger negative effect than the better-known 
poor region of Karakalpakstan. The data suggests that the traditional 
advantages associated with Slavic ethnicity have persisted, although
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this may be due to selection effects given the large-scale migration of 
Russians since the early 1990s.
• The sectoral effects confirm the picture that was presented in PART II: 
higher earnings are associated with all sectors of employment relative 
to the agricultural kolkhoz. There is also a premium associated with 
private sector employment.
Wage Arrears
• Uzbekistan exhibits a number of characteristics that are peculiar to 
economies in transition -  in particular, the late payment of wages, 
which affects almost two in five workers. In an extended human capital 
earnings model, a dummy variable for arrears has large and signifi­
cant negative effects, and interaction terms indicate that this effect is 
compounded for residents of Fergana and non-Uzbeks.
• The possibility of statistically significant differences in the returns to 
human capital between those individuals who are affected by arrears, 
and those who are not, are investigated. Estimation of separate earn­
ings functions for the two groups (and by sex) with the net wage re­
ceived as the dependent variable show large differences in the returns 
to education and experience. However formal F tests reveal that the 
differences are not statistically significant. These results confirm the 
appropriateness of the modelling approach adopted in this thesis, which 
pools individuals regardless of whether or not they have been affected 
by arrears.
• The amount of arrears is calculated as the amount reported as owing to 
the individual from the past month from the main place of work. The 
amount of money that the individual had contracted to receive in the 
preceding month (May) can be simply derived by adding the net wage
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plus the amount of arrears owed. This is referred to as the “contract 
wage”, and is used in the analysis of the incidence and size of arrears.
• A conceptual framework is established, within which a series of hy­
potheses about the nature and extent of arrears are set up. In partic­
ular, it is possible that arrears are a route to greater efficiency in the 
labour market, reducing the real value of payments to workers whose 
contract wages are, for institutional or other reasons, higher than pro­
ductivity would imply; however it is also possible that arrears are sim­
ply a reflection of government intervention in the economy.
• Analysis of microdata on the pattern of wage arrears reveals distinct 
patterns. Adopting a two-step approach, the analysis illustrates who 
was affected by arrears, and second, among those affected, by how 
much. In general the individual characteristics most frequently asso­
ciated with the presence of arrears were also associated with larger 
amounts of arrears. In particular those working on collective farms 
and people living outside the capital were found to be most affected. 
These regional and rural/urban disparities are compounded by the fact 
that the individuals with low contract wages are more frequently and 
worst affected by arrears. Hence arrears have a distributive impact.
• The extent and incidence of arrears provide support for the efficiency 
hypothesis: that arrears are one way for employers to shift net wages 
toward market-clearing levels in the face of institutional and other con­
straints. It is shown that arrears account for between half and two- 
thirds of the widening of the earnings distribution that has occurred 
since 1989, and in this sense may be contributing to a more efficient 
labour market. However there is only mixed support for the hypothesis 
that indicators of individual productivity reflected in human capital 
variables would be a significant factor in explaining the pattern of ar­
rears.
SUMMARY OF PART II 167
• Even so, the analysis shows that a political economic perspective is 
a fruitful approach to thinking about wage arrears. The pattern of 
arrears can be interpreted largely in terms of domestic political and 
fiscal considerations. On the one hand, the government has regularly 
announced decrees which have indexed all contract wages. But on the 
other hand, the government is concerned about macro-economic sta­
bility and unemployment, and seeks to limit growth in labour costs. 
The regional patterns of arrears, revealing that workers in the capital 
are least affected, provides support for the political economy hypoth­
esis. It is argued that the concentration of arrears in agriculture is 
an outcome, albeit possibly unintended, of government priorities. The 
resulting reduction in labour costs may have facilitated expansion of 
agricultural employment, and thereby enabled what would otherwise 
be surplus labour to be formally employed.
• In the presence of the high rates of inflation that have characterised 
much of the transition, delayed payment will reduce the real value of 
earnings and the measured rate of wage inflation. However this fact 
has not been taken into account in the construction of official statistics 
on wages by domestic and international agencies. Wage simulations are 
used to establish upper and lower bounds for the effect of arrears on 
real wage trends and levels. The implications are substantial, even if 
the delay in wage payments was limited to only one month.
C h a p te r  5
T h e  D a ta  and  Basic R esu lts
5.1 Introduction
Uzbekistan, alongside the other republics of the former Soviet Union, has ex­
perienced tremendous social, economic and institutional changes since gain­
ing independence in 1992. One would expect, among other things, significant 
changes in the labour market to follow. To date, however, understanding 
about the labour market in Uzbekistan has been significantly limited by a 
paucity of data. The problems arising from simple lack (or suppression) of 
data and its unrepresentative nature has been compounded by Soviet mea­
surement concepts that are not useful or relevant in a market economy. This 
is true at the aggregate level with respect to unemployment, for example. 
Understanding of the determinants of individual wages has also been con­
strained.
The recent availability of representative microdata allows some major 
gaps in understanding to be filled. It enables, for example, empirical investi­
gation of the determinants of individual labour earnings during the economic 
transition. This will shed light on the question as to whether the shift to 
a market economy has been associated with significant adjustments in inter 
alia the structure of wage relativities and the returns to human capital, as 
is often expected (see, e.g., Rutkowski 1995).
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In this chapter the data set is introduced, and a detailed description 
of variables is provided. Attention is given to the regional and ethnicity 
variables that are shown to have key relevance in the later empirical analysis. 
A basic model of earnings is estimated using the Uzbek data. This highlights 
the need to consider a range of adjustments to the simple model, in terms of 
the measurement of key variables and the appropriate functional form.
The chapter is set out as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the data set that 
is subject to investigation, and the basic profile of the sample. Section 5.3 
highlights the key variables used in the analysis of earnings and, in particu­
lar, the ethic and regional dimensions that are specific to Uzbekistan. The 
next section presents a basic Mincerian model of wage determination, points 
to some apparent peculiarities on the education side, and draws attention to 
the need to treat men and women separately. The chapter concludes that ad­
justments are needed to the basic model before proceeding to an augmented 
model that includes regional as well as “transition-specific,, variables such as 
arrears.
5.2 The Data Set
The data were collected in a household survey conducted in June 1995. The 
European University Institute/ Essex Survey in Uzbekistan (EESU) collected 
data on about 500 households in each of three different oblasts (regions) of 
the country that together represent over 25 percent of the total population. 
The oblasts were: the capital, Tashkent; the densely populated Fergana in the 
south-east of the republic; and the traditionally poor region of Karakalpak- 
stan adjacent to the Aral Sea. (A regional map and detailed background 
analysis of regional and ethnic aspects are presented below.) Data were col­
lected, inter alia, on a range of basic demographic and education indicators, 
and on labour market behaviour and outcomes.
The labour market module, answered by all individuals in the household
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over the age of 15, elicits information on employment, earnings and education. 
Table 5.1 describes the main variables used in the estimation. The variables 
fall into three broad groups : demographic (sex, ethnicity, marital status and 
the presence of young children); human capital (experience and education) 
and labour market (type of employer, location and whether they receive in- 
kind benefits). Specifically, on employment, the individual is asked about 
primary and secondary jobs, sector of employment, and seasonality of work, 
for the present time and for one year ago.
A series of questions obtain information on all sources of income and 
any in-kind benefits received from the employer. There are further earnings- 
related variables, in addition to the main dependent variable of net earnings, 
that are needed because of the problem of arrears, or non-payment of wages. 
The next section provides details about those variables that are specific to 
the Uzbek context, namely the regional and ethnic dimensions, as well as 
elaboration of the earnings variable and the concept of arrears.
The analysis of the determinants of earnings are generally restricted to 
the sample of individuals whose contract wage was positive at the time of 
the survey.1 Individuals whose main employment was home production or 
self employment were excluded, given the well-known problems involved in 
interpreting information about the earnings of the self employed. While there 
have been some attempts to estimate earnings equations for the self employed 
(e.g.. Rees and Shah 1986; Kidd 1993), most studies of the determinants of 
earnings exclude this group. The basic difficulty stems from the lack of a 
clear distinction between returns to labour and returns to capital (Covick 
1984; Bradbury 1997). In the Uzbek context, there are significant problems 
involved in ascertaining or valuing home consumption of rural households.2
LSee Table 5.1 for summary definitions. This inclusion rule is preferable to the more 
common restriction to “individuals with positive earnings” , because of the phenomenon 
of arrears. Section 5.3.1 elaborates the concepts of wage arrears and the concept wage as 
used in the thesis.
2Survey respondents were asked to value home consumption, but the results suggest
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Table 5.1: Main variables used in estimation
Variable Description Comments
Demographic
sex 58.8 percent are male.
married 84.5 percent married.
kids Children under 7 years in the household
Experience
pexp Potential experience: exp=age-yrsch-7. School entry a t age 7
aexp adjusted experience for females See Chapter 6
Education See Chapter 2
yrsch Years of schooling Imputed,
elem Elem entary (primary) or less see Chapter 5.4
hgh Incomplete secondary
dhgh Complete secondary
incvoc Incomplete vocational
voc Complete vocational
incol Incomplete teknikum or college
col Complete teknikum or college
incuni
uni Complete higher
Ethnicity See Chapter 5.3.2
uzbek Uzbek
Slavic Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian
karal Karakalpak
kazak Kazakh
cenasia O ther Central Asian
other O ther (e.g.) European, Korean and Tatar
Employer See Chapter 3
soe S ta te  owned enterprise or organisation
kolhkoz Collective farm
hire Private or privatised firm
miloth M ilitary or other
benefit Reported non-wage benefit See Chapter 3.1
tenure More than one year in present job
Region See Chapter 5.3.3
KKP Karakalpakalstan
Tashkent Tashkent
Ferg ana Fergana
Earnings
wage Net amount received in preceding month, including bonuses
arrears (dummy) Non-payment of full wage in preceding month See Chapter 9
contractw Equals wage +  amount of arrears
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The exclusion involved 5.8 percent of the adult sample (3.5 percent of women 
and 7.4 percent of men).
Table 5.2 presents the main characteristics of the data for the restricted 
sample used in the estimation. The average age of this sample is about 36 
years. A majority (52 percent) have above high school education, and about 
16 percent have university degrees. Ethnically, 57 percent are Uzbek, with 
several sizeable minority groups, viz. Slavic (13 percent), Karakalpak (10 
percent) and Kazakh (9 percent). The structure of employment shows the 
state sector to be dominant (68 percent of employed) alongside the former 
state farms (kolhoz) which employ over 20 percent. About 7 percent are hired 
in the private sector. The vast majority (91 percent) of the sample have been 
in their present employment for over one year. There is a substantial gap 
between the average earnings of men and women, of the order of 45 per cent. 
A somewhat higher share of men than women have completed university 
degrees (19 versus 14 per cent).
It is also of interest to examine the same breakdown for the entire adult 
sample. This is provided in Table 5.3, which indicates the rates of employ­
ment and unemployment, and rates of participation in the labour market in 
the overall adult sample. The employment rate for the adult sample (under 
60 years) was about 57 percent; but significantly higher for men (67 percent) 
compared to women (46 percent). The unemployment rate, based on those 
who described themselves as “not working and looking for work or retrain­
ing”, was 9 percent. The reported rate for men was double that for women 
(11.9 versus 6 percent). Labour force participation rates for individuals be­
tween 16 and 60 years of age (55 for women) were constructed based on the 
ILO definition of those working plus those looking for work or retraining.* 3 
The overall participation rate was 65.5 percent, but was significantly higher 
for men (79.2 percent) relative to women (52.3 percent).
significant undervaluation (see Coudouel, 1998).
3 Ages 55 and 60 are the respective pension eligilibility ages for women and men.
174 CHAPTER 5. THE DATA AND BASIC RESULTS
Table 5.2: Summary of variables, restricted sample
Variable females males total
Demographic
age (years) 35.4 35.6 35.7
m arried (per cent) 71.6 82.6 78.1
pexp (years) 16.1 (11.5) 16.7 (12.1) 16.4 (11.9)
Education (per cent)
elem 1.3 1.8 1.6
hgh 13.3 13.7 13.5
dhgh 33.5 33.1 33.3
incvoc 0.6 2.0 1.5
voc 11.0 12.1 12.7
inccol 0.5 2.0 1.5
col 12.9 12.1 12.7
incuni 1.8 1.6 1.7
uni 14.0 19.0 16.4
yrsch (years) 12.4 13.0 12.0
Ethnicity (per cent)
uzbek 54.4 59.1 57.1
Slavic 15.9 10.2 12.6
karal 9.9 10.2 10.1
kazak 7.4 9.3 8.5
cenasia 4.5 5.7 5.2
other 7.8 5.4 6.4
Employer (per cent)
soe 73.3 64.7 68.3
kolkhoz 19.0 21.2 20.3
hire 5.6 7.9 7.0
miloth 0.9 2.8 2.0
tenure 90.4 92.9 91.9
benefit (per cent) 12.0 15.3 13.8
Region (per cent)
kpak 31.2 33.3 32.6
tash 31.0 32.5
ferg 34.1 33.3 35.0
Earnings (soum per month)
wage 415.1 762.2 494.9
arrears 252.5 338.1 302.0
contractw 667.6 1226.1 796.9
N 1029 1415 2444
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Table 5.3: Summary of variables, unrestricted adult sample
Variable total males females
Demographic
age (years) 38.4 (16.4) 37.4 (15.5) 39.4 (17.2)
married (per cent) 72.8 76.7 69.2
Education (per cent)
elem 7.9 5.5 10.1
hgh 18.9 18.5 19.3
dhgh 32.1 32.3 31.9
incvoc 2.0 2.3 1.7
voc 11.8 12.8 10.9
incol 1.4 2.0 0.8
col 10.2 10.2 10.2
incuni 2.1 2.3 1.9
uni 13.6 14.2 13.0
Ethnicity (per cent)
uzbek 57.1 58.8 55.4
rub 10.8 8.9 12.4
karal 10.7 10.8 10.6
kazak 10.2 10.6 9.9
cenasia 5.1 5.6 4.5
other 6.2 5.3 7.1
Region (per cent)
kpak 36.7 37.3 48.0
tash 29.4 27.8 46.2
ferg 34.0 34.9 47.1
Labour Force Status (per cent)
Work 56.6 67.3 46.3
Unemployed 8.9 11.9 6.0
M aternity Leave 15.4 0.6 29.9
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There are additional groups outside the restricted sample of employees 
that are worth highlighting. First, about 4 percent of the sample described 
themselves as “not working”, but then listed “employed in home production” 
as most accurately describing their current position. Second, there is a small 
group who described themselves as being on involuntary leave (0.7 percent). 
Third, and most important, is the prevalence of maternity leave. The con­
cepts of involuntary leave and the incidence of maternity leave in the Uzbek 
context deserve some elaboration.
Forced leave (generally unpaid) has been a widespread phenomenon in a 
number of former Soviet republics. As noted in the previous chapter, together 
with arrears in wage payments, involuntary leave has been used by employers 
as a counter approach to outright labour shedding. In Russia, for example, 
in 1994, about 8 percent of workers in firms with more than 200 workers had 
experienced involuntary leave in the first quarter of the year, averaging about 
one month (Commander and Yemtsov 1997, Table 6.3). Since official data 
on involuntary leave is not available, the Uzbek survey questionnaire asked 
direct questions on this point. The results show that involuntary leave, per 
■se, was much less important in Uzbekistan than might have been expected, 
at least based on self reporting in 1995. At the same time, wage arrears are 
quite prevalent (see section 3 below), so the distinction between forced leave, 
and being in work but not being paid, may be one of semantics.
About 30 percent of women described themselves as being on maternity 
leave at the time of the survey (recall from Chapter 2 that women are enti­
tled to three years off work after childbirth). This may effectively amount to 
forced leave, with (limited) income support being paid out of the state Social 
Insurance Fund by way of maternity benefits. There is however insufficient 
information to ascertain the extent to which women in this group have gen­
uinely chosen to take time out of the labour force, or whether they have de 
facto been forced to take leave by their employers as a way of cutting firm 
labour costs.
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In Western and international literature, women on maternity leave are 
conventionally treated as not participating in the labour market. The fact of 
their inclusion in Soviet concepts of work may partly explain the widespread 
belief that women’s labour force participation rates were unusually high in 
the former Soviet Union, a topic that is subject to detailed investigation in 
the next chapter.4
5.3 T he Variables
This section elaborates upon the main variables used in estimating labour 
earnings in the empirical analysis that follows. In particular, details are 
provided about the earnings variable, ethnicity and region. Extensive back­
ground on the education system and the structure of the economy was pre­
sented in Chapters 2 and 3.
5.3 .1  E arnings
The dependent variable used in the earnings equations is the log of monthly 
cash, earnings received from the main place of work, post-tax. Earnings from 
secondary jobs or from home agricultural production are excluded, given 
the focus of the thesis on the determination of employees’ wages. Nor are 
benefits provided in non-monetary form by the employer included. This 
section introduces the phenomenon of wage arrears, and considers the system 
of individual wage taxation and the extent of non wage benefits.
Arrears
Arrears or delays in payment have been a pervasive theme of economic tran­
sition in most countries of the former Soviet Union. As described in Chapter 
3, there are different types of arrears, which can arise between enterprises,
4 The rate of female labour force participation would rise to about 76 percent if women 
on leave were to be included.
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in payment of tax obligations to government, in payment of social transfers 
to individuals, and in payment of contracted wage obligations to workers. 
The last is known as wage arrears. The payments may be received in a later 
month, in part or in full, or not at all. There is typically no indexation of 
payments if and when these are eventually made.
Since wages are normally calculated on a monthly basis, arrears refer to 
payments not received in the month due. The amount of arrears is calculated 
as the amount reported as owing to the individual from the past month 
from the main place of work.0 The amount of money that the individual 
had contracted to receive in the preceding month (May) can be derived by 
adding the net wage to the amount of arrears owed. This is referred to as 
the “contract wage”.
One unfortunate complication is that the amount received (which is re­
ferred to here as the “net wage”) may not have been owed for May. That 
is, the amount received may include payment of arrears owed from earlier 
periods. The income question simply asks: “Please tell me the net sum of 
money (after income tax) which you received in the last calender month from 
the following sources....monthly wage at main place of work”. It is possible 
that the respondent reports all wage income received that month (including 
past amounts owed), rather than the monthly wage received for that month. 
However this seems unlikely, since the average (contract) wage reported by 
respondents in the survey for the month of May (approximately 800 soum, 
after tax) is consistent with the economy-wide average gross (pre-tax) wage 
of 1,082 soum for the third quarter of 1995 reported by the IMF. Details 
about rates of personal income tax are given in the next section.
Unless otherwise noted, the earnings regressions in the thesis use the
0Immediately after the question on sources of income received, the respondent is asked 
“Were you paid everything due to you in the last calender month? I will read again the 
various sources of income and you tell me please, if you are owed money for any of them. 
But remember that I am only interested in the last calender month, and not for any earlier 
period”. Then the interviewer is instructed to read out each sources and write down the 
amount of sums owed: the first source is monthly wage at main place of work.
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net wage received as the dependent variable. The sample of employees is 
pooled regardless of whether they have been affected by arrears, though the 
appropriateness of this approach is explicitly tested in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 
presents a detailed investigation of wage arrears in Uzbekistan.
Taxation
The survey collects data on earnings net of taxes. In this section, the sys­
tem of personal income taxation is briefly described, and the question as to 
whether the derivation of pre-tax earnings would be appropriate is consid­
ered. This enables an evaluation of how the interpretation of results of the 
earnings regressions could be affected by the use of post-tax earnings.
The basic legislation governing taxation on earnings is the law On In­
come Tax for the Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan 1992. The system 
of taxation of labour earnings has undergone frequent changes during the 
transition period however, as Presidential Decrees have frequently amended 
the relevant thresholds and rates of taxation. In general, the different rates 
of tax and the tax-free threshold have been linked to the national minimum 
wage (and multiples thereof).
At the time of the survey, in mid 1995, the tax-free threshold was equiv­
alent to twice the minimum wage (2 times 150 soum). Earnings over the 
tax-free threshold were subject to the following marginal rates, which were 
set as multiples of the minimum wage. The rates are set out in Table 5.4. In 
principle, the tax applies to income received in cash or in-kind.
Table 5.4: Personal income tax rates, June 1995
Earnings (sum) Tax rate (percent)
301-800 25
801-1,500 35
above 1,500 40
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Collective farm (kolkhoz) workers are not legally subject to personal in­
come tax.6 Instead, there is a tax on the wage fund of kolkhozes, set at a flat 
rate of 8 percent, for all earnings over the tax-free threshold (as per above). 
Again, in principle, bonuses and payments in kind are subject to the tax.
Ideally, the empirical analysis of earnings in this thesis would proceed 
from a measure of pre-tax earnings. It is pre-tax earnings, that is, the cost of 
labour to employers, that is normally considered to be the relevant dependent 
variable in earnings functions.
The rate structure of taxation is fairly simple, as shown above, and it 
could therefore be argued that earnings be proportionately adjusted. In 
fact, however, such an adjustment would introduce substantial measurement 
error because of the subtleties of the tax system, as well as transition-specific 
problem of arrears.
There is a complicated system of exemptions and deductions for different 
types of income and, more relevant in the present case, for different types 
of individuals. The types of income that are listed as exempt include, for 
example, cost of living allowances for gold miners; pay of military personnel; 
income of war veterans, invalids and the legally blind; and wages of work­
ers assigned to agricultural work. There is a list of deductions from taxable 
income that includes donations to charitable organisations; “for certain in­
valids" , 50 percent of income; for single mothers with two or more children, 
30 percent of income; for one of the parents of an invalid child, for both par­
ents with three or more children and an invalid child, 30 percent of income; 
and for one parent with three or more children, 30 per cent of income.
A further complication is raised by the presence of arrears. In principle, 
the tax rate is calculated on the basis of the contract wage. However as 
described in the preceding section, the contract wage is often not paid in 
full. It is possible that individuals are just being taxed on the basis of the
6 As is typical in Uzbek legislation, there is a series of exemptions: which range from 
“hero mothers” (women with more than five children) to war veterans to Chernobyl 
victims.
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amounts actually received, but these amounts could well vary from month 
to month, in which case varying amounts of repaid arrears would have to be 
somehow taken into account as well.
The foregoing considerations suggest that any attempt to adjust the net 
wage figures by the simple proportionate amounts listed in the tax schedule 
would introduce substantial measurement error. The dependent variable is 
therefore simply the net wage received, after tax. It is noted that the average 
net earnings for the sample falls into the lowest marginal tax rate category, 
and that most of their earnings actually fall below the tax-free threshold 
(300 soum). Approximately three-quarters (74.8) percent of the sample have 
earnings below 801 sum, where the 35 percent marginal tax rate takes effect.
The fact of reliance on net earnings is nonetheless worth bearing in mind 
in interpreting the results of the earnings regressions. The associated esti­
mates will still be consistent (i.e. otherwise unbiased), but there are a couple 
of caveats.
First, to the extent that there is a positive correlation between observed 
characteristics and the level of earnings, given a progressive system of per­
sonal income taxation, the coefficients on those estimates would tend to be 
under-estimated. This could be relevant for the coefficients on education and 
experience, for example. If the coefficient on university education is, say, 10 
percent in an earnings regression based on the post-tax wage, then the pre­
tax coefficient could be closer to 11 percent. Likewise, for the characteristics 
that are inversely associated with the level of earnings, the effect will be 
over-estimated. Second, and relatedly, this tendency needs to be borne in 
mind in any cross-country comparisons with studies that use gross (pre-tax) 
earnings as the dependent variable.'
7 In some of the studies it is unclear whether the dependent wage variable is pre- or 
post-tax: for example, the multi-country study of Newell and Reilly (forthcoming) refers 
to “monthly log wage” as being the dependent variable, though we know that at least for 
the case of Uzbekistan, this is a net (post-tax) figure.
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Wages in-kind
Ideally non-wage payments would be included in the earnings measure, since 
the provision of housing, childcare and food on a free or highly subsidised 
basis was an important activity for Soviet employers, especially for large 
firms and in the industrial sector (Commander and Jackman 1993). This has 
been an active area of Western research related to the theory of equalising 
differences that was set out in the previous chapter (Rosen 1986, p. 669). 
From the employer’s point of view, the relevant cost of labour is obviously 
total compensation including fringe benefits as well as cash.
Official sources based on firm-level data suggest that until the mid 1990s 
at least, non-wage compensation was important in Uzbekistan (World Bank 
1994; 1995b). Information is available from Goskomprognostat on enterprise 
social spending, that is spending by enterprises on non-wage benefits and 
services. This data suggests that, over the period of transition, measured 
enterprise social expenditures have declined relative to national income (see 
Klugman and Marnie 1998, p. 63). In 1993, about 80 percent of enterprise 
spending took place in the industrial sector.s With the exception of mining 
in iNavoi oblast, the regional distribution of spending tends to favour urban 
areas, and in particular Tashkent and its environs (Newell 1995). Enterprise 
social expenditures were equivalent to about 10 percent of total public social 
spending in 1993, although about 30 percent of the total could be traced to 
a mining company in Navoi (World Bank 1995b).
However there are problems in incorporating non-wage benefits into the 
dependent earnings variable. These arise from both the under-reporting of 
incidence and under-valuation. It is difficult for individuals in Uzbekistan to 
place an accurate value on such benefits, partly because markets and prices 
for these services did not exist in the Soviet period.
sThis reflects a continuation of the Soviet pattern, where enterprise social provision 
was more extensive in the industrial sector, and in larger firms (Commander and Jackman, 
1993).
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The incidence of firm benefits may be under-reported since service provi­
sion (for example, education and health care) was often financed by a mixture 
of firm and state budget sources, so that it is unclear whether the benefit 
should be regarded as part of labour compensation or as part of the state 
welfare system. Moreover, given recent changes, individuals may not even 
be aware of the current source of financing. The most obvious example 
of this has been the transfer of large numbers of kindergartens formerly fi­
nanced by employers to the local authority budget (Klugman et al. 1997; 
UNICEF 1998). During field work in Karakalpakstan and Khorezm in mid 
1997, for example, local authorities reported increasing financial pressures on 
their budgets to the transfer of facilities formerly operated and financed by 
enterprises (Klugman 1997a; 1997b).
There is a direct question in the EESU survey about the receipt of non­
monetary benefits, which reveals two important points. First, the share of 
employees reporting receipt of such benefits is small.9 Only about 8 percent of 
working adults reported receipt of “non-wage benefits” from their employer. 
In addition, small proportions of the sample reported receipt of specific items 
- that is, food (3.4 per cent); animal food (2 per cent), medical care (1.3 per 
cent); agricultural items, and housing (only 0.5 percent). Second, however, 
for those individuals who do receive such benefits, the value is relatively large. 
For recipients, the amount of non-wage benefits averaged 305 sum (with a 
range from 15 to 2210), almost double the average cash wage received (169 
sum) for this group overall. However once those who did not receive their 
cash wage in the preceding month are excluded, the non-wage share falls to 
(a still sizeable) 57 percent of the average cash wage (N=67).
In the analysis that follows, information about access to non-wage ben­
efits is used to create a dummy variable indicating receipt of any benefit, 
that is included as an explanatory variable in the extended model of earn-
9 It is possible that respondents under-reported receipt of free or subsidised items from 
their employer.
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ings. Information about non-wage benefits is also utilised in investigating 
specific questions, for example in the analysis of arrears. This is the first 
study of earnings in transition to have included such information in earnings 
regressions.
However the dependent variable on remuneration includes only cash re­
ceived. This may give rise to measurement error if the error is correlated 
with the right hand variables. This type of error, like measurement error on 
the right hand side (independent variables) will decrease the precision with 
which the parameters are estimated (Deaton 1997, p. 99).
5.3.2 E thnicity
The majority of the population is Uzbek, with sizeable minorities of Karakal­
paks, Slavs, Kazakhs and other Central Asian groups. Karakalpaks reside 
mainly in Karakalpakstan, the northernmost part of the republic (see Section 
5.3.3).
In many respects, Soviet policies were aimed at destroying traditional 
identities and communities in order to foster individual loyalty to the state. 
The forced relocations associated with collectivisation were one manifesta­
tion of this phenomenon, alongside the undermining of religious (Islamic) 
structures. In rural areas, the kolkhoz chairman became the local source of 
authority with power to determine the allocation of jobs, garden plots and 
so on. Two group identities -  that of being a Soviet citizen, and of being an 
Uzbek in Uzbekistan -  were promoted to replace pre-existing attachments 
based on lineage and religion, although not always successfully (Schloerbein- 
Engel, 1994).10
Earlier analysis of the ethnic dimensions of Uzbek society nonetheless sug­
gests its continuing relevance for studies of the labour market. Sociological 
studies have pointed to an interplay between ethnicity and gender. Relying
L0For example, the Kipchaks and the Turkic-speaking people of Uzbekistan, were offi­
cially absorbed into the Uzbek population.
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on census data up to the late 1970s, Sacks (1982) argued that different gen­
der/ethnic groups occupied different rungs of the job hierarchy, with Russian 
men occupying the most desirable positions, Russian women and Uzbek men 
occupying roughly equal positions, and Uzbek women located on the bottom 
rung. Data on the occupational structure of the workforce by ethnic group 
is scarce, however. Based on official sources, Marnie and Motivans (1993) 
report that Uzbeks were relatively under-represented in industry, construc­
tion and science (53, 50 and 39 percent of the workforce respectively), while 
accounting for shares of agriculture and education (76 and 69 percent) much 
closer to their share in the population.
Lubin’s (1984) comprehensive sociological analysis of labour and ethnic­
ity in the late Soviet period investigated the general perception that Slavs 
dominated industrial sector jobs which tended to have higher pay and pres­
tige.11 She found no evidence of discrimination against indigenous nation­
alities; to the contrary, the local nationalities had greater opportunities to 
pursue employment and training through implicit affirmative action—type 
programmes -  for example that they had priority in entrance to many train­
ing programmes and that once enrolled, grading policy was often easier for 
them (pp. 156-157).12 Lubin (1984, pp. 171-224) suggests that the appar­
ently paradoxical preference of local nationalities for work in the (low-paid 
and low prestige) service and agricultural sectors can be explained by the 
associated access to home production and preferences for more traditional 
consumption patterns.
More recently, Smith (1995) undertook an empirical analysis of ethnicity 
based on a survey in Tashkent. Although the sample size was small (130), 
and the income variable was not defined (in particular, it is unclear whether
11 See, in particular, Chapter 5, “Who Gets Hired For What?”.
12 An analysis of admissions data by ethnicity presents various examples where the ac­
ceptance rates for Uzbeks were much higher than for Slavs - eg for the Bukhara State 
Pedagogical Institute in 1978, one in three Uzbek applicants were accepted, compared to 
one out of seven non-Uzbeks.
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the variable refers to only labour income or total income including transfers), 
the results are of interest. He found that, on average, Uzbeks had lower ed­
ucational qualifications and were younger than Russians, and that Russians 
had higher average incomes. In an OLS model, being Russian as opposed to 
Uzbek had a significant positive effect on income, holding constant the influ­
ence of sex, age, education and occupation (Table 4, p. 104). Other results 
cast light on attitudes to economic opportunities and to change: Uzbeks were 
more likely than Russians to believe that their economic position was better 
in late 1994 than in 1990 (37 versus 15 percent respectively).
A full investigation of ethnicity and the associated expectations, percep­
tions and cultural factors are beyond the scope of this thesis. The effect 
of ethnicity on wage outcomes is nonetheless important, as will be shown 
in Chapter 8. The existing evidence leads to several specific expectations, 
namely that (i) Slavic ethnicity will tend to be associated with higher levels 
of education; (ii) Slavic ethnicity will tend tq be associated with higher earn­
ings; and (iii) in the formal sector, at least, individuals of Uzbek ethnicity 
will tend to be concentrated into agricultural and unskilled occupations, and 
therefore be lower paid to the extent that these occupations are low paid.
5 .3 .3  R eg io n
This section provides background to facilitate interpretation of the regional 
effects on earnings, and to identify the patterns that might be expected to 
emerge from the micro-analysis in the chapters that follow. The detailed fo­
cus is on the oblasts covered in the micro-analysis, viz. the capital Tashkent, 
Fergana and KKP. The information is based on official administrative data, 
obtained from the national and local statistical offices (Goskomprognostat), 
and several field visits by the author over the period 1993-1997.
There is significant regional differentiation in the labour sphere. Tashkent, 
Karakalpakalstan and Fergana differ quite markedly in the structure of em­
ployment (Table 5.5). The share of formal employment in industry ranges
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Table 5.5: Regional employment by sector, 1993
Total Fergana KKP Tashkent
Industry 16.7 21.9 10.2 27.2
Agriculture 32.3 31.7 34.4 0.7
Construction 8.7 7.2 12.7 12.3
Trade and Catering 6.6 6.3 6.0 8.7
Transport and Comm. 5.3 4.9 5.8 9.8
Education and Culture 16.2 15.7 17.6 19.3
Health and Social Services 7.2 6.2 7.6 9.1
Other 7.0 6.1 5.7 13.0
Total Official Employment 
MEMO: share of labour resources
100 100 100 100
in home production 24.8 26.0 20.7 21.2
SOURCE: Ministry of Labour, Uzbekistan
from 27 percent in Tashkent city to about 10 percent in KKP. Conversely, 
the share of agriculture varies from less than  one percent in the capital to 
about one-third in Fergana and in KKP. The shares engaged in education 
and health and related services are also higher in the capital.13
Table 5.6: Relative wages by region, 1991-1995
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Kar akalpakalst an 97.0 89.2 86.8 76.8 81.6
Tashkent 105.2 118.2 119.5 121.5 131.2
Fergana 92.9 91.7 94.7 88.8 87.1
national average 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
memo: minimum wage 23.1 39.8 30.5 24.9 16.4
SOURCE: Goskomprognostat, 1997
13 Official labour statistics suggest that the share of the working aged population engaged 
in the “official economy” is similar in the three oblasts (66, 68 and 67 percent in Fergana, 
KKP and Tashkent respectively) .The share engaged in home production and private plots 
is highest in Fergana (26 percent) and lowest is KKP (21 percent).
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Figure 5.1: Incidence of poverty, by region, 1995
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Official data shows that average earnings in Tashkent oblast are more than 
30 percent higher than the national average (Table 5.6). The average wage 
in both KKP and Fergana was similarly low in 1995, about 80 percent of the 
national average. The differences between the top and bottom ranked oblasts 
have widened significantly over the transition. Adjustment for differences in 
regional price levels does not change the ranking of the oblasts (Goskom- 
prognostat, 1997). Even at the regional level, of course, averages can be 
misleading. Available data also suggest significant intra-republic variation in 
level of average incomes and earnings.14 The appendix to this chapter details 
intra-oblast variation in earnings using the case of KKP.
Consistent with this inter-regional pattern of wages, Figure 5.1 presents 
the incidence of poverty by oblast. The percentage of households with income 
(from all sources, including public and private transfers) under the poverty 
line (set at the minimum wage), and less than half the poverty line in mid 
1995 was calculated by Coudouel (1998). The incidence of poverty nationally 
was about 30 percent in 1995, of whom about 17 percent were very poor 
(Coudouel 1998). The incidence of poverty was much higher in both rural and 
urban Karakalpakstan, standing at rates of 69 and 49 percent respectively. 
The estimated rate of severe poverty (defined as 50 percent of the minimum 
wage per capita) was 41 percent in rural and 27.5 percent in urban KKP. 
The rates are significantly higher than those found in Tashkent and Fergana, 
although poverty incidence in rural Fergana approached that for urban KKP.
Tashkent
As the national administrative and commercial capital, one would expect 
the economy and labour market of the city of Tashkent to provide greater 
labour market opportunities than more remote areas. Table 1.1 indicated 
that the population, of about 2.1 million people, is classified as 100 percent
14 A household survey undertaken in April 1996 revealed that per capita monthly incomes 
in the south of KKP were double those in the north (US$14 versus $7). Average incomes 
in the centre of KKP lay between these extremes, at US $11 (Expert Centre, 1996).
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Figure 5.2: Trends in industrial output by region, 1994-1997
year
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urban. Tashkent (city and oblast) accounts for close to 30 percent of the 
economy’s industrial production (Uzbek Economic Trends, 1998, page 40). 
Recent official data on trends in industrial output suggest that firms in the 
capital have not been adversely affected by the transition. This is shown in 
Figure 5.2.
Overall national trends in industrial output suggest some recovery follow­
ing fairly flat levels of output in 1994 and 1995. By way of contrast, following 
an earlier period of output contraction, industrial output in the capital has 
grown substantially in the years 1995-1997. This would be expected to have 
direct effects on the demand for labour and wages in industry.
K araka lpaks ta n  (K K P )
KKP, adjacent to the Aral Sea, has been widely recognised as a region with 
serious ecological and poverty problems (see e.g. World Bank 1993). The 
most important sectors of employment are agriculture, followed by various 
public social services. In 1996, the composition of employment was domi-
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nated by agriculture, which engaged 139,000 workers (plus 55,000 recorded 
under private plots), compared to less than 38,000 in industry. In the so- 
called non-material sphere, the education sector dominated employment.
Overall levels of employment in KKP declined significantly during the 
transition, by about 12 percent to 1994 relative to 1991. There was some 
recovery in 1995, to reach about 96 percent of the 1991 level (Klugman 
1997a). This stands in contrast to overall national trends, which suggest 
that total employment expanded by almost 3 percent over the period 1991- 
1995 (Chapter 3).
The expansion of the working age population in KKP has continued at a 
rapid pace, growing by more than 12 percent between 1991 and 1995. Loss of 
job opportunities has meant that the number of working age people in KKP 
who are “not employed” has doubled over the period.15 Hence, based on 
official labour statistics, the regional unemployment rate can be estimated to 
be around 13 percent in 1996. While this figure cannot directly be equated 
to unemployment (see Chapter 2), it is indicative of recent trends.
Changes in the structure of wages by branch suggest a mixed story on 
adjustment (Klugman 1997a). The relative wage has declined in agriculture 
as well as other sectors of public employment (state administration, health 
and education). Relative gains have been recorded for finance and credit, 
housing and communal services, transport and to a lesser extent construc­
tion. It seems that several sectors, including transport, construction and 
industry, have not seen a wage adjustment consistent with the decline in 
sectoral employment.
15 While the category of non-employed includes women on maternity leave and women 
“with many children”, the absolute number of individuals in these groups has remained 
fairly stable in size over time (they accounted for about 51 percent of the total “not 
employed in the economy” in 1995).
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Fergana
The densely populated Fergana Valley is “shared” by three Central Asian 
neighbours: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It was the scene of 
substantial ethnic tensions in the late 1980s, which have apparently subsided 
(or been repressed) since then.16 Fergana has traditionally been a labour sur­
plus region (Marnie 1992), with relatively low household incomes (Coudouel 
et al. 1997; Coudouel 1998).
Industry plays an important role in the oblast’s economy. Indeed the 
proportionate contribution of Fergana to national industrial output (close to 
30 percent) is similar to that of Tashkent city and oblast. However, by way 
of contrast to Tashkent, levels of industrial output have been quite depressed 
between 1994 and 1997. Figure 5.2 shows stagnant and negative growth in 
1994-1995, with only limited subsequent recovery in industrial output. As 
noted above, industry accounts for about one-fifth of formal employment in 
Fergana, and agriculture engages about one-third of workers in the official 
economy. In addition, private plot production is especially important, which 
was traditionally seen as being symptomatic of the tendency toward labour 
surplus in the region.
Existing evidence about regional differentiation in Uzbekistan leads one 
to expect the following regional effects: (i) residence in Tashkent would have 
a large and positive effect on earnings. This has traditionally been the case, 
and has likely strengthened during the transition. However one would not 
expect the effect to be as large as the differences in average earnings suggest, 
once differences in the level of education and the sectoral composition of em­
ployment are controlled for; (ii) KKP would be expected to be the worst off, 
based on widely held beliefs about the impact of the Aral Sea disaster on
16 There were serious outbreaks of killing and looting, in conflicts that were frequently 
delineated in ethnic terms, for example, Uzbeks versus Kyrgyz, over claims to land and 
water in the Fergana Valley in 1990 (Schoeberlein-Engel, 1995). In 1989 there was an 
outbreak of violence against the Meskhetian Turks (one of the groups relocated to Central 
Asia by Stalin) which took the form of murders, assaults and property damage.
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living Standards and economic opportunities in the region; (iii) in both Fer­
gana and KKP, the pre-existing labour surplus alongside continuing labour 
force growth during the transition should have exerted downward influence 
on wages, especially for new entrants.
5.4 T h e  B asic  M odel
Earlier chapters have set the economic, structural and institutional context 
within which wage determination has taken place during, and since, the 
Soviet period. The objective of PART II of the thesis is to understand the 
individual determinants of wages in transition. This section embarks upon 
that task by applying a basic human capital model to the present data set. 
The initial results suggest that there are a number of reasons to be cautious 
about the usefulness of the conventional approach to modelling earnings, 
applied in its simplest form, even though this approach has been widely 
applied in other studies of transition economies. Hence a building-block type 
approach is employed in PART II, whereby the results of successive chapters 
axe utilised in constructing a preferred model of earnings.
The basic Mincer-type model that was introduced in the preceding chap­
ter is estimated for labour earnings, where the dependent variable is the net 
monthly wage from main place of work. In this estimation and henceforth, 
the restricted sample (excluding the self employed) is used. The only inde­
pendent variables included at this initial stage are experience and experience 
squared, and the education dummies. Following convention, a ‘potential 
experience’ variable was constructed based on age in years minus years of 
education minus seven (age at school entry) (see Chapter 4.2, equation 4.6).
Table 5.7 presents the results for the basic regression on log earnings for 
the pooled sample. This model is necessarily misspecified, since even a sex 
dummy is missing. It is nonetheless a useful first step. While the coefficients 
generally take the expected sign, there are some unexpected aspects. For the
194 CHAPTER 5. THE DATA AND BASIC RESULTS
education variables, which are defined relative to elementary (four grades) 
or less of schooling, the coefficients generally rise with the level of education. 
However, at several levels, completion is associated with lower returns than 
some (incomplete) education at the same level.
Controlling for experience, Table 5.7 shows that while complete high 
school education appears to be “worth” more than incomplete high school, 
incomplete vocational appears to generate greater returns than completed 
vocational training, and the same is true of the teknikums. This result is 
puzzling, certainly from a signalling perspective (see Chapter 4.2), but also 
in terms of the human capital/ productivity view of returns to education. 
This point is revisited in Chapter 8, where the possible existence of sheep­
skin effects is explored.
Table 5.7: Basic Mincer model with education dummies, pooled sample
Coefficient t-statistic
pexp .013 3.17
pexp2/100 -.013 -1.40
hgh .396 2.60
dhgh .412 2.71
incvoc .732 3.81
voc .661 4.23
inccol .829 3.99
col .694 4.43
incuni .943 5.04
uni .984 6.43
constant 5.51 36.17
Adjusted R2 
N
0.114
1708
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A new variable which captured years of schooling was used to replace the 
education dummies. The information on the highest level of education was 
transformed into continuous years of schooling, by imputing certain values 
to each stage of education.1' This procedure undoubtedly introduces mea­
surement error, especially in the light of the non-linearities in the returns 
to education reported in the previous table, and therefore the results should 
be treated with caution. It is nonetheless an interesting exercise, which fa­
cilitates a simple comparison of results from the basic human capital model 
with studies from Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world which have 
employed a continuous schooling variable. The results are presented in Table 
5.8.
Table 5.8: Basic Mincer model, pooled sample
Coefficient t-statistic
pexp .012 2.90
pexp2/100 -.005 -0.61
yrsch .077 13.13
constant 5.16 61.40
Adjusted R2 TOO
N 1708
Controlling for experience, the return to an additional year of education 
is about 7.7 percent for the pooled sample. These results for Uzbekistan in 
1995 are of similar orders of magnitude found in the studies of other transition 
economies reviewed in the preceding chapter. For example, Flanagan (1998) 
reports returns to years of schooling for both sexes in the Czech Republic 
in 1996 of 5.7 percent; Rutkowski (1996) found that an additional year of 
schooling increased wages by 7.4 percent in Poland in 1993.
17Specifically, the following values were assigned to the respective levels of schooling in 
consultation with local experts: none (0); incomplete primary (3); complete primary (4); 
incomplete middle secondary(6); incomplete secondary (9); full secondary (11), incomplete 
vocational (9); complete vocational (11); incomplete teknikum (10); complete teknikum 
(12); incomplete higher (14); and complete higher (16).
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There are, however, problems with this basic model. For example, there 
may well be correlations between education and other variables that are omit­
ted or mis-specified. Interpretation is thus deferred until a more adequate 
functional form is developed in the following chapters.
The overall explanatory power of the basic Mincer-type approach revealed 
by the coefficient of determination (adjusted R 2) is low, at around 0.10. 
The reasons to expect a decline in the explanatory value of the observed 
characteristics during transition have already been noted and illustrated in 
the previous chapter. The size of the adjusted R 2 is low relative to established 
Western market economies where the adjusted R2 in earnings regressions 
range up to 0.20-0.25. (This figure is nonetheless higher than what Newell 
and Reilly (1996) found for Russia: adjusted R 2 for males of 0.049 and 
for females of 0.034.) Such poor fits could be traced to various factors, 
that axe not mutually exclusive. The functional form is likely to be wrong, 
for example, some of the variables could have been mismeasured, and/ or 
factors other than experience or education could play a more important role 
in the determination of earnings. Each of these possibilities is explored in 
the chapters that follow.
Before proceeding, it is useful to look at the gender effects. An indication 
of the importance of gender is provided in Table 5.9. This suggests that, 
holding the human capital variables constant, a substantial premium is as­
sociated with being male. This effect, which is of the order of 25 percent, 
is highly significant. It also significantly increases the explanatory power of 
the earnings regression.
Basic Results by Gender
The next step is to separate men and women. There are a number of reasons 
for this distinction, the foremost being the constructed “potential experi­
ence” term, which likely overstates women’s actual experience in the labour
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Table 5.9: Basic Mincer model with sex dummy
Coefficient t-statistic
pexp .009 1.81
pexp2/100 -.003 -0.028
yrsch .070 12.39
male .245 7.40
constant 5.18 64.02
Adjusted R2 .1196
N 1649
market.18 Most obviously, women take time off to have and raise children. In 
Uzbekistan the total fertility rate, w'hich is a synthetic measure of the num­
ber of children a woman would have if she passed through her child bearing 
years at the current age-specific fertility rates, was about 3.8 in 1994 (Klug- 
man and Schieber, 1997, Table 3). This demographic picture, coupled with 
long-established maternity leave provisions (see Chapter 2 above), suggests 
that the work history of many women tended to be discontinuous.
In fact running separate OLS regressions for men and women on the ba­
sic model reveals quite different orders of magnitude on the coefficients for 
potential experience, each level of schooling, and in the overall explanatory 
value of the model (Table 5.10). The returns to potential experience axe 
much higher for men -  the coefficient on the experience variable is over three 
times that for women. On the other hand, the higher coefficient of determi­
nation for women suggests that the conventional human capital factors play 
a somewhat larger role in explaining their wages, relative to men.
The results by gender show large differences in the returns to experience. 
Of course one cannot state definitively that this is the case in the absence 
of direct measures of “true” experience. However this is clearly suggestive 
of mis-specification -  in particular, that experience is mis-specified when the
18 A number of international studies are restricted to men, for this reason (e.g. Vella 
and Gregory 1992).
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Table 5.10: Basic Mincer model, by sex
Men Women
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
pexp .020 3.20 .006 1.67
pexp2/100 -.028 -2.07 .003 .023
hgh .385 1.92 .411 1.80
dhgh .385 1.91 .470 2.09
incvoc .690 2.68 .794 2.86
voc .568 2.73 .817 • 3.55
inccol .693 2.59 1.008 3.15
col .560 2.68 .888 3.85
incuni 1.062 4.12 .885 3.35
uni .879 4.34 1.135 5.00
constant 5.62 28.12 5.32 23.38
Adjusted R2 .092 .169
N 977 731
simple Mincerian proxy is used.
The Mincerian measure of experience comprises ''‘true1' experience plus 
some unknown element of error. The size and therefore implications of the 
error in measurement of experience would tend to differ among individuals. 
The extent of error would tend to be inversely related with the individual’s 
level of education, for example. University-educated women, for example, 
would be expected to have higher levels of labour force participation (closer 
to the assumption of continuous attachment underlying the Mincerian mea­
sure of potential experience). The impact of mismeasurement of female ex­
perience on the experience coefficient, and on other coefficient estimates, is 
set out more formally in the next chapter (section 2). Chapter 6 also derives 
and imputes an alternative measure of female experience. It is therefore ap­
propriate to defer interpretation of results until after experience is properly 
specified.
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5.5 C onclusions
This chapter introduced the data set upon which the empirical analysis in 
PART II of the thesis is founded. The elaboration of the independent vari­
ables to be used in the earnings regression equations indicated likely areas 
of importance in the extended model -  in particular, the regional and eth­
nic variables. Initial results about the returns to education and experience 
in Uzbekistan were presented. The chapter also raised several issues that 
will be analysed in more depth in the chapters that follow, some of which 
are unique to economies in transition, such as arrears, and others with more 
general methodological relevance to the study of earnings. The main findings 
of the chapter can be summarised as follows.
The descriptive statistics showed that the sample of workers is, on aver­
age, fairly well-educated and young. There are a number of characteristics 
that are peculiar to economies in transition -  in particular, pervasive non­
payment of wages due. Unexpected aspects included the findings that rates of 
labour force participation among working-age women are far from universal, 
and a very high incidence of maternity leave.
Evidence based on official data and field work suggested that the regional 
differences in the level of earnings and structure of the labour markets are 
significant, and that regional dummies will be significant in models of earn­
ings outcomes. Likewise, evidence about ethnicity indicates that non-Slavic 
groups will have relatively lower rates of pay. However the studies to date 
have not quantified these effects on earnings with controls for education, 
experience and other factors expected to affect earnings.
The basic Mincerian human capital model was applied to the pooled 
sample, with the initial results suggesting that the return to an additional 
year of schooling was roughly comparable to that found for other transition 
economies. But the chapter also demonstrated that there are a number of 
reasons to be cautious about the usefulness of the conventional approach 
applied in its simplest form.
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First, the use of a continuous years of schooling variable introduces an 
undesirable degree of mismeasurement. The question of appropriate spec­
ification of the education dummies is examined below. The possibility of 
sheepskin effects -  that is, returns to completion of a particular level of edu­
cation over and above any increases in productivity associated with additional 
schooling -  is addressed in Chapter 8.
Second, the male wage premium, coupled with the much higher returns to 
education for women and the much lower returns to “Mincerian” experience 
suggest that pooling all individuals is likely to lead to results that are mis­
leading. Henceforth, then, results are presented separately by gender. The 
very low returns to experience for women are open to alternative explana­
tions, including gender discrimination, low rates of on-the-job training, the 
relevance of other determinants of earnings, and/or mismeasurement of the 
experience term. For these reasons, it was argued that interpretation of the 
results should be deferred until Chapter 8, once a more satisfactory model of 
earnings has been developed.
The results of the basic model do provide some guidance as to next steps. 
All estimations are carried out separately by sex. In later extensions to the 
“basic” model, regional and ethnic dummies are included in the estimations. 
The next chapter investigates whether women really are being rewarded so 
much less for additional years of experience, or whether there is a measure­
ment problem. It explores ways to adjust the measure of experience for 
women, to take account of intermittent labour force participation, and de­
rives an improved measure that more closely reflects actual experience.
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5. A Appendix. Earnings by Raion: the Case
of KKP
Available data suggests significant intra-oblast variation in the level of aver­
age earnings. Table 5A.1 shows average nominal earnings, on a raion basis, 
for employees for 1990 and 1995, and in agriculture for 1995. Employee 
salaries tended to exceed agricultural earnings (the only exception is Chim- 
bai). The overall gap in 1995 (871 versus 612 sum) was of the order of 30 
percent. At the same time, however, not all rural raions are worse off.
The relative importance of agricultural earnings versus the employee 
salaries is shown in columns four and five. It is notable that even in the rural 
raions of KKP, agricultural earnings do not generally predominate sources of 
labour income.
Klugman (1997a) constructed composite labour earnings for each raion as 
a weighted average of both wages of workers and employees, and agricultural 
income, weighted according to the relative numbers of workers and employees 
versus those receiving agricultural income, in each raion.
Trends in this variable show that the dispersion in wages among raions has 
generally increased since 1990. Hence workers in Kungrad (town and raion), 
Tashaus and Nukus, already above average, have moved further ahead. Raions 
that appear to have slipped further behind already below average positions 
include Chimbai (town and raion), Berin and Veruni. A number of raions 
also appear to have slipped in relative position on the earnings scale, such as 
Keglin and Tahtakup.
The index of composite earnings tends to suggest greater levels of in­
equality of earnings among oblasts than a measure confined to the wages of 
workers and employees. This is to be expected, since as noted above, agri­
cultural earnings are significantly lower on average. Hence the urban centres 
draw further ahead relative to most rural raions.
202 CHAPTER 5. THE DATA AND BASIC RESULTS
Table 5A.1: Labour earnings by raion, KKP
Average employee salary Av. ag wage Non ag./ to ta l
1990 1995 1995 employment (%)
towns* 100
Nukus 1.02 1.14 100
Tashaus 1.05 1.26 100
Turkul 0.98 0.97 100
Chimbai 0.90 0.83 100
Veruni 0.92 0.82 100
Kungrad 1.21 1.42 100
Hojel 0.86 0.87 100
M uynak 0.92 0.91 100
Rural raions
Amuydaryan 0.90 0.79 0.11 48
Ollikkalink 1.01 0.88 1.14 42
Tahtakup 1.08 0.92 1.08 86
Karusyak 0.99 0.95 0.92 97
Kegilin 1.05 0.84 1.32 65
Bozat 0.83 0.90 100
Nukus 1.01 0.88 1.19 49
Kangul 1.04 1.00 1.40 61
Shuman 1.02 1.01 1.24 41
Hodjel 0.96 1.07 0.99 26
Turtkul 1.04 0.80 1.20 30
Berin 0.88 0.78 0.97 39
Chimbai 1.00 0.83 1.22 62
Kungrad 1.15 1.54 1.42 42
Muynak 0.96 0.93 1.12 69
Oblast Average 1.00 1.00 1.00
NOTE: Several raions bear the same name as towns.
SOURCE: author calculations based on official data. See Klugman 1997a.
Chapter 6
M easurem ent of Female 
Experience
6.1 Introduction
One of the major insights of human capital theory is the observation that 
individuals can increase their productivity not only through investments in 
formal education but also by learning work skills while they are on the job. 
This may occur through formal training programmes sponsored by their em­
ployer, and/or on an informal day-to-day basis through instruction of col­
leagues, task repetition, and so on. Human capital theory thus suggests that 
if women’s attachment to the workforce is weaker than men’s, due to compet­
ing family responsibilities, they will acquire less of this valuable on-the-job 
training, not only because of fewer years spent in employment per se but also 
because the expectation of lower labour force participation reduces training 
investments.1
The results of the basic model presented in the previous chapter suggested 
that women’s returns to potential experience are less than a third of men’s. 
However this measure of experience assumes continuous time in the labour 
force after leaving school. Many of the recent empirical studies of women’s
1 Blau and Ferber, 1992, p. 162.
203
204 CHAPTER 6. MEASUREMENT OF FEMALE EXPERIENCE
earnings, especially studies concerned with gender discrimination, acknowl­
edge that the Mincerian proxy for labour market experience is an inaccurate 
measure of actual accumulated experience for women.2
However none of the studies of wages in transition, known to the author, 
have directly addressed ways to resolve this problem. This has usually been 
justified by reference to assumed high rates of labour force participation 
during the Soviet period (e.g. Newell and Reilly 1996), an assumption that 
can be shown to be highly questionable, especially in the Central Asian 
context.
In the present data set, as is typical of most empirical studies of wages, 
information on actual time in employment is lacking. This gives rise to 
a general problem, which is not novel, and in the present context can be 
described as follows. In the former Soviet Union, women were expected to 
undertake the bulk of child-rearing responsibilities. Maternity leave rights 
were established shortly after the revolution, in the 1922 Labour Code (see 
McAuley 1981 for details).
Since 1956, women were allowed, on full pay, eight weeks leave prior to 
birth and eight weeks post-partum. They were also entitled to take unpaid 
leave up to the child’s third birthday. While subsidised child care was ex­
tensive, access was far from universal, especially in rural areas (see Klugman 
et al 1997; UNICEF 1998). Hence, as shown in Chapter 5, the share of 
working-aged women on maternity leave is high.
Women who are not working, even if formally attached to their jobs 
through maternity leave, may accumulate less human capital that is recog­
nised or valued by employers. The importance of this is that it would tend to 
cause earnings functions that utilise age or Mincerian experience as a proxy 
for experience to bias downward experience coefficients for women than is the 
case for men.3 The application of the conventional Mincer model to female
2See Kidd and Shannon (1997), and references cited therein.
3This need not be the case, however, if for example women were more productive in 
the on-the-job training that was undertaken.
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earnings in Chapter 5 indicated surprisingly low returns to experience in ab­
solute terms, and relative to men. Those results suggested that, for example, 
at five years of experience an additional year of experience increased women’s 
pay by only 0.6 percent, whereas for men the estimated increase would be 
more than three times higher, or 2 percent.
The above result could reflect either: (i) women of age X  have worked 
fewer years than men of the same age; and/or (ii) women axe accorded lower 
returns to experience. If the first explanation holds, this implies mismeasure- 
ment if a model of earnings utilises age, or a Mincerian term, for experience. 
To resolve this problem, one needs to construct a more appropriate proxy for 
actual labour market experience. This has important implications for, inter 
alia, the evaluation of unexplained differences in earnings by sex, as shown 
in Chapter 8.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section establishes levels 
and trends in female labour force participation, demonstrating the likelihood 
of discontinuous work force attachment for this sex. Drawing on the method­
ology that has been used in several published studies that have suggested 
ways to impute a more satisfactory measure of female experience, this task 
is undertaken in Section 6.3. The effect of alternative measures of experience 
on the estimated returns to experience is demonstrated in Section 6.4. The 
final section concludes.
6.2 Fem ale P articipation  and E m ploym ent
The lengths of individuals’ work experiences depends on the extent to which 
they have been employed in the labour market. If female labour force partic­
ipation rates are high, then the Mincerian measure of potential labour force 
experience, based on the assumption of continuous work after school-leaving 
age, will tend to closely approximate the underlying reality.
This section investigates evidence about levels and trends in female labour
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force participation in Uzbekistan over the past four decades or so, thereby 
providing the context and motivation for the imputation of female experience 
that follows. Definitional difficulties are reviewed before the analysis goes on 
to critically examine the belief that female rates of labour force participa­
tion in the formerly planned economies have been high, at least by Western 
standards.4 If labour force participation and employment rates were high, 
then the assumption of continuous work force attachment since leaving school 
is not contentious. However, the best available evidence suggests that less 
than two in three working aged women in Central Asia were employed in the 
labour force.
D efin itio n a l Issu es
A critical prior issue, that was alluded to in PART II, lies in the conceptual 
differences related to labour force participation.5 It matters that there was 
no Soviet concept of labour force participation in the sense used in the West. 
The notion of “Balance of Labour Resources” was used to guide central plan­
ning (and remains current in official statistics) (see Chapter 2). Within total 
labour resources, the “Economically Active Population” comprises those who 
are employed, while the category “Not Economically Active” includes stu­
dents plus those “Not Employed in the Economy”. The latter, which includes 
such groups as women on maternity leave, is not equivalent to unemployment, 
since it does not take into account whether or not the individuals are actively 
seeking work
The widely used International Labor Organisation (ILO) concept of labour 
force participation refers to individuals who are in paid work, plus those who 
are unemployed and actively looking for work or retraining. The closest ap­
proximation to the ILO concept in Soviet sources is the ratio of the number
4See, eg., Milanovic (1998), p. 20; World Bank (1996a), Chapter 4; Blau and Ferber 
(1992), Chapter 10.
5See Klugman and Scott (1997) for a review of these difficulties in the context of the 
former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan.
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of women employed to the number of women aged 16-54 years, which we can 
call an employment rate.6 7While 55 is the normal age at which rights to a 
State pension accrue, many women continue to work beyond that time (in 
part because individuals are allowed to receive both pension and wage, and 
accumulate additional work history for the purposes of pension entitlement). 
The presence of working women aged 55 and over in the numerator tends to 
raise the employment rate.
Soviet statistical practices thus helped reinforce the notion that employ­
ment and labour force participation rates were high in the former Soviet 
Union. It is likely however that the “true” employment rates were some­
what lower. The differences in reporting practices also make comparisons 
between the Soviet and Western situations with respect to rates of labour 
force participation and employment somewhat difficult.
Levels o f E m p lo ym en t and P a r tic ip a tio n
Definitional problems notwithstanding, it is widely thought that Soviet women 
were employed in the labour market to a far greater extent than their west­
ern counterparts, and that steep increases in employment rates preceded the 
rises in participation rates experienced in the West after the 1970s (see, e.g. 
World Bank 1996a). McAuley (1981) documents the increase in the absolute 
number of Soviet women in “gainful employment’, from less than five mil­
lion in the late 1920s to over 50 million by 1975. Marxist ideology and the 
labour demands of industrialisation efforts combined in the right, and im­
plicitly the obligation, of women to find paid employment, as set out in the 
1936 Constitution.'
6In fact the employment rate is of greater interest for present purposes, since time 
spent actually working and gaining on-the-job training is what matters for the effect of 
experience on earnings.
7 In the USSR, over and above ideological pressures, various measures that enabled 
women to work, in particular the expansion of child care places and the extension of 
maternity leaves and concessions that permitted women to combine work and domestic 
responsibilities (see Chapter 8), within an overall incomes regime which effectively meant
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Table 6.1 shows that overall rates of participation were already high by 
1960, at levels that only Sweden had reached even by 1990.8Yet female labour 
force participation rates in Central Asia diverged from the Soviet averages, 
in terms of both levels and trends. The measured rates scarcely rose after 
1965 according to the figures reported by McAuley (1981). The differences 
can be attributed to the labour “surplus” which characterised the region, in 
contrast to the shortages that characterised much of the European parts of 
the Union, as well as to higher fertility rates.9 Trends over time are important 
for the analysis that follows because the imputation procedure requires the 
construction of a record of past experience for current participants.
Chapter 2 has already reviewed evidence suggesting that the rates of 
“non-employment” of working-aged adults in Soviet Uzbekistan were up to 14 
percent, among whom nine out of ten were women. The picture that emerged 
from representative survey data for 1995 shows that the share of women on 
maternity leave was extraordinarily high, since the leave entitlement is up to 
three years.10 The female employment rate in the sample is of the order of 
46 percent.* 11
that a family with children needed to have two earners in order to have a decent income 
(Klugman and Braithwaite, 1998).
8 As noted above, the rates for the Western countries are defined as the total female 
labour force divided by the female population aged 15-64 years (OECD, 1991, p. 461), 
whereas the Soviet figures show the ratio of average annual employment to the female 
population age 16-54 years (McAuley, 1982, Table 3.2).
9The total fertility rate in 1980 was 4.81 in Uzbekistan, compared to 1.87 in Russia, 
1.95 in Ukraine and 2.0 in Lithuania (UNICEF, 1998, Table 2.4).
10This is consistent with other recent evidence for Uzbekistan. Expert Centre (1998) 
report that nearly one-third of women employed in industry in Fergana oblast were on 
maternity leave in 1997.
11 There have been widespread concerns about declining labour force participation for 
women during the transition (see, e.g., World Bank, 1996a, p. 72-73). While it is no easy 
matter to establish trends since the Soviet period, there are a number of reasons to expect 
changes to have occurred during the transition. However the overall expected effect of the 
various influences - declining real wages, reduced access to childcare, falling fertility rates 
and changing ideological pressures - is indeterminate (Klugman et al, 1997). Untangling 
trends in labour force participation, especially the impact of diminished childcare access, 
is a subject beyond the scope of this chapter that nonetheless warrants further research.
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Table 6.1: Female participation and employment rates, selected countries, 
1970-1990
1960 1970 1980 1990
OECD
UK 55.5 61.7 68.4
France 49.5 55.6 57.7
Sweden 62.1 75.8 83.5
Ireland 34.6 35.2 37.5
USA 50.6 61.3 69.6
Australia 46.1 52.5 61.9
Former Soviet Union 1970 1980 1990
USSR 62.7 81.6 83.1
Russia 66.7 85.1 86.9 78.0
Central Asia* 60.1 66.5 65.4 71.1
Sources: McAuley (1981) for FSU, except 1990, 
ILO (1992). OECD (1991) for OECD countries. 
Notes: Soviet figures show employment/female 
population, 16-54 years. * excluding Kazakhstan.
The E ffect o f M ism ea su rem en t o f E xperience
The review of the evidence has shown that employment rates for women in 
Uzbekistan has been much less than 100 percent. Hence the assumption 
of continuous employment since leaving school is likely to over-estimate the 
amount of “true” work experience.
It is relevant to ask: what is the effect of mismeasurement of experience? 
This has (at least) two dimensions: an effect on the coefficient for experience, 
and possible effects on other coefficients in the model. It is useful to set out 
the conceptual basis for each of these.
If potential experience exceeds “true” experience, then the coefficient es­
timated for experience will be too low (relative to the male coefficients on 
experience, and also relative to the coefficient on true experience).
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More formally, this can be shown as follows. Assume a model of earnings
w = aTp + ßS
where w is the wage, Tp is the measure of potential experience and 5 is 
the number of years of schooling. Assume that there is some relationship 
between potential and “true” or actual experience (T'a ), depicted by
TP = STa
Since the number of years of potential experience is greater than years of 
actual experience, 6 > 1. Hence the coefficient estimates on true experience 
can be estimated in an earnings regression as
w = ol6Ta +  ßS
Because <5 > 1, it follows that the coefficient on potential experience (a) is 
biased downwards.
Mismeasurement of one dependent variable (experience) will also affect 
the other coefficients in the model. This is a standard econometric result.12 
The effect of mismeasurement of experience on the other estimated coeffi­
cients in the model can be illustrated more formally for the case of schooling. 
Recall the model
w = aTp + ßS  (6.1)
defined as before. Assume that actual experience, Ta , is known. In this case, 
equation 6.1 can be rewritten as
w = aTA + 7 {Tp -  Ta) + ß S
The importance of this is that if true experience is less than potential ex­
perience (Ta < Tp), then 7 < 0. Assume, further for the purposes of this 
illustration, that there is an inverse correlation between number of years of
12See, for example, Greene 1994, pp. 279-284.
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education and the size of the difference (T4 < TP). This would tend to occur 
if, for example, university educated women are less likely to have time out of 
the labour force.
The effect of the mismeasurement of experience on the education coeffi­
cient (/?), depends on the relationship between 7 on the one hand, and the 
size of the error (Tp — T&) and X  on the other. Under the present assump­
tions, both 7 and the relationship between the size of the error and number 
of years of schooling is negative, so that the overall effect on the schooling 
coefficient is likely to be positive.
The above case is only illustrative of the possible effects, since the “true” 
effect is not known in the absence of direct information on actual experience. 
For Australia, for example, Rummery (1992, p. 361) suggests that errors 
associated with measurement of the experience term may bias the coeffi­
cients on the other variables in the earnings equation model either upwards 
(as appeared to be the case for males), or downwards (as was the case for 
females).
It seems that the belief that rates of female employment were high in the 
Soviet period is ill-founded, at least for the case of Uzbekistan. The evidence 
suggests that their time in employment were likely to be interrupted by 
childbirth and the associated leaves, and that this would have affected the 
length of the true experience. The most important implication of this for 
the present analysis is that overstatement of “true” experience would tend 
to reduce the estimated returns to female experience, relative to the “true” 
returns (and also relative to men). A standard econometric result is that the 
errors associated with one term in an OLS model are expected to carry though 
to the other coefficient estimates.13 The analysis therefore suggests that 
any modelling of wages based on the assumption of continuous employment 
since leaving school (for example, Newell and Reilly, forthcoming) is open to 
criticism. In the next section, this issue is considered empirically.
13Unless the variables were completely uncorrelated.
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6.3 Im p u ting  E xperience for W om en
This section undertakes a procedure, similar to that which has been utilised 
in other countries, to impute a measure of labour market experience for 
women that takes into account the role of intermittent work attachment. 
The method utilises the observed characteristics of women in the sample 
who are presently participating, in order to derive work histories for each 
individual.
Before proceeding to elaborate this procedure in detail, the next sub­
section reviews the factors that might be expected to affect the participation 
decision and uses the micro-data to construct a profile of female participants 
in the Uzbek labour market. Such a profile has never been previously pub­
lished. Section 6.3.3 presents and implements the model, which is based on 
logit estimates. Finally in this section, attention is drawn to the assumptions 
underlying this procedure, and potential interpretative problems are raised.
6.3.1 Factors Affecting the Participation Decision
A number of studies have modelled the decision of the individual to allocate 
time between the market and home production.14 Studies in Western coun­
tries have tended to find fairly common patterns by age, level of education, 
marital status and number of children, especially in countries with lower 
rates of participation (OECD 1988). Studies of the Soviet period obviously 
face serious data constraints, however, and those that have been undertaken 
typically analyse European Russia (Ofer and Vinokur 1992; Katz 1994).
One exception that casts light on Soviet Uzbekistan is Berliner’s (1989) 
study of Soviet female urban labour participation. His analysis was not based 
on individual micro-data, however, but instead on regional-level informa­
tion for 168 oblasts, which included Uzbekistan. The regional-level variables 
subject to investigation included fertility, ethnicity/religion, education and
14See Blau and Ferber (1992) Chapter 4, and references cited therein.
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wages. The main findings were that:
(a) taking into account that fertility and participation decisions will be 
made jointly, participation had a strong negative effect on fertility, but not 
the converse. The general declines in fertility were particularly pronounced 
in Central Asia; for example, between 1970 and 1980 the Soviet fertility rate 
declined by about 4 percent compared to a fall of 13 percent in Uzbekistan 
(Kingkade 1987; Table 6.4).
(b) Higher male wages (as proxied by education) had a negative effect on 
female participation.
(c) While Muslim and Slavic fertility levels seem to differ substantially, 
participation rates did not vary once fertility, education and other factors 
were controlled for.
A more recent study of neighbouring Kazakhstan casts further light on the 
participation decision in the Central Asian context (Klugman et al. 1997). 
Although the focus of this study was on the impact of childcare on household 
welfare, the effects were expected to flow through changes in the labour force 
participation of women with pre-school aged children. Based on maximum 
likelihood estimation, the significant factors affecting the probability of par­
ticipation were the age of the youngest child (higher the age, the more likely 
is the mother to participate); education of the mother (the more educated, 
the more likely they were to participate); household income15 (which had a 
negative impact); and, living in a town, but not the oblast capital (which 
had a positive impact).16
Who is participating in the labour market in Uzbekistan in 1995? A useful 
initial step in the investigation of participation patterns in Uzbekistan is to 
construct a profile of participants in the EESU sample. Table 6.2 presents 
simple cross-tabulations of female labour force participation rates by age 
group, level of education, marital status and number of children.
^Excluding the women’s own wage.
16See Klugman et al, (1997), Table 10.2.
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The first issue concerns age. The age profile of participants is of most in­
terest because it provides insights into fife cycle effects. In Western countries, 
three broad age patterns have been identified (OECD 1988). The first dis­
plays a single peak in the early twenties, followed by (permanent) withdrawal 
after marriage and childbirth. Ireland fits this experience, for example. An­
other pattern, now seen in the UK, has two peaks around a valley about 30 
years of age given the presence of young children. A third pattern, which 
has been found in Sweden, does not show any marked differences over time 
after women enter the labour force, and participation rates rise to a plateau 
that persists until retirement age. However this latter group of countries also 
tend to have significant opportunities for part-time employment.
What pattern might be expected to prevail in Uzbekistan? On the one 
hand, the availability of childcare, maternity benefits and leave in Uzbek­
istan suggest that the third pattern would tend to prevail. On the other 
hand, the large average family size and the very limited scope for part-time 
employment in the former Soviet system suggests that some women might 
be discouraged from participating at all. Official statistics are silent on the 
question of part-time work in the USSR -  at least in sectors other than 
agriculture.1. There was very little formal part-time employment, although 
the organisation of work in agriculture did involve seasonal fluctuations in 
the intensity of work. The only available evidence, for Russia, suggests that 
part-time employment in the state sector represented less than 0.5 percent 
of state sector employment in the 1970s (McAuley 1981, p. 28). In this 
sense the pattern of female employment in the former Soviet Union is quite 
different to that in most industrial market economies.18
Table 6.2 indicates that female labour force participation rates do not 
decline around the child-bearing years. Rather, their participation rates con-
17McAuley (1982, p. 27) argues that this in itself should be taken as evidence tha t the 
phenomenon is unimportant.
18 In the US in 1990, 27 percent of women (and 12 percent of men) worked less than 35 
hours per week (Blau and Ferber, 1992, p. 184).
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Table 6.2: Labour force participation rates for selected characteristics,
Uzbekistan, 1995
Characteristic Participation Rate (per cent)
Marital status:
married 52.7
Education:
completed secondary 56.3
completed vocational 60.7
completed college 63.4
incomplete university 37.7
completed university 67.0
Ethnicity:
Uzbek 51.0
Slavic 68.0
Karakalpak 52.8
Kazakh 45.8
Age:
18-25 years 41.6
26-30 years 53.3
31-35 years 62.9
36-40 years 72.7
40-44 years 78.1
45-49 years 73.1
50-54 years 40.9
S O U R C E :  Author estimates based on EESU
tinue to rise and peak in the 40-44 year age group. This pattern is somewhat 
surprising given the co-existence of large shares of women on maternity leave 
in the sample. It is, however, consistent with the age patterns of the ratio 
of the employed to the working age population estimated by Isamiddinova 
(1997, pp. 13-15), which are based on extrapolations from the 1989 census.
This can be explained, at least partly, by the age patterns of the individ­
uals on maternity leave. The average age of women who are working is about 
36.5 years, compared to only 27 years for women on maternity leave. Almost
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three in four women on maternity leave (72 per cent) are under the age of 30 
years. In this light it is not surprising that rates of labour force participation 
are some 10 percentage points higher for women aged 31-35 than those aged 
26-30 years (and higher again for both of the next two five-year age cohorts). 
The labour force participation rate of women in the 26-30 year age group is 
nonetheless higher than the youngest working age group, given the greater 
involvement in full-time education of the latter.
Second, education patterns are of interest. The education patterns shown 
in Table 6.2 mirror the age profile, in so far as the eldest cohorts tend to have 
both lower educational attainments and lower participation rates. Hence, for 
example, the rate of labour force participation for the small number with el­
ementary education or less (N=264) is less than 10 percent. There is a broad 
association between completion of education at various levels, and rates of 
labour force participation -  the table shows the example of university educa­
tion, where rates of participation for those who had completed are 67 percent, 
almost double that for those who dropped out.19 This suggests that those 
who drop out of education move into domestic responsibilities. The overall 
pattern of participation rates by education level is depicted graphically in 
Figure 6.1.
The majority of married women participate in the labour force (Table 
6.2). Not shown in the Table is the relationship between the rate of partici­
pation and the number of children. In Western countries, there tends to be a 
negative correlation.20 This can be observed for the present sample, for whom 
data are available on young children: among women with no pre-school aged 
children, two-thirds participated in the labour market, among women with 
one pre-school aged child, 53 percent participated, with the share dropping 
to 36 percent for those with three young children.
19 This pattern is confirmed with the negative coefficients found in the model of the 
probability of participation that is estimated below.
20As in Ireland, for example, see Callan and Farrell 1991; for the US, see Blau and 
Ferber 1992, table 4.4
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Figure 6.1: Female participation rates by age, 1995
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This section has pointed to the factors expected to affect the probability 
of female participation in the labour force, and presented evidence about the 
correlates of participation in the present sample. The reason this matters 
for the current exercise is that it provides essential background for the lo­
gistic model of the participation decision and imputation procedure that is 
undertaken in the next section.
6 .3 .2  T h e M o d el
Ideally, of course, to capture experience for the purpose of earnings functions, 
one would obtain direct measures of work experience, as did Ofer and Vinokur
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(1992), for example, in their analysis of the labour market experience of 
Soviet Jewish emigres. In the absence of direct information, however, an 
approach is to impute female experience based on the observed characteristics 
of the sample (Zabzala and Arrufat 1985). This would lead to more accurate 
wage estimates of the role of experience.
In other words, the results from logit estimates of female participation are 
useful because these can be utilised to predict experience for each woman in 
the sample. In the rare cases where actual labour force experience has been 
available for the same sample (e.g. for Australia, as reported in Kidd and 
Shannon 1997), this adjustment leads to estimates that come much closer to 
approximating “true” experience than Mincerian experience (and age).21
The basis of these approaches is to predict the probability of female em­
ployment for each individual, backward through time, in order to derive a 
measure of accumulated experience. Using the single cross-section for June 
1995, a logit model on the probability of employment can then be estimated. 
The probability of employment E*t of individual i in period t — j  is derived 
from a model specified as:
E*t —  Zit q  -+- Ai + S i  (6-2)
where E*t > 0 if z is working; E*t ^  0 if i has no job; Zu are the time- 
invariant variables that affect individual z’s participation decision; Ai is the 
individual’s age in years; and £* is a residual error term.
The independent variables are limited to the information for which there 
is complete information on the sample. Hence the term Z represents several 
variables that can be assumed to remain constant over time-viz. level of 
education, ethnicity, region of residence, and never having been married.
The inclusion of region in the above is justifiable since Soviet citizens’ 
choice of residence was restricted by residence permits, known as the propiska,
21 For the full sample, actual experience average 10.8 years, whereas the Mincerian proxy 
was 21 years. The imputed experience estimate based on the reduced form model (similar 
to that implementade here) was 11.6 years (Kidd and Shannon 1997, Table 3).
6.3. IMPUTING EXPERIENCE FOR WOMEN 219
a system which prevailed in Uzbekistan at least up through the mid-1990s. 
While individuals were allowed to change jobs, inter-regional mobility in the 
USSR was thereby restrained (Commander and Yemtsov 1997). We specify 
a flexible form by using levels of education (complete and incomplete), five- 
year age cohorts and a series of interaction terms. The only time-varying 
variable for which we have complete information is the individual’s age.
Some of the Western studies that have undertaken this imputation pro­
cedure have included the predicted log wage for the current period under the 
assumption that the individual worked in the labour market. For example, 
Kidd and Shannon (1997) predict the individual’s wage from a reduced form 
wage equation that includes age, age squared and four education dummies 
as regressors. However, when the log wage is included in the logit model, 
complications follow: for example, adjustments are needed to allow for real 
wage changes over time, and it is necessary to exclude at least one of the 
wage equation regressors from the vector Z.
Kidd and Shannon (1997) show that the implied wage coefficient can 
vary substantially with the identification restriction imposed. They conclude 
that there are “substantial difficulties associated with allowing for real wage 
growth in the derivation of imputed labour market experience” (p. 140).
It is arguable that these problems would be significantly compounded in a 
transition context, particularly given the large shifts in real wage levels that 
have occurred in Uzbekistan (see Chapter 3). A critical point is that Kidd 
and Shannon (1997, p. 142) also show that, at least for the case of Australia, 
ignoring real wage effects has little impact on experience imputation, and that 
the reduced form model with no adjustment for real wage growth performs , 
much better in an econometric diagnostic sense. The preferred approach 
taken now, therefore, is to restrict the independent variables to those for 
which we have complete data since labour force entry, which excludes the 
real wage from the model.
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R esu lts
The model presented in equation 6.2 is estimated in STATA as a logistic 
regression on the sample of 2789 women of working age. An age cut-off is 
used rather than dropping women who had actually retired, since the latter 
might well introduce bias into the analysis.22 The age cut-off is 55 years, 
the normal age of pension eligibility. This excluded 572 women from the 
sample.23
Three alternative specifications of the logistic regression model were esti­
mated. Model 1 is a basic model, Model 2 includes a range of regional and 
ethnic terms interacted with schooling. Model 3, which includes an interac­
tion term between marriage and years of schooling, is the preferred model, 
since the additional interaction terms allowed the relationship between the 
observed variables and the likelihood of being in employment to be more fully 
captured by the model.24 The significant results are presented in terms of 
marginal effects in Table 6.3, and the co-efficients and Z-values of the model 
are in the appendix (Table 6A.1).
The marginal effects in Table 6.3 were calculated relative to a base case, 
viz. unmarried, educated to primary level or less, aged under 25 years and
22 The exclusion of women of retirement age is standard international practice in mod­
elling participation decisions (Callan and Farrell 1991), since modelling of the retire­
ment decision raises different considerations (such as pension entitlements) to that of 
participation.
23 A smaller number of women (77, or 3.5 percent of the sample) reported themselves 
as “not working for health reasons” . These individuals were retained, since health and 
disability from an employment perspective is largely quantitative and a question of degree.
24Theory does not provide any firm guide as to the appropriate functional form of the 
model, so that we need to justify on empirical grounds. A summary schooling term is 
used instead of education dummies for the interaction terms. To test the validity of the 
restriction, this involves the ratio
ma x L(9)r 
maxL(9)u
(Maddala 1988, p. 84). The Likelihood Ratio test consists of using -21ogeA as a x 2 with 
degrees of freedom k , where k is the number of restrictions (in this case, 25). In this case, 
A =  1, which is well below the critical table value of 11.5.
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living in Tashkent. Specifically, the marginal effect of variable a is obtained 
via matrix multiplication:
exp (X*ß)_______ exp(XBASEß)
1 + exp(X *a ß a) 1 + exp{ X b a s e P)
where ß  is vector of logit coefficients obtained from Table 6A.1, X Ba s e  is 
the base case of characteristics as defined in the text. The calculation of 
the marginal effects for the interaction terms is somewhat more complicated, 
requiring that a different base case be used in each case, consistent with the 
nature of the interaction.20
The results can be highlighted as follows. First, marital status is sig­
nificant. The negative effect of being married, of the order of one-third, is 
largest in Model 3. Marital status reflects in part the availability and level 
of alternative sources of income. It may also proxy the presence of children. 
Hence the finding that women who are married are generally less likely to 
work outside the home is a common finding in the international literature 
(Blau and Ferber 1992, p. 90).
Second, education generally has a positive effect on the likelihood of em­
ployment. This is clear in Model 1, where there is a positive relationship 
between the level of education and the likelihood of employment. This is 
consistent with the international literature (Blau and Ferber 1992, p. 94), 
and may be explained in terms of women who plan to spend a relatively 
higher proportion of their time in paid employment to be also more likely 
to invest more in education. The net impact of education is also positive 
in Model 3, once the large positive interaction effects between schooling and 
region, ethnicity and marriage are taken into account. The largest impact 
occurs in the case of marriage, of the order of 65 per cent.
25For example, the base case for Fergana*schooling has Fergana region (cf. Tashkent for 
the general base case) and complete secondary schooling (the school category equivalent 
to the mean number of years of school for the Fergana sample). In the X* case, the value 
for schooling is entered as the value of the mean number of years of school (10.7), plus the 
standard deviation (2.5).
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Table 6.3: Logit model of female employment: marginal effects
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
married -.060 -.117 -.334
Education (relative to primary or less)
incomplete secondary -.065
complete vocational -.247
complete college .174
incomplete university -.259 -.284
complete university .163 -.211
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic -.354
Age (relative to 16-25 years)
Aged 26-30 .253 .084 .062
Aged 31-35 .340 .178 .152
Aged 36-40 .479 .331 .304
Aged 40-44 .551 .411 .387
Aged 45-49 .522 .390 .368
Aged 50-54 .225 .079 .068
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Karakalpakalstan -.354 -.372
Fergana .043 -.354
Interaction terms
Fergana and schooling .483 .384
KKP and schooling .514 .375
Slavic and schooling .198 .218
Married and schooling .651
N 2789
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Age is significant and, relative to the youngest omitted group (16-25 
years), positive in each of the models. The pattern of effects is consistent 
with what was observed in the cross-tabulations. The size of the effects is re­
duced somewhat by the inclusion of the interaction terms that were discussed 
above.
After estimating the preferred logit model, the sample was expanded by 
creating additional observations for each women for each year from the survey 
year back to the year when she left school. On this expanded sample, the 
probability of employment was predicted for each observation based on the 
individual’s vector of (unchanged) characteristics, and age in that year. The 
predicted probabilities, from school-leaving year up through to the year of 
the survey (1995) are then summed for each individual to yield a “corrected” 
measure of labour market experience (Zabzala and Arrufat 1985; Kidd and 
Shannon 1997). The expanded sample was then collapsed back to the original 
number of observations.
6 .3 ,3  L im ita tion s
In implementing this approach, potential drawbacks need to be borne in 
mind. The most important relate to the assumption of time-invariance and 
to the constraints imposed by the data, in particular, the lack of complete 
fertility information. These deserve some elaboration.
It is assumed that there are no changes over time in unmeasured factors 
affecting the probability of female participation, that the variables chosen do 
not vary over time, and that there are no group or cohort effects. In other 
words, differences in the propensity to work of a 30 year old woman today 
and a 30 year old woman twenty years ago are assumed to be attributable 
to differences in the values of the explanatory variables in the vector Z. 
Depending on the particular economic and institutional context, such an 
assumption may be problematic.
An obvious example would be where female labour force participation
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rates have been rising, a common phenomenon in Western countries, at least 
since 1970 (see Table 6.1). In Uzbekistan, by way of contrast, employment 
rates have been quite stable in recent decades. Section 6.2 presented evidence 
that labour force participation rates of working age women in Uzbekistan rose 
from 60 to 65 percent between 1960 and 1980. (In Russia, the rates rose from 
about 67 to 87 percent over the same period.)
One potential problem arises from part-time, as opposed to full-time, em­
ployment, which would be worth less in terms of labour market experience. 
It is assumed here that the individuals were working full-time. The assump­
tion of full-time rather than part-time employment over the work history is 
justified in the former Soviet context. In 1992, only 1.2 percent of women 
worked part-time (Katz 1994). However to the extent that any falls in female 
participation and employment during the transition have taken the form of 
selective withdrawal from the labour market of certain types of women, this 
could be problematic since the estimates are based on the characteristics of 
those participating in 1995.
Another problem arises because the lack of complete fertility data for 
the sample.26 Age can only provide an imperfect proxy for the presence of 
children since fertility rates have tended to fall in recent decades: an Uzbek 
woman could expect to have four children in the 1990s, which is two less than 
in the early to mid 1970s. This is shown in Table 6.4. The total fertility rate 
is a measure of fertility which represents the theoretical number of births to 
a woman during child-bearing years using the given year’s birth rate as a 
constant (UNICEF 1998, p. 126).
Since they are dependent on the length of the interruption to employ­
ment associated with each birth, the decline in fertility rates suggests that 
women in older cohorts have fewer years of actual employment experience 
than women who entered the labour force after the mid 1980s. Because only
26There is full information on pre-school aged children (under seven years) for individual 
women, but no specific information on either the number or age of any other offspring for 
women in the sample at the individual level.
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Table 6.4: Fertility trends in Uzbekistan, 1958-1993
Year Total Fertility Rate
1958-59 4.92
1965-66 5.53
1969-70 5.67
1975-76 5.67
1978-79 5.09
1985 4.68
1989 4.02
1993 3.80
SOURCE: Goskomstat 1988/1990 
UNICEF Transmonee Project Database 
NOTE: See text for definition.
the existence of children presently aged under seven years is known for in­
dividual women in the sample, it would be wrong to make inferences from 
mothers with young children to the whole sample of women because of these 
cohort-type effects. This unavoidable degree of imprecision in the measure­
ment of work force attachment is offset, to some extent, by the inclusion of 
the status of “never married” in the logit model.
The rate of single motherhood in Uzbekistan is not high: only 4 percent 
of births in 1989 were to unmarried mothers, compared to 14 percent for 
Russia, for example.2. Thus being single might be taken as a proxy for the 
absence of children, and might also be interpreted as providing some insight 
into work force (as opposed to family) attachment.28
A final problem is that this imputation procedure likely gives rise to 
additional “noise”, because of selection effects. The procedure entails the loss 
of some information about the likelihood of an individual who is participating 
in the labour force at time t. Selection effects mean that an individual who
27UNICEF, 1998, Table 2.2.
28 The coefficient on single status in a logit participation model is positive and significant. 
Married status has a large negative impact on the likelihood of being employed.
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is in the labour force at time t is more likely (than an average member of the 
population) to have been participating at time t — 1. The present procedure 
uses predictions derived from the average logit coefficients and thus imposes 
an average participation relationship for all women. This means that their 
probability of participating in the previous period is based on their observed 
characteristics, even if it neglects the fact that they are in fact participating 
at the later date.
6 .4  T h e Effect o f Im putation
This section sets out the results of the imputation procedure. First, the 
results are graphically illustrated, and then the effect of imputation is shown 
for individuals with various selected characteristics. Second, the effects of 
imputed experience on the estimated returns to experience are presented.
6.4.1 Results
W hat is the effect of the imputation procedure? The results of the individual- 
based correction are shown graphically in Figure 6.2. It is not a simple pro­
portionate adjustment, since the extent of correction depends on the individ­
ual’s observable characteristics. Each dot represents the imputed amount of 
experience for an individual woman. The 45 degree line in Figure 6.2 repre­
sents Mincerian experience and, as must be true, all the imputed experience 
estimates lie below that line.
Table 6.5 illustrates the average effect of ‘correcting’ experience for groups 
with selected economic and demographic characteristics. The extent of cor­
rection varies significantly across groups, as shown by the ratio of imputed 
experience to age given in the final column. For women in the sample with 
children under seven years of age, for example, the imputation reduces their 
measured experience by 60 percent, about twice that of those women with-
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Figure 6.2: Imputed versus potential experience
0 Imputed A Potential
0 0  ° 0 0
Potential experience
out children.29 By region, women in Tashkent appear to have less continuous 
work records than those outside the capital, which is consistent with the rel­
atively higher measures of experience derived for workers in agriculture, and 
those with only secondary education.
6.4.2 Returns to Experience
The impact of alternative approaches to the measurement of experience can 
be examined by looking at the results from a basic OLS earnings regression 
using alternative measures of experience. Three versions of the basic model, 
with “experience” and its quadratic and years of school as regressors are
29This result is not unexpected, of course, although reassuring given that information 
about the presence of children is not actually included in the logit model.
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Table 6.5: Comparison of age and imputed experience for selected character­
istics
Age
(years)
Imputed experience 
(years)
Imputed/
Age
Average Std. Dev. Average Std.Dev.
Total 35.0 9.8 8.9 6.9 0.70
Education level
Secondary 33.8 9.1 9.4 7.2 0.79
University 38.7 9.0 9.8 5.9 0.66
Employment
Agriculture 33.6 9.2 9.0 7.3 0.79
State Enterprise 35.6 10.0 9.0 6.8 0.68
Private 33.7 10.4 8.3 7.4 0.71
Region
Tashkent 37.9 10.3 9.7 6.7 0.65
Fergana 33.7 9.4 9.2 7.1 0.76
Karakalpakalstan 33.5 9.2 7.8 6.9 0.75
Demographic
Married 36.2 8.9 9.8 6.9 0.78
Not Married 31.5 11.3 6.7 6.7 0.59
Children 35.7 16.4 7.5 6.5 0.40
No children 37.8 10.4 10.8 7.1 0.68
Ethnicity
Uzbek 33.7 9.4 8.6 6.9 0.73
Slavic 40.0 10.9 10.9 6.8 0.62
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estimated on the female sample. Model A uses age in years as the measure 
of experience; model B, Mincerian experience (as in Chapter 5); and Model 
C utilises the imputed experience that was derived in the preceding section. 
The results are presented in Table 6.6
As expected, the imputed experience term affects the returns to experi­
ence. The measure of imputed experience suggests that women, on average, 
have far fewer years in employment, which in turn significantly increases the 
estimated returns to each year of experience. Age as a proxy for experi­
ence suggests that additional years on average bring less than a 0.5 percent 
increase in wages. The use of Mincerian “potential” experience leads to a 
similarly low coefficient (though in both cases the term is very insignificant). 
Average years of imputed experience are less than a quarter of the average 
age, and the associated returns to experience are about four times as high 
under the imputed approach. It is noted that experience in each of the model 
is associated with low t-statistics; this has to do partly with functional form, 
an issue addressed in the next chapter.
Table 6.6: Alternative experience measures: summary OLS results
Model A Model B Model C
“Experience” .0085 (0.585) .0054 (0.765) .0196 (1.59)
“Experience” squared/100 .0026 (0.133) .0132 (0.741) -.0550 (-1.02)
Years of education .0745 (9.74) .0861 (10.83) .0748 (9.77)
Constant 4.95 (19.42) 5.00 (45.70) 5.18 (52.75)
Adjusted R2 .148 .148 0.134
N 707 707 691
NOTE: t-statistic in parentheses.
See text for derivation of the imputed measure.
The reported coefficients from the OLS regression do not directly show the 
effect of experience at various ages. To do this, a further simple calculation 
is required, multiplying the respective coefficients by the relevant number 
of years of experience and its square. This shows the effect of alternative
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measures of experience on the measured contribution of experience, over a 
range of years in the experience profile. The results of this exercise are 
presented in Figure 6.3 and Table 6.7.
Figure 6.3 shows that the imputed experience measure forms an experience- 
earnings profile of familiar shape, whereas the other measures are, unusually, 
convex in form. This means that using the imputed measure, there is more 
rapid growth of earnings in the first decade or so of work experience.30 For 
example, Model C suggests that at two years of experience, a woman has 4 
percent higher wages than a new entrant, whereas Model A suggests a differ­
ence of only 1.6 percent and for Model B, the difference is only 1 percent. At 
six years, the effect of experience relative to a new entrant is about 10 per­
cent according to Model C, but less than half that amount for Models A and 
B. For Model C (the imputed measure), the effect of experience peaks after 
around 17 years in the labour force. A woman with 17 years of experience, 
holding education constant, would have about 16.7 percent higher earnings 
than a woman with no experience.
The actual figures underlying the graph are presented for selected years in 
Table 6.7. The effect of the measure of experience on the estimated increase 
in earnings due to experience clearly varies over the range of working ages. 
As depicted in the graph, the imputed measure suggests that there is more 
rapid growth of earnings in the first decade or so of work experience. At the 
mean number of years of experience, the estimated increase in earnings due 
to an additional year of experience under Model A is only 57 percent of that 
estimated using the imputed experience variable in Model C. Up to about 20 
years of experience, both the Mincerian and age proxies for experience show 
a smaller increment in earnings due to experience.
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the value of experience from a 
human capital perspective derives from the associated training that takes
30 The literature review in the next chapter suggests that this more rapid initial growth is 
consistent with the “stylised facts” of the experience-earnings profile found in international 
studies.
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Figure 6.3: Alternative experience-earnings profiles
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place on-the-job or through more formal mechanisms. The idea is that em­
ployers value experience because of its productivity-enhancing effect. The 
results presented in this section could be taken to suggest that the use of age 
or Mincerian experience as a proxy for actual time in employment leads to 
mismeasurement. If this is the case, then the use of such proxies would tend 
to bias the estimated returns to female experience in a model of earnings.
6.5 C onclusions
The typical pattern of female labour force attachment in Uzbekistan is much 
more intermittent than suggested by age, or by the Mincerian proxy for
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Table 6.7: Increase in earnings associated with experience (percent)
Years
of experience
Measure of Experience
Model A Model B Model C A/B B /C A /C
5 4.1 2.8 8.5 1.44 0.33 0.48
9 (mean) 7.4 5.5 13.1 1.34 0.42 0.57
15 12.7 10.4 16.5 1.22 0.63 0.77
20 17.2 15.2 16.0 1.15 0.87 1.00
25 21.9 20.6 12.5 1.06 1.65 1.75
NOTE: Model A uses age as a proxy, Model B, Mincerian potential 
experience and C is the imputed measure (see text for derivation).
experience. In other words, the rate of investment in human capital on the 
job per year of age is lower for women than for men. In the former Soviet 
Union, as elsewhere, this is generally due to the greater family responsibilities 
being borne by women.
This chapter presented and applied an imputation method, showing how 
measures of experience can be adjusted to better reflect actual work force 
attachment of individuals in the sample. The imputation method was shown 
to be simple, and the data requirements relatively undemanding, although 
there are caveats related to the underlying assumptions.
The use of age or Mincerian proxies for female experience will always tend 
to bias the coefficients on experience downward. In the absence of time series 
effects, the suggested imputation method would, on average, provide a true 
measure of experience. The coefficient estimates for imputed experience are 
about three times larger than that on Mincerian experience. But note that 
even if the imputation leads to measures that are correct, on average, it does 
not follow that the resulting imputation will be correct for every individual. 
For individuals, the measure is inevitably “noisy” because one is relying 
on logit coefficients and observable characteristics to derive a probability 
of labour force participation over time. This is based on the observable 
correlates of participation in the current cohort of participants. It may well
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be that there are differing unobservable characteristics of the group presently 
participating that are not taken into account. Ideally of course, one would 
compare the results with information about actual experience, but that is 
not possible in the present case. This calls for caution in interpretation.
One might expect that the estimated extent of unexplained gender wage 
differences is sensitive to the measurement of female experience. Chapter 
8 applies the imputed measure to illustrate its importance for analyses of 
gender discrimination in the labour market. It will demonstrate that the use 
of age in human capital functions for women in the former Soviet republic 
of Uzbekistan, and by implication, in the Russian Federation and elsewhere, 
will tend to overestimate the extent of unexplained wage variation in the 
labour market.
The effects of alternative measures of experience were illustrated in this 
chapter using the conventional use of experience and its quadratic. Yet there 
is a growing body of international evidence that suggests that this is not 
the appropriate functional form. Therefore before going on to develop an 
extended model of earnings determination in Uzbekistan, the functional form 
related to the specification of experience is addressed in the next chapter.
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6 .A  A p p en d ix
Table 6A.1: Logit model of female participation decision
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coeff. (Z) Coeff. (Z) Coeff. (Z)
m arried -.377 (3.0) -.583 (-4.8) -1.66 (5.1)
Education  (relative to  prim ary or less)
incom plete secondary -.415 (-2.8) -.229 (-1.5) -.178 (1.6)
com plete vocational -.242 (-.62) -.637 (-1.6) -.733 (-1.9)
com plete college .824 (5.1) .315 (1.8) .167 (.94)
incom plete university -.194 (-.71) -1.04 (-3.6) -1.12 (-3.9)
com plete university .773 (4.9) -.061 (-.31) -.437 (-1.9)
Slavic (relative to  Uzbek) .227 (1.5) -1.19 (-2.3) -.727 (-1.3)
Aged 26-30 (relative to  <26) 1.14 (8.1) .962 (6.7) .948 (6.7)
Aged 31-35 1.49 (10.2) 1.34 (9.2) 1.31 (8.9)
Aged 36-40 2.10 (12.5) 1.99 (11.9) 1.95 (11.6)
Aged 41-45 2.48 (12.0) 2.39 (11.4) 2.36 (11.2)
Aged 46-50 2.32 (9.28) 2.28 (9.0) 2.26 (8.9)
Aged 51-55 1.03 (4.35) .943 (3.9) .97 (4.0)
K K P  (relative to  Tashkent) -.09 (-.06) -1.32 (-3.4) -.928 (-2.2)
Fergana .230 (1.84) -1.33 (-4.0) -.678 (-1.7)
C onstant -1.21 (-7.14) -.60 (-3.5) -.521 (-3.1)
Fergana and  schooling .150 (5.0) .088 (2.5)
K K P  and schooling .112 (3.3) .077 (2.1)
Slavic and  schooling .122 (2.9) .078 (1.8)
M arried and schooling .104 (3.6)
N 2789
Log Likelihood -1559.72 -1567.5 -1560.72
P rob  >  chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R 2 0.1583 0.1613 0.1649
C h a p te r  7
F unctional Form  an d  
E xperience
7.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates alternative specifications of the earnings model with 
respect to experience, or the “experience-earnings profile”. In empirical ap­
plications of human capital theory, years of experience are taken to repre­
sent post-school enhancements to individual productivity, usually associated 
with on-the-job training. The observed correlation between experience and 
earnings is consistent with alternative explanations, however, as discussed in 
Chapter 4.
The measurement and specification of experience raises a number of con­
ceptual and econometric issues. The measurement problems that arise es­
pecially for women were addressed in Chapter 6. Here the focus is on one 
aspect of functional form: should we include a quadratic or higher order 
polynomial term on experience? The preferred option has substantial effects 
on the predicted effect of experience on wage outcomes.
The specification of the earnings function with a quadratic term on ex­
perience has been the most widely adopted form in the regression analysis of
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determinants of individual wages. That is, recalling the review in Chapter 4,
Wi = O' + bSi + cTi + dT^ +  Ui (7.1)
where Wi represents the natural logarithm of labour earnings for individual 
i, S{ represents years of schooling for individual z, T’i represents years of 
work experience for individual z, and is an error term (see Chapter 4.2). 
For example, all the empirical studies of earnings determination in transi­
tion economies reviewed in Chapter 4 used a quadratic term on experience. 
But the wider international literature has increasingly recognised that this 
may not be the most appropriate specification. Alternative specifications 
for experience have been demonstrated to dominate the quadratic model in 
a number of contexts, including the USA (Murphy and Welch 1990) and 
Australia (Borland and Suen 1994). There is a range of reasons why this 
might be so, not least because the quadratic form forces a simple non-linear 
relationship with a single turning point. This chapter explores the extent to 
which these issues matter in the transition context of Uzbekistan.
Alternative polynomial specifications of experience have substantial im­
plications for the estimated effect of experience on earnings in Uzbekistan. 
This heightens the importance of an investigation into the preferred func­
tional form. One might also expect that alternative specifications of experi­
ence have repercussions for the estimated coefficients on other variables, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. In fact, however, this is not the case for 
schooling (as shown in the regression results for each of the models presented 
in the appendix to this chapter, the coefficients on education are similar in 
each case, for women and men).1
The analysis of age or experience profiles based on a single snapshot 
encounters the potential difficulty of confounding true age effects with cohort 
and business cycle effects. Cohort effects can arise because, for example, of 
differences in economic conditions at the time of labor force entry. The
lrThe effect of alternative experience specifications on the coefficients of other variables 
in the model is presented in an appendix to Chapter 8.
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changes that have occurred over time are also sometimes known as ‘vintage 
effects’.
Potential cohort effects are unfortunately inevitable with cross-sectional 
analysis. At the same time, however, at least for the United States, Murphy 
and Welch argue that “the specification bias induced by ignoring changes in 
the age-earnings profile from year-to-year is actually smaller than the bias 
generated by the quadratic specification” (Murphy and Welch 1990, p. 203). 
In the present case, possible vintage effects could arise from demographic 
changes over time as well as from the macro-economic and structural changes 
associated with the demise of central planning. Hence an investigation of 
the appropriate functional form is still well worth undertaking, bearing the 
possibility of vintage-type effects in mind.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical 
rationale for alternative polynomial specifications is set out. Section 7.3 
subjects the alternative approaches to some conventional diagnostic tests. In 
Section 7.4 non-parametric methods are introduced, outlining the underlying 
theory before presenting the results and possible interpretations. Section 7.5 
provides a graphical comparison of non-parametric and polynomial results 
before the final section concludes.
7.2 Polynom ial Specifications
7.2.1 Theory
Given the basic human capital model, the question arises, what is the appro­
priate form of the life-cycle investment ratio? Borland and Suen (1994) note 
that human capital theory does not provide specific guidance here, beyond 
the implication that at some point in an individual’s working life, investment 
in human capital should begin to decline.
Ben-Porath (1967) analysed the optimal distribution of human capital
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investment over the life cycle.* 2 Rational allocation of time for human capital 
investment suggests that most of the investment in human capital would be 
undertaken at younger ages, for several reasons: the payoff period is longer, 
postponement reduces the value of present gains and also because later in­
vestments could involve higher opportunity costs (Mincer 1997, p. S28). The 
idea is that, at the individual level, depreciation eventually outstrips declin­
ing new investment in human capital. This implies that the experience-wage 
profile will slope upwards, and then downwards.3
At the same time, there are reasons to believe that ,and/or circumstances 
where, the simple experience-earnings story might not hold. First, on the 
supply side, the existence of uncertainty due to structural change might lead 
rational individuals to delay investments in human capital given irreversibil­
ity. Chapter 3 documented the significant declines in vocational, college and 
university enrolments, both full-time and part-time, that have occurred dur­
ing the transition. This could be related to increased uncertainty about the 
value of such training and qualifications under the new market conditions.
Second, on the supply side at the firm level, the output declines that 
have accompanied the transition might be expected to reduce the provision 
of training by firms, which could apply to both general and specific training. 
Large declines in output relative to firm capacity imply significant reductions 
in work activity at the plant level, and corresponding reductions in learning- 
by-doing.
On the other hand, if the transition from a command economy is asso­
ciated with more rapid technical change, highly educated workers might be 
expected to have a comparative advantage in the adoption and implementa­
tion of new technologies (Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987), which would in turn 
be reflected in their experience-earnings profiles. These possibilities are elab-
“By way of contrast, Becker (1975) focussed on the optimal distribution of total accu­
mulation across persons (Mincer, 1997, p. S27).
3 Given technical progress and economic growth, actual declines in earnings increments 
over time would normally seem to be unlikely.
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orated below in the interpretation of the empirical results for Uzbekistan. It 
is sufficient to note at this stage that in such circumstances, the profiles of 
earnings and experience may be more complex than the simple path depicted 
by a quadratic model.
The conventional way that economists have conceptualised paths of indi­
vidual training in a human capital framework can be set out as follows. An 
individual i from schooling group s has net earnings (U), and R  is the rate of 
return to her post-school investment. In period £, kft is the fraction of time 
spent by the individual in human capital investment activity in that period. 
This is also referred to as the “individual human capital investment ratio.”
Earnings capacity E  depends on the amount of, and rate of return to, 
post-school investment and level of schooling. Mincer (1974) suggested that 
the individual human capital investment ratio might be a declining function 
o fT  = t — s — 1, the number of years since leaving school (not counting 
the current year, year t). He considered two possible specifications. One 
assumption saw human capital investment declining on a linear path, in 
which case
k3 = as -  bsTi
where the respective a3, bs > 0, and are parameters for schooling group s.4
If the rate of return on post-school investment is constant and the invest­
ment ratio has a linear inverse relation with experience, then it can be shown 
that the net earnings function is:
ln Y ‘ =  InE° + ln(l -  kf) + r ( a ‘ -  | )  T, -  ( j f j  Tt2.
This is the familiar earnings function that is quadratic in years of post-school 
investment.
4 Alternatively, human capital investment was assumed to follow an exponentially 
declining path as experience increased:
ksiT = cse(-d*T)
where again, cs ,ds > 0  are parameters for schooling group s.
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If, on the other hand, the investment ratio declines at an increasing rate 
according to the quadratic equation
kl = 0s-  bsT> -
then the net earnings function would be:
InY ;  =  ln E* +  ln(l -  k \) +  r  (a* -  j  -  A) Tt -  £(6* +  g3)T? -  r ^ T f
which involves a cubic in years of post-school investment in human capital. 
Similarly, if the investment ratio is assumed to include a cubic term, then the 
associated earnings function has a quartic function on the years of post-school 
investment.
It should be recalled that critics of the human capital explanation of the 
observed correlation between experience and earnings have argued that it 
has not been proven that the productivity-enhancing effects of post school 
investment actually cause the higher earnings5 (see Chapter 4). It was noted 
that, thus far, the empirical relationship on the relationship between tenure 
and productivity is mixed, with some studies supporting the human capital 
explanation and others refuting it. The present data set does not permit 
such an inquiry.6 In any case, however, these points axe borne in mind in the 
analysis and interpretation below.
7 .2 .2  M eth o d
The preceding section has shown that different assumptions about the form 
of the investment ratio imply different order polynomials in experience in the 
associated earnings function. This provided the context for investigation of
°See, e.g., Medoff and Abraham (1980).
6 If there are returns to tenure, then the coefficients on experience (and possibly other 
regressors) will be biased (Chapman and Tan 1980). On the other hand it is possible 
that tenure is less important in the post-socialist context of Uzbekistan given (i) greater 
standardisation of firm technology in the planned economy and (ii) the importance of 
agriculture in the economy.
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more flexible forms in the specification of experience in the earnings model. 
It has already been noted that theory does not provide much guidance with 
respect to the specification of experience in the earnings function. However 
the issue of functional form is important even if one is not committed to a 
“training-only” interpretation of the experience-earnings profile, wherein all 
changes in the slope of the profile can be traced back to patterns of on-the-job 
training. In the analysis that follows, the following equations are estimated 
for each schooling group:
ln Y* = ct 4- ßiTi 4- ßzEf + 7X.i 4- £i (7.2)
In Y{ = a. 4- ßiT{ 4- /?2Tf 4- ßzTf 4- 'yXi 4- £i (7-3)
In Yi = a  4- f t Ti 4- AT? + foT f + ß j f  4- (7.4)
which are referred to as the quadratic, cubic and quartic models respectively, 
where Ti equals years of experience of the zth individual and X{ is a vector 
of exogenous characteristics (see Chapter 5).
How should different education groups be treated in this evaluation? In 
theory, different levels of schooling might be expected to be associated with 
different paths of on-the-job training. Empirically, a positive correlation be­
tween the level of schooling and job training has been observed in a number 
of Western studies.7 The expectation that changes in the economy have af­
fected relative labour demand for workers with different levels of education 
(Katz and Murphy 1992) is another reason to separate the sample thus.8 In 
their investigations of experience-earnings profiles, Borland and Suen (1994) 
and Pagan and Ullah (forthcoming) both carry out their estimations sepa­
rately for each schooling group in order to avoid schooling and experience 
interaction effects being confounded in the measured returns to experience.
' See Lillard and Tan (1986); Mincer (1988).
?In the US, for example, changes in relative labour demand over the past 25 years have 
been seen to have favoured the relative labour demand for more educated workers (Katz 
and Murphy, 1992, p. 36).
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One way to test whether the same procedure should be adopted in this 
study is to introduce terms which interact experience and different levels of 
schooling, and test whether these terms are jointly significant. This provides 
a test of whether the returns to experience vary by schooling group. To do 
this, interaction terms for each level of education and the quadratic, cubic and 
quartic orders of experience are constructed, and the models are estimated 
separately by sex.
The results clearly reject the separation of women by schooling group, 
since the interaction terms were jointly insignificant in the quadratic, cubic 
and quartic cases. For men, by way of contrast, the interaction terms were 
jointly significant at the 5 percent levels, or less.9 Hence in the analysis that 
follows, the sample of women is pooled, while men are separated by level of 
education.
The final point on methodology is to recall how experience is measured for 
males and females in the sample, and also the nature of the schooling groups. 
For males, experience is calculated according to the Mincerian convention - 
that is, age minus years of school minus age of school entry. For women, 
Chapter 6 derived and imputed a corrected measure of experience that takes 
into account the likelihood of interruptions to the work career. Table 7A.1 in 
the appendix presents the regression results for both specifications for women, 
indicating the increase in returns to “experience” associated with the imputed 
measure. Table 7A.2 shows the breakdown of the male and female samples 
for experience groupings and, for women, for selected education categories.
9 The joint significance of the interaction terms (different polynomials on experience 
and levels of education) were as follows:
(i) for the quadratic, prob.>F=0.0263;
(ii) the cubic form, prob.>F=0.0110; and
(iii) quartic form: prob.>F=0.0340.
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7.2 .3  T estin g  P o lyn om ia l S pecification s
In this section, the adequacy of alternative models is tested. The approach 
adopted is to compare fully estimated alternative models - specifically, the 
quadratic, cubic and quartic models.10 If the initial model is “correct”, then 
adding additional regressor variables should not improve econometric perfor­
mance.
A range of methods is used to evaluate the appropriate functional form 
of the earnings model with respect to experience, namely:
1) F — and t-test of significance levels on the coefficients;
2) Adjusted R-squared; and
3) Reset test, which tests for omitted variables in regression specification. 
In all the analysis that follows in this chapter, the earnings functions are
specified including only the experience terms as regressors.
F — and t-tests of significance
The three alternative models are run for each sub-sample, including only the 
orders of experience as regressors, and the associated F statistics and t-ratios 
are calculated. The results are presented in Table 7.1. The focus is on the 
F-statistics, which present a useful overall measure of statistical significance.
The first point to note is that experience plays a statistically significant 
explanatory role for the pooled samples of both men and women under each 
of the functional forms. For men with secondary education, each model 
performs similarly well with respect to an F-test. For the vocational and 
university groups, the cubic dominates the alternative specifications. The 
quadratic appears to perform particularly poorly for the university group, 
and is only just within the 10 percent level of significance for the vocational 
group.
10 A Gompertz function is an alternative, but given its poor predictive performance (in 
the Australian case), Borland and Suen (1994, p. 54) recommend against the adoption of 
this type of function as a standard estimation methodology.
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The Ttest results axe difficult to interpret because the patterns are less 
clear (see Will 1998). Within particular models, some terms are significant 
and others are not. For men, none of the specifications perform very well, 
with the exception of the quadratic model for the secondary group and the 
pooled sample. Among the vocational and university groups the cubic spec­
ification appears to have the highest ^-statistics. The quartic appears to 
perform badly in terms of levels of significance. For women, referring to the 
pooled sample, the Ttest criterion suggests that the cubic form dominates 
the quadratic, and also the quartic form.
E xp lan atory  pow er
The adjusted R-squared results are presented in Table 7.2. Each of the 
models, which include only experience on the right hand side, has fairly 
weak explanatory power. The adjusted R squared for the cubic and quartic 
specifications for women dominate the quadratic. For men, none of the forms 
shows clear superiority in terms of explanatory power, though the quartic is 
a more consistent performer across the different education groups.
R am sey  R E SE T  Test
This test, based on Ramsey (1969), tests for non-linear relationships between 
the dependent variable and omitted variables. The RESET test is poten­
tially useful in the present case given the suspicion that the “initial model 
has under-represented the curvature of the function it intends to estimate” 
(Beggs 1988, p. 93). RESET2 in the STATA programme, involves adding 
the squared, cubed and quartic predictions of the model to the regression, 
and applying an F-test to the coefficients of the added variables. The signif­
icance of the coefficients is indicative of some kind of specification error such 
as incorrect functional form (Griffiths et al. 1994, p. 344).
Using powers of the fitted values of the wage, the hypothesis is that the 
model has no omitted variables. The reset test results for the pooled sample
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Table 7.1: Comparison of t and F statistics using different polynomials, by 
sex
Women Men
Quadratic Cubic Quartic Quadratic Cubic Quartic
All groups
experience 2.91 3.06 2.44 3.97 2.72 0.28
quadratic -2.33 -2.39 -1.68 -3.22 -1.65 0.51
cubic 2.01 1.27 0.90 -0.76
quartic -1.01 0.82
Prob>F 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Secondary educated
experience 3.30 1.50 0.11
quadratic -2.37 -0.53 0.77
cubic 0.13 0.95
quartic 0.98
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vocational training
experience 0.94 1.79 1.68
quadratic -.39 -1.59 -1.35
cubic 1.55 1.12
quartic -0.92
Prob>F 0.099 0.072 0.098
University
experience 1.00 -1.54 -1.07
quadratic -1.26 1.86 0.88
cubic -2.09 -0.64
quartic 0.40
Prob>F 0.297 0.081 0.14
NOTE: For women, pooled sample: see text.
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Table 7.2: Explanatory power of alternative specifications (per cent)
Men Women
Quadratic Cubic Quartic Quadratic Cubic Q uartic
All groups 1.88 1.79 1.86 1.37 1.80 1.81
Secondary 4.19 3.96 3.95
Vocational 0.95 1.45 1.39
University 0.20 0.16 1.22
Table 7.3: Ramsey RESET test results
men women
Pooled
quadratic 0.5449
cubic 0.6387
quartic 0.2597
Secondary
quadratic 0.7653
cubic 0.5752
quartic 0.5650
University
quadratic 0.7653
cubic 0.4449
quartic 0.5997
of women, and for men separated by level of education are presented in Table 
7.3. The coefficients are very low in each case. The F-probabilities suggest 
that this hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level for any of the 
specifications. The insignificance of the coefficients in each of the models 
(quadratic, cubic and quartic) indicates incorrect functional form or omitted 
variables. (This result is not unexpected since the only regressor in the model 
is experience.)
7.3. NON-PARAMETRIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 247
In terp retation
The results help in the choice of functional forms. Two main points emerge: 
First, there is uncertainty about the preferred specification. In particular, 
it is not clear that the quadratic model is the preferred specification, since it 
performed poorly in several respects, including the t-tests of significance for 
most schooling groups and the coefficient of determination.
Second, none of the specifications performed consistently well. In several 
cases the cubic model appeared to provide a superior specification. However 
the results were not clear cut.
Indeed it is difficult to establish formally the joint significance of a group 
of tests. The sample sizes do not allow out-of-sample prediction tests (as 
were undertaken by Borland and Suen 1994).11 This motivates the use of 
alternative methods to point to the preferred functional form for experience. 
In the next section non-parametric analysis is used to help establish the 
preferred model.
7.3 N on-P aram etric R egression A nalysis
Each of the polynomial specifications still involves strong parametric assump­
tions, and it has been shown that none of these specifications perform par­
ticularly well in terms of conventional diagnostic tests. An alternative, non- 
parametric, approach to the estimation of the experience-earnings profile is 
therefore a useful way of letting the data suggest the appropriate form of 
model.
There is a rapidly expanding literature on non-parametric methods in 
econometrics, most recently and notably Pagan and Ullah (forthcoming). 
Blundell and Duncan (1997) is a valuable recent survey of kernel regression 
in empirical microeconomics.
11 For example, Borland and Suen’s sample included 1049 males with university degrees, 
whereas the present sample has less than 400.
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“The main strength of non-parametric over parametric regression 
is the fact that it assumes no functional form, allowing the data 
to choose not only the parameter estimates, but the shape of the 
curve itself” (Deaton 1997 p. 193).
As Pagan and Ullah (forthcoming, p. 12) note, studies of the wage paid 
to an individual is one area where some variables might be restricted to 
have a linear impact while allowing a much smaller number to have a non­
linear impact. That is, whereas the impact on earnings of demographic 
characteristics, for example, might be assumed to be linear, the relationship 
between experience and earnings may be non-linear.
The application of non-parametric analysis of experience-earnings profiles 
is a technical innovation in the context of economies in transition, which 
brings the major benefit of flexibility. The approach obviates the need to 
pre-specify the precise analytic functional relationship between earnings and 
experience, which is a clear advantage given the dearth of knowledge about 
the role of latter in Uzbekistan.
It nonetheless carries certain disadvantages. First, and most obviously, 
non-parametric analysis lacks the familiar summary of the model as a small 
number of estimated parameters (Beggs and Chapman 1988). Second, there 
is no easy access to the usual test statistics including confidence intervals. 
Third, the observed non-parametric relationships are sensitive to choices 
about the “bandwidth”, as explained below.
This section is structured as follows. First the theory underlying non- 
parametric analysis is reviewed; second, the specific method utilised in this 
chapter is set out; and thirdly, the results of non-parametric analysis are 
presented graphically.
7 .3 .1  T h eo ry
The basis for the non-parametric approach recalls the definition of a re­
gression as a conditional expectation. The data are assumed to derive from
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some multi-nomial density function that is estimated using so-called “kernel” 
techniques, which essentially provide weighting rules in establishing the con­
tribution of each data point. For example, given data on the log-wage In Yi 
and experience 7), a density function f ( lnY .T)  is estimated, from which the 
data are assumed to derive. Writing f c(\nY\T) as the conditional probability 
density function, the “regression” of the log-wage on experience is
E {lnY \T )=  [  InY  x f c(lnY\T)d{lnY)
J]nY
or, using the data directly,
E(lnY\T)
/ h y l n r x / ( I n y i r ) d ( l n K )  
f ( lnY \T)d(lnY)
EIL: ln U x ki(T)]
EL k,(T)
where ki(T) is a weighting or kernel function used to estimate the density 
function /( .,.) . In most applications, the kernel function takes the form
ki(T) = k
where h is the “band-width”, and points further away from T  receive less 
weight. Various forms of the function k[.) have been used in the literature, 
including the rectangular kernel, the quadratic kernel, and the Gaussian ker­
nel (see Deaton, 1997, p. 173).
Thus the essential idea with non-parametric density analysis is to esti­
mate the density f (x)  from the part of the sample that is “near” to x. The 
bandwidth is the interval or band under consideration, which controls how 
much smoothing occurs. There are trade-offs involved in the choice of band­
width, since the bandwidth controls the trade-off between bias and variance 
(Deaton 1997, p. 174). The smaller the sample size, the wider the bandwidth 
needed to include sufficient number of observations, although the resulting 
smooth estimate risks bias from bringing in data that come from a different 
part of the distribution. Conversely, a small bandwidth helps allow detection 
of genuine underlying features in the data, but runs the risk of unnecessary 
variability.
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There are formal theories about the trade-off between bias and variance 
(Silverman 1986, p. 38-40), but these are beyond the scope of our present 
needs. According to Deaton (1997, p. 175), an adequate procedure is to con­
sider alternative bandwidths by plotting the associated estimates, and judge 
by eye whether there is under- or over-smoothing. He suggests a preference 
for undersmoothing, in that the eye can better ignore spurious variability 
than discern features that have been subsumed by oversmoothing.
The construction of a histogram is one way to look at the distribution of 
the data, but this has disadvantages associated with the arbitrariness in the 
choice of the number of ‘bins’ and their width (Deaton 1997, p. 171). These 
practical choices can change the shape of the histogram so that the empiri­
cal distribution is apparently different. There are also conceptual problems 
involved in reliance on a histogram - which is a tool for representing a dis­
crete distribution - to represent the density of a variable that is inherently 
continuous (length of experience) (ibid.). Non-parametric techniques allow 
direct inspection of the data but do not share all the drawbacks associated 
with histograms.
7 .3 .2  L oca lly -W eighted  R egression
A final variant of the non-parametric estimation technique, which is employed 
in this chapter, combines the density estimation approach above with familiar 
OLS regression techniques. The technique is referred to as a “locally weighted 
regression”, or LOWESS.
LOWESS is a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing, which can be thought 
of as a series of linear regressions at different points appropriately “stitched 
together” (Deaton 1997, p. 193). The LOWESS technique uses a nearest 
neighbour definition of closeness rather than a kernel, thus normalising the 
number of data points used in each local regression, rather than the wddth 
of the band. Instead of estimating the expectation of the log-wage condi­
tional on experience, T, by calculating a simple average of the values nearby,
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the LOWESS approach estimates the conditional expectation by running a 
regression using only points close to T.
This estimation method was implemented using S t a t a . The basic idea is 
to create a new variable that, for each observation, contains the corresponding 
smoothed value. For i =  1 ...T V , the smoothed value Wi is obtained by running 
a regression of wages on experience using only a small amount of data in the 
vicinity of the point (Wi,Xi). In particular, LOWESS uses running-line least- 
squares smoothing, and Cleveland’s (1979) tri-cube weighting function. The 
weighting formula used in the regression is such that the central point (it;*, Xi) 
receives the largest weight and points farther away (based on the distance 
\xj — Xi\) receive less.12
The estimated regression is then used to predict the smoothed value Wi 
for Wi. The procedure is repeated to obtain the remaining smoothed values, 
so that a separate weighted regression function is estimated at every observa­
tion. Thus for women, a regression was run on each of the 691 observations 
with full information.
Non-parametric approaches to regression analysis have the advantage that 
the graphs tend to “follow the data,” and more closely the smaller the band­
width. In contrast, the polynomial specifications graphed in the final part 
of the preceding section were global, in the sense that characteristics of the 
data on, say, the extreme left of a scatterplot could affect fitted values on 
the extreme right.13
Following experimentation with alternative bandwidths, values of be­
tween 0.3-0.7 were chosen. This is less than the STATA default bandwddth of
12 The weight placed on observation j ,  in a local regression around the point X{, is
where A =  max(x+ — Xi,Xi — x_), and x +/x _  is the highest/lowest value of x. See 
Cleveland (1979).
13 Of course, this problem would arise with any functional form, polynomial or otherwise.
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0.8. Bandwidths smaller than 0.3 naturally followed the data more closely, 
but appeared to involve ‘unnecessary’ variability. The chosen bandwidth 
means that between 30-70 percent of the data were used in smoothing each 
point.
7.3.3 Results
A general caution about interpretation is in order. It is not possible to 
draw conclusions about the statistical significance of the observed patterns. 
The non-parametric experience-earnings profiles may reveal which functional 
forms are clearly inappropriate, but the lack of confidence intervals means 
that caution is required in inferring that the observed pattern is necessarily 
the “true” form.
The results for women and men, disaggregated for the latter by levels of 
education, are presented in Figures 7.1-7.5 below. For the pooled sample of 
women, Figure 7.1 suggests that the experience-earnings profile rises through 
the first eight years or so, then there is an extended dip in the experience- 
earnings profile from around that time. The male sample is divided according 
to education level.14 The results for males with secondary education axe 
presented in Figure 7.2. There are “dips” for recent cohorts (0-3 years) and 
again at around 20-25 years.
Can these patterns be observed with respect to other levels of education? 
Figure 7.3 shows a quite unusual pattern for males with university educa­
tion. Recent university graduates, as well as graduates with around 20 years 
experience, have dips in the experience-earnings profile. This finding for uni­
versity graduates is perhaps surprising, and an explanation is offered in the 
next section.
The final groups to be examined are men with post-secondary training 
from PTUs and colleges. The results of non-parametric regression for men
14Recall that, each of the groups include a (small) share who did not gain the certification 
at the relevant level (see Appendix 5.1).
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Figure 7.1: All females
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Figure 7.2: Secondary males
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Figure 7.3: University males
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Figure 7.4: Vocational males
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Figure 7.5: College males
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with PTU (vocational) education are presented in Figure 7.4. The profile 
does not follow the familiar quadratic shape: there is uneven initial growth 
up to around 17 years in the workforce.
The results for college educated men, presented in Figure 7.5, echo the 
U-shaped pattern seen for university educated men. Figure 7.5 shows that re­
cent college graduates secure higher earnings, and a convex pattern emerging 
again after 20 years in the workforce. The next section offers some interpre­
tations of these results.
7.3.4 Interpretation
The profiles suggest that dips occur in the underlying earnings data at cer­
tain ranges of experience for both women, and men of different education 
groups. While these patterns might initially seem surprising in the context 
of a literature which has traditionally relied upon quadratic functional forms
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for experience, the results are not unprecedented (see, e.g. Pagan and Ul- 
lah, forthcoming, pp. 151-152). Given that the data is limited to a single 
cross-section, definitive statements about the underlying experience-earnings 
profiles cannot be made. It is nonetheless useful to introduce three con­
ceptually distinct influences on the experience-earnings profile -  specifically, 
the actual relationship between experience and earnings, year and cohorts 
effects- each of which deserve some elaboration.
First, the observed cross-section patterns could actually reflect the un­
derlying experience-earnings relationship in Uzbekistan in 1995. It is con­
ceivable that the economic transition has reduced the value of higher and 
college education, so that these workers face a declining path of earnings 
during their initial years in the labour force. This would lead to the un­
usual downward sloping experience-earnings profile that is observed in the 
cross-sectional data.
Second, the onset of transition might be expected to cause year effects, 
which can be thought of as a fixed effect for all age groups. Chapter 3 
elaborated a series of major economic and structural changes in the economy 
that could cause year effects. One obvious example in the present case arises 
from the substantial slowdown in the economy, in that the annual rate of 
economic growth dropped from over 10 percent in 1988 to less than 4 percent 
in 1989, down to 1.6 percent in 1990, and became negative in 1991. The 
economy actually contracted in each of the following years through to 1995, 
by about 20 percent (see Klugman 1996, Table 7). One would expect this to 
have had an important influence on the level of wages, but the year effects on 
the experience-earnings profile cannot be isolated in the single cross-section 
of data.
Third, the existence of cohort effects could give rise to the patterns ob­
served in the non-parametric results. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), 
cohorts are not defined solely on the basis of age: rather it is suggested that 
different demographic groups -  by sex and level of education, as well as ex-
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perience - might be considered as distinct labour inputs or cohorts. To the 
extent that these are imperfect substitutes, changes in the relative demand 
and supply for these different groups will affect their relative wages, and this 
could be reflected in the experience-earnings profiles. A change in education 
system that affected the supply or quality of different types of skills is an 
example of a cohort effect. Major cohort effects would be expected to follow 
from changes in the demand for, and supply of, different types of labour, and 
from institutional changes during the transition.
Pagan and Ullah (forthcoming, pp. 151-152), who also found patterns 
with dips for samples drawn from two quite different economies, Canada and 
China, attribute this to cohort effects in the cross-section sample “that repre­
sents earnings of people at a point of time who essentially belong to different 
generations. Thus the plot of earnings represents the overlap of earnings 
trajectories of different generations. Only if the socio-political environment 
of the economy has remained stable intergenerationally, can we assume these 
trajectories to be the same” (p. 153).
Clearly there are reasons to expect stronger vintage or cohort effects in a 
transition context. In the case of Uzbekistan, conditions have clearly altered 
over time. These changes have been socio-political and demographic, as well 
as economic in nature.
The interpretation of the non-parametric results is difficult because these 
three explanations may be confounded in practice, and impossible to disen­
tangle in the cross-sectional data. However the difficulty in reconciling the 
observed patterns with traditional theory about the experience-earnings path 
leads to a focus on cohort effects as the main explanation. What would be 
the effect of transition on relative wages of different demographic groups? 
Any transition effects might be expected to show up most strongly for recent 
cohorts, whose wages can be most easily adjusted to reflect the new condi­
tions. The transition (or cohort) effects that are expected to affect relative 
wages during the transition can be grouped into changes in (i) the demand
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for labour; and (ii) the supply of labour; and (iii) the institutional framework 
that governs wage-setting decisions.
D em and fo r  Labour
There are different effects emanating from the demand-side of the labour 
market, so that the net cohort effects are not a priori clear. The focus is on 
differences in labour demand among different cohorts, rather than aggregate 
changes (due to the drop in output, for example).
First, it might be expected that transition will increase the relative de­
mand for better educated workers, since higher education allows individuals 
to better cope with change and disequilibria in the economy. According to 
Schultz (1975), education allows individuals to adjust more effectively to dis­
equilibria and change in the economy. That individuals have been better 
equipped to deal with structural changes and take advantage of emerging 
opportunities was found by Chase (1997), for example, in a study of Czech 
earnings over time. This is consistent with empirical evidence that highly 
educated workers have a comparative advantage with respect to the adjust­
ment to and implementation of new technologies (Bartel and Lichtenberg 
1987). One might expect that these effects would be most pronounced for 
younger (more recently educated) workers. According to the “active labour 
market hypothesis” (Freeman 1975), changes in the labour market would be 
expected to show up most sharply for new entrants.
There have been some important structural changes in the economy, as 
described in Chapter 3. For example, the share of services in final output has 
risen significantly over the transition -  from about 7 percent up to 25 percent 
of GDP. Employment in the social sectors and general administration, sectors 
traditionally dominated by women, has been relatively buoyant. Ideally some 
measures of the pace of technical change would be used to inform on the 
nature of the structural changes taking place in the Uzbek economy: this 
could cast some light on the interrelationships between technological change,
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labour market experience, formal training and wages.
Econometric studies have used proxies like growth in multi-factor produc­
tivity (Chapman and Tan 1992) and the age of plant and equipment (Bartel 
and Lichtenberg 1987). Unfortunately similar measures are not available 
for the present case. There is nonetheless evidence, from aggregate data on 
gross domestic investment, that rates of investment have been quite robust 
throughout the transition. The investment share in GDP has ranged be­
tween 25 and 33 percent (in 1991 and 1995 respectively), which is above the 
regional averages reported by the World Bank for 1991 for the OECD (21 
percent) and Latin America (19 percent).15
Older workers might find that the skills acquired on-the-job during the 
period of central planning axe less valuable as the structure of the econ­
omy adjusts to market conditions. Studies from other European countries in 
transition based on panel data and/or on series of cross-sections have been 
interpreted as confirming this suspicion (Svenjar, forthcoming). However 
the changes in returns to training may be confounded with cohort effects.16 
Flanagan (1998) reports that returns to (potential) experience for both men 
and women in the Czech Republic approximately halved over the decade to 
1996. Similarly, Krueger and Pischke (1995), who estimated human capital 
functions for East Germany before and during the transition, found that the 
already flat experience-earnings profiles became even flatter.
Supply of Labour
There have been some major changes on the supply-side of the labour market. 
Aggregate labour force growth has continued at rapid rates, corresponding to 
past rates of population growth. This may have been offset, to some extent, 
by declines in the labour force participation rate, though it is very difficult 
to establish trends over time (see Chapters 3 and 6). The focus here is on
L5 World Bank (1993b) Table 9.
16 Chapter 4 reviewed studies investigating pre and post transition periods which had 
found such effects.
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changes in the relative supply of different cohort types.
There have been clear declines in the supply of new graduates from differ­
ent types of higher education institutions, given the falls in enrolment rates 
during the transition. Tertiary enrolments, as a share of the 16-22 year old 
age group, dropped by over 40 per cent between 1989 and 1996. Similar 
trends are evident for vocational and technical enrolments over the period 
(see Chapter 3; UNICEF 1998, Annex Tables 7.4-7.6). There have also been 
declines in secondary enrolment rates, of the order of 25 per cent, leading 
to fewer individuals completing that level of education. Cuts in supply of 
different types of skilled labour could be expected to lead to increases in the 
wages thereof.
Another major change on the supply-side of the labour market could be 
expected with the demise of on-the-job training. In the face of large and 
sustained declines in output, firm-based provision of formal training would 
tend to decline. This trend has been observed in Russia, for example (World 
Bank 1996a). Chapter 3 has documented substantial declines in evening 
and correspondence enrolments in vocational training, that were formerly an 
important element of adult education.
The effect of formal post-school training (general or specific) on earnings 
might be expected to be greater when individuals are employed in industries 
that are experiencing rapid rates of technological change (Chapman and Tan 
1992). To the extent that large-scale changes in the nature of work have been 
associated with marketisation of the economy, reduced amounts of training 
due to, for example, current constraints in access to capital to finance such 
investment, would tend to flatten the experience earnings profile.
Even on-the-job training in the form of learning-by-doing could have been 
stifled during the transition. In the wake of the breakdown of pre-existing 
trading arrangements, some firms effectively ceased production due to prob­
lems in, for example, securing essential inputs. Soviet Uzbekistan was part 
of a highly interdependent system of supply and distribution, so that the
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collapse of the All-Union market in the early 1990s dramatically affected the 
region (Abazov 1997, p. 435). Recall that a significant share of the present 
sample had not been fully paid in the previous month -  one might suspect 
that at least some of these individuals were not effectively working either. 
The associated failure of individuals to learn-by-doing would tend to flatten 
the experience-earnings profile.
Changes in the Institutional Framework
There have been a series of changes to the institutional framework that gov­
erns wage-setting. Chapter 3 presented evidence that the distribution of 
earnings has widened during the transition. While a minimum wage is still 
legally in place, its role has been diminished through lagged and partial in­
dexation in the midst of high inflation (see Chapter 3). At the top end of 
the earnings distribution, an upward shift in the profile of highly-educated 
workers might be expected. The liberalisation of the inherited framework 
that had limited wage relativities could be more relevant to establishing the 
pay of new entrants, rather than older workers.1'
In the light of this framework of demand, supply-side and institutional 
factors, explanations are provided separately by sex, with an emphasis on 
the observed cohort effects.
Women
The imputation of “actual” labour force experience for women potentially 
complicates interpretation of the experience-earnings profiles. Take, for ex­
ample, two women with ten years of experience. The fact that they have the 
same number of years of experience does not imply that they are the same 
age, or that they entered the workforce at the same time. Therefore the 
graphs cannot be directly interpreted in terms of chronological time, when
1 ‘ It is of course likely that the effects of liberalisation go both ways -  that is, reducing 
wages at the bottom of the distribution as well as increasing wages at the top.
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considering prevailing economic conditions as part of the explanations for the 
profiles. And, as with men, the analysis is constrained by the cross-sectional 
nature of the data. It is nonetheless possible to offer some alternative expla­
nations.
Figure 7.1 suggested that the experience-earnings profile for women is 
fairly flat. To the extent that changes can be observed, there appears to 
be a dip in the experience-earnings profile from around ten years, with no 
evident recovery over time. Both a relatively flat experience-earnings profile 
and a downward tendency after about ten years can be explained in terms of 
similar factors. The decline in the experience-earnings profile begins at the 
time which, for many women, would coincide with the most intensive period 
of child-bearing and child-rearing activities. The majority of women are likely 
to either have been taking maternity leave or returning from leave around 
this time. (Recall that the Soviet and now Uzbek maternity leave provisions 
are quite lengthy -  up to three years -  and that the average number of 
children for women in this cohort is about three.) Even though the corrected 
measure of female experience has sought to take intermittent labour force 
participation into account, it is possible that women’s earnings may still be 
effectively penalised during the period of child-bearing and thereafter.
There are a number of Western studies that have examined the effect 
of intermittent labour force participation on the female experience-earnings 
profile (see, e.g., Goldin and Polachek 1987; Rummery 1992). Figure 7.6 illus­
trates some possible scenarios. The typical male experience-earnings profile 
is depicted by 0\G . An individual with intermittent labour force participa­
tion is likely to have a different profile, however. Goldin and Polachek (1987) 
identified OABC  as the profile of an individual with commitments outside 
the labour force, in particular, family responsibilities. There is an initial 
period earnings growth for new female entrants, followed by the period of 
withdrawal from work (h0 — hi) associated with child-birth when earnings 
are zero (hence the dashed lines). Then she re-enters the labour market at
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a lower rate of pay. That is, women re-enter the labour market at a wage 
lower than the wage at which withdrawal occurred, but then earnings growth 
resumes at that time (see also Rummery 1992, p. 354).
A drop in the wage at which women re-enter the workforce after mater­
nity leave might be attributed to skill depreciation or the atrophy of human 
capital. The former effect could well be exacerbated in a context of changes 
in the technological nature and/or organisation of work that are associated 
with transition to a market economy, if existing skills become redundant. 
Apart from the human capital explanations, it is possible that women expe­
rience a loss of seniority due to time out of the labour force, which would 
adversely affect their earnings profile regardless of individual productivity 
(Medoff and Abraham 1980). The same factors could well explain the rel­
ative flatness of the experience-earnings profile for women: relatively lower 
rates of investments in on-the-job training by women and/or promotion to 
more senior positions would tend to flatten the profile.
The profile OABC  in Figure 7.6 shows that women’s earnings suffer from 
the depreciation of their human capital that occurs around the period of 
child-bearing and rearing, but then the earnings profile returns to the earlier 
growth path after re-entry. It is also conceivable, however, that women’s 
earnings never recover after child-bearing, due to lack of subsequent on-the- 
job training. Lack of job training for mothers might be traced to the demand 
side (due to greater domestic responsibilities and therefore less time to, for 
example, attend evening courses), and/or to the supply side (unwillingness 
of employers to finance training for employees with less than full attachment 
to work). It is also possible that there are smaller investments in on-the-job 
training for women in anticipation of lower labour force participation.
In the Uzbek data, the pattern is closer to that depicted by O ABF  in 
Figure 7.6. The continuing depreciation or, at best, flatness of the experience- 
earnings profile can be traced to several factors. First, the legal guarantees 
which formally prevent employers from reducing women’s pay on their return
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Figure 7.6: Possible effects of career breaks on female earnings profiles
Time out of the labour force
to work after childbirth are evidently ineffective. Hence in terms of Figure 
7.6, a woman’s earnings should have been secured at A , the level that had 
been attained when leave was taken, so she can return at E. This may not 
happen in practice. Second, as noted above, the lack of earnings growth 
after their return from maternity leave may be associated with employer 
reluctance to invest in training of employees’ who are perceived to have lower 
work attachment, and also affect the demand for education, given women’s 
greater domestic responsibilities.
M en
I now turn to interpret the results for men. The possibility of cohort effects is 
the most fruitful avenue of investigation, bearing in mind that these effects
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could be confounded with year and other factors. Recall that cohorts are 
defined here in terms of education and gender, as well as by age. In particular, 
it is useful to distinguish between men with post-secondary training from 
those without.
Initial inspection of the non-parametric results indicate a declining profile 
of earnings for male university and college graduates, through to about seven 
years. Since the use of Mincerian experience for males allows this to be 
mapped chronologically, this coincides with the period of economic change 
since 1988. However this pattern must be considered in absolute as well as 
relative terms. Recent cohorts of graduates are actually better off. This leads 
to the unusual observed pattern in the cross-section data, which does not 
conform to traditional shape of the experience-earnings profile. The unusual 
U-shaped pattern could indicate that new cohorts are located on earnings 
profiles that have become successively higher since the late 1980s -  although 
of course that this is the case cannot be proven since the present data is a 
single cross-section. This is shown graphically in Figure 7.7. New graduates 
move on to successively higher experience-earnings profiles.
In addition to the conventional “Schultz story” , there are important in­
stitutional factors operating in transition. Liberalisation of the economy and 
the labour market, and the associated widening of wage relativities, would 
be expected to advantage more capable individuals. This might well coincide 
with university qualifications. Even though there is evidence that higher ed­
ucation institutions in Uzbekistan are plagued by problems that range from 
outdated methods of instruction to lack of resources for maintenance and 
teaching aids (Salehi-Esfahani and Thornton 1997), university entry is still 
highly competitive and generally remains the goal of the most able secondary 
graduates in Uzbekistan. Thus the results are consistent with the expected 
shifts in the earnings structure associated with marketisation of the economy.
The results are also consistent with the drop in supply of university grad­
uates as a result of the substantial falls in enrolment that have occurred
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Figure 7.7: Possible effect of transition on male earnings profiles
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during the transition. Reduced supply of recently trained graduates could 
be lead to the price being bid up. Therefore either the demand or supply 
side could shift up the profile for younger workers.
There is fall in the experience-earnings profile for university educated 
males, after a peak at around 20 years of experience (and after 40 years 
for college graduates), which does not have an easy explanation in terms 
of prevailing economic and demographic conditions. One could, of course, 
characterise this as the conventional depreciation of human capital after an 
observed peak in experience-earnings profiles.
For men with college training, there is a pattern for the recent past echo­
ing that for university graduates. The declining profile up through at least 
about 12 years of experience suggests that more recent cohorts have been
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on successively higher earnings profiles. For university-educated males, the 
profile begins the more conventional quadratic shape after that time, with a 
peak at around 40 years.
The cohort effects that characterise the earnings profiles of recent college 
graduates are somewhat unexpected, in that post-secondary training under 
the old Soviet system was notoriously narrow (Heynemann 1997a). The spe­
cialised nature of the training might have been expected to hamper the ability 
of individuals to adjust to new job tasks. Chapter 3 presented evidence of 
significant declines in enrolment in various types of vocational training insti­
tutions. The smaller numbers of graduates with college training, like those 
with university education, have nonetheless benefitted from the transition 
and could have shifted onto higher age-earnings profiles.
By way of contrast, the pattern for males with vocational education does 
not show any dramatic earnings advantage for recent entrants similar to that 
observed for university and college graduates. This can be attributed to 
the profile of skills associated with vocational (PTU) education, and is con­
sistent with other studies of earnings in transition (for example, Flanagan 
1998). PTUs provide only basic training associated with manual jobs and 
do not necessarily require intellectual ability and general knowledge or skills. 
The duration of vocational training is short (typically one, and rarely two, 
year(s)), whereas the duration of college courses is typically three or four 
years, providing basic training in the specific field as well as more general, 
academic orientation. Colleges (teknikums) and universities both provide 
better, more general background training and qualifications so that the indi­
vidual is likely to be more flexible and also more amenable to any retraining 
and adjustment. Recall the colleges train individuals for mid-ranking white 
collar jobs. Examples of the types of professions included are accountants 
and auditors, teachers and nurses.
Finally, the non-parametric results suggest that the experience-earnings 
profile for males with secondary education is much closer to the conventional
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quadratic specification. There is some rise in the profile through to about 20 
years, after which time it becomes at best flat. In contrast to the university 
and college-educated groups, recent male entrants with secondary education 
have not gained from the economic changes associated with the transition.
7.4 G raphical C om parisons
In this section, experience-earnings profiles are graphed using predicted log 
wages. The objective is to graph alternative functional forms, and compare 
to what was revealed by the non-parametric analysis above. An OLS wage 
model is estimated with only experience as a regressor, then the wage is 
predicted. This is carried out for each model (quadratic, cubic and quartic), 
by demographic group. For men, in order to simplify, and to highlight the 
experience effects, the sample is again divided by education group. Only the 
male groups with above secondary education are included, since the previous 
section found that the underlying patterns in the data for the secondary 
group were quite similar to the quadratic shape (Figure 7.2). For women, 
results are presented for the pooled sample. These visual impressions provide 
insight into the extent of distortion associated with alternative models.
Figure 7.8 shows university educated men (22 percent of the male sam­
ple), for two alternative polynomial specifications, quadratic and quartic, in 
comparison to the non-parametric results. The quadratic profile is in fact 
fairly flat. The cubic and quartic forms come much closer to portraying 
what the non-parametric results reveal: that the earnings profiles of the re­
cent cohort has been significantly advantaged by the transition. The cubic 
also appears to better to reflect the declining pattern of earnings later in the 
career, whereas the quartic shows renewed growth that is not evident in the 
non-parametric results.
For men with vocational education, the cubic and quartic forms capture 
the dips in the profile that are portrayed by the non-parametric results (Fig-
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ure 7.9).The quadratic form has virtually no curvature, whereas the data 
show a peak after about ten years in the workforce.
Figure 7.10 depicts the experience-earnings profiles of college-educated 
men. The quadratic form has been forced into an unusual convex shape by 
the higher earnings of recent graduates. But even then, the impression is 
misleading because the patterns in later working life are ignored. The cubic 
form appears to better reflect the trends among recent entrants as well as the 
slowdown in earnings growth later in the careers of college-educated males 
that is shown in the non-parametric specification.
Finally, comparisons for the pooled sample of women are presented in 
Figure 7.11. The quartic comes closest to showing the initially flat earnings 
profile. At the same time, the quadratic does not appear to be too misleading. 
This is because the overall profile for women has so little variation overall.
Using a single cross-section, some important facts about the data re­
vealed by the non-parametric specification would have been missed if only 
the quadratic specification had been employed. It is necessary to be cau­
tious about the non-parametric patterns, given the uncertainty about the 
statistical significance of the observed patterns. The results nonetheless sug­
gest that higher order polynomials, in particular the cubic specification, will 
better “fit the data”.
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Figure 7.8: Predicted earnings profiles: university males
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Figure 7.10: Predicted earnings profiles: college males
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Figure 7.11: Predicted earnings profiles: all females
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7.5 C onclusions
This investigation of functional form with respect to experience leads to 
several conclusions relating to methodology, the preferred functional form 
with respect to experience in Uzbekistan and, more generally, about the 
cohort effects associated with structural change and economic transition.
First, the chapter has drawn attention to the difficulties in interpreting 
experience-earnings profiles in cross-sectional analysis. It was suggested that 
a strict human capital interpretation that would wholly attribute the pat­
terns to on-the-job training and productivity may not be warranted. The 
international studies that were reviewed in Chapter 4 indicate that a num­
ber of other factors could come into play, including the pace of structural 
and technological change, tenure at the firm and the relative importance of 
firm specific and general experience. More generally, especially in the tran­
sition context of large-scale economic changes, one would expect year and 
cohort effects to be important. Although data limitations prevent fuller em­
pirical exploration, these points are borne in mind in the interpretation of 
the results.
Second, the chapter has demonstrated the value of non-parametric analy­
sis, which was utilised alongside more conventional testing techniques. The 
latter did suggest that the quadratic model performed badly, though with­
out indicating a clear preference among the alternatives. Local regression 
techniques, implemented in STATA, provided tools with which to tackle the 
problem of functional form. This was valuable in indicating the preferred 
model when the results of the conventional tests were not unambiguous. The 
question -  which of the alternative functional forms better reflects the un­
derlying reality -  was addressed using the non-parametric results.
Third, the chapter showed that the quadratic model does pose a serious 
risk of mis-specification in the present context. The main problem with a 
quadratic model, particularly in the case of cross-sectional data, is that it 
may lead one to miss important cohort effects. Hence one might be mislead
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into concluding that there was a standard shaped experience-earnings profile 
when non-parametric inspection of the data indicates that there is not. Wage 
models using a quadratic specification of experience tend to perform badly 
in Uzbekistan for some demographic groups. The quadratic form is appar­
ently too simple to pick up the unusual patterns of experience and earnings 
observed in transition for recent cohorts, especially of university and college 
educated males.
The higher order polynomial specifications of experience, on the other 
hand, appeared to provide a more adequate description of the experience- 
earnings profile for different education groups. Of course one cannot draw 
definitive conclusions about the true experience earnings profile, since this 
is not contained in a single cross-section. The results of the non-parametric 
analysis revealed that the patterns observed using the cubic and quartic 
specifications reflect the underlying data and not just the functional form. 
In particular, the cubic model appears to provide the best alternative poly­
nomial specification for experience in Uzbekistan in the mid 1990s.
Fourth, the cohort effects in Uzbekistan might well be expected to char­
acterise other transition economies which have experienced similar types of 
structural changes. In this sense, the myriad of studies of earnings in transi­
tion (reviewed in Chapter 4), that have proceeded on the basis of a quadratic 
on experience, could suffer from model mis-specification. This is a more seri­
ous problem for studies that are based on a single cross-section -  earlier stud­
ies based on the analysis of data collected over time (e.g. Flanagan 1998; 
Chase 1997) have picked up cohort effects, even using a quadratic model. 
Although the results of the non-parametric analysis cannot be regarded as 
definitive, the results are illuminating and suggestive. One important impli­
cation is that a quadratic specification of experience will underestimate the 
slope of the experience-earnings profile in the early stages of working life. 
And in theory, such mis-specification will have repercussions for the other 
coefficient estimates.
274 CHAPTER 7. FUNCTIONAL FORM AND EXPERIENCE
Finally, and perhaps most interesting in terms of broader changes in the 
labour market during the transition, the non-parametric approach enabled 
the examination and interpretation of the patterns underlying the data. It 
was unclear a priori whether recent cohorts would be adversely affected, 
or relatively advantaged, by economic transition. The results indicate that 
recent cohorts of youth, especially those with higher levels of education, 
have significantly benefitted. Even in depressed macroeconomic conditions, 
liberalisation of the economy has evidently created substantial new earnings 
opportunities -  and recent cohorts (and well-educated men, in particular), 
seem to be well-placed to take advantage of such opportunities.
Finally, from a policy perspective, the significant declines in tertiary en­
rolments in recent years are a possible cause for concern. This trend could 
have important distributive effects given evidence that up-front cost recov­
ery has diminished access to education among children from lower income 
households.
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7. A Appendix
Table 7A.1: Regression results with alternative specifications
Women Men
M odel Quadratic Cubic Quartic Q uadratic Cubic Q uartic
P otentia l Experience
exp .054 (.77) 2.4 (1.5) .5 (.2) 1.69 (2.3) 4.67 (2.5) 1.30 (-.4)
exp2/ 100 .011 (.74) - 1  ( -L i) .01 (.3) -.01 (-1.0) -.01 (-1.9) ..01 (.37)
exp3/ 100 .02 (1.3) -.01 (-.5) .002 (1.7) -.01 (-.7)
exp4/ 100 .00(.00 .000 (1.0)
education 8.61 (10.8) 8.75 (10.9) 8.8 (10.9) 5.98 (7.7) 6.23 (7.8) 6.26 (7.8)
R 2 .148 .149 .146 .070 .071 .074
Im puted Experience
exp 1.96 (1.6) 8.23 (3.2) 12.2 (2.2)
2exp -.05 (-1.0) -0.07 (2.9) -1.5 (-1.5)
exp3 .002 (2.7) .06 (1.0)
exp* .000 (-.7)
education 7.47 (9.8) 7.63 (10.0) 7.58 (9.9)
~rW ~ .132 .141 .140
276 CHAPTER 7. FUNCTIONAL FORM AND EXPERIENCE
Table 7A.2: Sample by education and gender
number of years of experience men women
pooled higher secondary higher
less than 10 789 130 546 179
10-20 638 114 154 117
21-30 352 81 62 12
31-40 214 51 85 14
more than 41 80 - - -
to ta l 376 847 322
N O T E S  : For a description of system of schooling see Chapter 2. 
For women, the table combines the final two age categories - the 
im puted experience measure, together with retirement at age 55, 
means th a t few women fall into the older categories.
Chapter 8
Extensions and Applications
8.1 Introduction
This chapter develops extensions to the basic Mincer model presented in 
Chapter 5. The basic model was shown to be inadequate, or at least po­
tentially problematic, in several respects. Since the analysis undertaken in 
Chapters 6 and 7 has addressed concerns about the measurement and speci­
fication of experience, the model can now be taken forward to gain insights 
from its application to a range of interesting labour market questions from 
the role of signalling to unexplained gender wage differences.
The chapter develops or applies the human capital model in four areas. 
The first task is to estimate an extended model of earnings. The selection of 
controls for earnings follows suggestions from the analysis in Chapters 2 and 
3 about which individual characteristics would be expected to affect earnings. 
The resulting extended model is applied in later sections of the chapter.
Second, some apparent peculiarities in the returns to education are in­
vestigated. This possibility was introduced in Chapter 4, in the context of 
so-called sheepskin effects. In this chapter, tests are applied to ascertain 
whether or not individual diplomas are being relied upon as a signal by em­
ployers, which would lead to earnings premiums for graduates over and above 
the true productivity enhancing effects of education.
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Third, the human capital earnings profiles for the net and contract wage 
are compared. As defined in Chapter 5, the net wage is the amount actu­
ally received in the previous month, and has thus far been utilised as the 
dependent variable in the earnings functions. The contract wage is the net 
wage plus that amount which was not paid by the employer for the previous 
month. What difference does the choice of dependent variable make to the 
estimation of returns to human capital? This inquiry answers some obvious 
questions that arise in the light of the significant impact of arrears on net 
earnings in the results presented in Section 8.2.
The fourth task is an application of the imputed experience variable, 
demonstrating the importance of correct measurement of female experience 
to the estimated extent of so-called “discrimination” (or unexplained gender 
wage variation). The analysis casts some doubt on the usefulness of the 
conventional approach to decomposition of the gender wage gap. This is the 
final application of the human capital model in this thesis, with the next 
chapter investigating the arrears question in greater depth.
8.2 The Effect of Additional Controls
There is a range of variables, in addition to experience and education, that 
would be expected to affect earnings outcomes in Uzbekistan. Chapter 5 
reviewed evidence suggesting that regional dimensions are important, given 
the substantial differences in local economic structures and conditions. So­
ciological evidence about the role of ethnicity indicated that Slavic groups 
were traditionally favoured in terms of labour market earnings.
In this section, the effect of additional controls is examined separately by 
sex, and in two stages, with the second including a range of interaction terms. 
The variables were defined and described in Chapter 5.1 The dependent 
variable is the log of the net wage received.
1 Means of all the variables were given in Table 5.1.
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8.2 .1  M en
The results of an extended model of earnings for men are presented in Table 
8.1. An initial point to note is that the inclusion of these controls raises the 
explanatory power (adjusted R2) of the regression significantly, from .17 in 
the basic model, to about .35.
Table 8.1 has several results of interest. Most striking are the effects 
of the arrears and region dummies on log earnings. Recall from Chapter 
5 that the arrears dummy simply captures whether or not the individual 
experienced wage arrears in the previous month, while net earnings is the 
amount received. The potential problem of joint endogeneity between the 
net wage and the fact of arrears is therefore not an important issue.2
The fact that the individual reported non-payment of wages in the pre­
ceding month is found to have a significant negative effect on the net wage: 
all else being equal, the presence of arrears, relative to not having arrears, 
was associated with a negative impact on net earnings of the order of one- 
third. The possibility of systemic distributive effects in the pattern of arrears 
is examined in the next chapter.
The signs on the regional dummies fox living outside of Tashkent confirm 
and quantify the significance of the patterns described in Chapter 5, holding 
human capital, sectoral and other observed characteristics constant. Living 
in Fergana has a significant and negative impact of the order of one-third. 
The magnitude of the negative effect associated with residence in KKP is 
large, but nonetheless only about half that for Fergana.
These findings are not surprising either for the densely populated Fergana 
Valley where surplus labour was a problem even during the Soviet period 
(see Chapter 2), nor for KKP, given what has been referred to as “the Aral 
Sea crisis” in the region(see, e.g., World Bank 1993). However the ranking 
and scale of the differences between the two oblasts is somewhat unexpected
2 By way of contrast, there is some joint endogeneity between the contract wage and 
the amount of arrears, since the latter is used to derive the amount of the former.
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Table 8.1: Extended model of wage determination: men
Coefficient t-statistic
Experience
exp 0.922 3.24
exp2/ 100 -.0.200 -2.32
exp3/ 100 0.001 1.57
Education (relative to primary or less)
high 0.196 1.26
college 0.278 1.71
vocational 0.272 1.68
university 0.491 3.11
arrears -.344 -6.20
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic 0.169 2.54
Karakalpak -0.184 -1.89
Kazak -0.099 -1.06
Central Asian 0.144 1.46
other 0.128 1.49
Sector (relative to kolkhoz)
State 0.535 8.13
Private 0.716 7.81
military 1.19 9.49
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Fergana -0.324 -6.51
KKP -0.161 -2.06
Constant 4.58 14.08
N 925
K 2 0.3495
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if one expected the levels of earnings and household income poverty to be 
inversely correlated: it is KKP which has been portrayed by international 
agencies such as the World Bank as the poorest region of Uzbekistan. These 
regional results would hold even allowing for the fact that the wage data 
is in nominal terms. While there is a positive correlation between levels of 
income and prices at the regional level, differences in regional price levels do 
not change the income ranking of the regions under consideration (Coudouel 
1998).
Part of the negative effect associated with residence in KKP is captured by 
the ethnicity term (Karakalpak). If these two terms are added (Karakalpak- 
stan and Karakalpak), then the overall negative effect is of the order of 34 
percent. However this cumulative impact would only be relevant for the 30 
percent of the KKP sample of employees who are Karakalpak.
The sociological evidence reviewed in Chapter 5 suggested that Russians 
and other Slavic groups have traditionally occupied better-paying positions 
in the economy. Table 8.1 confirms the persistence of this pattern during the 
transition and, for the first time, quantifies its significance for earnings using 
representative microdata.
Holding other observed characteristics constant, earnings for individuals 
of Slavic ethnicity are about 17 percent higher than for Uzbeks. This finding 
of earnings advantage is perhaps surprising in the light of their large-scale 
out-migration from the republic since independence (see Chapter 3), but can 
be explained as follows. First, the fact of outmigration could have created a 
selectivity problem: the Slavs who have chosen to stay may indeed be those 
who do have better-paying jobs, while poorly paid Slavs have tended to em­
igrate. Second, it is possible that the earnings premium for Slavs is a proxy 
for skills (not captured by the levels of formal education) traditionally held 
by Slavs that have become relatively more scarce due to outmigration. Third, 
the outmigration might be more a reflection of insecurity about their future 
livelihood and/or prospects: Smith (1995) found that Slavs were much more
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pessimistic about their likely position in 2000 than were Uzbeks. The eth­
nicity dummies for the other ethnic groups are not statistically significantly 
different from each other and from the omitted category (Uzbek).
Higher earnings are associated with all sectors relative to the agricultural 
kolkhoz. Workers in agriculture have traditionally been relatively low paid, 
and the aggregate picture of wage relativities that was presented in Chapter 3 
suggested continuation of this pattern during the transition. This is true even 
with the inclusion of a dummy variable capturing receipt of benefits-in-kind 
from the workplace. The continuing controls on agricultural producers, in 
particular, compulsory procurement of most cotton and grain output at prices 
fixed by the state, has undoubtedly affected the profitability of the sector. 
At the same time, aggregate evidence suggests that agriculture has tended 
to absorb surplus labour, which would be expected to dampen earnings in 
the sector during the transition period of slow economic growth.
Interestingly privatised firms that have emerged with marketisation of the 
economy are associated with earnings that are about 72 percent higher than 
for kolkhozes. This appears to be markedly above the large effect registered 
for state employment, of about 54 percent, although the difference is not 
statistically significant.3 Whether or not privatisation is an effective way to 
hold down labour costs is therefore somewTat unclear. International agencies 
advising the Government, in particular the World Bank and IMF, have often 
tended to assume that the divestment of state ownership is a critical part 
of wage restraint (se, e.g., Nellis 1991). This assumption appears not to be 
borne out by the data. Finally, the coefficient on military employment is also 
significant, and highest, although the size of this group is small (see Table 
5.2).
The inclusion of additional controls has a large impact on the size of the 
returns to education for men. In the extended model, the coefficients asso-
3 The difference between the coefficients (0.18) is outweighed by the standard error 
(approximately 0.36).
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ciated with each level of education are lower than those reported in Chapter 
5.
Table 8A. 1 in the appendix presents the extended model using a quadratic 
rather than a cubic specification of experience. This is of interest because 
earlier studies of earnings in transition have proceeded on the basis of a 
quadratic for experience. As expected, the quadratic model shows very much 
lower coefficients on experience -  the coefficients on experience are .922 and 
.049 for the cubic and quadratic models respectively. This translates into 
large differences in the contribution of experience to earnings at the mean 
number of years of experience. At 17 years of experience, the total effect 
of experience is approximately 86 percent (relative to an individual with no 
experience), whereas in the quadratic model the overall effect associated with 
experience is negative. However the changes in the other coefficients of the 
model are insignificant.
To get a better sense of the interplay of the variables of interest, a fully 
interacted model was estimated. All the variables that had significant coef­
ficients in Table 8.1 were interacted with each other. That is, arrears and 
the ethnic, sector and region variables; the ethnic and sector and region vari­
ables; and the sector and region variables against each other.4 The results of 
the fully interacted model are presented in Table 8A.4 in the appendix. In 
the interests of clarity, the model presented in the text (Table 8.2) limited 
the interaction terms to those which were significant.
Table 8.2 shows that the interaction effects related to arrears which are 
significant and in many cases quite large. None of the other interaction 
effects proved to be significant, however. The arrears dummy itself has a 
large negative effect (-63 percent), and there are further effects when ar­
rears are interacted with other observed characteristics. These interactions 
can be described as follows. Living in Fergana and having arrears has an
4 In light of the preceding results, the ethnic groupings were simplified as follows: Slavic 
and other non-Uzbeks, which are compared to the omitted group (Uzbek).
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Table 8.2: Extended model w ith interaction terms: men
Coefficient t-statistic
Experience
exp 0.944 3.33
exp2/ 100 -0.200 -2.48
exp3/ 100 0.001 1.78
Education (relative to less than primary)
high .103 0.65
college .160 0.95
vocational .168 1.01
university .385 2.32
arrears -.627 -2.26
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic .158 2.40
non-Uzbek .092 1.45
Sector (relative to kolkhoz)
State .383 4.83
Private .596 5.76
military 1.08 7.51
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Fergana -.296 -5.55
KKP -.324 -4.15
Interaction terms
nonUzbek* arrears -.213 -1.72
state* arrears .309 2.19
Fergana* arrears -.438 -2.69
Constant 4.82 14.57
N 925
Adjusted R2 0.3633
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additional negative effect over and above the large negative effects of the 
regional dummy alone (-44 percent) and arrears per se, with Tashkent being 
the omitted region. (The effect for Karakalpakstan is also negative, but not 
significant.) Being non-Uzbek as opposed to Slavic, or Uzbek (the omitted 
group), and having arrears is also associated with a sizeable negative effect 
on earnings. On the other hand, and somewhat surprisingly, there is a large 
positive effect for state sector workers with arrears. Why this should be 
the case is unclear. The arrears phenomenon is thus not only novel, but it 
presents a number of puzzles that deserve detailed investigation. Chapter 9 
is devoted to this task, while the final section of this chapter considers differ­
ences in the human capital determinants of earnings depending on whether 
net or contract wages are the dependent variable.
8.2 .2  W om en
The results for the extended model for women are presented in Table 8.3. 
Many of the patterns are similar to those found for men, in terms of which 
coefficients are significant, and their respective signs. In these cases, the 
interpretations offered for men therefore largely hold again hexe.
In several cases, however, the orders of magnitude differ between men and 
women. For example the returns to university degrees, relative to education 
of elementary or less, are about one-third higher for women. This is not un­
usual in an international context. The wide ranging survey of rates of return 
to education in 56 countries that was reviewed in Chapter 4 (Psacharapoulos 
1985), found that in developing countries the estimates for women generally 
exceeds that for men.5 Rates of return to education in US have often been 
higher for women than for men (Carnoy and Marenbach 1975; Gwartney and 
Long 1978).
Various reasons have been advanced to explain the phenomenon of higher
0Education coefficients are often referred to as “rates of return”, although this is not 
strictly correct since the opportunity cost of investment (wages foregone) is not measured.
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Table 8.3: Extended model: women
Coefficient t-statistic
Experience
exp 0.064 2.55
exp2/ 100 -0.589 -2.21
exp3/ 100 0.016 2.13
Education (relative to primary or less)
high 0.246 1.15
college 0.465 2.09
vocational 0.459 2.11
university 0.670 3.00
arrears -.415 -7.43
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic 0.085 1.35
non-Uzbek 0.085 1.48
Sector (relative to kolkhoz)
State 0.456 6.01
Private 0.547 4.87
Military 0.774 2.97
non-wage benefits -0.177 -.28
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Fergana -0.239 -4.26
KKP -0.249 -3.76
Constant 5.321 22.17
N 685
.435
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returns for women, including mismeasurement of the experience variable 
(Blinder 1973) and differences in the demand for, and supply of, educated 
men and women (Sloan 1985). In the present case, the possibility of mismea­
surement should have been alleviated: discontinuity in labour force attach­
ment have been at least partly corrected for in Chapter 6, thereby diminishing 
the risk of overestimation of the schooling coefficient.
On the supply side, a higher share of men have higher educational qual­
ifications (see Table 8A.7 in the appendix, and Chapter 5). This may lead 
to selection effects due to omitted ability bias: since a smaller proportion 
of women have tertiary degrees they are likely to have higher on average 
unobserved ability than women without degrees (assuming that unobserved 
ability is correlated with educational attainment).6
The negative impact of arrears is larger for women (cf. Table 8.1 for 
men). All else equal, the presence of arrears is associated with a reduction in 
the net wage of over 41 percent, compared to women without arrears. Like 
men, women in non-farm sectors earn more than those on kolkhozes, but the 
earnings advantages associated with private sector employment are not as 
large (55 percent higher for women, versus 72 percent for men).
Table 8A. 2 in the appendix presents the extended model using a quadratic 
rather than a cubic specification of experience. As for men, this comparison 
is of interest because previous studies of earnings in transition have employed 
a quadratic model of experience. As expected, the quadratic model shows 
much lower coefficients on experience. The education coefficients are smaller 
at every level in the quadratic model relative to the cubic model. However
6 Blackburn and Neumark (1992, p. 525) point out that the human capital model of 
earnings predicts that those workers who choose more schooling will tend to have higher 
levels of ability. See Chapter 4 for a review of omitted ability bias.
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all the differences in the coefficients of the two models are insignificant.7
The next step is to add a range of interaction variables. A fully inter­
acted model was estimated; the results are presented in Table 8A.5 in the 
appendix. Since the interacted variables of significance were limited to those 
related to arrears and sector of employment, the model was re-estimated us­
ing only the significant variables (Table 8.4).8 In this model, the effect of the 
arrears dummy per se is positive but insignificant, although all the signifi­
cant interaction effects are negative. However being non-Uzbek and having 
arrears has a large negative effect, and the negative impact of the interac­
tion of residence in Fergana and having arrears is even larger (-78 percent). 
There is also a negative interaction between the summary education variable 
(years of schooling) and arrears, that is significant at the 10 percent level, 
suggesting that the better educated are worse affected by arrears.
Examining the interaction terms for sector of employment, state sector 
and Fergana had a significant and strongly positive effect; in Karakalpakstan 
the positive effect of state employment was not significant. The effect of pri­
vate sector employment interacted with Fergana region was actually negative 
in this model, at least at the 10 percent level.
Table 8A. 3 in the appendix presents the extended model with interac­
tion terms using a quadratic rather than a cubic specification of experience. 
As before, the quadratic model shows much lower coefficients on experience. 
However all the differences in the coefficients of the two models are insignif­
icant.
The overall picture of women compared to men suggests that the effect 
of transition has been mixed. On the one hand, several of the trends associ-
1 The significance of the differences were tested using a standard t-test
ß\ — ß%
V S  Ei  4 - S E 2
where ßi and ß? refer to the coefficients, and ST^and SE2 to the standard errors on those 
coefficients, in the cubic and quadratic models respectively.
sAs noted above, the fully interacted model also runs the risk of multi-collinearity.
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ated with transition (including arrears in wage payment and growing private 
sector opportunities) have either been more adverse, or less advantageous, 
for women in Uzbekistan. This has been reflected in the coefficients on these 
characteristics in the extended model. Chapter 5 has illustrated that women 
are more concentrated in the state sector and less likely to be working in 
private firms. Those women who do work in the private sector have less to 
gain than men -  and private employment is actually associated with negative 
wage effects in Fergana. On the other hand, the returns to women’s educa­
tional attainments are at least as high as men’s. Still the net effect is that 
women earn on average less than men, a gap that is investigated in depth in 
Section 8.4 below.
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Table 8.4: Extended model with interaction terms: women
Coefficient t-statistic
Experience
exp .042 1.76
exp2/100 -.391 -1.55
exp3/100 .011 1.51
Education (relative to elementary or less)
high .263 1.38
college .449 2.26
vocational .431 2.19
university .702 3.46
arrears .325 1.23
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic .234 1.08
Other non-Uzbek .184 3.08
Sector (relative to kolkhoz)
State -.094 -0.47
Private .243 1.24
military .343 1.16
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Fergana -.655 -3.01
KKP -.615 -3.20
Interaction terms
non-Uzbek* arrears -.479 -3.46
Fergana* arrears -.777 -4.38
State* Fergana .575 2.60
Private* Fergana -.456 -1.62
Yrsch* arrears -.029 -1.83
Constant 5.84 20.18
N 685
n2 .435
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8.3 E ducation  and Sheepskin  Effects
One area of ongoing debate in labour economics is between those who sub­
scribe to the productivity-augmenting role of education that is associated 
with human capital theory, and those who prefer a signalling interpretation 
of the observed correlation between education and earnings (see Chapter 4). 
One way to disentangle the data on education and earnings is to test for the 
existence of so-called “sheepskin effects”. If education was valued by employ­
ers for its effect in enhancing productivity, one would not expect the award 
of a degree or diploma after, say, three years of tertiary education to have 
a dramatic effect on earnings relative to the effect of two years of univer­
sity. This is known as a sheepskin or diploma effect, which was introduced 
in Chapter 4. The sheepskin hypothesis predicts that “wages will rise faster 
with extra years of education when the extra year also confers a certificate” 
(Riley 1979).
A sheepskin effect is manifest where there is a statistically significant dif­
ference associated with completion of a level of education, over and above 
the returns to some (incomplete) education at that level. In the case of a 
continuous education variable, this would take the form of significant dis­
continuities in returns to education in the years normally associated with 
completion. In the present case of dummy variables, a more direct method 
can be applied to test whether completion per se brings additional returns 
that are statistically significant, as elaborated below.
This chapter empirically tests for the existence of sheepskin effects in 
Uzbekistan. To date, there have not been any published studies on this topic 
for transition economies even though, as suggested in Chapter 4, there are 
reasons to expect signalling to have been important in the former Soviet 
republics.
In the basic human capital model using education dummies that was esti­
mated in Chapter 5, sharp discontinuities appeared to exist between the size 
of the coefficients for the various completed and incomplete levels of educa-
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tion. The patterns also differed by sex. This is suggestive of the existence 
of sheepskin effects, a novel finding in the context of transition economies. 
However the interpretation of the returns to different levels of schooling was 
problematic when the rest of the regression was mis-specified. Now that 
Chapters 6 and 7 have developed a satisfactory specification of the basic 
model, it is appropriate to investigate the returns associated with comple­
tion.
Recall that Table 5.10 suggested that men who do not gain certification 
at various levels of education are receiving higher wages than those who do 
complete. This pattern for men is a bit puzzling at first sight, but could 
be consistent with the existence of ability bias for men. (The problem of 
omitted variables was introduced in Chapter 4.) Although omitted ability 
bias is often thought to skew returns to education in an upward direction 
(when the more able stay on at school), equally, there are circumstances 
where individuals leave formal education to take up more lucrative activities 
elsewhere.
Such opportunities might be greater for men. One obvious example is 
where physically able males drop out of education to take up manual work. 
The structure of Soviet wage differentials was such that semi-skilled blue 
collar work was relatively well compensated (Chapter 2).
Discontinuities in the returns to education were also apparent for women. 
But by way of contrast to men, women in the sample received greater re­
wards if they completed each of the levels of education (with the exception 
of college). These results could be interpreted as showing the existence of a 
‘sheepskin effect’, whereby female workers are being rewarded for obtaining 
the certification, over and above any productivity effect.
This section examines patterns in the returns to different levels of edu­
cation in detail. First, the international debate about sheepskin effects is 
reviewed. Second, the existence of sheepskin effects in Uzbekistan is tested 
separately for men and women.
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8.3 .1  T h e Sheepskin  H yp oth esis: E v id en ce and  C aveats
This section reviews published studies in the international literature about 
the existence of sheepskin effects. It then goes on to provide some caveats 
to be borne in mind in the interpretation of the test results, even where 
sheepskin effects appear to exist.
In te rn a tio n a l E viden ce
There are no published analyses of the existence of sheepskin effects in the 
transition economies, with much of the empirical analysis of the sheepskin 
effect coming from the United States. Jaeger and Page (1996), Belman and 
Heywood (1991) and Hungerford and Solon (1987) each found evidence of 
sheepskin effects in the returns to education in the US, with significantly 
larger returns to diploma years than to other years of education.
Available evidence from developing countries is mixed (see Patrinos 1996 
and Shabbir 1991 for recent reviews). In Latin America, Griffin and Cox 
Edwards (1993) and Patrinos (1996) have found non-linearities in returns 
to years of schooling for Brazil and Guatemala respectively, though not at 
every level of certification. For the Cote dTvoire, van der Gaag and Vijerberg 
(1989) found positive and significant coefficients when dichotomous dummy 
variables representing completed diplomas are included in the earnings func­
tion. Shabbir (1991) found substantial and statistically significant sheepskin 
effects for men at four levels of certification in Pakistan, although not at the 
primary and middle secondary levels. Mohan (1986) found that diploma ef­
fects were important for men, but not for women, in Columbia. Uzbekistan is 
somewhat unusual relative to the developing countries that have been studied 
in the literature on sheepskin effects (e.g. Brazil, Guatemala and Pakistan) 
given virtually universal literacy.9
There is some international evidence suggesting that women and minori-
9 For example, the average number of years of schooling in Guatemala is only four 
(Patrinos, 1996), compared to 12 years in the present sample.
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ties receive greater returns to signals of high productivity than males. For 
example, medical board certification increases the earnings of female doctors 
more than their male counterparts (Culler et al. 1987).
Belman and Heywood (1991) outline a signalling model predicting that 
minorities will receive greater returns to signals of higher productivity, be­
cause the signal is more closely correlated with productivity for minorities 
than for the majority group. This may occur because, for example, minori­
ties have less resources with which to purchase inaccurately large signals (p. 
721). The findings presented by Belman and Heywood (1991) suggest that 
white women, minority women and minority men receive higher returns for 
graduate school and white males do not (although they do not statistically 
test this hypothesis). They note that these results are consistent with expla­
nations other than the screening function of education -  in particular there 
may be different patterns of labour supply and demand, and women with 
higher degrees may be in relatively short supply.
On the other hand, Jaeger and Page (1996) using actual information on 
completion (as opposed to imputation based on number of years of educa­
tion) find little evidence that the sheepskin effects of high school and college 
graduation in the US differ across race and sex groups. They conduct hy­
pothesis tests for diploma effects across demographic groups and conclude 
that the apparent differences in returns across gender and race groups are 
generally not statistically significant.10
It is noted that the data sets used to test for sheepskin effects typically 
do not contain actual information on completion or non-completion -  rather, 
this has to be inferred from information about the number of years spent 
in education.* 11 Several of the studies of developing countries -  including 
Patrinos (1996) and Shabbir (1991)- are similarly limited by the available 
data and assume degree completion based on the number of years of school.
10 With the exception of occupational Associate’s degrees for white women.
11 Most of the US studies have been based on the Current Population Survey which, 
until recently, lacked information on degree attainment.
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Caveats
The sheepskin hypothesis has wider importance as one of the testable predic­
tions of signalling theory: it is often interpreted as evidence for the signalling, 
as opposed to the human capital, function of education. Yet the existence 
of sheepskin effects does not provide conclusive evidence against the produc­
tivity view of education for several, related, reasons.
First, notwithstanding the conventional specification using a ‘years of 
schooling’ variable in earnings function analysis, which implies the existence 
of linear returns to each extra year of education, human capital theory does 
not require that the returns to education be constant across each year of 
education. The courses and examinations that are undertaken in the fi­
nal year of education (and the associated certification) may imply that the 
productivity-enhancing effect of the final year was higher than that of earlier 
years of education.
Second, an alternative interpretation of the existence of sheepskin effects 
due to Chiswick (1973), is that dropouts are disproportionately comprised 
of inefficient learners who leave school when they realise how little their 
productivity is being augmented by education. Hence the diploma effects 
on earnings exist because this self-select ion means that graduates are more 
productive, and not due to any signalling function. A third related point 
is that omitted ability variables may correlate with completion (Hungerford 
and Solon 1987).12 For example, those sitting the final examinations may well 
be more motivated than those who drop out; hence gaining the qualification 
signals individual motivation and preparedness to complete a task. While 
the latter traits cannot generally be directly observed, obtaining a degree 
may be considered to be a proxy that is correlated with productivity in the 
workforce.
Finally, as noted in Chapter 2, the value of tertiary education may lie
12 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the problem of omitted variables including unobserved 
ability.
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in the personal connections developed at university that lead to better-paid 
jobs. The importance of social networks for labour market outcomes has long 
been recognised by labour economists -  although the focus is typically on the 
role of employee referrals in the hiring process.13 Montgomery (1991), and 
O’Regan and Quigley (1993), conclude from reviews of the US literature that 
approximately 50 percent of all workers currently employed found their jobs 
through friends and relatives. If social networks are an important avenue to 
better paying jobs in Uzbekistan, graduation may simply be a proxy for the 
amount of time spent developing such relationships at school and university.
8 .3 .2  T estin g  for S heep sk in  E ffects in U zb ek ista n
The peculiarities apparent in the returns to complete and incomplete educa­
tion do not necessarily imply the existence of sheepskin effects. The numbers 
of individuals in the sample whose highest level of formal education is “in­
complete” is relatively small - for example only 2 percent report incomplete 
teknikum compared to about 10 percent who completed (Table 5.2).14 Are 
the differences in earnings between those who completed and those who did 
not statistically significant? The survey information was used to construct 
a set of discrete dummy (or binary) variables with a value of one if the 
individual is in a given category and zero otherwise.
To test the significance of the differences between completion versus non­
completion at various levels of education, these dummies are amended so the 
incomplete category at each level also includes completion. For example, for 
the university level, there are already two dummy variables: inchigh and high. 
The variable inchigh was amended so that inchigh = 1 where high =  1. The 
regression was rerun including the amended inchigh and high, after carrying 
out the same procedure for each level of education. The basic model was 
run with these combined education dummies, plus the separate dummies for
13See Saloner (1985) and Montgomery (1991), and references therein.
14 The numbers of observations are corresondingly small -  26 individuals in the restricted 
sample fall into the incomplete teknikum category.
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completion only, to test whether the latter category was significant. In effect, 
the additional dummy for completion in this model shows the deviation from 
the average effect due to completion. There are other ways to test for the 
existence of sheepskin effects, including the construction of spline functions.15
The present data set avoids the problems investigated by Jaeger and Page 
(1996) that afflict many international studies. There is direct information on 
degree attainment, so that measurement error is not introduced by having 
to impute degree receipt from the usual number of years of education to 
complete that level.
The sheepskin test results are presented in Table 8.5, where the variables 
with asteriks represent the combined group of persons with complete and 
incomplete qualifications at the relevant level of education. This test, run 
separately by sex, shows that completion is not associated with statistically 
significant coefficients for men nor for women at any level of education. -
8 .3 .3  In terp reta tion
These results have important implications for the appropriate specification of 
the education variables in the earning^ functions, and provide insights about 
the relevance of human capital theory of earnings to Uzbekistan. However 
there is also cause for caution in interpretation, as highlighted below.
First, from the practical perspective of modelling the determinants of 
earnings, the results suggest that pooling individuals at each level of edu­
cation, even if some did not obtain a certificate, is an appropriate way to 
clarify the empirical analysis. This confirms that the approach adopted in 
the previous section, which estimated an extended model of earnings, is the
15 The spline function approach generalises the human capital log linear specification set 
out in Chapter 4 to allow for discontinuities at values of S which correspond to comple­
tion in addition to the continuous years of schooling variable (the so-called “dummies for 
degrees” approach, where sheepskin effects would be indicated by significant and positive 
coefficients on the dummy variables); see, for example, Shabbir (1991) pp. 6-9. This ap­
proach is often used in the case of a continuous education variable, but is not necessary in 
the present case.
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Table 8.5: Sheepskin test results
Men Women
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
exp .035 2.47 .079 2.83
exp2/ 100 l Ö h-4 o -1.57 -.761 -2.58
exp3/ 100 0.00 1.12 .021 2.50
high* .391 2.05 .448 2.08
high diploma .010 .012 .077 0.94
vocational* .666 2.68 .819 3.07
voc. diploma -.118 -0.67 .034 0.19
college* .678 2.60 1.04 3.42
col. diploma -.121 -0.63 -.144 -0.61
university* 1.08 4.33 1.00 3.90
uni diploma -.187 -1.08 .147 0.89
constant 5.52 26.65 5.18 23.97
~ W 0.093 0.174
N 979 708
NOTE: * indicates pooled group, with complete and incomplete 
education at that level.
correct model. (For comparison, the results of the revised basic models for 
men and women are presented in Table 8A.6 in the appendix.)
Another broader implication follows the finding that sheepskin effects 
are not important in Uzbekistan for either men or women. These results are 
consistent with the human capital view of the importance of education. There 
are not significant gains to an individual in gaining the diploma, as opposed 
to the earlier years of study. The simplest interpretation is that productivity­
enhancing skills are being imparted in each year spent in education, so that 
graduation per se makes no significant difference to earnings outcomes in 
later life.
There are caveats, however. The absence of sheepskin effects does not 
necessarily mean that the Soviet system of education is adequate for the 
needs of a market economy. The review of the Soviet system of education in
8.4. ARREARS AND RETURNS TO HUMAN CAPITAL 299
Chapter 2 suggested that the course structures and teaching methods reflects 
the preparedness of the individual to work in a disciplined fashion and in 
close-knit groups (study-collectives). This was arguably more important to 
Soviet-type employers than the content of tertiary courses. These worker 
traits, that were important in the planned economy, may have continued to 
influence individual earnings outcomes in the early years of the transition.
There are further reasons for caution in interpreting the results. It is 
possible that the value of education lies more in the acquisition of personal 
connections, as opposed to productivity-enhancing skills, as a route to better 
labour market outcomes. Such connections were especially important in a 
bureaucratic command economy (see Chapter 2), but also hold relevance in 
a market-based system (Saloner 1985; Montgomery 1991). Unfortunately 
these issues are impossible to untangle empirically with the present data set.
8.4 Arrears and R eturns to  H um an C apital
Arrears are a pervasive phenomenon in Uzbekistan, as in other former Soviet 
countries. Section 8.2 demonstrated that the inclusion in an OLS earnings 
regression of a dummy variable representing the presence of arrears was neg­
ative and strongly significant. The coefficient on the arrears dummy in the 
OLS regression on log net wages was minus 42 percent for women (with a 
^-statistic of -7.1). The negative effect for men was almost as large -  the 
coefficient was minus 34 percent with a ^-statistic of -6.2). Recall that those 
estimations were based on the net wage for all workers, without distinguish­
ing those individuals with arrears.
In this context, the analysis addresses two broad questions. First, are 
there differences in the returns to human capital between those workers who 
are affected by arrears and those who are not? Preliminary modeling is used 
to illustrate the ways in which such differences might arise, and the effect is 
quantified by running separate earnings regressions for the individuals with
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and without arrears. Second, and relatedly, are the observed differences 
statistically significant? An F test is used for this purpose. This will reveal 
whether pooling of the samples, regardless whether the individuals have wage 
arrears, has been the appropriate approach to adopt in examining the returns 
to human capital during the transition.
These questions are important for Uzbekistan in and of themselves, but 
also have wider implications for studies of transition given the frequency of 
arrears elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. This section is limited to a 
consideration of arrears in the context of human capital earnings functions. 
A more extended discussion of ways to model arrears is presented in the next 
chapter.
Before proceeding, some definitions should be recalled (see Chapter 5.2). 
Net wage means the amount in soum actually received by the individual in 
the past month from the main place of work. Arrears is the amount reported 
as owing to the individual from the past month from the main place of work.16 
The contract wage is simply derived by adding the net wage to the amount 
of arrears owed.1'
L6Immediately after the question on sources of income received, the respondent is asked 
“Were you paid everything due to you in the last calender month? I will read again the 
various sources of income and you tell me please, if you are owed money for any of them. 
But remember that I am only interested in the last calender month, and not for any earlier 
period”. Then the interviewer is instructed to read out each sources and write down the 
amount of soums owed: the first source is monthly wage at main place of work.
17One unfortunate complication that may affect the accuracy of this summation, and 
indeed all the estimates using the net wage, is that the amount received need not have 
been owed for that month. That is, the amount received may include payment of arrears 
owed from earlier periods. The income question simply asks: “Please tell me the net 
sum of money (after income tax) which you received in the last calender month from the 
following sources....monthly wage at main place of work”. It is possible that the respondent 
reports all wage income received that month (including past amounts owed), rather than 
the monthly wage for that month. However as shown in Chapter 5.3, this seems to be 
unlikely.
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8 .4 .1  P o ssib le  E ffects o f A rrears
Are there significant differences between the individuals who have been af­
fected by arrears, and those who have not? By way of illustration of the 
possible effects, it is useful to think about how arrears could impact on re­
turns to human capital. This can be conceived in the following simple terms.
Individuals invest in education, leave school and obtain jobs. There could 
be two different scenarios. Under the first, arrears are randomly distributed 
and amount to a proportion of the contracted wage (or a specific absolute 
amount). Under a second scenario, arrears are not randomly distributed. For 
example, individuals with higher levels of education or with higher wages are 
less affected or unaffected by arrears.
Figure 8.1 illustrates these alternative scenarios. In the upper panel, 
arrears are randomly distributed with respect to individual human capital 
characteristics. The effect of arrears is simply to reduce the levels of earnings 
received across the distribution, while the slope of the earnings profile (that 
is, the returns to human capital characteristics) remains unchanged.
In the lower panel of Figure 8.1, individuals with lower levels of education 
are more affected by arrears. This results in falls in earnings at the bottom 
end of the education distribution. However this also has the effect of steep­
ening the slope of the human capital-earnings profile for those individuals 
affected by arrears. In this case the returns to, say, education, would rise for 
individuals affected by arrears.
The question then arises, are the apparent differences in the co-efficients 
(slopes of the curves) on the human capital variables for individuals with and 
without arrears statistically significant? The focus here is on differences in 
the human capital variables.18 Testing whether or not there exist significant 
differences between the groups is analogous to testing for structural change. 
This test is often labelled a Chow test, in reference to Chow (I960),19 which
18 The next chapter is devoted to exploring regional and other dimensions of arrears.
19See Greene 1994, pp. 211-212 for an elaboration and examples.
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Figure 8.1: Possible effect of arrears on human capital returns
Individuals without 
arrears
Individuals with arrears
Human capital 
characteristics
Individuals without
Individuals with arrears
Human capital 
characteristics
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tests the hypothesis that some of the regression coefficients are different in 
the subsets of the data. This is a common application of the F test (Greene 
1994, p. 211).
More formally, the test is as follows
= SSR C -  S S R ^ / K  
y ’ ’ S S R u / N - K
where S S R C is the sum of squared residuals from the constrained (pooled) 
model and SSRu is the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained 
model (as defined below), K  is equal to the number of parameters and N  is 
the number of observations.
8.4.2 Results
The investigation is carried out separately by gender. The first step is to es­
timate earnings functions separately for the groups with and without arrears. 
The relevant wage (dependent variable) is the amount actually received in 
the previous month, net of arrears. The summary years of schooling variable 
is used to indicate what happens to returns to education.
Men are examined first. The results reported in Table 8.6 show much 
higher returns to education for male workers with arrears. This is because 
the wage cut incurred by arrears has the effect of steepening the slope on 
the wage-education curve, as depicted in the lower panel of the preceding 
figure. The same is true of the experience-earnings profile. At four years 
of experience, the estimated return to an additional year of experience is 
about 50 percent higher for the arrears group than for the non-arrears group 
(15 versus 10 percent). By ten years of experience, however, the difference 
between the two groups in the effect of an additional year of experience has 
narrowed considerably.
The next step, of course, is to test whether these apparent differences in 
the returns to education are statistically significant. This is done by way of 
an F test. The sum of squared errors for the constrained model is taken from
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Table 8.6: Comparing returns to human capital: males with and w ithout 
arrears
With Arrears Without Arrears
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
experience .166 1.76 .085 2.71
experience2 /10 0 -.409 -1.37 -.176 -1.88
exp3/ 100 .003 1.15 .001 1.26
years of school .059 3.00 .034 5.38
constant 3.20 3.53 4.86 15.03
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.089
N 186 756
the pooled sample. An unconstrained model is constructed by introducing 
interaction term s for the human capital variables. Additional interaction 
term s for each level of education and experience plus the presence of arrears 
- are included in the model for the pooled sample.20
The result of the application of this F test for male employees is
F (2 5 ,934)
(360 — 352)/25 
352/909
0.826
The tabled critical value is 2.17 for one percent significance, so th a t the 
hypothesis th a t the human capital coefficient vectors are the same between 
the two samples (those with and those without arrears) cannot be rejected.
In other words, formal testing shows tha t despite the apparently large 
differences in returns to  human capital between the arrears and non-arrears 
groups, the presence of arrears does not have a statistically significant impact 
on the returns to  education and experience.
W hat is the impact of arrears on women’s returns to human capital? 
This is examined as for men, and the first step is to split the sample and
20 An alternative approach would be to include the interaction terms but not the arrears 
dummy. However this would mean that the coefficients of the model could be affected by 
the omitted variable (arrears) which has already been shown to be significant, and therefore 
possibly biased (see Hammermesh 1998). Hence the arrears dummy was included.
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run the basic OLS wage regressions. Comparing returns to experience for 
women without arrears, to those with arrears, reveals results opposite to 
those found for men (Table 8.7). At 10 years of experience, this translates 
into contributions of experience (relative to someone without experience) of 
approximately 22 versus 6 percent for the arrears and non-arrears groups 
respectively. Women with arrears apparently get much higher returns to 
experience than those without arrears. For education, there is an opposite 
tendency: women without arrears have a coefficient on the years of schooling 
variables that is about one-fifth higher than that for women with arrears.
Table 8.7: Comparing returns to human capital: females with and without 
arrears
W ith  Arrears W ithout Arrears
Coefficient t-sta tistic Coefficient t-s ta tis tic
experience .232 2.44 .061 2.41
experience2 -.023 -2.385 -.006 -2.06
exp3/100 .068 2.34 .015 1.90
years of school .058 2.59 .072 10.21
constant 4.51 14.14 5.26 52.49
A djusted R 2 .073 .166
N 125 575
Are these differences statistically significant? The same testing procedure 
as for men was adopted. An F or Chow-type test was used, with an uncon­
strained model for the pooled sample which includes interaction terms for 
arrears, and each level of education and years of (imputed) experience. The 
result of the application of this F test for female employees is
(183 — 181)/25
F(25,674) 0.295
181/668
As noted above, the tabled critical value is 2.17 for one percent significance. 
Again, the hypothesis that the human capital coefficient vectors are the same 
between the two samples (those with and those without arrears) cannot be 
rejected.
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The findings of this section can be summarised as follows. Given the wide­
spread prevalence of arrears, a general question arose as to whether or not 
there are statistically significant differences in the returns to human capital 
between those who are affected by arrears and those who are not. Alterna­
tive scenarios were illustrated, and separate regressions suggested that the 
returns to experience were higher for both men and women who are affected 
by arrears. The picture with respect to education was less clear cut: for 
men, the returns were higher for the arrears group, whereas the opposite was 
found for women. In the case of both men and women, however, formal test­
ing was used to show that the apparent differences in the returns to human 
capital between the arrears and non-arrears groups were not significant. It 
is therefore reasonable to maintain the extended model developed in Section 
8.2 for the pooled samples of individuals, whether or not they are affected 
by arrears.
8.5 E xperience and G ender W age D ifferences
The crude gap between the average earnings of women and men in the sam­
ple is of the order of 25 percent. A gender difference in earnings of this order 
of magnitude is not unusual. Mincer (1985) reports an average gap of 25 
percent for eleven industrial countries in 1980. Numerous international stud­
ies have investigated the gender wage gap, seeking to ascertain the extent of 
discrimination in the labour market (for reviews of the international litera­
ture see Gunderson 1989; Killingsworth 1990). The methodology typically 
involves a decomposition of the gap into explained and unexplained parts, 
following Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). The unexplained part is often 
referred to as “discrimination”, although strictly speaking the most that we 
can say is that this part is unexplained by observed differences in the data.
Most of the studies published to date have focussed on western industrial 
countries. There are fewer studies of transition economies. The published
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examples include Meng (1998) for China and Newell and Reilly (1996) for 
Russia.21 Two earlier studies examined the case of Soviet Russia: Katz 
(1994) and Ofer and Vinokur (1992, Chapter 6).
This section applies the imputed female experience that was derived in 
Chapter 6 to test the sensitivity of the size of unexplained gender wage differ­
entials to the measure of experience. In the next section, background on wom­
en’s wages in Soviet Uzbekistan is provided, then Section 8.5.2 presents the 
widely used Blinder-Oaxaca method of wage decomposition. This method, 
and the more recent refinements of Cotton (1988) are then applied to the 
present data set. The concluding section highlights the methodological diffi­
culties, and points to possible implications for policy.
8,5*1 Existing Evidence
The persistence of differences in average earnings throughout the Soviet pe­
riod despite, on the one hand, formal pronouncements of sexual equality and, 
on the other, the lack of official wage data by sex, has been well documented. 
Information from sample surveys consistently revealed substantial earnings 
differentials between men and women, as reported in Table 8.8.
McAuley’s 1981 book, ‘Women’s Work and Wages in the Soviet Union’, 
cites earnings disparities, based on various small sample surveys in the Eu­
ropean parts of the Soviet Union, of between 28-40 percent (Table 2.1, p. 
21). Ofer and Vinokur’s analysis of sex differentials in wages among Jewish 
emigres from the 1970s found a ratio of 0.68 for the basic wage, ranging up 
to 0.59 when all earnings are taken into account (1992, Table 7.1).Table 8.8 
summarises the findings of various studies about the size of the gender wage 
gap in former Soviet countries.
Chapter 2 described how the rewards to labour in Uzbekistan were planned 
as part of the same structure that governed the entire Union. Not surprisingly
21 Also Glinskaya and Mroz (1997, unpublished mimeo) examined the gender wage gap 
in Russia over the period 1992-1995.
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Table 8.8: Estimates of the crude gender wage gap
Source Country and Year F em a le  W age  M ale  W age V / o )
McAuley (1981) Russia, Lenigrad, 1960-5 70
McAuley (1981) Russia (urban) 1975 60
McAuley (1981) Armenia, Yerevan 1963 65
Ofer and Vinokur (1992) Russia (urban) 1979 77
Katz (1994) Russia (Taganrog) 1989 66
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) USSR 1989 71
Newell and Reilly (1996) Russian Federation 1992 74
Glinskaya and Mroz (1997) Russian Federation 1995 71
then, the sizeable difference in average earnings between men and women in 
Uzbekistan is similar in magnitude to that found in Russia. Simply compar­
ing mean earnings at main place of work by sex reveals that in Uzbekistan, 
in June 1995, men earned 768 sum whereas women earned only 570 sum, 
that is on average about one quarter less than did men. This is comparable 
to the gap-of 26 percent estimated by Newell and Reilly (1996) for Russia 
for 1992, and slightly less than the Soviet-wide average gap of 29 percent 
reported Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) for 1989.
The most immediate explanation for the gaps reported in Table 8.8 is 
that women are simply being discriminated against by employers. Yet formal 
guarantees of equal pay were set out in Soviet law. Shortly after the October 
revolution the Party pledged commitment to alleviate sexual inequality (see 
McAuley 1981, pp. 5-6). The measures adopted included legal guarantees 
of equal rates of pay for equal work; and protection against “unsuitable” 
work (e.g. night work and overtime), as well as the expansion of education 
opportunities and the provision of subsidised child care.
The national Labour Code (dating from January 1995) contains formal 
protection for women that is very similar to the Soviet period. Discrimination 
on the basis of gender is expressly prohibited, and individuals who feel that 
they have been discriminated against in the sphere of work can apply to
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the “people’s court” (narodnyi sud) for redress (Article 6).22 There are also 
additional guarantees for women viewed as potentially disadvantaged in the 
workplace, specifically including single parents, women with disabled children 
and women with many children under the age of 14. Enterprises with more 
than 100 employees (whether public or private) are obliged to allocate 4 
percent of jobs to the last group. Pregnant women and women with children 
under the age of three years cannot be fired (Labour Code, Article 237).
While the likelihood of discrimination in rates of pay for the same job 
can be reduced by the legislative guarantees, social attitudes and norms, as 
well as segregation of the labour force, may still lead to lower wage out­
comes for women. This has been the case in Western countries, where the 
enactment of equal pay legislation has narrowed but not eliminated gender 
wage differences (see, for example, Rummery 1992; Miller 1994; and Wooden 
1998 on Australia).23 There are different types of segregation: horizontal - 
where women and men are concentrated in different sectors - and vertical 
segregation - where women axe concentrated in the job hierarchy in positions 
involving less skill and responsibility.24 Measures of occupational segrega­
tion, like those presented for a range of countries by Blau and Ferber (1992, 
Table 10.2), are unfortunately not available for Uzbekistan.25 Other evidence
22 Article 6 reads as follows:
“All citizens have equal opportunities to acquire and practice employment rights. The 
setting of any limitations or preferences in the sphere of labour relations with regard to 
sex, age, nationality... and such circumstances unconnected with the work qualifications 
of the worker and his/her work performance is not permissable and is discriminatory” (see 
Marnie 1998, p .l).
23In Sweden, perhaps the most progressive industrial country in terms of egalitarian 
public policies between women and men in the family and in the workplace, the gender 
wage gap is still 10 percent (Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993, p. 235).
24 There is empirical support for the argument that work in female-dominated occupa­
tions is undervalued relative to work undertaken in male occupations: see, for example, 
evidence for Australia in Miller (1994) who concluded that this amounted to about 40 
percent of the gender wage gap.
25 An index of segregation is computed using ILO data, equal to the percentage of one 
group that would have to change jobs in order for the occupational distribution of men 
and women to be the same. It ranges from 9.7 in China to 62.3 in Qatar. The measured
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does nonetheless suggest substantial gender segregation in the former Soviet 
labour market and in transition Uzbekistan.
Based on the analysis of four decades of Soviet census data, McAuley 
(1981, Table 4.1) found that rising female labour force participation had 
been associated with an expansion of the sorts of jobs regarded as women’s 
work, into which women were concentrated -  in the USSR as a whole in 1970, 
54 percent of manual, and 47 percent of non-manual female employees in the 
non-agricultural sector were engaged in industries where over 75 percent of 
the workforce was female. McAuley (1981) concluded that occupational seg­
regation was the primary source of earnings disparities, and that segregation 
persisted because of the differences in the type of educational qualifications 
acquired, the difficulties in reconciling paid work and domestic responsibili­
ties, and limitations on job choice imposed by protective legislation.
There is evidence that women have become increasingly concentrated into 
the worst paid (and traditionally female) parts of the Uzbek economy dur­
ing the transition.26 According to official employment statistics (quoted by 
Expert Centre 1998), the share of women working in the health sector rose 
from 15 to 19 percent between 1991 and 1996 and the share working in ed­
ucation rose from 20 to 30 percent; while the share working in industry fell 
from 26 to 19 percent. Health and education were traditionally favoured 
by women since the jobs offered the prospect of greater flexibility with re­
spect to domestic responsibilities (McAuley 1981; Marnie 1998). Even in the 
female-dominated fields, however, women are under-represented at manage­
rial levels. In Fergana oblast, for example, women represent 79 percent of 
those employed in the health sector, but only 16 percent of managers in the 
sector (Expert Centre 1998).
Thus differences between women and men in the labour market may arise
extent of segregation is obviously sensitive to the size of occupational groupings.
26 Also, Marnie (1998) suggests that the requirement that jobs be reserved via quota for 
disadvantaged women means that enterprises offer the most unattractive jobs which most 
would not prepared to take up.
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as a result of differences on the supply-side, as well as discrimination against 
women. In Uzbekistan, as in Western economies, women and men in the 
labour force may differ in terms of their education, experience, sector of 
employment and so on.2. Traditional gender roles and expectations about 
family size may well affect earnings outcomes, in a variety of ways. Women 
may choose occupations and careers that allow them to juggle family respon­
sibilities, and they may invest less in human capital because they expect 
greater interruptions to labour force participation over their working life. If 
they give greater priority to family concerns over career, women may restrict 
their hours and work schedules as well as their availability for travel.28
Comparison of the observed characteristics of the female and male sam­
ples in Uzbekistan in 1995 shows several key differences in the means. Most 
notably, women have, on average, less than half the number of years of ex­
perience and a lower share with university education (16 versus 21 percent). 
There is a greater concentration of women in the sample into employment in 
the state sector, and fewer in private and military and other types employ­
ment.
In the empirical economics literature, the most popular approach to ac­
counting for gender differences in earnings has been to adopt the method­
ology of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), and decompose the overall gap 
into explained (differences in observed productivity characteristics) and un­
explained parts. This methodology, and its main weaknesses, are set out in 
the next section before going on to applications.
8.5 .2  M o d els  o f  W age D iscrim in ation
Writings on lower pay for women can be traced back to early religious ref­
erences, nineteenth century writings of John Stuart Mill and a number of
2' Blau and Ferber (1992, Chapter 6) provide a useful review of the evidence on supply- 
side explanations, especially for the US.
28 In Uzbekistan, these priorities are supported by protective legislation, but may 
nonetheless restrict women to certain kinds of (generally lower-paid) jobs.
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British commentators in the early twentieth century.29 The empirical evi­
dence suggests that there are pay differences between men and women that 
are not accounted for by (potential) productivity differences.30 Economists 
have developed a variety of models that may be used to analyse these dif­
ferences, including models based on “tastes” for discrimination, “statistical” 
discrimination and overcrowding. Each of these models is briefly reviewed 
before going on to present the usual approach to decomposition of the gender 
wage gap.31 For the most part, these explanations are not mutually exclu­
sive and each may shed light on the nature and impact of labour market 
discrimination on women’s earnings (Blau and Ferber 1992, p. 200).
Tastes fo r  D iscrim ination
The foundation for the modern neoclassical analysis of labour market dis­
crimination was laid by Becker (1957). In his work, discrimination arises 
because of individual “tastes” -  an employer who does not want to employ 
women is willing to “either pay or forfeit income for this privilege” (Becker 
1957, p.14).32 Becker suggested that a discrimination coefficient could be 
conceived as the net cost to the employer associated with employing women, 
which included the wage paid plus the disutility caused by the presence of 
women.
In this framework, discrimination can be measured as the difference be­
tween the equilibrium wage rates of men and women, and equilibrium wage 
rates for men and women in the absence of discrimination. More formally, 
assuming perfect substitutability in production between women and men, 
this can be written as:
DC Wf
29See Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993, pp. 210-212 for an interesting overview.
30Blau and Ferber 1992, p. 199.
3LThis section draws on Blau and Ferber (1992), pp. 199-218.
32 In addition to the tastes of employers, co-workers and/or customers may also have 
potentially discriminatory tastes. See Blau and Ferber (1992) pp. 205-208.
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The discrimination coefficient (DC) is the difference between the equilibrium 
wage rates of men (Wm) and women (W f), and equilibrium wage rates for 
men (W and women (Wf)  in the absence of discrimination. One implica­
tion of tastes antithetical to women is that the demand curve for women’s 
labour would shift inward to compensate for the associated psychic cost.33 
Among the contributions of the Becker model is the idea that discrimina­
tion is potentially measurable on a continuous scale, and later analyses have 
developed this point.34
Statistical D iscrim ination
Models of statistical discrimination developed by Phelps (1972) and others35 
attribute the existence of discrimination to decision-making under condi­
tions of incomplete information. Decisions about hiring and promotion can 
be costly in the sense that fixed recruitment and training costs are involved. 
In such a situation, employers use any readily available information to aid 
in their decisions. If they believe that, on average, women are more likely 
than men to have career breaks, statistical discrimination against individual 
women may result.^ Employers may systematically overstate the costs of 
employing women -  for example, their perception of differences in quit likeli­
hoods and labour turnover rates between the sexes may be wrong. Nonethe­
less if an employer believes that for a given level of educational qualifications, 
women as a group are less likely to remain with the firm than men, then the
33 A number of other predictions are associated with the model -  for example, if women’s 
wages are lower than men’s, under the assumption of perfect substitutability in produc­
tion, then the higher the percentage of men in the labour force, the lower the firm’s 
profits would be (indeed, the profits of the discriminating employer will become negative 
before the workforce becomes all-male). Another implication is that in the long run un­
der perfect competition, the discriminating employer will be driven out of the market by 
non-discriminating employers: see Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993), p. 213-216.
34 At the same time, among the shortcomings of the Becker aproach is that discrimination 
is simply assumed to exist, but its origins are neglected (Dex, 1986, p.21).
3oSee, for example, Arrow (1973); Aigner and Cain (1977).
36This has been shown to be the case in Australia, for example: see Chapman, 1984.
314 CHAPTER 8. EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
employer would hire the woman only at a lower wage (or perhaps simply hire 
a man instead).37
In Uzbekistan, women on average tend to have discontinuous work attach­
ment (Chapter 6). Although employers only bear part of the direct monetary 
cost of maternity leave (the rest being paid by social insurance funds), they 
may well prefer to employ individuals who are unlikely to take leave to bear 
and raise children. There is anecdotal evidence that, while there is officially 
no discrimination in hiring practices, employers in the public and private 
sectors try to avoid hiring women of child-bearing age because of the very 
generous maternity leave and various rights accorded to women with children 
(Marnie 1998).
One important distinction between statistical discrimination and discrim­
ination based on tastes is that, in the former model, discrimination is not 
likely to be eroded by the forces of competition. Employer thinking based on 
stereotypes is discriminatory (and contrary to the provision of the Labour 
Code in Uzbekistan), but it is nonetheless based on employers’ correct as­
sessment of average gender differences.
Ov ercrowding
This model, attributed to Bergmann (1974), demonstrates that regardless of 
the sources of gender segregation in the workforce, the consequence may be a 
female-male wage differential. The argument is that the relative oversupply 
of women in certain sectors of the labour force will tend to push down the 
wage in those sectors. This can arise if, for example, job opportunities in 
the female sector are small relative to the supply of women available for such 
work (see Blau and Ferber 1992, p. 214).
The overcrowding model is consistent with the evidence that has been
3 As noted by Blau and Ferber (1992, p. 210), the effects of statistical discrimination 
are particularly pernicious when there are feedback effects. If women are given low paid 
jobs and given less training, they have less incentive to stay, thus reinforcing employer 
expectations of “unstable” behaviour.
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presented about the Uzbek labour market: women are concentrated into 
certain sectors, which tend to be low paid. One important development in the 
transition, noted in Chapter 3, has been the demechanisation of agriculture: 
manual cotton picking has traditionally (and still is) considered to be a female 
job (Expert Centre 1998, Chapter 4). However the overcrowding model does 
not explain why women are concentrated into certain sectors -  in Uzbekistan, 
women may be trading higher wages and steeper earnings profiles for job 
conditions that allow them to balance home responsibilities, for example. 
Nor does the model explain why women are so under-represented at higher 
levels even within these sectors.
8 .5 .3  D eco m p o sitio n  M eth o d o lo g y
This section presents the most commonly used approach to decomposing the 
gender wage gap, which is applied in the next section to the Uzbek data. 
Blinder (1973) developed an approach which decomposed into two parts: 
the first, attributable to differences in individual characteristics, and the 
second, to differences in treatment.
Earnings equations, similar in form to those estimated in Section 8.2, are 
constructed separately for men and women, as follows:
n
3 =  1
n
ln W? = a ” '  + Y /ßTXTi+£? (8-3)
3 =1
where a  is a constant term, X  is a vector of individual characteristics and 
ß's are the returns to those characteristics, and e is an error term.38 The two
jS An alternative approach is to simply add a sex dummy to a pooled earnings regression 
model. The coefficient on the sex dummy shows whether, on average, women recieve lower 
pay than men, other things being equal. However this model constrains the values on the 
other explanatory variables (such as education and experience) to be the same for men 
and women. Since sex-specific earnings functions have significantly different coefficients
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regressions must have a strictly comparable specification, that is the number 
and type of variables should be the same in the female and male equations.
Utilising the regression property that the error term has a mean value of 
zero, the predicted difference in the mean log wages can be decomposed as 
(Oaxaca 1973):
Adopting matrix notation, this can be further decomposed as:
ßmX m -  ß f X f = ßm(Xrn -  X f ) +  X f (ßm -  ß f )
(8.4)
(8.5)
or
ß mX m -  ß f X ‘ =  ß ' ( X m-  X f ) + X m( / r  -  ßf)  (8.6)
The first term on the right-hand side shows the contribution of differences 
in endowments or characteristics to the wage differential. The second term 
reflects that part of the overall differential attributable to differing returns 
to those characteristics, or unjustified “discrimination".
While this decomposition approach has been widely adopted in empirical 
labour economics, it is useful to recall several caveats:
First, the second component of the decomposition equations (8.5 and 8.6), 
that is (X^ß™ — ßf),  or X m(ßTn — ßf )) is simply a residual; for this to be an 
exact measure of discrimination all of the factors that determine the wage 
must have been included in the model. In fact, that will typically not be 
true -  in the present case the adjusted R2 is about .39 -  so that the residual 
will reflect the omitted influences as well. As Cotton (1988, p. 237) notes, 
this is a long standing problem and nothing very much can be done except 
to recognise the caution needed in our interpretation of the results.
(as shown for Uzbekistan in Section 8.2 above), the pooled approach would in general lead 
to biased results.
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Second, it is immediately clear that equations 8.5 and 8.6 do not produce 
the same results. The former decomposition evaluates the components as 
if women were paid as men, whereas the latter assumes that men are paid 
as women. This is a common problem with index numbers. Jones (1983) 
and others have noted that the “decomposition depends critically upon the 
reference point from which the differences are calculated.” It is not a pri­
ori known whether a decomposition based on female means will produce 
higher or lower estimates of discrimination than a decomposition based on 
male means. It depends on the relative positions and shapes of the female 
and male earnings functions. If the male earnings function lies above the 
female function and has a steeper slope, then the female weighted estimate 
of discrimination will be larger (Sloan 1985).
This is shown graphically in Figure 8.2. The horizontal axis measures 
productivity characteristics (e.g. education in terms of years of schooling) 
and the vertical axis measures wages. A stylised case is presented, where the 
male earnings function has both a higher intercept and steeper slope than the 
female function. Let X*  and X m be the average productivity characteristics 
(years of schooling) of women and men respectively, ß f and ßm are the 
returns to those characteristics (that is, the slopes of the functions).
The way Figure 8.2 is drawn suggests that women have lower earnings 
than men (Wm > W f ) for three reasons. Namely, because
(i) women have fewer years of schooling than men (X* < A 771);
(ii) their education attainments are rewarded less than men’s (ßTn > ß*)\
and
(iii) the intercept (constant term) is smaller for women (oT < am).
The measured extent of discrimination depends on whether it is assumed 
that, in the absence of discrimination, men would be paid as women, or 
vice versa. Alternatively, the structure of earnings that would prevail in the 
absence of discrimination might well lie somewhere in between (Cotton 1988). 
Each of these scenarios are shown in Figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2: Gender wage decomposition: hypothetical case
discrimination 
(femal freighted) ^ explained
explained
Productivity
characteristics
If no discrimination means that women should be paid as men, then their 
earnings would rise from ß*X* to ß ^ X T  That is, the returns to women’s ed­
ucation (X f ) would be equal to that accorded to men (ßm). This is evaluated 
at the position on the X axis that is equivalent to female average education 
( X *),which is referred to in the literature as the “male-weighted”case. The 
difference arising because of the differences in the ß's represents the “unex­
plained" part of the earnings gap. On the other hand, if no discrimination 
is taken to mean that men would be paid as if they were women, then the 
unexplained part is much larger (ßmX Tn — ß f X m). This is referred to in the 
literature as the “female-weighted” case.
Cotton (1988) pointed out that the standard Blinder-Oaxaca approach 
fails to portray the wage structure that would prevail in the absence of dis- 
crimination (-^yr), which was a critical element of Becker’s theory. He sug­
gested that, in reality, the preferred group is overvalued and the discrimi­
nated group is undervalued, and that the latter subsidises the former. In this
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case, in the absence of discrimination, neither the female nor male structure 
would prevail. This is illustrated in Figure 8.2 by the positions related to ß*. 
Under a “Cotton” scenario, women would be paid ß*X f , and men would be 
paid ß*Xm. In the analysis below, the possible range of discrimination effects 
are shown using the male and female-weighted cases as well as the so-called 
Cotton method.
A third caveat is that Becker’s assumption that women and men axe 
perfect substitutes in production underlies all the decomposition models, 
including Cotton’s.39 This assumption may be problematic if women and men 
have very different characteristics, and work in very different types of jobs. In 
the US, for example, women are more likely to work in the state sector, since 
they attach greater weight to job security and related benefits. In Uzbekistan, 
large average family size and extensive maternity leave entitlements mean 
that women tend to have fewer years of experience; women in Uzbekistan 
are also more likely to work in the state sector, and especially in social 
services, while evidence from elsewhere in the Soviet Union suggests that 
women attach greater importance to job security and non-pecuniary aspects 
of work than men, even at the expense of higher earnings.40
Just how different the characteristics and jobs have to be to overturn the 
assumption of perfect substitution is a 'priori unclear. However this point 
calls for caution in the interpretation of the decomposition results: the de­
composition may not cast much light on the “true” extent of discrimination 
in the labour market since the differences arise in the respective “choices” of 
their X ’s (such as the level of experience and occupation).41 In the present 
analysis, occupational controls are not available beyond broad sectoral break-
39 This is also generally true of the models of discrimination that were reviewed in the 
previous section.
40 Evidence for Russia is presented in Zubova and Kovalyova, Chapter 10 in Klugman 
(ed.) (1997).
41 While occupational outcomes do reflect choices, rarely are these choices unconstrained. 
In this sense, it is reasonable to assume that the distribution of women and men across 
occupations is given (see Miller, 1994; Wooden, 1998).
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downs. The inclusion of more detailed occupational dummies would increase 
the proportion of the pay gap attributed to occupational segregation (or 
discrimination) (Blau and Ferber 1992, p. 197).
This raises a more fundamental problem that is inherent in the conven­
tional decomposition methodology. Differences in individual characteristics 
(“endowments”) are considered to be non-discriminatory, but this assump­
tion is open to criticism. Most obviously, women tend to have less labour 
force experience and on-the-job training because they undertake the bulk 
of domestic responsibilities. They may also participate less in the labour 
market because of lower expected earnings -  raising a “chicken-or-the-egg” 
problem (Gronau 1988). This is also known as “feedback effects”.42 Societal 
discrimination and employee expectation of future labour market discrimi­
nation may induce differences in factor endowments (Goldin and Polachek 
1987, p. 144).
Another practical problem with the conventional gender wage decompo­
sition is that Mincerian experience is used as a proxy for time in the labour 
force. It has been widely recognised that this will tend to over-estimate ac­
tual labour market experience for women (see Kidd and Shannon 1997, and 
references therein). Yet the studies of the gender wage gap in transition that 
have been undertaken to date have ignored this problem. The investigations 
of the Russian gender wage gap undertaken by both Newell and Reilly (1996) 
and Glinskaya and Mroz (1997) use age rather than a closer measure of true 
female experience. In the next section the implications of mismeasurement 
of female experience are investigated for the case of Uzbekistan.
8.5.4 Decomposition Results
In this section, the results of Chapter 6 are reviewed before going on to 
decompose the wage gap using alternative measures of experience. A com­
parison of the results from a basic OLS regression of the female log wage on
42As already noted above. See Blau and Ferber (1992), pp 217-218.
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years of school and “experience” (Table 6.6) showed that the imputed experi­
ence term affects not only estimates of the average amount of experience, but 
also the returns to experience. The measure of imputed experience suggests 
that women, on average, have far fewer years in employment, which in turn 
significantly increased the estimated returns to experience. Age and Min- 
cerian experience as a proxy for time in employment suggests that additional 
years on average bring less than a 0.5 percent increase in wages (though in 
both cases the term is very insignificant).43
A comparison of the estimation results shows that the imputed experience 
term has substantial repercussions not only for the estimated size of returns 
to experience, but also for returns to education. Table 8A.7 in the appendix 
presents extended models of earnings determination using alternative mea­
sures of experience. The first two columns show the female coefficients. At 
every level of education, the returns to education are much higher in Model 
A, which is based on imputed experience. This is more pronounced here 
than was evident in Chapter 6 from the comparison of the basic models with 
a continuous years of schooling variable (Table 6.6). The coefficient on the 
term indicating the presence of young children in the household turns from 
negative in the Mincerian model (Model B) to positive in Model A. On the 
other hand, the coefficients on the other variables -  sector, region, ethnicity 
and arrears - are not much affected.
The differences in the coefficients in the two models will affect the es­
timated extent of discrimination in the labour market. Two models of the 
Oaxaca decomposition are estimated: the first (Model A) uses imputed ex­
perience and the second (Model B), a Mincerian proxy. Male and female 
earnings are regressed separately on a vector of variables that includes the 
relevant measure of experience and its cubic, and dummies for the level of 
education, marital status, ethnicity, sector of employment and location. Two
43 By way of contrast, a study of the gender wage gap in Australia presents coefficient es­
timates for experience that are broadly similar across the alternative definitions (Rummery 
1992, p. 360).
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alternative base cases are presented in Table 8.9. It is assumed that in the ab­
sence of discrimination, either the male wage would prevail (male weighted), 
or that the female wage would prevail (female weighted).
Table 8.9: Decomposition results: Oaxaca-Blinder method
Model A Model B
ßmX m 7.91 7.91
ßmX ! 6.02 6.73
X f ß f 6.45 6.08
ß ’X m 7.65 6.18
Unexplained (%)
Male weighted -28.7 35.0
Female weighted 18.0 95.0
The differences between Model A and Model B are immediately obvious: 
under Model B, women would be paid over 10 percent more if their char­
acteristics were rewarded as men’s ß171 > ß ^ X ?); whereas under Model 
A, they would receive less ( X f ß m < ß f X f ). This affects the assessed extent 
of discrimination in earnings. However the results are also sensitive to the 
structure of wages that is assumed to prevail in the absence of discrimination, 
as discussed below.
The rows labelled “unexplained” show the percentage of the wage gap that 
is due to the difference in returns: that is, X^ß™ — ß f ) / (ßrnX m — ß * Xf ) and 
X rn{ßf — ßm)/(ß TnX m — ß f X f ), for the cases of male and female weighted 
estimations, respectively. One example is derived here for the purpose of 
exposition. If the female structure of wages is assumed to prevail in the 
absence of discrimination -  that is, that discrimination implied that there 
was aversion to women, as well as favouritism toward men - then in Model 
A, the unexplained part of the gap can be calculated simply as:
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The results for the other cases are presented in Table 8.9. (The vectors of 
male and female characteristics are presented in Table 8A.7 in the appendix.)
The situation can be depicted graphically to illustrate how Uzbekistan 
differs from the preceding stylised case (Figure 8.3). By way of contrast to 
Figure 8.2, this figure suggests that men are paid more than women {Wm > 
W f ) for two basic reasons:
(i) women have a lower level of productivity characteristics than men ( X f 
< X m)- and
(ii) their characteristics are rewarded less than men’s (ß m > ßl).
If no discrimination is taken to mean that men would be paid as if they 
were women, then the unexplained part is sizeable (and is shown by the 
difference between ßmX m and ßf X m).
Note, however, that the constant term is not smaller for women; rather, 
oA > a 771.44 This raises a somewhat unexpected scenario. If no discrimination 
was taken to mean that women should be paid as if they were men, then their 
earnings would actually fall, from ßf X f  to ßmX f . This difference represents 
the “unexplained” part of the earnings gap in the male-weighted case.
The adjustment of experience makes an enormous difference to the esti­
mated extent of discrimination in the labour market. The hypothesis was 
that the use of Mincerian experience would greatly inflate the estimated ex­
tent of discrimination. When the Oaxaca decomposition is re-estimated ac­
cording to Model B, this is indeed the case. The assessed extent of unjustified 
discrimination increases dramatically for both the male- and female-weighted 
cases. In the former, the results suggest that the unexplained component 
accounts for over nine-tenths of the difference in female and male wages. 
Similarly, Rummery (1992) found that decomposition based on Mincerian 
experience attributed virtually the entire wage gap to discrimination.
The results for Model A, when the male-weighted structure is assumed to
44 Typically the intercept term is shown to be higher for men: see, eg, Goldin and 
Polachek (1987) and Rummery (1992).
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Figure 8.3: Gender wage decomposition: Uzbekistan, 1995
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be the non-discriminatory norm, indicate that men have “superior” observed 
endowments to women. In particular, in Model A, men have about twice as 
much measured experience as women. In this scenario, there is no adverse 
treatment of women: indeed if women were rewarded as if they were men, 
their earnings would fall. The more detailed decomposition presented in the 
appendix (Table 8A. 7) shows where the differences arise.
However even more striking than the differences associated with alterna­
tive measures of experience is the arbitrariness of the conventional Blinder- 
Oaxaca decomposition. Table 8.9 highlights a huge range of measured dis­
crimination depending upon whether a male or female weighted structure of 
wages is assumed to exist in the absence of discrimination. Indeed, under 
Model A, the unexplained portion entirely disappears in the male-weighted 
case. Such large differences between the female and male wage structures 
suggest that their labour markets are segmented. Labour market segmenta­
tion makes the application and interpretation of the traditional decomposi­
tion problematic -  is it appropriate to assume that men (women) are being 
treated like women (men) if the labour market (s) in this economy would not?
Recall that a basic assumption of Becker’s (1957) analysis that enabled 
the quantification of discrimination in the labour market was that men and 
women are perfectly substitutable in production. In the present case, oc­
cupational segregation may be so extensive as to overturn this assumption. 
Earlier studies of the Soviet labour market have documented the female dom­
inance of low-paid jobs and low paid sectors (see, e.g., McAuley 1981 and 
Katz 1994).
The extreme sensitivity of the results to the choice between the male and 
female weighted estimations suggests that alternative approaches should be 
tested. Cotton (1988) set out an approach that uses the weighted average of 
the male and female estimations. More formally:
ln W™ -  ln W {  =  ß ' { X f  -  X j )  + X f ( ß f  -/?*) +  X j (/?* -  /?/) (8.7)
where ß * represents the “non-discriminatory” wage structure which lies some-
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where between the current male and female wage structures (Cotton 1988, 
p. 239). It is assumed that this wage structure would be some function of 
the forces that currently determine the male and female wage structures, and 
will be closer to the wage structure which accounts for the majority of the 
labour force. Specifically,
ß* = f mßm +  f f ß f
where f m and f f  are the employment shares of men and women respec­
tively.45
The results of this extension are presented in Table 8.10. (The terms 
X f ßT,  X f ß f , ß r x m, and ßf X m are unchanged.)
Table 8.10: Decomposition results: Cotton method
Model A Model B
ß*X m 7.04 6.56
ß 'X * 5.56 5.85
Unexplained (%) -1.3 60.7
By construction, the Cotton decomposition suggests that in each model 
(A and B), the extent of discrimination lies somewhere between that found 
in the male-weighted and female-weighted cases. It still indicates that an 
imputed measure of experience for women in Uzbekistan that takes intermit­
tent workforce attachment into account will dramatically reduce, and indeed 
eliminate, the assessed extent of unexplained gender wage differences. These 
comparisons suggest that an appropriate measure of female labour force is 
important. Mismeasurement will not only bias our estimated returns to ex­
perience, but also assessments of, inter alia, the extent of discrimination in 
the labour market.
4oA further assumption implicit in this assumption, as noted by Cotton (1988) is that 
neither total actual output nor the total wage bill would change in the absence of discrim­
ination. The only effect would be a redistribution of income and jobs (p. 240).
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8.6 C onclusions
This chapter has investigated a range of extensions and applications of the 
basic model that was introduced in Chapter 5.
The first section introduced a range of extra controls to the basic model. 
This built on the analysis in Part I and Chapter 5 which suggested the impor­
tance of ethnicity and regional differentiation in Uzbekistan. The analysis, 
undertaken separately for men and women, provides a number of important 
insights into the determinants of earnings in Uzbekistan and, for the first 
time, quantifies their significance.
For both men and women, the estimates showed significant effects for 
the regional and ethnic dummies. There is a premium associated with living 
in the capital; somewhat less expected was the finding that Fergana has a 
larger negative effect than the better-known poor region of KKP. The data 
suggests that the traditional advantages associated with Slavic ethnicity have 
persisted since independence from Moscow. This somewhat surprising result 
could be explained in terms of the selection effects resulting from the large- 
scale migration of Russians since the early 1990s.
The sectoral effects confirmed the picture that was presented in P akt I: 
higher earnings are associated with all sectors of employment relative to the 
agricultural kolkhoz. An arrears dummy had large and significant negative 
effects, and interaction terms were used to indicated that the negative effect 
of arrears was compounded for residents of Fergana and non-Uzbeks.
The results of the extended model for women in many ways mirrored that 
for men, although in several cases the orders of magnitude differed. Women 
exhibit higher returns to university education than men, a phenomenon which 
is not uncommon in international studies, and reasons for this are advanced. 
The negative effect of arrears is also larger for women than for men. The 
picture overall suggests that many of the effects of transition have either been 
more adverse, or at least less advantageous, for women. The continuing gap 
between men and women’s average earnings was investigated in Section 8.5.
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The next task was to explore the apparent peculiarities in the returns to 
education in Uzbekistan. The question investigated was whether or not there 
were gains associated with completion (a “diploma effect”), over and above 
the productivity gains associated with an additional year of education. Such 
effects, known as “sheepskin effects” have been found to exist in a range of 
industrial and developing countries, although there are no published studies 
for transition economies. The data set allowed the differences associated with 
actual completion to be investigated, in contrast to a number of international 
studies that had to impute completion from information about the number 
of years of schooling completed. The differences between completion and 
non-completion were tested and found to be statistically insignificant. This 
analysis confirmed that pooling of individuals with complete and incomplete 
education at each of the respective level is the appropriate approach.
Section 8.4 investigated the possibility of statistically significant differ­
ences in the returns to human capital between those individuals who are 
affected by arrears, and those who are not. Estimation of separate earnings 
functions for the two groups (and by sex) suggests that there are large dif­
ferences in the returns to education and experience. However formal testing 
of the observed differences, by way of an F, or Chow-type test, reveals that 
the differences are not statistically significant. These results confirm that 
the appropriateness of the modelling approach adopted in this thesis, which 
pools individuals regardless of whether or not they have been affected by 
arrears.
The final section has shown the sensitivity of estimates of wage discrimi­
nation to the measure of female experience. An imputed measure of female 
experience, derived in Chapter 6, was applied to illustrate its importance for 
the estimates of unexplained gender wage differences in the labour market. 
The exercise suggested two main results. First, the use of Mincerian experi­
ence, or age, in earnings functions for women in the former Soviet republic 
of Uzbekistan, and by implication, in the Russian Federation and elsewhere,
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will tend to overestimate the extent of gender discrimination in the labour 
market. Second, the extreme sensitivity of any conclusions about the ex­
tent of discrimination to the method of gender wage decomposition used 
demonstrates the need for caution in drawing any firm conclusions about the 
magnitude of discrimination using conventional methods.
From a policy perspective, some tentative conclusions are possible about 
gender differences in wages. The education system appears to have pro­
vided equitable access for men and women, at least relative to neighbouring 
countries outside the Soviet bloc at similar levels of per capita income (Falk- 
ingham et al. 1997). The main exception was at the tertiary level. This 
could be cause for concern given the evidence about the earnings advantages 
accruing to university graduates presented in Chapter 7.
Overall, the differences in characteristics between men and women are 
the primary source of earnings differences. In particular the tendency to­
ward large families and the associated discontinuities in female labour force 
participation are an important difference between male and female produc­
tivity profiles.
Caution is however needed in interpreting the results about the appar­
ently extent of discrimination in the Uzbek labour market. The fact that 
women do have extensive interruptions to their working careers may be at­
tributable, at least in part, to lower earnings expectations. The possibility 
of feedback effects in the generation of discrimination in the labour market 
was discussed. In this sense, government efforts to promote family planning, 
which have already been associated with marked declines in the fertility rate 
since independence (Klugman and Schieber 1997) could help to raise women’s 
earnings in the long term.
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8. A  Appendix
Table 8A.1: Extended male model, with quadratic experience
Coefficient t -statistic
Experience
exp 0.048 5.47
exp2/100 -.601 -4.91
Education (relative to primary or less)
high 0.175 1.12
college 0.245 1.51
vocational 0.257 1.58
university 0.477 3.01
arrears -.338 -6.07
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic 0.159 2.40
Non-Uzbek 0.247 0.450
Sector (relative to kolkhoz)
State 0.517 7.88
Private 0.714 7.77
military 1.16 9.29
non-wage benefits .024 0.42
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Fergana -0.327 -6.12
KKP -0.263 -3.95
Constant 5.04 24.38
N 925
7f 0.3437
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Table 8A.2: Extended female model, with quadratic experience
Coefficient t-statistic
Experience
exp 0.172 1.56
exp2/100 -0.04 -0.93
Education (relative to primary or less)
high 0.181 0.83
college .406 1.80
vocational 0.389 1.73
university 0.604 2.70
arrears -.417 -7.43
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic 0.087 1.37
non-Uzbek 0.083 1.43
Sector (relative to kolkhoz)
State 0.469 6.20
Private 0.559 4.96
Military 0.775 2.81
non-wage benefits -0.021
COCO
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Fergana -0.237 -4.20
KKP -0.239 -3.63
Constant 5.45 23.4
N 685
~R2 .435
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Table 8A.3: Quadratic model with interaction terms:
Coefficient t-statistic
Experience
exp 0.013 1.276
exp2/100 -.034 -0.75
Education (relative to elementary or less)
high 0.293 1.30
college 0.449 2.12
vocational 0.458 2.00
university 0.728 3.10
arrears 0.405 1.81
Ethnicity (relative to Uzbek)
Slavic 0.112 1.78
Other non-Uzbek 0.171 2.82
Sector (relative to kolkhoz)
State -.092 -0.61
Private 0.379 2.15
Military 0.421 1.44
In on-w age b en efit -.065 -1.05
Region (relative to Tashkent)
Fergana -.440 -2.58
KKP -.332 -5.03
Interaction terms
non- Uzbek * arrears -.453 -3.32
Fergana* arrears -.900 -6.76
State* Fergana 0.356 2.06
Hire*Fergana -.637 -2.42
Yrsch* arrears -.030 -1.78
Constant 5.68 20.51
N 685
~R2 .436
women
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Table 8A.4: Fully interacted model: men
Coefficient t-statistic
experience 0.092 3.23
exp2/100 -.210 -2.40
exp3/100 0.000 1.70
high 0.137 .86
college 0.190 1.13
vocational 0.206 1.23
university 0.429 2.55
arrears -590 -2.15
Slavic 0.285 1.34
non-Uzbek 0.089 1.40
State 0.225 1.52
Private 0.556 3.80
Military 1.06 8.17
Non wage benefit 0.019 0.34
Fergana -.472 -3.05
KKP -.369 -2.32
Interaction terms
Slavic* arrears 0.010 .05
non-Uzbek * arrears -.207 -1.66
State*arrears 0.305 2.31
Fergana* arrears -.452 -2.57
KKP* arrears -.109 -.63
State* Fergana 0.238 1.47
State*KKP 0.054 0.33
Hire* Fergana -.213 -.99
Experience* arrears 0.007 1.35
Yrsch* arrears 0.009 0.57
Yrsch* Slavic -.012 -.69
Constant 4.95 14.03
N 925
.3641
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Table 8A.5: Fully interacted model: women
Coefficient t-statistic
experience 0.045 1.83
exp2/100 -.407 -1.58
exp3/100 0.011 1.49
high 0.352 1.54
college 0.547 2.30
vocational 0.519 2.19
university 0.805 3.34
arrears 0.353 1.28
Slavic 0.357 1.41
non-Uzbek 0.178 2.95
State -.088 -0.43
Private 0.246 1.20
Military 0.344 1.13
Non wage benefit -.055 -087
Fergana -.617 -2.80
KKP -.589 -3.01
Interaction terms
Slavic* arrears 0.046 -.20
non-Uzbek*arrears -.485 -3.43
State* arrears -.029 -.19
Fergana* arrears 0.801 -4.28
KKP* arrears 0.158 .94
State* Fergana 0.533 2.38
State*KKP 0.250 1.25
Hire* Fergana -.484 -1.70
Experience* arrears 0.001 -1.85
Yrsch* arrears 1 Ö CO y—* -1.85
Constant 5.74 18.24
N 685
7? .435
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Table 8A.6: Revised basic results, by sex
Men Women
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
experience 0.034 2.37 0.082 2.94
exp2/ 100 -.009 -1.48 -.776 -2.64
exp3/ 100 0.00 1.05 0.022 2.53
high 0.395 2.14 0.508 2.48
vocational 0.557 2.88 0.851 4.05
college 0.561 2.90 0.909 4.32
university 0.904 4.78 1.14 5.47
constant 5.542 27.00 5.18 24.00w
N
.173
724
0.176
708
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Table 8A.7: Decomposition with alternative experience measures
Coefficients Characteristics
A ( /? « “)) B {ß>^) Male ( T 1 X J
Experience
exp 0.063 0.006 0.092 9.4 (A) 30.2
exp2/100 -0.581 -0.01 -0.2 17.2 (B)
exp3/100 0.016 0 0
Education
high 0.193 0.119 0.196 0.496 0.467
college 0.406 0.31 0.278 0.134 0.166
vocational 0.404 0.34 0.272 0.116 0.141
university 0.622 0.55 0.491 0.158 0.206
Arrears -.415 -0.43 -0.34 0.18 0.20
Ethnicity
Slavic 0.740 0.075 0.169 0.21 0.13
non-Uzbek 0.093 0.078 0.044 0.26 0.25
Sector
state 0.477 0.504 0.535 0.833 0.76
private 0.572 0.586 0.716 0.054 0.09
military 0.803 0.817 1.19 0.006 0.03
Region
Fergana -0.227 -0.222 -0.324 0.33 0.35
KKP -0.239 -0.234 -0.161 0.21 0.24
Constant 5.36 5.47 4.58 1 1
Chapter 9
W ho G ets Paid in Transition?
9.1 Introduction
Payment arrears have become a widespread issue in a number of former Soviet 
countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. The 
phenomenon has on occasion threatened political stability (at least according 
to Western press reports about delays in payment of wages to Russian coal 
miners) and was cited as a prime reason for the dismissal of the entire Russian 
cabinet in March 1998, to take the best-known recent example. While the 
origins of arrears are beyond the scope of the present analysis, it is important 
to note that arrears pervade the enterprise and financial sectors, and the 
taxation system. For example, the IMF estimated that in late 1996 the stock 
of tax arrears had reached 3.5 percent of GDP, up from 2.5 percent in 1994 
and 1995. The focus here is on one, albeit important, aspect of the arrears 
problem, the late payment of wages.
Arrears in this context refer to non-payment of the contracted wage (see 
Chapter 5). Since wages are typically calculated on a monthly basis, arrears 
refer to payments not received in the month due. The payments may be 
received in a later month, in part or in full, or not at all. The key point from 
the perspective of wages and workers is that there is typically no indexation 
of payments if and when these are eventually made. In this context it is
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important to recall the high prevailing rates of inflation - in 1995, monthly 
inflation was running at about 13 percent.1
Arrears are generally thought to affect large numbers of workers in the for­
mer Soviet republics, although to date specific evidence has been scant. Offi­
cial data is typically limited to quantifying the aggregate amount of arrears. 
For example in March 1996, in the region of Karakalpakstan, Goskomprog- 
nostat estimated the extent of aggregate wage arrears to be about 20 percent 
of the wage fund (Klugman 1997a).
There is household level evidence that arrears have significant repercus­
sions for poverty and the distribution of income. In March 1996, in a sociolog­
ical survey of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm, 60 percent of respondents cited 
delayed payment of wages as ‘the most’ significant problem facing the family 
(Expert Centre 1996). A Ministry of Labour survey in Andizhan oblast in 
December 1996 found that 60 percent of households reported arrears, which 
represented, on average, 29 percent of their household budget. Beyond the 
inherent interest in the distributive effects of arrears, the phenomenon also 
casts light on the nature and scale of labour market adjustment in a country 
which has in several respects been somewhat of a puzzle for analysts (see 
Chapter 3). This study is the first to quantify the incidence and size of wage 
arrears in Uzbekistan, or indeed in any former Soviet republic.
Two studies have looked at wage arrears in the Russian Federation. The 
most useful analysis, Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1997), found that 
arrears affected about 37 percent of employees in 1996. Prevalence of arrears 
varied by region, and also by sector, with workers in mining, agriculture and 
manufacture being most often affected. Standing (1997) found that over 60 
percent of Russian enterprises reported that they had experienced “severe 
difficulty” in paying wages in mid-1994, up from about 47 percent in mid- 
1993, thus supporting union claims that millions of workers had not been
1 Annual inflation was running at 645, 534, 746 and 315 percent in the years 1992, 1993, 
1994 and 1995: see Chapter 3.
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paid the wages contracted.2
The analysis in this chapter is motivated by the need to understand what 
has become an integral part of the transition experience for workers. Al­
though arrears are pervasive in most of the fifteen former Soviet republics 
outside the Baltics, there is little systematic evidence about the distribution, 
size and consequences of arrears in wage payments. One problem with the 
surveys available for Russia, however, is that they indicate who is affected, 
but cannot identify the real value of the arrears.3
It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that arrears are a signif­
icant factor in explaining earnings outcomes. The data on arrears are of 
further interest in several respects, which fall broadly under the headings 
of incidence, size and consequences. The present data set allows a detailed 
investigation of arrears at the individual level, although unfortunately, there 
is no direct information at the firm-level that could be used to compliment 
this information. The chapter is structured as follows.
The institutional and economic framework within which arrears arise has 
key implications for the economic interpretation of arrears. This is reviewed 
in Section 9.2, where a conceptual framework for thinking about arrears is 
proposed. The chapter is then in a position to embark upon empirical analy­
sis, and investigate whether there are systematic patterns in the distribution 
of arrears. Adopting a two-step approach, the chapter employs multi-variate 
analysis to show who was affected by arrears (probit analysis), and second, 
among those affected, by how much (using OLS regression analysis).4 Section
2 These estimates are based on the Russian Labour Flexibility Survey, which covered 
about 400 establishments and was intended to be representative of the manufacturing 
industry in four oblasts (Moscow, St Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod and Ivanovo). See 
Standing, 1997.
3 Hence the effect on wages is indeterminate because it is not known by how much 
individuals are affected (the survey questions in the Russian case refer to aggregate ac­
cumulated arrears, rather than a specific period, so it difficult to interpret relative to the 
wage or whatever).
4 An alternative multi-variate approach would be to employ a Tobit, or censored regres­
sion, model (see Greene, 1994, pp. 694-696).
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9.3 describes the characteristics of the individuals experiencing wage arrears 
in June 1995. In Section 9.4 a probit model is estimated to isolate the impact 
of individual characteristics and to cast light on the alternative hypotheses 
set out in Section 9.2.
By how much are individuals being affected by arrears? From an individ­
ual and household perspective, the size of arrears is at least as important as 
whether or not one is affected. Section 9.5 examines the distributive reper­
cussions of arrears in greater detail, specifically, whether individuals at the 
bottom end of the distribution of contract wages are disproportionately af­
fected, as well as the contribution of arrears to the overall widening of the 
wage distribution during the transition. In Section 9.6, a regression model 
is estimated to trace the impact of observed characteristics on the extent of 
non-payment since, from the individual’s point of view, whether one is owed 
5 or 85 percent of the contract wage makes a substantial difference.
What are the consequences of arrears? The data allows an investigation 
of whether the potential welfare effects are alleviated by the receipt of non­
monetary benefits from the employer. For this reason, Section 9.7 examines 
whether the individuals in arrears are being otherwise compensated for their 
labour. A broader dimension of the consequences of arrears for the economy 
is considered in Section 9.8. Arrears imply substantial cuts in real labour 
costs in the economy, and matter for our understanding of the transition 
process in Uzbekistan because official data (reviewed in Chapter 3) have 
previously indicated that there have been only limited reductions in the real 
wage.
9.2 Institutionell and Econom ic C ontext
Broadly speaking, in the specific economic and institutional context of tran­
sition in Uzbekistan, arrears come about at two levels. First, at the firm 
level, enterprises are faced with shortages of funds to pay employees. It will
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be argued that the pattern of such shortages among firms is at least partly a 
product of government enterprise and financial policies. Second, within the 
firm, employers can discriminate among individuals as to whom should be 
paid in full. In the sections that follow, these patterns are first described, 
and then analysed and modelled more formally.
Before investigating the incidence and size of arrears, there is a need to 
clarify what types of economic interpretation and behaviour might be given 
to the results. This section provides a conceptual framework, a series of 
hypotheses to be tested, and some institutional background.
9.2.1 A Conceptual Framework
A conceptual framework for understanding how arrears arise in Uzbekistan 
can be presented as follows.
1. Arrears for any individual, regardless of their level of skill or contract 
wage, represent a reduction in their effective or net wage.
2. Such reductions can only be sustained -  that is, accepted by the 
employee — if the contract wage is above the worker’s reservation wage. In 
a competitive labour market, the reservation wage is equal to the worker’s 
marginal productivity (which is also equal to her alternative job option). 
Formal institutional norms and the legacy of old-style Soviet wage fixation 
which inhibit relative wage adjustments may account for contract wages being 
above marginal products for at least some workers and sectors in the economy. 
Alternatively, in the presence of worker immobility (due to, for example, 
housing costs) and other search costs (due to the relative isolation of rural 
workers, for example), the worker’s real wage may be below her marginal 
product. One would expect the latter scenario to have practical importance 
in the Uzbek context.
3. The question then arises, which workers have contract wages above 
their reservation wage (that is, assuming competitive conditions, above their 
marginal product)? The presence of arrears for some workers suggests that
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their contract wages are above their marginal products.
Proceeding from this conceptual framework, the empirical analysis ad­
dresses a series of behavioural hypotheses, specifically:
(i):  EFFICIENCY. Workers with characteristics associated with higher 
productivity and/or working in sectors that are doing relatively well are less 
likely to be in arrears. On the other hand, workers with low productivity char­
acteristics (who may have traditionally been relatively “overpaid”) and/or 
workers in poorly performing sectors are more likely to have contract wages 
above their marginal product. This comes about because formal and informal 
institutional constraints inhibit adjustment of the structure of wages that was 
inherited from the command economy. Potential productivity-related char­
acteristics are: level of education; age; sector of employment; and length of 
tenure.
The predicted effect of age is ambiguous. Increases in an employee’s age 
could either increase the value of that employee to the firm (given firm- 
specific experience) or reduce the employee’s value because her skills have 
been made redundant during the transition. The analysis in Chapter 7 sug­
gested that the age-earnings profile is rather flat, so that the latter effect 
might be expected to dominate. Similarly, the effect of short tenure could 
be to either increase or decrease the perceived value of the employee. Sector 
of employment effects could be interpreted as evidence of efficiency, or from 
a political economic perspective.
(il): POLITICAL ECONOMY, political economic considerations would sug­
gest that workers in Tashkent are less likely to be affected by arrears, insofar 
as the risk of collective urban discontent poses a greater threat to the regime 
than scattered rural workers. From a political economic perspective, the sec­
toral distribution of arrears could be taken to reflect the sectoral priorities of 
the government. In the latter case it is however difficult to separate political 
economy and productivity-related factors.
( i l l ) :  EMPLOYER BENEVOLENCE. Benevolent employers may take the
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potential social repercussions of arrears into account in determining the in­
cidence of non-payment. This is an indirect test of the extent to which 
employers are operating in a profit-maximising way. A number of dummy 
variables related to the individual’s personal characteristics can be included: 
specifically, ethnicity; marital status; number of children; and gender. Hav­
ing a second job might be evidence of employer benevolence, in allowing 
latitude to employees in augmenting their incomes outside the firm.
( i v )  : BARGAINING POWER. Workers with lower bargaining power are 
more likely to accept arrears rather than leave the firm. Proxies for the 
bargaining power of individual workers include: the level of contract wage 
relative to the poverty line, having a second job, and being on involuntary 
leave. It has already been noted that the labour market may not clear be­
cause of individual immobility and/or search costs, for example. Individual 
immobility has been a traditional trait of the rural regions of Uzbekistan 
(Lubin 1984).
( v )  : NON-WAGE COMPENSATION. The distribution of non-wage ben­
efits may offset the distribution of arrears. Non-wage benefits -  such as 
provision of private plots for farming to kolkhoz workers -  may be used by 
employers to secure worker attachment to the firm. This practice is however 
consistent with the employer benevolence, political economy and efficiency 
hypotheses. Benevolent employers and a government seeking to minimise the 
welfare impact of arrears could respectively rely upon, and encourage, non­
wage compensation. Alternatively, profit maximising firms with cash flow 
problems could seek to minimise worker turnover through the provision of 
such benefits.
Before proceeding to investigate these hypotheses, a consideration of the 
economic and institutional context is required.
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9 .2 .2  E x istin g  E v id en ce  and In stitu tio n a l F actors
The absence of specific information on the individual’s place of work in the 
present data set means that it is difficult to disentangle individual and firm- 
level factors. For example, the data does not allow a test of the hypothesis 
that wage arrears are essentially a firm-level phenomenon.* 5 If this hypoth­
esis were true, using individual-level data on workers to go beyond data 
description to develop a model of how and why arrears affect different types 
of workers would not be appropriate. There are, however, several counter 
arguments against such an assertion, as explained below.
First, there is anecdotal evidence that firms pay some workers contracted 
wages, but not others. Hence within the same firm, some workers are not paid 
at all in a given month, while others are paid most or all of their contracted 
wage. According to information provided by local experts, in the event of 
shortfalls in the wage fund in Uzbekistan the priority of payment is as fol­
lows: first, workers of the “administrative apparatus” (managers and office 
workers) are paid; second, engineers (so-called ITR- inzhenerno-tekhnichekie 
rabotniki; see Chapter 2); and finally, ordinary workers.6
This is consistent with a recent study of wage arrears in Russia, which 
found evidence that firms can to some degree discriminate among individuals 
when in comes to not paying wages (Lehmann et al 1997). Their conclusion 
was based on the fact that some demographic factors -  age, gender and educa­
tion -  had a statistically significant effect on the probability of a worker being 
in arrears, over and above controls for enterprise characteristics (specifically, 
size, sector and ownership) and region.
Second, within the conceptual framework presented above, the pattern of
°It is possible that certain firms in the economy suffer cash constraints (which might
arise from, for example, inter-enterprise arrears), in which event the firm reduces the wages
of all their staff.
6Personal communication: Alisher Ilkamov, Director, The Center for Social and Mar­
keting Research, Tashkent, known as the “Expert Centre,” which is the foremost indepen­
dent survey organisation in the country.
9.2. INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 345
arrears across worker types and across sectors could be consistent with the 
types of wage adjustment that might have been expected in an economy in 
transition. For example, less well educated workers may be disproportion­
ately affected by arrears if the structure of contract wages was previously 
“biased” in their favour, as the evidence in Chapter 2 suggested. If institu­
tional norms prevent changes in relative contract wages, the accumulation of 
wage arrears may be used by employers to effect the same result. Low-paid 
and low-skilled workers may also be perceived to be more easily replaced from 
the existing pool of unemployed. On the other hand, if low-skilled workers 
are already being paid their reservation wage (i.e. the lowest the firm can 
pay them), then the firm will be reluctant to impose arrears on this group.
Third, however, the specific post-Soviet context may affect employer de­
cisions. Even if contract wages exceed the marginal product of low skilled 
workers, Uzbek employers may not respond in a strictly profit-maximising 
fashion. Hence there will be counteracting forces if employers have benevo­
lent motives and take social and family-related factors into account. There 
is anecdotal evidence that this has occurred, on occasion, in Russia.1 *7 Earlier 
studies of firm employment decisions in the post-Soviet period have suggested 
the importance of benevolent motives (see Commander and Yemtsov 1997). 
This is reinforced in Uzbekistan by the continuation of legislative norms that 
accord social protection functions to employers with respect to disadvantaged 
groups in the economy (see Chapter 3). The operation of benevolent motives 
could be evidenced by the demographic characteristics of those affected by 
arrears, and/or by the effect of arrears being cushioned by employers through 
the provision of non-wage benefits.
1 For example, in one factory where the wage fund was only one-sixth of the contract
wages owed, a meeting of senior management and union representatives called by the
general manager agreed that senior managers would forego wages altogether and that
they were going to give most to low-income workers most in need (Standing, 1997, p.
383). A recent enterprise level survey in Russia provides further evidence of employer
paternalism, since employment maximisation was one of the two top goals of 27 percent
of enterprise directors (Ickes and Gaddy, 1998).
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Fourth, the large role of government in the economy and in particular 
in the labour market and the agricultural and financial sectors needs to be 
borne in mind. This will influence the behaviour of firms even if they are 
solely motivated by profits, and raises a key political economic dimension 
of transition. The objectives of government and the instruments that are 
employed to affect economic outcomes play a critical role in transition, espe­
cially in Uzbekistan given the gradual pace and partial extent of liberalisation 
that was reviewed in Chapter 3. The government has sought to distinguish 
its policies from those of neighbouring countries by stressing its desire to 
alleviate the social costs of transition. This is evidenced, for example, in the 
highly-publicised Presidential decrees at regular intervals announcing that all 
wages (and pensions) should rise by a certain proportion. In the early part 
of the transition, firms with insufficient funds to finance the mandated wage 
increase had recourse to government loans (World Bank 1994), although this 
practice ceased following stabilisation of the economy in late 1994.
Government decisions about credit allocation and payment for state or­
ders have critical implications for the capacity of firms to pay contract wages. 
The financial sector is very much state dominated, and bank credit deci­
sions are still largely subject to Government direction (World Bank 1996c; 
FAPU/TACIS 1997).8 The kolkhozes are also vulnerable to state decisions 
about payment, since the bulk of cotton and grain output at the time of the 
survey was subject to compulsory procurement. The extraction of surplus 
from agriculture, through the implementation of state orders and delayed 
payment for procured output, has made an important contribution to gov­
ernment revenues in Uzbekistan through the transition (Herman 1998; IMF 
1997). In this sense, even if wage arrears are a firm-specific phenomenon, 
they might basically reflect government policy decisions about which firms 
ought to be able to pay their wage obligations. Hence, if there are significant
8There have been serious problems with access to deposits, and even greater ones with 
respect to credit, for individual customers and small enterprises (World Bank 1998a). See 
also Lubin and Zholdasov (1998).
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regional and sectoral patterns in the distribution of wage arrears, it may be 
appropriate to interpret these in a political economic framework.
While the individual worker always has the option of leaving the firm, 
a number of authors have pointed to reasons motivating individual workers 
to remain formally attached to the firm, even if they are not paid (see also 
Chapter 3, Section 4). First, pension entitlements are based on the length of 
an individual’s official work record (stazh): even if they are not being paid 
wages, workers with arrears are still accumulating pension entitlements.9 
Second, in Uzbekistan as elsewhere, the workplace itself may provide better 
opportunities for job search (through contacts, access to telephones and so 
on) than the local employment office.10 Third, in agriculture, rights of the 
individual to farm on plots linked to the collective farm are contingent upon 
the individual continuing to work on the kolkhoz.* 11
Fourth, the large degree of economic uncertainty that has characterised 
the transition, and lack of information about alternative opportunities, may 
well motivate individuals to remain attached to their employer, especially if 
they expect the arrears to be repaid the following month. A fifth reason for 
continuing attachment, which tends to have been stressed by the World Bank 
in other former Soviet countries, is that access to non-wage benefits is tied 
to employment, and that even where cash wages are not being paid, other 
payments in-kind provide sufficient incentive for the individual to remain 
with the firm. This point is directly examined below.
Consideration of the institutional and economic context facilitates inter­
pretation of the empirical results. Before proceeding to econometrically test 
the hypotheses, however, the descriptive patterns underlying the incidence 
of arrears are presented.
9 This is one of the most common answers to the question of why unpaid employees 
stay on at enterprises (Marnie 1998).
10 See Commander and Yemtsov (1997) on this point for Russia.
11 Allocation of such plots depends on kolkhoz management -  household plots account for 
only 15 percent of irrigated land, but about half the total value of agricultural production 
(mainly fruits, vegetables and livestock) (Herman 1998, p. 5).
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9.3 Who is Affected?
In this section some basic indications of the incidence of wage arrears are 
described, in terms of the number of people affected, and their characteris­
tics. The sample under investigation was described in Chapter 5. In June 
1995, wage arrears affected 37 percent of working individuals in the sample. 
Moreover, arrears are very significant in size for those affected, with mean 
reported arrears for the month amounting to 86 percent of contract wages.
Looking at the characteristics of individuals affected by wage arrears sug­
gests some interesting patterns. The results are presented in Table 9.1. The 
descriptive statistics indicate that the incidence of arrears is systematic rather 
than random, particularly affecting workers in agriculture and those located 
in regions outside the capital. There are some marked correlations in the 
incidence of arrears by level of education, ethnicity, sector of employment 
and oblast. There appears to be a strong negative association between the 
presence of arrears and the level of education: almost half of the individu­
als with less than primary education are affected (although this is a small 
group), compared to only one in four university graduates.
By sector of employment, arrears are clearly more pervasive in the agri­
cultural sector (kolkhoz or collective farms), affecting almost six out of ten 
workers. The incidence of arrears is fairly similar in state and private enter­
prises, at around 32 and 29 percent respectively.
The sectoral differences in the incidence of arrears are consistent with 
what is known about recent structural changes in the economy. Transition 
and adjustment had been associated with substantial declines in the prices of 
agricultural output (Chapter 2). Yet employment in the sector has actually 
expanded. While contract wages in agriculture have fallen relative to the 
national average, by some 32 percent (Chapter 3), one might have expected 
even larger declines. It seems that arrears have been used to effect such real 
wage cuts. The high prevalence of arrears in agriculture is also consistent 
with the structural problems in that sector as reviewed in Chapter 3, which
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Table 9.1: Incidence and size of arrears: descriptive statistics
Num ber affected M ean arrears (SD) A rrear Share
(percent of group) (su m / m onth) (percent)
Demographic
Men 616 (36) 524 (328) 86.0
Women 414 (38) 426 (203) 86.0
Age
Youth (<  26) 246 (38) 386 (202) 90.3
Young (26-35) 278 (39) 492 (280) 86.4
M iddle (35-45) 251 (37) 540 (375) 85.6
Older (46 + ) 171 (33) 520 (242) 78.8
M arried 806 (37) 503 (303) 84.9
Children under 7 700 (41) 470 (278) 86.3
Em ploym ent
Recent recruit 62 (40) 381 (204) 84.2
Second job 114 (40) 435 (224) 91.6
Forced leave 7 (19.4) 407 (241) 100.0
Education
elem entary or less 15 (47) 398 (145) 85.8
elem entary 7 (4 4 ) 450 (178) 93.5
high 539 (40.4) 415 (224) 88.6
college 162 (43) 552 (350) 83.3
vocational 165 (35) 503 (317) 86.8
university 140 (25) 657 (316) 76.1
C ontract Wage
Poor 391 (55) 291 (85) 96.0
Not poor 639 (31) 608 (304) 79.1
E thnicity
Uzbek 572 (36.2) 449 (264) 86.0
Slavic 51 (16) 728 (497) 74.6
K arakalpak 165 (57) 518 (289) 89.5
other 242 (41) 491 (252) 84.5
Sector
S ta te 555 (32) 545 (310) 80.6
A griculture 373 (57) 375 (209) 93.1
P rivate 58 (29) 558 (306) 86.8
m ilitary 18 (35) 644 (354) 72.0
Region
Fergana 366 (38) 441 (284) 90.7
Karakal. 571 (60) 482 (265) 85.5
Tashkent 93 (11) 664 (367) 68.5
Total 1030 (37) 484 (288) 86.0
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need to be interpreted in the overall political economic context. In particular, 
the continuing dominance of state orders (quotas) means that the majority 
of kolkhozes must sell target quantities of output at prices which are consid­
erably below world market prices. Kolkhozes are also vulnerable to overall 
government fiscal constraints. A recent report of a European Union agri­
cultural advisory group found that “..[l]ate payment from state-controlled 
buyers is one of the most commonly heard complaints from farmers... Con­
tracts for supply are rather one-sided and are in any case not enforceable 
under the law in any practical sense” (FAPU/TACIS 1997 p.6). Reductions 
in government expenditure in accordance with overall macroeconomic stabil­
isation objectives (in particular, reduced recourse to deficit financing) have 
been associated with arrears in the payment of state obligations in Uzbek­
istan and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, in particular, Russia.12
Private and state enterprises reveal similar rates of non-payment of wages.13 
This result would be surprising if one expected state enterprises to be less 
efficient and therefore in worse financial condition than their private sector 
counterparts. On the other hand, arrears could be larger in private establish­
ments because they face harder budget constraints due to relatively restricted 
access to credit from the state-dominated banking sector. The latter expla­
nation is consistent with the limited extent of financial sector reform to date 
that was reviewed in Chapter 3.
Another explanation for the equivalence of arrears in the private sector 
and the public sector lies in the legislation that has governed the privatisation 
process. Enterprises are not permitted to retrench workers for a three year 
period after privatisation. Faced with this constraint, employers may sim­
ply not pay redundant workers, possibly with the objectives of encouraging 
“voluntary” quits.
12 Budget problems have caused delays in several aspects of government operations, from 
the payment of farms for their produce, to public service employees’ salaries, and various 
social transfers like pensions.
L3A similar pattern is evident in Russia: see Standing (1997), Figure 5.8.
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The relative prevalence of arrears among different ethnic groups matches 
what is observed by oblast. (The independent effect of ethnicity is investi­
gated below using multi-variate analysis.) Karakalpakstan, populated largely 
by people of the Karakalpak and Kazakh ethnic groups, has by far the high­
est incidence of arrears, with over three out of four individuals affected. On 
the other hand, arrears are far less common in the capital Tashkent, and also 
among ethnic groups that tend to reside in urban areas, in particular, the 
Slavic groups (see Chapter 5).
Finally, the regional patterns, whereby a much higher proportion of in­
dividuals living in the capital are paid in full, may reflect better financial 
intermediation in Tashkent. Private commercial activity and banking in­
frastructure is much more developed in the nation’s capital. In-addition, this 
pattern could be interpreted in terms of domestic political considerations. 
That is, an unpaid urban worker is likely to be a far more potent force of 
discontent, than one living in a remote regions like Karakalpakstan. Hence 
government policy, through the direction of credit and other means, may en­
able enterprises in the capital to pay their wage bills on time, but limit credit 
to firms outside the capital. Such actions can be interpreted in the political 
framework set out above: the government wants to both (i) limit inflation­
ary possibilities associated with credit expansion; and (ii) meet the popular 
expectations created by the mandated increases in the contract wage. These 
somewhat conflicting objectives require prioritisation among groups of work­
ers, and this is done in favour of those in the capital, given the potential for 
popular discontent to be associated with unpaid wages.
In several respects the results for Uzbekistan mirror what Lehmann et 
al (1997) found for Russia. Divergent regional patterns were an important 
characteristic of the incidence of wage arrears, as was the relatively better off 
position of workers in the capital, Moscow. In their probit analysis control­
ling for the demographic composition of the workforce, enterprise ownership 
and regional industrial structure, regional location was still found to have
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overriding importance. In Section 9.4, multi-variate analysis is used to test 
which of the observed factors associated with wage arrears are statistically 
significant in Uzbekistan.
9.4  P rob it A nalysis
The next step is to investigate the determinants of the presence of arrears. 
The conceptual framework presented in Section 9.2 indicated a series of eco­
nomic and social factors that are expected to influence whether or not some­
one is paid in full. These various potential influences on the probability of 
experiencing arrears can be tested econometrically.
The econometric modelling approach is formally identical to statistical 
description -  that is, the expectation of arrears conditional on a vector of 
variables (Deaton 1997, p. 64). However this section seeks to go beyond a 
simple descriptive analysis to draw some behavioural inferences. That is, how 
does the vector of independent variables determine the dependent variable 
of interest (arrears). Multi-variate probit analysis enables the independent 
effect of each factor to be established. As always, caution is needed in inter­
pretation, since correlation does not mean causation. However, even where 
causal inference is not possible, careful inspection of the data using multi­
variate techniques can yield important insights about the phenomenon of 
wage arrears.
Formally, the procedure can be described as follows. A probit model is 
a nonlinear (in the parameters) statistical model that meets the objective of 
relating the probability of being in arrears to explanatory factors in such a 
way that the probability remains in the [0,1] interval. A maximum likelihood 
estimation is used for this problem because of the discrete nature of the 
outcome variable (being in arrears, or not in arrears) (Griffiths et al 1994, 
p.744). The idea of maximum likelihood estimation is to choose, as estimates 
of the unknown parameters ß of the probit model, the values of ß that
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maximise the probability of obtaining the sample that is actually observed.
A maximum likelihood probit model was estimated using STATA, formu­
lated as:
where the transformed dependent variable, An takes the value An — 1 when 
arrears are positive and, An = 0 otherwise. The vector X  is a set of indepen­
dent factors that are expected to influence the probability of being in arrears, 
Un represent random errors, and $ is the cumulative distribution function of 
the normal distribution.
In order to test the hypotheses set out in Section 9.2, the model specifies 
the probability of being in arrears as a function of the individual’s personal 
characteristics (gender, number of children, marital status and ethnicity); 
employment and productivity-related characteristics (age, sector of employ­
ment, level of education, tenure); the influence of political economy (region), 
as well as the bargaining power of the individual (proxied by the level of the 
contract wage, length of tenure and holding a second job).
More formally, the marginal effects of the independent variable X * is cal­
culated as:
where ß  is the vector of coefficient estimates from the probit regression for the 
probability of having arrears (equation 9.1), X °  is a vector of characteristics 
with X% = 0, and X 1 is a vector of characteristics which differs only in 
the kth  component, i.e., with X j = X j  for all j  ^  fc, and X \ = 1. All 
the independent variables utilised in the regression are dummy variables. 
The coefficient therefore shows the marginal effect (in percentage terms) of 
changing the value of the dummy from zero to one, relative to the base case.
To illustrate the impact of the range of socio-economic variables on the 
probability of arrears, marginal effects were estimated relative to a base case. 
A base case was constructed with the following characteristics: a male under 
26 years of age, who has been in his present job, in the private sector, for at
A n  —  3 ? ( < a  +  ß X n  4 -  Un) (9.1)
(9.2)
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least one year, with primary or less schooling, of Uzbek ethnicity, and living 
in Karakalpakstan, and is unmarried. The probability of such an individual 
not having been fully paid in the previous month is about 0.41, which is close 
to the overall average for the sample (see the descriptive statistics in Table 
9.1 above). The incremental effect of the presence of the other characteristics 
is compared to this case.
The probit estimates suggest some striking patterns in the factors affect­
ing the likelihood of an individual being in arrears (Table 9.2). A wide range 
of factors are statistically significant. The fact of an individual having con­
tract earnings below the poverty line, relative to the base case, raises the 
probability of that individual not being paid in full to .58, about 17 points 
higher than the base case. Recall that poverty here is defined as having a 
contract wage (received plus arrears) of less than the minimum wage of 413 
sum. This can be interpreted as evidence of the weak bargaining power of 
workers with low contract wages, and as evidence against employer benev­
olence. This could also reflect relative immobility on the part of low wage 
workers.
From an efficiency perspective, it was hypothesised that recent recruits 
might be more likely to be in arrears than established workers with greater 
firm-specific training. However the coefficient on the variable capturing job 
tenure of less than one year is insignificant, suggesting that recent recruits are 
not more likely to be in arrears as against workers with longer tenure. This 
is consistent with the pattern observed with respect to younger and older 
workers discussed below, and also with the proposition that recent recruits 
are more valued by firms during the transition.14
Significant age effects are apparent. Relative to youth, individuals in the 
26-35, and over 35 year age groups have a 9 percent greater probability of 
not having been paid. Hence it seems that younger workers are less likely to
14Evidence in Chapter 7 suggested that this was especially true for male university and 
college graduates.
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Table 9.2: Probit model of arrears
Probability of being in arrears Z-value
Base Case .407
Poor 0.580 6.69
Recent recruit 0.452 .92
Involuntary leave 0.200 2.44
Sector
State 0.519 1.55
Kolkhoz 0.648 3.99
M ilitary/other 0.433 .26
Age
Young (26-35 years) 0.487 2.58
Middle (36-45 years) 0.498 2.79
Older (over 46 years) 0.481 2.08
Education
Primary 0.441 .83
Secondary 0.421 .56
Vocational 0.557 .81
College 0.483 .44
University 0.401 .20
Region
Fergana 0.168 9.16
Tashkent 0.036 14.70
Personal
Married 0.368 1.33
More than two children 0.410 .37
Female 0.451 1.94
Ethnicity
Slavic 0.480 1.59
Karakalpak 0.368 .90
Kazakh 0.300 2.66
Other 0.298 .19
Notes: See text for definition of dummy variables and of the 
base case.
Number of observations =  929
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experience arrears, lending support to results in earlier chapters suggesting 
that pre-transition experience is not valued by employers, and that youth 
are entering the labour market on successively higher experience-net earnings 
profiles (as suggested by the non-parametric results in Chapter 7). In terms 
of the conceptual framework that was presented at the outset, the results 
suggest younger workers are less likely to have contract wages in excess of 
their marginal product (or market clearing levels). This is consistent with 
the expectation that employers have found relative adjustment of contract 
wages of new recruits easier than changes in the relativities of established 
workers.
The negative association between higher levels of educational attainment 
and the presence of arrears suggested by the descriptive statistics is statis­
tically insignificant once other controls are introduced. This is contrary to 
what one might expect if arrears were operating to realign a structure of 
wage relativities that was biased toward the low-skilled.
The marginal effects of the variables indicating sector of employment 
are large and significant. By type of employment, individuals working on 
collective farms are much more likely to have wage arrears than individuals 
employed in the private sector. The probability, 65 percent, is significantly 
different from zero at the five percent level. This is consistent with the 
weak financial position of kolkhozes in the wake of the break up of the Soviet 
Union, as highlighted in the previous section and described in Chapter 3. The 
probability of wage arrears for those individuals working in the state sector is 
almost as large, though the Z-value is low (1.55). This again may reflect those 
firms’ failure to adjust to changing economic conditions during the transition, 
and their consequently relatively poor financial position. These results can 
be interpreted as supportive of either the marginal productivity/ efficiency 
view of arrears (arising because contract wages in the kolkhozes and state 
sectors are above market-clearing levels), or within the political economic 
framework. The sectors with the highest incidence of arrears (kolkhozes and
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state firms) are those most influenced by government policy -  it seems that 
government has, for political/populist reasons, been setting contract wages 
in those sectors at higher levels than can actually be paid.
There are strong regional effects, confirming the significance of the ear­
lier descriptive patterns, so that individuals working in either the capital 
Tashkent or Fergana, all else being equal, are much less likely to experience 
arrears relative to individuals in Karakalpakstan. The estimated probability 
of experiencing wage arrears for workers in the capital is especially small, only 
about 4 percent. This finding lends further support to the political economy 
view since, as noted above, the government may be especially concerned to 
avoid the emergence of discontent due to unpaid wages in Tashkent (popu­
lation 2.1 million: see Chapter 5) in the largest urban area of the country.
Possibly unexpected is the result that individuals on involuntary leave 
are less likely (of the order of 20 percent) to report arrears than the base 
case. The relationship with this factor is significant. However the number of 
individuals on involuntary leave is small (of whom only 7 reported arrears), 
and further, individuals on leave may not report themselves as being owed 
wages since they axe not working.
Some of the earlier observed correlations with ethnicity are insignificant 
once regional and other controls are introduced -  this is the case with respect 
to Slavic and Karakalpak ethnicity. Nonetheless, an individual who is Kazakh 
or from elsewhere in Central Asia is significantly less likely to not have been 
fully paid relative to the majority Uzbek group.
Finally, most of the controls that were introduced to capture potential 
social concerns are not statistically significant. The hypothesis was that 
benevolent employers might place priority on full payment to workers who 
have three or more children or are married is not confirmed. While those 
groups are less likely to experience arrears, the Z-values are not significant. 
Nor is there a significant gender effect.
On the other hand, the result that individuals with secondary jobs are
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more likely to experience arrears in payment from their main place of work 
may indicate some latitude or benevolence on the part of employers. However 
the causation is unclear, since non-payment may well have motivated multiple 
job-holding in the first place.
9.5 Distributive Effects
Earlier work has shown that the share of households in poverty in Uzbekistan 
in 1995 almost doubles, to about 30 percent, once the effect of arrears in 
payment of wages and transfers is taken into account (Coudouel 1998). There 
are two questions of interest related to the distributive effects of arrears. 
First, are arrears distributed evenly across individuals with different levels 
of earnings, or concentrated on the lower end of the distribution? Second, 
do arrears operate to widen the distribution of net wages, relative to the 
outcome had the contract wage been fulfilled? Both questions are addressed 
in this section.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the pattern of arrears by earnings group. The groups 
are defined on the basis of their contract wage -  that is, earnings received 
plus arrears -  so that the presence of arrears per se is not more likely to place 
individuals in the poor category. The poverty line is defined consistently with 
the practice of the national authorities, using the minimum wage (at that 
time, 413 sum) as the threshold (see World Bank 1994; Coudouel 1998).10 In 
order to reveal differentiation among the poor; severe poverty is used to refer 
to those individuals reporting contract earnings less than half the poverty 
threshold. The non-poor, as the term implies, have contract earnings above 
the threshold, while the above average group reported contract wages above 
the level of average earnings (752 sum).
15The poverty line is based on the cost of a basket of consumption goods, and has been 
used by the government to set the minimum wage and the level of benefits, as well as 
to  determine income thresholds for eligibility to means-tested benefits: see World Bank, 
1994; Klugman and Marnie, 1998.
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Figure 9.1: Incidence of arrears by contract earnings group
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The pattern across income groups is quite pronounced. The share of 
individuals in wage arrears is highest among the very poor, as is the share 
of arrears in their contract wage. Indeed more than half of the very poor 
were receiving virtually none of their contracted wage. At the other end of 
the scale, less than 8 percent of individuals with above average earnings were 
affected by arrears, and their reported arrears as share of earnings were some 
20 percentage points below the sample average. These results are consistent 
with those of Coudouel (1998), who focused on household-level income.
This variation by income group is clearly suggestive of an impact of ar­
rears on the overall distribution of wages. It is generally expected that the 
distribution of earnings will wdden during the course of transition from a
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planned economy (Rutkowski 1995; World Bank 1996a; Allison and Ringold 
1996). There is evidence across a range of countries that this has indeed 
been the case with respect to contract wages (based on official data) and 
with respect to net wages (based on individual level data) (Milanovic 1998; 
see also Flemming and Micklewright, forthcoming, for a survey). However 
there are no published studies which have directly examined the impact of 
arrears on the distribution of earnings.
How do arrears affect the contract earnings distribution in Uzbekistan? 
The hypothesis is that, consistent with their observed poverty impact, the 
distributive effect of arrears would be to widen the distribution of wages. 
This can be tested for by comparing the summary distribution statistics 
contracted and net wages.
Following the review of the strengths and weaknesses of some commonly 
used measures of inequality in Chapter 2, several alternative measures are 
used, specifically, the relative mean deviation, the Gini coefficient, the decile 
(90/10) ratio and 75/25 measures of inequality. Each of these measures focus 
on different dimensions of inequality. In a population of size n, the relative 
mean deviation shows the extent to which individual wages, tu* , i = 1 , . . . ,  n, 
differ from the mean, w . The relative mean deviation is defined by:
The RMD shows the proportion of total wages that would have to be trans­
ferred to those below the mean wage in order to achieve equality. However 
this measure is insensitive to differences among individuals on the same side 
of the mean.16
The Gini coefficient is a commonly used indicator of the extent of income 
inequality. The basis of this measure was set out in Chapter 2. Lower values
16The RMD therefore violates the “Pigou-Dalton” condition that a fruitful index of 
inequality should decrease whenever income is transferred to a poorer individual (see 
Wolfson, 1997).
2 w n
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Table 9.3: Measures of earnings inequality: contract versus net wage
Measure of Inequality Pre-transition Contract
1995
Net
1995
Relative Mean Deviation 0.299 0.455
Gini coefficient 0.280 0.434 0.606
Decile ratio (90/ 10) 2.98 4.83 6.00
75/ 25 2.00 2.01
SOURCE: Pre-transition, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992); 
1995 figures are author estimates.
of the Gini coefficient indicate a lesser degree of inequality.1' Together with 
the decile ratio, this measure has the advantage of enabling comparison with 
the pre-transition picture of inequality.
The decile ratio and 75/25 measures both simply show the ratio of earn­
ings between the respective points in the distribution. The latter is typically 
more robust in the sense that it utilises “thicker” points in the distribution, 
but obviously at the expense of excluding information about the tails of the 
distribution, which is arguably the prime interest in this inequality analysis. 
It is nonetheless a useful complementary measure, to be considered alongside 
the decile ratio and the other measures.
The results are presented in Table 9.3. With one exception, all the mea­
sures show significantly higher inequality in the distribution of the net wage, 
compared to the contract wage. The fact that the 75/25 measure of in­
equality does not appear to widen is consistent with the fact that arrears 
disproportionately affect people at the bottom of the earnings distribution 
(who are below the 25th percentile).
Table 9.3 suggests that arrears have operated as a route to widen the 
wage differentials inherited from the Soviet period. This result is consistent 
with both the marginal productivity/ efficiency hypothesis about the role of
17 There are, however, a number of criticisms made of the Gini coefficient including, for 
example, that it is most sensitive to income transfers near to the mean (see Atkinson 1970; 
Kakwani, 1980).
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wage arrears, and a political economic framework. From an efficiency view­
point, many commentators including for example the World Bank (1996a), 
have seen a significant widening of the earnings distribution as an inevitable 
part of transition to a market economy. To the extent that contract wage 
relativities adjust slowly, arrears act to speed up this process. On the other 
hand, in a political economy framework the commitment of the government 
to social stability limits widening of the contract wage distribution. One 
might well expect that institutional and political factors would inhibit the 
adjustment of ex ante relativities -  just as it is argued that the notion of 
comparative wage justice has helped to entrench wage relativities in Aus­
tralia.18 Ex post, however, the government is prepared to allow a widening 
of the wage distribution in response to market pressures via non-payment of 
wages.
At the same time, it is interesting to note that arrears are not the only av­
enue by which the expected widening in the wage distribution has occurred. 
The extent of inequality in the contract wage in 1995, measured by a Gini 
coefficient of approximately .43, is much larger than that suggested for the 
Soviet period by Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), who report a Gini coef­
ficient of .276.19 The same is true with respect to the decile ratio, which was 
estimated at 2.98 prior to the transition, and has risen to 4.83 with respect 
to the contract wage.
The contribution of arrears to the widening of the earnings distribution 
is reflected in a simple decomposition of the overall change (Table 9.4). This 
suggests that arrears have contributed between almost half to two-thirds of 
the overall rise in earnings inequality over the period of transition. Decom­
position of the decile ratio, which focuses on changes at the ends of the dis­
tribution, indicates that arrears account for about 63 percent of the increase 
in wage inequality over the period.
18See, for example, Norris (1986).
19Milanovic (1998) also reports a Gini coefficient for household incomes in Uzbekistan 
in 1987-8 of .280.
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Table 9.4: Decomposition of the rise in wage inequality, 1989-95
Absolute change 1995/1989 Percentage of change due to arrears
Gini coefficient .326 47.2
Decile ratio 2.92 63.0
Even taking into account the sensitivity of the measured extent of in­
equality is sensitive to the index used, the conclusions are clear. Arrears 
disproportionately affect the poor, and have operated to significantly widen 
the distribution of earnings. It is now appropriate to turn to examine more 
directly the determinants of the size of arrears.
9.6 H ow  M u ch  is N o t B e in g  P a id ?
So far the investigation has been limited to the determinants of whether or 
not an individual was fully paid. For the individual, however, the size of 
arrears relative to the contract wage is likely to be of greater significance. 
As reported in Table 9.1, the mean share of arrears in total earnings was 86 
per cent among the 1030 workers with positive arrears in the sample, with a 
range from 5 to 100 percent.
What are the characteristics associated with a higher arrears share, among 
those who reported arrears? In other words, given that an individual was 
not paid in full, what factors determine how much the individual was owed?
The estimates in this section rely on the share of arrears in the contract 
wage, rather than the absolute amount of arrears, as the dependent variable. 
The correlates of absolute arrear amounts are difficult to interpret since these 
may simply be correlated with differences in the amount of contract wages. 
Instead, the share of arrears in the contract wage is used to differentiate 
those individual factors which the framework in Section 9.2 suggested would 
be relevant.
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More formally, we posit the relationship
log— = a  + ß ' X + u  
wc
where log ^  is the log share of arrears in contracted earnings, a  is a constant, 
and ß  is a vector of coefficients on the set of independent variables (X), 
related to human capital, sectoral, regional and personal characteristics of 
the individual, as used and defined in the previous section which conducted 
probit analysis.20
This functional form allows one to interpret the ß  coefficients as percent­
age effects. That is, writing (a/w)0 as the estimated share of arrears in the 
base case (i.e., with each dummy variable set to zero), we assume
=  1 + f i x
Taking logs and rearranging,
l o g ( - )  - l o g ( - )  =  l°g(l +  ß'X)\wJ \ w J 0
«  ß'X
(under the assumption that ß 'X  is small) so that
log ( —') = a  + ß 'X  + u 
\ wJ
where a  =  log (^) ,and u is an error term.
The model was estimated for the 910 workers in the sample with arrears 
for whom complete information on the set of independent variables is avail­
able, as well as separately by gender. Two models were estimated for the 
entire sample of workers with arrears: the first model is limited to human
20There is no explicit model of arrears, in the sense that there is no theory of functional 
form that is used to determine the structure of this regression model. The choice of 
individual variables arises from the conceptual framework and the objective of testing the 
alternative hypotheses, as set out in Section 9.2.
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capital and personal variables; whereas the second extends the list of inde­
pendent variables to include ethnic, sector and regional variables, and is also 
estimated separately by gender.
The regression results presented in Table 9.5 for the determinants of the 
size of arrears confirm and begin to quantify the distributive effects suggested 
by the probit results. The results are described in this section before pro­
viding a fuller interpretation in the next section. The focus here is on the 
results of the extended model, while drawing attention to any differences in 
results between the two models.
The most striking result is that arrears are especially severe among indi­
viduals at the bottom end of the contract wage distribution. The comparison 
group is individuals with contracted wages above the minimum wage. Not 
only are the individuals with below the minimum contract wage (defined 
above as the poor) much more likely to have not been paid (Table 9.2), the 
extent of arrears is proportionately much higher. This is true for both men 
and women with arrears, with the average impact on the arrears share of hav­
ing contract wages below the minimum wage/poverty line in the extended 
model being about 19 percent and even higher, 21 percent, for men. In the 
limited model without the regional and other controls, the coefficient is larger 
still, raising the arrears share by about 24 percent.
Among different ethnic groups, the OLS results show that Karakalpaks 
have larger arrears than Uzbeks (the omitted ethnic group). The difference 
is of the order of about 12 percent. This is consistent with the significant 
regional effects. Living in KKP, all else being equal, raises the size of arrears 
by 10 percent relative to living in the national capital. For rural Fergana, 
the effect is even greater, around 15 percent. This provides some support for 
the political economic interpretation, as noted below.
The omitted category for the different types of employment is a job in 
a kolkhoz. There is a significant negative relationship between working at 
a state enterprise and the relative size of individual arrears, the size of the
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Table 9.5: OLS model of size of arrears: employees with arrears
Basic Model Extended Model
coef
A n
t-s ta t coef
All
t-s ta t
Men
coef t-s ta t
W omen 
coef t-s ta t
Low cont. w. .237 9.33 .188 (7.6) .211 (6.28) .159 (3.79)
Age (relative to  <26)
young
r-oo (-.24) .000 (.03) -.018 (-.68) .013 (.44)
middle -.001 (-.021) -.001 (.05) -.012 (-.43) .005 (.15)
older -.093 (-2.48) -.039 (-1.67) -.060 (-1.51) -.048 (-1.21)
Education
secondary -.074 (.94) -.071 (-.79) -.099 (-.97)' .008 .06
vocational b CO (-.52) -.026 (-.31) -.213 (-.20) .018 .12
teknikum -.094 (-1.13) -.087 (-1.00) l ►—1
 
O 00 (-1.00) -.009 -.06
university -.152 (-1.82) -.110 (-1.26) -.147 (-1.36) .017 .117
second job .052 (1.32) .025 (1.01) .020 (.68) .024 (.56)
no tenure -.044 (-.83) -.032 (-1.06) -078 (-1.53) -.002 (-.04)
Personal
children -.020 (-.63) -.001 (-.07) .008 (.38) -.146 (-2.78)
m arried .013 (.40) -.016 (-.84) -.011 (-.40) -.015 (-.56)
male .012 (.32) .020 (.40)
Slavic .045 (1.24) .051 (1.03) .030 (.54)
K arakalpak .115 (3.68) .112 (2.85) .102 (1.68)
O ther ethnic .017 (.94) .034 (1.40) -.011 (-.37)
Sector (relative to  kolkhoz)
sta te -.075 (-2.43) -.060 (-1.51) -.093 (-1.91)
private -.017 (-.53) -.021 (-.50) -.020 (-.39)
m ilitary -.224 (-3.24) -.228 (-3.15) .064 (.54)
Region (relative to  Tashkent)
Fergana .262 (5.04) .135 (3.46) .298 (3.59)
K KP .207 (4.02) .073 (1.85) .307 (3.94)
C onstant -.216 (-2.61) -.379 (-3.79) .822 (13.31) -.493 (-2.56)
N 940 910 538 372
R 2 .125 .172 .177 .165
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effect is about 7 percent on average, and slightly larger (9 percent) for women. 
The dummy variable on ‘military and other’ group in employment has a large 
negative effect overall and for men (of the order of 23 percent), which also 
provides support for a political economic view.
The age of the individual, a variable that significantly influenced whether 
or not someone was fully paid does not, however, affect the extent of non­
payment in the extended model. The only exception is in the limited model, 
where older age relative to being under 26 year of age has a significant neg­
ative effect on the size of arrears, of around 9 percent.
The t-values of dummy variables for education suggest that schooling is 
not statistically significant with respect to the extent of non-payment. This 
is true for both the limited and extended models, and casts some doubt on 
the efficiency adjustment hypothesis, as noted below.
And, as in the probit results, the family-structure variables (number of 
children and marital status) are not significant for the pooled sample, with 
one important exception. The presence of young children has a large and 
statistically significant negative effect on the size of arrears for the female 
sample, of around 15 percent. This provides support for the “benevolent 
employer” hypothesis, and is consistent with the legal duties imposed on 
employers to protect women with young children, as described in Chapter 3.
Looking at other differences in the results by gender, the reduction in 
arrears for women associated with state sector employment is about one- 
third higher for women than men, at about 9 percent, which could indicate 
the operation of benevolent motives on the part of state managers. Finally, 
it is notable that the effects of the regional factors (being outside the capital) 
are also relatively larger for women than for men; the negative coefficient on 
KKP is about double that for men.
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In terp reta tion
It is appropriate at this stage to provide an overall interpretation of the 
patterns observed in the incidence and size of arrears. The evidence presented 
in Chapter 3 and in this chapter has confirmed that in Uzbekistan, as in 
Russia, adjustment in the labour market during the transition in response to 
declines in output has taken place on the price rather than the quantity side of 
the labour market. Beyond the reductions in the contract wage, insecurity for 
many workers arises as a result of delays in wage payments. Non-payment of 
contract wages creates tremendous uncertainty for workers, especially in the 
presence of high inflation, and where they cannot anticipate the incidence 
nor extent of arrears. Sociological evidence cited at the beginning of the 
chapter suggests that arrears have been the most important problem facing 
families in Uzbekistan. Almost four out of ten workers in the 1995 survey 
were affected by arrears, for whom the share of arrears averaged about 86 
percent of the contract wage.
While caution is needed in interpretation of the results, the evidence 
is consistent with the nature of transition and the institutional context in 
Uzbekistan. It also provides support for the hypothesis that firms discrimi­
nate among employees in the allocation of arrears.
The analysis suggested that workers at the bottom of the contract wage 
distribution are most affected by arrears. Not only were they more likely to 
not be paid in full, but the size of arrears was relatively large. Hence, it was 
shown that arrears have the effect of widening the distribution of earnings, 
suggesting that arrears are being used to achieve an ex post widening in the 
structure of wages that was inherited from the Soviet command economy. 
This finding provides some support for the efficiency hypothesis, in so far as 
a less equal distribution of earnings is a necessary part of the transition to 
an efficiently functioning labour market (World Bank 1996a). Yet while the 
level of the individual’s contract wage is clearly an important dimension of 
the pattern of arrears, there are a series of further significant factors, over
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and above the contract wage.
It was hypothesised that arrears might be used by employers to achieve de 
facto adjustments in wage relativities, consistent with differences between in­
dividual marginal productivity and the contract wage. This hypothesis does 
receive some support from the empirical analysis, in several respects. The 
likelihood of having arrears was positively correlated with age. This would 
have been somewhat surprising if one had expected employers to reward in­
dividual experience, but it is consistent with evidence presented in earlier 
chapters (and other studies of earnings in transition, for example, Flanagan 
(1998)) that employers do not place much value on pre-transit ion experience. 
Chapter 7 suggested that younger workers, particularly males with higher 
levels of education, are receiving wage premiums. The descriptive statistics 
suggested an inverse relation between level of education and the likelihood 
of being in arrears, though this relationship was generally insignificant once 
further controls were introduced.
There is mixed evidence for an alternative hypothesis that the behaviour 
of firms in Uzbekistan is not profit-maximising and is affected by benevolent 
motives. Certain characteristics associated with potential labour market dis­
advantage -  such as being female and having larger numbers of young chil­
dren -  did not mean that one was more likely to be paid. On the other hand, 
the presence of young children significantly reduced the size of arrears for 
women. Also the fact that secondary employment and arrears are positively 
correlated could be interpreted as employers giving latitude to employees to 
seek to alleviate the welfare impact of arrears.
The political economic perspective -  wherein government policies are seen 
as deliberately affecting the incidence and size of arrears -  gained some sup­
port from the descriptive and multivariate analysis. It was hypothesised that, 
for political reasons, the government had ostensibly preserved wage relativ­
ities through wage indexation decrees which increased all workers’ wages by 
the same proportionate amount. Similarly, there is legislative prohibition
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against reductions in employment for a two year period following privatisa­
tion. That is, for political economic reasons, the government wants to be 
seen to be preserving the status quo in the labour market.
The government nonetheless causes adjustments in wage relativities through 
the system of state orders and credit policies, which in turn lead to wage ar­
rears. The relative disadvantage of workers in agriculture was clearly demon­
strated -  and it was argued that this can be directly attributed to state pro­
curement and payment policies. The importance of arrears in the private 
sector is consistent with a picture where the employment decisions of priva­
tised firms are significantly constrained, leading to large de facto adjustments 
on the price side, and is consistent with state financial policies which limit 
private sector access to credit.
There were very strong regional effects. The finding that workers out­
side the capital were much less likely to be paid, and that they experienced 
higher arrears shares, cannot be interpreted as a result of firm-level deci­
sions. Rather, this could be seen as flowing from the stance of government. 
In particular, firms outside the capital have difficulties in obtaining access to 
credit from the state dominated financial sector (World Bank 1996c). The 
fact that workers in Tashkent are relatively rarely affected by arrears helps 
to minimise the potentially explosive political consequences of non-payment 
of wages.
Overall, among the alternative hypotheses presented above, the empirical 
evidence provided greatest support for a political economic perspective on 
wage arrears. The sectoral and regional patterns dominate productivity and 
other potential factors that might have explained the observed pattern. The 
situation may be similar to that in neighbouring Russia, w'here the govern­
ment has promised periodically to require repayment of all the wage arrears 
owed in the economy, in recognition of political imperatives.
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9.7  D o N on-W age B enefits M atter?
The foregoing analysis has addressed delays in payment of money wages. It is 
however possible that money wages “do not matter”, because non-wage ben­
efits are at least as important a form of labour compensation (see, e.g. World 
Bank 1996a). It is true that non-wage benefits played an important role in 
the Soviet economic system, and that enterprises and farms have been slow to 
divest themselves of their “social” responsibilities (World Bank 1994). The 
distribution of non-wage remuneration was traditionally biased in favour of 
so-called priority sectors, in particular heavy industry and mining (Comman­
der and Jackman 1993). Hence studies of the scale of enterprise spending in 
the early 1990s suggested a lesser degree of importance in Uzbekistan, given 
the largely rural nature of the economy, relative to more industrialised parts 
of the former Soviet Union (see Chapter 5).
Section 9.2 suggested that the provision of non-wage benefits to workers in 
arrears is consistent with alternative perspectives on the transition process, 
specifically, with efficiency (reduce worker turnover), political economy and 
employer benevolence (by mitigating the welfare impact of arrears). Bearing 
these possibilities in mind, this section examines whether workers who are 
not being paid are in fact receiving non-wage compensation from their place 
of work. The present data allows this question to be addressed directly. All 
adult respondents are asked whether they received any material benefits from 
their place of work in the preceding month.
The types of benefit listed are: free or subsidised food or animal food; 
housing; subsidised medical care; lease of agricultural equipment; and other 
benefits. There is an additional question that asks the respondent about 
total “wages-in-kind”. However, the respondent is not asked to value each 
of the different types of non-wage compensation separately. For the different 
benefit types listed, one knows only whether or not the good/service was 
received.
A variable was constructed to capture those individuals who reported
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Table 9.6: Frequency of arrears and non-wage benefits
N on-w age b en e fit N o benefits benefit T o ta lno henpfit,
N o a rre a rs 203 1549 13.1 1752
In  a rre a rs 202 828 24.4 1030
T o t a l 405 2377 17.0 2850
any benefit, with the result being that 14.3 percent of the sample reported 
receiving at least one benefit. This variable is used to investigate the rela­
tionship between having arrears and non-wage benefits. Table 9.6 compares 
the numbers of individuals reporting having benefits or not, on the basis of 
whether or not they were experiencing wage arrears.
In June 1995, about 17 percent of all workers who reported receipt of 
non-wage benefits. About 24 percent of workers who had not been fully 
paid their contracted money wage in the preceding month received other 
compensation from their employer. Thus the share is higher than that for 
the overall sample. For those not in arrears, only 13 percent had additional 
non-wage compensation. This picture calls for some caution in interpretation 
of earlier results. Non-wage benefits appear to offset the effect of arrears on 
household welfare for some, but not all, workers with arrears.
The importance of non-wage benefits for certain groups is illustrated by 
a more disaggregated analysis of the joint incidence of benefits and arrears. 
Among workers in agriculture with arrears, for example, almost three in ten 
(29 percent) reported receipt of non-wage benefits. This is consistent with 
the above discussion that pointed to the links between continued employ­
ment on the kolkhoz and access to land for farming. Non-wage benefits are 
also more important than average among workers with arrears in Fergana, 
among whom about one in four receive non-wage benefits. From a political 
economic perspective, access to non-wage compensation may be encouraged 
by government as a way to alleviate hardship (and therefore potential social 
unrest) in rural areas.
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On the other hand, non-wage benefits are less prevalent among individuals 
with arrears than what statements by the World Bank and others might lead 
us to expect. The hypothesis that non-wage compensation substitutes for the 
non-payment of money wages can be rejected, since 80 percent of workers in 
arrears do not receive any other benefits from their employers. This is true 
even if the value of non-wage benefits has been under-reported by respondents 
(see Chapter 5), since the focus here is on receipt or non-receipt rather than 
the size of benefits.
This finding is explicable in terms of the distribution of arrears. The 
chapter has shown that arrears disproportionately affect workers at the bot­
tom of the contract wage distribution. Hence arrears are acting as a de 
facto adjustment mechanism to widen the wage distribution. Earlier studies 
have suggested that non-wage benefits also tend to widen the distribution 
of labour compensation (Commander and Jackman 1993). In other words, 
there is a tendency for high wage firms to offer more benefits -  that is, wages 
and benefits are complements rather than substitutes. This was the case in 
Poland, for example, where the determinants of the provision of non-wage 
benefits was examined using an enterprise survey (Estrin et al. 1997). In 
this context, it is not surprising that the incidence of non-wage benefits fails 
to offset the effect of arrears on the wage distribution.
A second reason for the limited overall importance of non-wage benefits 
is that firms unable to pay their wage bill are likely to be in financial distress, 
and may have already shed the ancillary social functions inherited from the 
Soviet period. Again, in Poland, reductions in the scale of benefits were 
inversely associated with firm profitability (Estrin et al. 1997). Firms with 
cash flow problems may be unable to minimise worker turnover through the 
provision of such benefits.
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9.8  Effects on th e  R eal W age
Government and international agencies typically report levels and trends in 
wage figures that ignore the presence of arrears. In other words, the real 
wage figures reported in Chapter 3 were trends in ‘contract earnings’ that 
combine payments that were received with payments still owed (arrears). 
From a political economic perspective, as noted in Section 9.2, this practice 
is used to strengthen the “social” credentials of government consistent with 
its announced commitment to minimising the social costs of transition on 
workers.
Evidence from the sample survey suggests that such reporting may be 
seriously misleading.21 In this section simulations are undertaken which in­
corporate the effect of arrears on the average real wage. While the results 
from the sample survey month of June 1995 cannot be projected across the 
whole year, let alone the entire period of transition, the results set upper 
and lower bounds on the effect of arrears on the real wage, and are therefore 
illustrative.
For 1995 as a whole, the rate of inflation as measured by the CPI was 
315 percent (World Bank 1996a). This translates into a monthly rate of ap­
proximately 12.6 percent. To calculate the impact of arrears on the reported 
real wage, alternative scenarios of repayment are examined, since there is no 
direct information as to when repayment was actually made. The data only 
show how much was owed for the month of May.
If arrears are repaid after one month, the real wage is reduced to:
where W  = the value of the real wage after arrears, a  is the share of arrears
21 This point has been made for Russia by Standing (1997, p. 132), noting that the 
apparent recovery of the real wage in official statistics in 1993-4 was misleading, since 
“(i)n reality the reported wages from the quarterly forms filled in for Goskomstat were 
the .. wages to which enterprises were committed, not necessarily those that they actually 
paid.”
(9.3)
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in the contract wage (.86) and i is the monthly rate of inflation. If arrears 
are repaid after t months, the value of the real wage is reduced to
where N  is the share of the workforce affected by arrears (.37), and W  is the 
average real wage across individuals with different repayment delays.
Two different scenarios are estimated and presented in Table 9.7. The 
table enables comparison of estimates of trends in the real wage, to determine 
what might be the case once arrears have been taken into account. First, it 
is assumed that all individuals are repaid at various intervals. For example, 
if the arrears incurred in May were fully repaid in June, for those affected, 
the delay would be equivalent to a real wage cut of about 9.6 percent. This is 
the lower bound of the effect of arrears, and reveals a substantial cut in real 
wages even if the individuals were to be repaid in full the following month. 
The same delay would mean a reduction in the contract wage bill of about 
3.5 percent. Hence the wage deflation that took place in 1995 is sharper once 
arrears are taken into account. If full repayment followed two months late, in 
July, then the individuals affected would have experienced the equivalent of 
a 21.1 percent wage cut, and the contract wage bill would have been reduced 
by about 7.8 percent. It is also possible that the amount in arrears will never 
be repaid (in which case t = oo), in which case the contract wage bill for 
May 1995 would have been about 32 percent less than reported in official 
statistics.22 This is the upper bound of the effect of arrears on the economy’s 
total wage bill. It is obvious that the longer the delay, the large the effect on 
the value of the real wage.
22 Standing (1997, p. 132) concludes from enterprise survey results that “wage arrears 
were often really non-payment -  in many factories the managers admitted that there was 
little prospect of the arrears being paid”.
(9.4)
The effect of arrears on the total wage bill is thus to reduce it to
E = W  x N
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Table 9.7: Effect of arrears on real wage trends
official wage index Wage net of arrears
1991 1994 1995 1995
length of delay (t)
one month 2 months never paid ‘Russia case’
100 117 95 91 87 62 85
SOURCE: Official series based on IMF figures.
Net wage estimates are the author’s; see text for details.
Second, evidence about the repayment scenario can be based on that 
presented by Lehmann et al (1997) for Russia. In Russia in October 1996, 
54 percent of the sample of workers were in wage arrears, of whom 26 percent 
had been owed wages for less than one month, another 26 percent for between 
one and two months, 18 percent for two to three months and 30 percent 
over three months. In other words, the repayment schedules differ across 
individuals in Russia. If this were the case in Uzbekistan, arrears would still 
have a marked effect on the real wage index even though almost two-thirds 
of workers in the economy are being paid on time.23
The prevalence of arrears in payment is a cause for caution in the inter­
pretation of official data about wage inflation. Obviously the effect on the 
aggregate level of real wages in the economy would be larger the longer the 
average period of non-payment and the higher the rate of inflation. Given 
data for a single month only, and in the absence of information about when 
repayment was being made, and whether or not arrears were being incurred 
more than once, it is difficult to estimate the general effects of arrears on key 
macro-economic variables like the rate of wage inflation. It is nonetheless ap­
parent that under each of the scenarios presented in Table 9.7, the slowdown 
in wage growth that occurred following stabilisation of the economy in late 
1994 is much sharper than official statistics suggest. Clearly, if arrears were
23For the group who reported a delay of “more than four months” , an average of eight 
months is assumed.
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being incurred every month, the impact would be magnified. The foregoing 
simulations are illustrative, and put upper and lower bounds on the effects 
of arrears on the rate of wage inflation and real wage levels in the economy.
9.9 C onclusions
Arrears have been widespread throughout the former Soviet republics during 
the transition. Before now, understanding of arrears has constrained by the 
lack of appropriate micro data. This chapter has addressed a number of key 
questions about wage arrears for the case of Uzbekistan.
Broadly speaking, in the specific economic and institutional context of 
transition in Uzbekistan, arrears come about at two levels. First, at the firm 
level, enterprises are faced with shortages of funds to pay employees. It was 
argued that the pattern of such shortages among firms is at least partly a 
product of the government’s enterprise and financial policies. Second, within 
the firm, employers can discriminate among individuals as to whom should 
be paid in full.
A neo-classical conceptual framework was outlined wherein arrears were 
used to effect changes in the structure of contract wages consistent with 
the marginal productivities of individual workers -  so that characteristics 
associated with higher productivity and/or working in sectors that are doing 
relatively well were less likely to be in arrears. However it was also recognised 
at the outset that a political economic perspective on arrears might be fruitful 
in relating patterns of arrears to government objectives and policies. The 
possibility that employers are not acting in a profit-maximising fashion was 
also noted and attributed to specific elements of the post-Soviet context.
Analysis of microdata on the pattern of wage arrears has revealed distinct 
patterns. Adopting a two-step approach, this chapter showed who was af­
fected by arrears, and second, among those affected, by how much. In general 
the individual characteristics most frequently associated with the presence
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of arrears were also associated with larger amounts of arrears. In particular 
those working on collective farms and people living outside the capital were 
found to be most affected. These regional and rural/urban disparities are 
compounded by the fact that the individuals with low contract wages are 
more frequently and worst affected by arrears. Hence arrears have a critical 
distributive impact.
In terms of transition and adjustment, the extent and incidence of arrears 
provided support for the efficiency hypothesis: that arrears are one way for 
employers to shift net wages toward market-clearing levels in the face of insti­
tutional and other constraints. In this sense, the aggregate picture presented 
by official statistics where adjustments in wages and employment appear to 
have lagged behind the declines in output and productivity fail to reveal the 
extent of wage adjustment in Uzbekistan. It was shown that arrears account 
for between half and two-thirds of the widening of the earnings distribution 
that has occurred since 1989, and in this sense may be contributing to a more 
efficient labour market (World Bank 1996a).
On the other hand, there was only mixed support for the hypothesis 
that indicators of individual productivity reflected in human capital variables 
would be a significant factor in explaining the pattern of arrears. Education 
was not important once additional controls were introduced. Age was how­
ever significant in explaining the incidence of arrears, and is consistent with 
the efficiency hypothesis if recent training is more valuable for employers, 
who are prepared to pay a premium to young workers.
A political economic perspective is perhaps a more fruitful approach to 
thinking about wage arrears. The pattern of arrears can be interpreted 
largely in terms of domestic political and fiscal considerations. On the one 
hand, the government has regularly announced decrees which have indexed 
the contract wage of all workers. But on the other hand, the government is 
concerned about macro-economic stability (i.e. reducing inflation) and un­
employment, and would like to limit growth in labour costs. In the interests
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of domestic political stability, the government has allowed (or caused) arrears 
to emerge, and has influenced the pattern of arrears in order to, respectively, 
minimise both (a) open unemployment and (b) arrears in wage payments 
to urban workers, for whom the possibilities for collective action and unrest 
may be greater.
The evidence about regional patterns of arrears, revealing that workers in 
the capital are least affected, provides strong support for the political econ­
omy hypothesis. Moreover, since the state exerts substantial control over 
the financial sector, and over much of agricultural production through the 
system of state orders, it can be argued that the concentration of arrears in 
agriculture is an outcome, albeit unintended, of government priorities. The 
reduction in labour costs caused by arrears may have facilitated expansion 
of employment in the agricultural sector, and thereby enabled what would 
otherwise be surplus labour to be formally employed. Whether or not such 
individuals are in fact properly regarded as ‘employed’ remains an open ques­
tion that is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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